

G. R. TREVIRANUS

REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA

Their Lessons for
The Western World



HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON

REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA

*Copyright, 1944, by Harper & Brothers, Publishers
Printed in the United States of America*

All rights in this book are reserved.

*No part of the book may be reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied
in critical articles and reviews. For information
address Harper & Brothers*

FIRST EDITION

D-T



This book is complete and unabridged
in contents, and is manufactured in strict
conformity with Government regulations
for saving paper.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	vii
I. REBELLIONS IN RUSSIA	I
1. Squires and Serfs	
2. Goliath Meets David	
3. Defeat Breeds Revolt	
II. THE REVOLUTION OF 1905	21
1. Birth of a Soviet	
2. Lip Service to Liberty	
3. Out of the Spark Will Rise the Flame!	
III. BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS	44
1. Lenin's Vision	
2. War or Peace	
3. "Byzantium Must Be Ours!"	
4. Nine Millions to Die	
IV. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION OF 1917	75
1. The Little Father Walks Out	
2. The Soviet as Sovereign	
3. Kornilov's Misadventure	
4. Kerensky on the Bridge	
V. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1917	110
1. The Last Stand for Democracy	
2. Lenin Wins	
3. New Wine in New Bottles	
4. Red and White Rose Go to War	
VI. THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN STRAITS	141
1. Brest Litovsk and Rapallo	
2. The Hounds and the Hedgehog	
3. "If Politbureau Orders . . ."	
4. Russians Learn Fast	

VII. RUSSIA, THE SOVIET UNION	179
1. Blast Furnaces Have Priority	
2. The Kulak Dies	
3. Who Foots the Bill?	
VIII. RUSSIA UNDER STALIN	210
1. The Comintern Scare	
2. School for Battle	
3. Calvary of the Old Guard	
4. Icons Defy Inquisition	
IX. TOWARD THE NEXT REVOLUTION	240
1. Lord of All the Russias	
2. Back to Old Glory	
3. The Eternal Peasant	
X. RUSSIA IN FUTURE	258
1. Heartland of the World Island	
2. God in Russia	
3. Charter of Charity	
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES	275
INDEX	293

PREFACE

Russian problems are no longer affairs of Russia alone but are thrown into the lap of every world citizen. To face them squarely needs some knowledge of Russian history and background. Scholars and other interpreters have scanned for three centuries printed evidence and hand-written proofs in search of the genuine spirit, the true facts of the American and French Revolutions. The outcome fills whole libraries. Still new finds are made, new books written.

The Russian Revolution will share the same fate. Its reverberations will be felt around the globe, when the present war, gigantic as it seems, will have faded into oblivion like the Napoleonic Wars.

Every revolution worth its name is a protest, social, economic, political, religious. Bolshevism was one of the secular movements "starting afresh from the Fall of Man." The aftermath of the Russian Revolution sees old wine in new bottles, new wine in old or occasionally new bottles. If Russia has been isolated through her own or others' fault, she no longer stands still or remains apart from the world at large. It is the duty of the Western world to have an answer to her requests and to define its own similar and contrasting traits.

While we were farming in Ontario and discussing world affairs between chores my sons asked for a book on modern Russia. Friends suggested that I should give them an account of thirty odd years of contacts and good-neighborly interest.

This is the attempt to satisfy the wish and the curiosity of my boys in uniform who now shoulder the same burden struggling in the same vicious maelstrom as my generation did when we were called upon to face dark times. They share with others the uncertain outlook on the world of tomorrow which they want to make safer for liberty of man than their fathers were able to make it.

We have to be aware of the great change in the Russian outlook within the last two decades. The East and Russia are adolescents calling for a dynamic future. Europe and the New World of America talk and fight for a static peace. Interpretation has to take into account also the differences in dictionaries and textbooks used by the West and the East, and those of Russia which stand between

the two. The trend toward misinformation is great among all people thrown into the turmoil of this Armageddon. Many prefer to close their ears and eyes and to defy Thomas Jefferson's credo that truth should be pursued whether the conclusions please oneself or others.

Grounds for fear may be present that the gulf between the Russian way of life and the principles of Western civilization cannot be bridged. I want to show that there is reason for hope that Russia will more readily co-operate and participate in a world-wide attempt to prevent new tidal waves playing havoc in the world after this war is over.

My general attitude to the historic event of a revolution is given in the citation of Victor Hugo. For one who was born and raised on the soil of free men, the recurrent theme of peasant search for equal status in society and for a fair measure of freedom had a particular attraction.

My research was based on the learning and wisdom of Russian friends and scholars whom I do not name to save them from being drawn into partisan feuds, and is derived from other methodical studies stored in private and public libraries.

I am indebted to many friends for help and encouragement, among them William Henry Moore, M.P., George N. Shuster, Gilbert Jackson, Wilhelm Roth, Egbert Munzer, Gisella Selden-Goth and Claire Nix.

I trust that "error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it" in these lands of the free.

G. R. TREVIRANUS

Bedford Hills, N. Y.

November 9, 1943

REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA

"Revolution is the work of the unknown in travail.

"Call it good or bad, as you please. You may yearn toward the future or toward the past, you must leave the Revolution to the mercy of the Creator.

"A revolution is the joint labor of great events and eminent persons. The decision belongs to the events. Men supply the stakes. Events determine, men accept.

"In the face of the mystical entanglement of benefit and suffering arises the question addressed to history Why?

"There is no answer, because . . . But the response of the creature which does not know a thing is equal to the response of the Creator who knows all things.

"One hesitates to pass judgement on individual actions by individuals in the presence of such climacteric catastrophes as rock the world.

"To blame or praise men for their deeds is almost like blaming or praising ciphers which extend to the infinite.

"What should happen, will happen. The blast which ought to blow, will blow.

"Above regulations, Truth and Justice remain as the stars stand fast in the heavens above the thundering clouds."

—Victor Hugo, 1793

CHAPTER ONE

REBELLIONS IN RUSSIA

I. SQUIRES AND SERFS

RUSSIA looks back on a unique history, painted in strong colors with a heavy brush. Russians inherit a personal pride in heroic traditions and in the Russian manner of executing demands of Destiny. At heart, they are peasants even if they live in cities. They live, and watch others live, with the shrewd patience and earthy wisdom of tillers of the soil, herdsmen and shepherds.

At the start of World War I, the Russian Tsar ruled over 174,099,600 people and a solid bloc of eight and a half million square miles, one-sixth of the earth's surface. In spite of mighty possessions, the Tsar's realm was an undeveloped, backward state. When the Revolution of 1917 burst the ancient crust, it was owing not to a thunderbolt from the blue sky, but to the accumulation of social evils, as history will one day find.

The adaptation of the Old Russia of squires and serfs to modern social structures had been often retarded and more often suppressed. Count M. M. Speransky had proposed as early as 1809 to Alexander I that a representative national constitution be granted. Provincial assemblies of the squires, the Dumas of Boyars, existed. They were to be transformed into legislative bodies of deputies elected by district dumas who in turn consisted of deputies of the townships of the squires and free state peasants. The Tsar agreed in principle to a reform policy and appointed Speransky First Minister. Finland was granted a separate constitution as semi-autonomous Grand Duchy. Other ideas met with the disapproval of the Imperial Council, after the gentry had voiced general indignation, and Speransky was forced to resign.

Young officers of the Guards had returned from Paris after Napoleon's downfall with the ideas of the Encyclopedists and the

French Revolution. They believed it their mission to translate these ideas into Russian. In clubs and drawing rooms the social problems were tossed about. Enlightenment had to come from above, as an act of grace by the ruling class. Members of the "Union of United Slavs," which had been modeled on the lines of the Prussian Tugendbund of 1808-09, advocated contact with the common people for popular support. But most of the young Lord Byrons decided in favor of a quick officers' revolt. It came to the insurrection of 1825 in St. Petersburg, which miscarried. The "Dekabrists"—called after the month of December in the old-style calendar—fought shy of a broader social platform, which might have roused the passion of the dumb peasant masses whom the noblemen honestly wanted to liberate.

After the defeat of the noble harbingers in 1825, the Tsar's police and the Orthodox Church strait-jacketed Russian society. All Western ideas of social and political progress were submerged in the rigorous affirmation of the Holy Trias, as Uvarov called it—Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.

Did living conditions improve under the "stern and just" rule of Nicholas I (1825-56)? Who condemned Dostoievsky and most of the Petrasky circle to death? The unrest of the serfs gives an answer. Apart from countless assaults on individual landlords and bailiffs, the Ministry of the Interior records 547 peasant revolts between 1828 and 1854.

The clamor for liberation was taken up by industrialists with the dawn of the machine age. Since the early days of the eighteenth century, labor for the mines and metal industry had simply been drafted from the peasantry by the state on terms dictated by the employers. But the products of slave labor could not compete with the European products of free labor.

Slave labor also proved incompetent for modern methods of agriculture, where the big estates were asked to produce more grain for export. The pious pope and peasant scorned the modern witchcraft of implements. "What shall we do with our womenfolk in the dark winter days when the flails stand idle?" they wailed, when the threshing machines appeared. As the church did not help, the landlords became receptive to liberal ideas. When the whole Russian economy cracked after the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II was forced to think of domestic reforms. He advised the Moscow

boyars: "It is better to repeal serfdom from above than wait until it is abolished by revolution from below." The Lithuanian gentry led the way, reform committees suggested various plans, "editing commissions" compiled a draft of a liberal edict to free all serfs from any bondage to the soil and from the squires' jurisdiction and compulsory labor.

The land problem overshadowed in importance all other social issues in a country where, in 1914, 90 per cent of the population still lived in small villages. The other Europe had since long overthrown the feudal system of serfdom. The Edict of Liberation of 1861 was a great step toward this goal but only a compromise. It relieved the peasants from the bondage to the squires but substituted the bondage to the village community, the Mir. It took one half of every estate from the squires for the common good of the villagers but left it to the landlord who retained the titles to the soil if he did not want to sell out against redemption bonds to choose the parcels. This distribution did not come near a solution of the real land crisis, did not satisfy the hunger of the peasants and blocked the progress of agriculture in a world which rapidly made use of science and machines in the cultivation of the soil. The individual peasant could neither own a share of the land nor was he allowed to leave the village.

Frustrated hope created enough opposition to keep the issue open. In the years to come, more than two thousand riots and rebellious flare-ups showed the spontaneous refusal of whole villages to sign the documents of liberation and of new bondage to the Treasury. They were the expression of deep discontent with the terms of the reform.

Other reforms followed. The law courts were made independent of the political administration. The judges were made responsible for impartial justice. The civil law was codified. In 1864, there was even an attempt to introduce local self-government. Provincial diets, the zemstvos, were elected by the three groups—landowners, village communities and city dwellers. The liberal elements hoped that these provincial assemblies would develop into genuine legislative bodies. But they mostly remained under the influence of the squires and deteriorated to mere advisory councils for the provincial governors-general. General conscription for a five-year term of service under arms was the last of the "Reforms of the Sixties."

Whatever chance there might have been for a gradual process of modernizing Russia was brutally stopped when Alexander II was killed by a terrorist bomb on March 13, 1881. The pendulum swung back to sheer absolutism. The next Tsar, Alexander III, was the prototype of an autocrat. Liberalism was crushed without fail. The draft of the Loris-Melikov constitution, modestly modeled on the lines of the Speransky proposal of 1809 and calling for a very limited nation-wide representation, was dropped. Official terror paralyzed all social and intellectual intercourse. People hardly dared to whisper for fear of the Ochrana, the forerunner of the Cheka, Gestapo, Ovra and other modern instruments of one-man rule.

K. H. Pobiedonoszev, the former tutor of the new Tsar and the Tsarevich Nicholas and now the almighty Minister of Church Affairs, as Procurator-General of the Holy Synod, ruling the Orthodox Church, was set on stopping the march of time. His powerful mind, less concerned with religious problems than with high politics, was sincere in the belief that Mother Russia could be saved from the contagious contact with modern ideas only by the omnipotent autocracy of the state and church, enjoying naturally the divine blessing. Under such an infallible rule he also hoped that Russia could rise to bring Christianity to the whole of Asia in a holy mission.

This meant consolidating all religious creeds by force into one church and all nationalities into one nation, depriving the people of their individuality, tongue and folklore. The Russification of schools, churches and chapels, local administrations and councils was rigorously executed. By such ruthlessness, the regime gained prestige at home and abroad. All autocrats appear stronger and more magnetic in their heydays than leaders chosen by ballot and ruling in the democratic way.

Alexander III and Pobiedonoszev did their best to avoid open outbreaks of domestic opposition and scorned any risk of war. When the Burjatic witch doctor Badjamev appeared from Tibet in 1893 with the grand scheme to incorporate Tibet, Mongolia and China into the fold of the Empire, the Tsar remarked drily that these ideas were "so novel and fantastic that one could hardly believe they are feasible."

This shrewd avoidance of all possible clashes with other nations stifled the opposition forces in the country. But police rule never eliminates sources of economic and political unrest. Alexander III

died in 1894. His son, Nicholas II, became the last reigning Romanov. He inherited a system full of infirmities, a system in which gangrene destroyed all regenerative forces.

Thirty-six years passed before the challenge of the First Revolution of 1825 was answered by the timid measures of the Agrarian Reform of 1861. More than forty years had to pass before the solution of the outstanding agrarian problems and the transformation of the absolutistic government into a modern constitutional regime were attempted, after the Second Revolution of 1905 was under way. Another twelve years were to go before the final breakdown of this policy of retardation led to the downfall of the Tsarist regime.

2. GOLIATH MEETS DAVID

The conquest of Byzantium, the center of the ancient Empire of Constantine, where "Kyrie Eleison" had been sung in Santa Sophia, became an obsession and later a focal postulate of the United Slavs, the defenders of the Greek Orthodox faith. This implied far more than a conflict between the Ottoman Moslems and the Russian Pan-slavs. From the Crimean War to World War I it was a Pan-European problem of the first order. It still is.

In various Turco-Russian wars, the European powers intervened only at the peace negotiations. The Peace of Jassy in 1792 confirmed Russia's conquest of the Crimea, but left unfulfilled the vision of an independent unit comprising Bessarabia, Roumania and Bulgaria—the principality of Dacia—and a revival of the Byzantine Empire with Constantinople and the provinces of Thrace and Macedonia under Russian overlordship. Austria was to receive Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina in this partition plan of European Turkey.

The Tsars under the Holy Alliance of 1815 had felt strongly the need to champion the cause of legitimacy wherever it was threatened in the world. When the Viceroy of Egypt in 1833 rebelled against the Sultan of Turkey, Nicholas I offered armed assistance. He received in return for this service a mutual-security pact which closed the Straits to fleets and warships of all nations. Russia was secured against attack on the Black Sea coast. This pact was guaranteed in 1841 by Great Britain, France, Prussia and Austria. Relations between Turkey and Russia again reached a breaking point in 1853. When Russia occupied the Danube estuary as "prevention

against a flanking attack," Turkey declared war. Admiral Nakhimov defeated the Turkish fleet at Sinop. British and French squadrons, passing through the Straits in violation of the 1841 convention, came to the rescue of the Turks. The Crimean War, thus begun, ended after the fall of Sevastopol, which had gallantly stood a year's siege under great privations, with the Peace of Paris in 1856.

Russia was forced to cede Bessarabia and the Danube estuary and was deprived of the right to keep a navy on the Black Sea. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were declared neutral ground under international guarantee. Russia's aims remained unchanged.

After the Congress of Berlin, 1878, Russia turned her eyes also to the Far East. "Why should we incorporate Asia? What interest do we have in Asia?" Dostoevsky asked in 1881. "It is essential for us because Russia lies not only in Europe but also in Asia. . . . Our future destiny may prefer Asia as an outlet above all others. In Europe, we are Tatars. In Asia, we are Europeans. Our civilisatory mission will tempt our spirit and draw us to the East, once we have started to move in there. . . ."

On her western border Russia could feel safe. Bismarck's policy served the Tsars well. The "*cauchemar des coalitions*," the anxiety lest an aggressive France should encircle Germany, had led him to take a cautious attitude toward his Russian neighbor. "I have always tried to safeguard us against Russian aggression. I have also tried to reconcile Russian sentiment and to confirm faith in our inoffensive policy. . . . A French attack will not necessarily bring Russia into the field, as would be the case with France if Russia should attack us. . . . A war with Germany will bring Russia just as little gain as vice versa. . . . If one considers Russia and Germany apart from their neighbors, it is difficult to find on either side a compelling or even barely legitimate reason to go to war."

In line with this belief, the realistic statesman in 1887 concluded a Re-Insurance Pact with Russia, which was kept secret but gave Russia considerable backing and a free hand in international politics. No wonder the Tsar wanted to prolong the treaty in 1890, asking Germany to support Russian diplomacy in the Balkans, at the Dardanelles and in the Far East, and offering neutrality in case France should attack Germany. Before the negotiator Gorchakov reached Berlin, the old pilot had left the German ship. His successor found the bargain unappetizing and, though refraining from any hostility

to Russian aims, preferred to lean rather toward Austria and Italy, in order to keep the balance of power in Europe.

France was the Tsar's second choice for a European ally. France had lent considerable money to the Russian market: 3,250,000,000 Fr. from 1888 to 1891 alone. In 1890 a Franco-Russian entente was signed and supplemented by a military convention in the following year. Its principal clause was the reciprocal pledge to keep permanently under arms and to mobilize instantly when any member of the Triple Alliance, Germany, Austria or Italy, mobilized under whatever pretext. This pact threatened Central Europe with a certain two-front war in case of a conflict.

The Entente Cordiale with France, into which England was drawn in the next decade, encouraged Russia, as did continued friendly relations with Germany, to launch out in the Far East. For two hundred years she had encroached steadily on Central Asia. It should have been common knowledge at the Newa that Great Britain would be directly confronted in any action toward the Persian Gulf, Armenia and Afghanistan, and that Japan and Great Britain would look askance on an invasion into the Chinese Empire. Japan's budding ambition for predominance on the continent of East Asia started the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, by which China was forced to cede Formosa and the Kwantung Peninsula to Japan. Under pressure from Russia, France and Germany, the victors surrendered the Kwantung toehold to China at the peace conference, while Russia took actual possession as concessionaire.

The agreements of 1895 left Korea's sovereignty nominally unaffected. Russia persuaded China to grant the concession for the East Siberian Railroad. In disregard of the treaty with Japan, she occupied Port Arthur in 1898 for the purpose of establishing a naval station. Now Russia was sailing on the fairway of expansionist fantasy. The Minister of War, General A. N. Kuropatkin, wrote in his diary in the fall of 1903:

"The Tsar is pregnant with grandiose plans. He dreams of the subjugation of Manchuria, the incorporation of Korea and a protectorate over Tibet, of the conquest of Iran, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. These ideas are not only outlined in the remarks of His Majesty but also in a series of All-Highest orders which are often issued without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister. . . ."

Archibald Colquhoun, the London *Times* correspondent in the

Far East, predicted in 1898 that Russia would "obey the law of sunward and seaward gravitation" on a course which she would continue until she encountered the opposition of a nation stronger and better than herself. "Hers is not the case of an over-populated country throwing off its surplus population. She is engaged on a purely political and military conquest which, after enormous expenditure, has already placed her in an advantageous position for influencing, menacing, and perhaps even attacking one, if not both, of the two richest and most populous countries in Asia. . . ."

It was certainly a great illusion to believe that the European powers would consider such a policy to be in their own interest, though the Tsar received the personal backing of the Kaiser—"Obviously this is Russia's task for the future . . . to defend Europe against interference by the great yellow race. . . ." Russia began to consolidate her new positions. She did not evacuate Manchuria. She secured valuable concessions in Korea and founded a semi-official enterprise for the exploitation of the forests along the Yalu River which received military protection and was placed under the management of a special Secretary of State, Besobranov. Count Witte estimated that the development of these outposts would take fifty years. But events moved at a higher speed.

When negotiations about disputed investments in Korea and Manchuria started in July, 1903, Japan played for time. The peace of Chimonoseki in 1895 had netted Japan, besides territorial gains, a Chinese contribution of 350 million yen. This was used to double the strength of the army and to rebuild the navy. Eight battleships were built on English ways, heavily armed with modern turrets, as the Japanese shipyards at that time could only turn out commercial craft. Six of the battleships were delivered before 1905, two more were bought from Italy. The alliance with England in 1902 brought new loans into the country and helped Japan to overcome the industrial crisis of 1898 and to modernize her industries.

Though Japan could not count on any active assistance from her new ally, the other powers were more or less handicapped. France would not move to the help of her Russian partner, as the entente was only intended for European use, and was also negotiating to include England in the entente. Germany was taking her first strides toward participation in sea and world power. The United States had

adopted a neutral but benevolent attitude toward the Japanese complaints about Russian expansion.

Thus the road seemed clear of major obstacles if Japan moved swiftly and gained a bridgehead on the continent before Russia could bring up reinforcements from the Baikal region.

And swiftly Japan did move. Negotiations with Russia were adjourned, without any agreement in sight, on February 5, 1904. On the same day, all cable communications between Japan and the continent were severed to prevent any leakage of the news that the Japanese fleet had left port. The fleet covered the 600 miles to Port Arthur within 70 hours. During the night of February 8, destroyers attacked the Russian ships in the roads off Port Arthur, severely damaging two battleships and an armored cruiser. This success was followed up in the early hours by a bombardment of the remaining ships of the Eastern Squadron, the harbor and coastal fortifications. The score for the Japanese raiders increased by two more battleships put out of action at the end of the second day.

On the same night as the attack on the unsuspecting Russians in their own base, four Japanese battalions landed in Korea and Chemulpo under cover of two battle cruisers and five light cruisers. An ultimatum was handed to the Russian units in harbor. After it had expired, the Russians lost an armored and a light cruiser and a transport. Following these thrusts in the best Pearl Harbor manner, war was officially declared two days later, on February 10, by Japan.

Official Russia naturally went wild with patriotism. Services and prayers for the crusade against the heathens were held in all churches, processions with the icons and portraits of the saints, led by the popes and gendarmes, brought religious and national fervor to a climax. Only a few groups of students and workers in cities like Warsaw and Riga demonstrated against the war. In scores of secret meetings, the police reports say, the revolutionary parties of underground Russia asked for peace with Japan. They failed to mobilize the masses.

The desk strategists in Russia counted on a quick success with their numerical superiority over the Japanese. Things turned out differently. The Mikado's troops were not overrun. Soon the Russian war machinery clogged. The Japanese could lay siege to Port Arthur in the fall of 1904. The battle honors of Liaoyang were left to Japan

because the Russian commander in Chief did not recognize his own tactical success in time. But worst of all, the Russian logicians were upset by corruption and underrating of the length of the supply lines. The carloads of boots with cardboard soles, of decayed food in cans, of fur coats too short and tight to wear, making lush profits for the suppliers and their friends in office, became the bitter talk of the front and the homeland. The marauding officer, the shirker, and draft dodger, the pilfering commissar of the supply dump and the depot gradually became prototypes of the regime. The single track of the Trans-Sib with the cumbersome reloading at Lake Baikal could not cope with the schedules for munitions, material and food. Hospital trains were held up on sidings for weeks, field ambulances got lost behind the front, typhoid fever, dysentery and rheumatism spread through the mud and snow. The banzais of the fanatical Nips, the knives and rifles of the Chinese guerillas made the troops panicky. Everything seemed to be a hopeless mess.

What the officers said at the front found its way quickly into the hinterland. More and more publicists dared to voice the latent, rising estrangement between the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy. An article written by Prince I. N. Trubeckoi in the *Pravo* of September, 1904, is an historic document. Enraged, he describes the complete unconcern of the general public when war broke out. People refused to see the danger signals even when the Japanese were standing at the gates of Port Arthur.

Since those days we have never been without surprises. The "treachery" of Japan came as a surprise in that she attacked us in the same manner as she had surprised the Chinese without a warning declaration in 1894. The formidable forces the Japanese mustered, were surprising to us, though all along our General Staff had known the exact figures and the Foreign Office the financial resources available. We simply denied the possibility that a nation of 50 million people could stock their tills and prepare a well-trained army for war all on their own.

The insufficient number of our troops in Manchuria was surprising, so were the incompetent handling of supplies on the imperfect Trans-Siberian Line, the awkward conditions of an harbor that had no dry-dock and allowed ships to dock only at high tide. It is another surprise that the Baltic Squadron is just preparing to leave for the East, and that, instead of being in Tokio, General Adjutant Kuropatkin is to be congratulated on having successfully retreated from Liaoyang. . . .

Who was to blame? Trubeckoi answered:

Russian society is to blame. We slept at the Government's command. While we slept, the almighty bureaucracy kept watch. The defeats at the front are their defeats. They may have kept a lookout for the enemy, but not abroad, because their attention was diverted to another side. Their bogey was the foe indoors . . . The radical parties have a monopoly of organization. Thanks to censorship and regimentation of the press, they have also a monopoly of free speech. . . . The streets are flooded with illegal pamphlets, the influence of which grows daily, no, hourly. . . .

When mobilization reached industrial districts, which were no longer exempted at the end of 1904, reservists and recruits had to be locked into their boxcars to prevent desertion. Seditious elements mixed cries of "Down with the war" with insults against the heads of the government. In November, 1904, Admiral Chuchnin warned the admiralty that recruits from the southern provinces should not be inducted at Sevastopol but should be shipped to Viborg and Kronstadt in the North, as they were poisoned by defeatist propaganda, and the city of Sevastopol was already a hotbed of sedition. On the whole, soldiers and sailors had shown little interest in socialist propaganda at the beginning of the war and usually handed over illegal agitators to the authorities. Now, daily clashes between the services and the police no longer made the headlines. Military police often joined with rioters against the regular police and the Cossacks. Troops going to the front raided canteens and station buffets, demolishing what they could lay hands on and giving the police no end of trouble. "Most of the active ring leaders came from the industrial proletariat of Ekaterinoslav and Kiev," writes the Governor of Voronezh in a confidential report. "The echelons for the Far East consist in the majority of Ukrainians, Jews, Poles and Gipsies who have worked in workshops, factories and mines," states the police chief of Sysran. The army decomposed in rapid progression.

One of the most important factors in the strict discipline of the services in prewar times had been the rigorous and careful isolation of all draftees from home influences and their transfer to remote districts for their terms of service. The boys from Orenburg were garrisoned in Warsaw, the youngsters from Moscow and Petersburg in border towns or Siberian villages, the Polish and Latvian recruits sent to Irkutsk and Tiflis. Units were never stationed in regions with the same mother tongue. This intricate system made it possible to keep the troops at arm's length from the population, to keep the traditional loyal and patriotic spirit of the army on the

alert against the home foe, to check morale and discharge unreliable elements promptly. This system broke down during the war. Soldiers were confronted with social and political unrest without the shock-absorbing confinement in barracks under strict control. This was the chief reason for the quick spreading of germs of rebellion, not only amongst members of the services but from the barracks to the villages, where parents sorely felt the economic depression aggravated by the absence of the draftees' toiling hands.

Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg, reports of pilfering and pillaging on estates, of the cutting and burning down of forests, were amassed. More and more peasants refused the draft and resisted arrest. They fought no longer for their own skins, but for the claim of free people from time immemorial: "Give us land to own!"

3. DEFEAT BREEDS REVOLT

The year 1905 started with a violent blow for Russian prestige. Port Arthur capitulated on New Year's Day after a siege of eighteen months. A mere incident sufficed to discharge pent-up revolutionary energy. The chief of the Moscow Political Police, S. V. Zubatov, had organized since 1901 "labor relief societies" with police funds. Other cities were favored with the same institutions. They entertained frequently in local clubs. Political discussions were ruled out. Though this made the going tougher in competition with the underground revolutionary cells, the membership rose steadily. In Petersburg, the police had appointed a priest, Father Gapon, in 1904 as chief organizer. He had 9000 members on the rolls in the first year.

Employers, of course, were doubtful of the value of this police socialism. Four members of the Labor Society were dismissed by the Putilov Works in Petersburg without apparent reason. Gapon intervened in vain and was refused a hearing by the chief of police. He promoted a strike, which spread to other factories. Soon 15,000 men were idle. Socialist pamphlets gave the only available news to the city. Riding high on the crest of the wave, Father Gapon preached "a crusade to the beloved Father of the People" to present a petition for the Tsar's intervention. The strikers accepted the idea with fervor.

On January 22, tens of thousands of workers and their families,

in Sunday clothes, with icons and portraits of the Tsar, assembled in the streets of Petersburg. The preface of the petition sounded to the pious masses like a hymn: "Sovereign Lord! We, workers of St. Petersburg, have come with our wives, our children, our aged parents to seek truth and protection. We are miserable, oppressed and overburdened with hard travail. We have been derided, treated like serfs who were silently to endure an unjust fate."

The procession did not get near the Winter Palace. The dark premonitions came true. Troops and police had blocked all approaches. The masses pushed forward. The troops fired and a slaughter started which lasted for hours. Under the rattling of volleys, under the hoofs of the Cossack horses, in the blood pools which stained the snow in the streets and the ice of the Neva, in the agonies of dying trusting people the stage was set for the doom of autocratic Russia.

Gapon was rescued by a bodyguard and hidden. During the night, he wrote a flaming pronunciamiento with a priestly malediction for all tyrants and a benediction for all soldiers who would help to liberate the people. For a few days the under-cover agent bore the mantle of a popular tribune. Lenin wrote of him shortly before that though he might be a tool of reaction he could turn out to be an honest Christian Socialist. Having reached refuge abroad, Gapon contacted revolutionary groups in Switzerland. Victor Adler, leader of the Austrian Social Democrats, commented on him: "It is a pity. If he had disappeared as mysteriously as he had come to prominence, it would have remained the beautiful saga of a priest who opened the floodgates of the Revolution. Some fellows one prefers as martyrs, not as colleagues."

This attitude prevailed and Gapon returned to Russia into the fold of the police. When he attempted to persuade social revolutionary friends to follow his example, he was liquidated. The executer was a young student, Rutenberg. He lived to become the pioneer of hydro-power in Palestine, where he died in 1942.

Bloody Sunday was to be one of the great turning points in Russian history. To all Russians, the Tsar for centuries had been a mystical patriarchal figure whose crown reached into the clouded sky, a venerable symbol of God's rule on Russian soil, uniting its many races and nationalities by a strong but wise regime. This myth was woven of religious and monarchic threads handed reverently from generation to generation. It was deeply imbedded in rural Russia,

where 90 per cent of the people still lived in 1914. And the peasants who left the land took this myth with them into the sordid surroundings of the factories. Whenever rebels carried the torch, they pretended to go out to restore the might of the Little Father, whom disloyal counselors kept misinformed. When Pugachev stood up in 1773, he was acclaimed Peter III. And after 1861, tales at the fireside would have it that the nobility had suppressed the real liberties which the Tsar had granted.

This solid faith in the supreme trusteeship of the Crown was rudely shaken in January, 1905. It may have been his genuine belief when Kukanov, a peasant delegate, exclaimed in 1906: "Break down the walls between the Tsar and the people. Let him know what happens to us, what we need, what hurts us!" But slowly the distrust crept on. The dumb masses remembered in 1917 the events of 1905. Then they saw red and the old faith in the dynasty was shattered forever.

Worse news from Manchuria increased the tension in Old Russia. In the battle of Mukden 300,000 Russians with 1439 guns were engaged, from February 20 to March 10, with the same number of Japanese and 1000 guns. The foe lost, all told, 42,000 men, the Russians 92,000 and the honors of the battlefield. The retreat was nearly a rout. The Baltic Squadron under Admiral Rozdhestvensky had at last reached the East after a cumbersome cruise around the Cape. It was intercepted in the Straits of Tshushima by Admiral Togo's armada and annihilated. Russia had to accept the mediation offered by President Theodore Roosevelt. Prime Minister Witte, to whom his colleagues and the Court gladly left the onus of signing the onerous peace, put his signature upon the document of capitulation at Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. Russia had to hand South Sachalin, Port Arthur and one-half of the shares of the Manchurian Railroad to Japan, had to evacuate Manchuria and resign all activities in Korea, which was occupied by Japan in 1910. The dwarfs had forced the giants to a temporary retreat from the dreamland of Pacific power and had gained a bridgehead on the continent, which was assiduously enlarged.

The Russian bureaucracy tried to divert the rising flood of rage and despair by the ancient ruse of "divide and rule" into the channel of pogroms. It was the strange Jew, who clung so stubbornly and industriously to any toehold he could gain with the instinct acquired

in centuries of persecution, against whom the clergy raised the Cross. This eternal wanderer was an easy prey whenever the primitive irrational elements of mass phobia could be blended with the bias of business rivalry. Greek merchants had repeatedly liquidated Jewish competitors in South Russia by massacres in 1821, 1859 and 1871. Government agents had staged pogroms in 1881. The Kichinev outrage of 1903, which left fifty Jews dead and several hundred wounded in the streets, was engineered by Kuchevan, the editor of the *Bessarabian*, sanctioned beforehand by a telegram from Minister of the Interior Plehve.

Now things were to be organized from above on a greater scale. Reactionary groups sprouted all over the country like the modern imitations in colorful shirts or hoods, harbingers of extreme chauvinism and racial discord, the "Black Hundreds," the "Russian People," "Archangel Michael," the "Lawful Order," all financed by the government. The outrages were not confined to attacks against the Jews. The same white terror was applied to intellectuals, to all law-abiding citizens suspect of liberal thought, to the boys who wore uniform as to students in schools and colleges. Racial and national jealousy was exploited nowhere less than in the Caucasus, where Armenians were incited to rise against the Tartars in bloody feuds.

The victims fought back. The Jews were aided in their self-defense by a volunteer Workers Militia which was formed spontaneously in many factories. In October, 1905, the official report acknowledged 810 dead and 1777 wounded and estimated the damaged property in 660 places with 62.7 million rubl. The real figures were said to be as high as 3500 to 4000 dead and more than 10,000 wounded. One result was a mass migration to the United States. The terror failed to damp or subdue the revolutionary spirit.

Neither did the government succeed with its cautious tactics of making concessions step by step. The slow motion of the government was punctuated by assassinations. Since Vera Zasulich had thrown the first bomb in February, 1878, against General Trepow, the Petersburg Chief of Police, the departmental heads had been marked men. Two Ministers of the Interior, Sipjagin and Plehve, were killed in 1902 and 1904. To ease the tension, a ukase of December, 1904, announced plans for the reform of censorship, the legal equality of peasants and the introduction of state insurance, and proclaimed religious tolerance. These plans the public considered as

an attempt at appeasement or as a taunt, so the authors failed in their purpose. In February, 1905, an outstanding representative of the autocratic regime, Grand Duke Sergei, was killed by a bomb. A month later, a ukase granted the right to petition to every citizen and the Minister of the Interior, A. G. Buygin, issued a decree calling for an Advisory Duma. This was no more than the revival of a Moscovite institution of the seventeenth century, the Zemskij Zbory—Imperial Diet of representatives, elected by the people—a step which had been suggested by the Moscovite aristocracy, in 1864, in place of the zemstvo scheme.

At the zemstvo congress of July, 1905, a majority supported the demand to form a responsible parliamentary regime. The Tsar was counseled by Count Pahlen and Admiral Chichakhov to consider strict emergency measures under an unveiled dictatorship. At that stage, it would have already meant staking the fate of the dynasty on a dangerous venture. A bitter opponent of all reform, the loyal Polovzov writes in his diary: "Terrible news from all sides. Finland is in the throes of revolution. In Irkutsk, the mob has proclaimed a provisional government which has to be overthrown by troops from Charbin. Everywhere in Russia is bloodshed. . . ." Wiser counsel prevailed and Count Witte, raised to peer's rank after Portsmouth, but still distrusted by the Court, was given a freer hand for elastic "voluntary concessions."

In August, 1905, a decree was issued providing for the election of a State Duma, but still restricting the future parliament to purely advisory functions. This tug of war continued for more than the current year, in fact, until the downfall of the regime in 1917. Though Count Witte was convinced that the government had lost any chance to act by force, he wanted to gain time by piecemeal appeasement.

He had the courage to forecast in a memorandum of October 9, 1905, for the Tsar:

The historical progress is irresistible. The civic liberties have either to be granted by reform or will come through revolution. In this second case, Liberty might only rise late from the ashes of a destroyed millennium of historical life. A Russian revolution will sweep all traditions aside without sense or mercy, will wreck and ruin everything. It passes our descriptive power to visualize in what form Russia could arise from such an unprecedented trial. But the horrors of the Russian Revolution will surpass all that history has told us so far. . . .



PRIVY COUNCILLORS OF THE TSAR
 (Cartoon by Salantara, Paris, 1906)

The October Manifesto of 1905 was passed by the Tsar according to Witte's draft. It introduced the civil liberties, long established in western and northern Europe, of inviolability of the person and the three freedoms of conscience, speech and assembly. It extended the electorate for the State Duma on the basis of universal male suffrage and made all ukases subject in future to the sanction of the Duma.

The manifesto was accompanied by the announcement that a ministerial cabinet had been formed under Count Witte as Prime Minister. It was favorably received by liberal circles. Detached observers commented critically. The *Temps*, the Paris voice of the creditors, was censorious:

The Tsar has simply signed the orders of the liberal opposition instead of acting on his own initiative. This is a dangerous method. It gives to necessary reforms the stigma of enforcement, a fragmentary and dubious character. This method shows the inconsistency of the Government and is like a premium on the use of force. Unfortunately, the whole world knows that hardly any other solution of the deadlock into which the Government had drifted, was possible. Let us forget as quickly as possible the character of their capitulation, a capitulation not only to the Liberals and Constitutionalists who should have been listened to in time, but also to the strike. A capitulation to the Revolution!

The masses, once in motion, were not impressed by the concessions and did not rest on the road of the Revolution. The records of the year 1905 show that the revolutionary actions were without direct contact with political headquarters or regional organizers. Neither were they confined to single groups or classes. The whole country was shaken by the fever. In three sectors the riots attracted nation-wide attention—the peasant rebellions, the insurrections in the services and the strikes with parallel political actions in the cities.

In 1905, the big landowners controlled three-quarters of the land in production and one-fifth of the arable soil. Production had remained backward in the three-course rotation. The soil had deteriorated without proper manure, but the rural population had doubled in the forty-five years since the Reform of 1861 had given them the use of land according to the number of eaters in the family. What was more natural than that the Russian peasant should have only one goal: More land! The Russian countryside was idealized by intellectuals, from a vantage point remote enough from every day's chores, who dreamt of the "rejuvenating of Russia from the fountains of the eternal patriarchal rural family orbit." Rural Russia

was in reality a barbaric relic, millions slaving in obedience to the few.

Most of the manorial properties were leased to the peasants, generally against labor exchange or delivery of rent in kind. In the Mir, different classes of farmers had come into being by better luck, better choice of land or better working methods: the richer kulaki—who were often the money-lenders to the neighbors—the impoverished middle farmers, the *seredniaki*, and the vast bulk of landless peasants, the *bedniaki*, growing year by year through the adverse times and famines. The peasantry was overburdened by taxation. The federal budget asked for two billion roubles annually. The redemption payments on the 1861 settlements which had decreased in productive value became a doubled burden. Indirect taxation on essentials—matches, oil and tobacco—the price fixing of the *monopolka-vodka* and the local taxes for the upkeep of the elders, the magistrates, the clerks and the wardens added to the load. Squires, local bureaucrats and popes were looked upon as the taskmasters of the hated government. Many foresaw the brewing trouble. The Liberal A. Novikov closed a thesis on the Russian village with the prophecy: “The peasant will also wade through an ocean of blood fighting against soldiers. He will then realize that he can expect no help from the Tsar. Trust in the Tsar will die.”

All villagers joined against the squires, enticing labor on the estates to refuse chores of any kind. The peasants thought that killing the landlords would net them the land. When an estate had been ruined, the wrath often turned against the rich in the village, the kulak and the grocer. The better the soil and the less industry in the district, the more bitter the feud. Seldom were the rioting peasants concerned about political issues, though the revolutionary parties attempted to capitalize the seditious moods and the “All Russian Peasants League” started to clamor for a Constituent. These revolts were hardly ever co-ordinated with the uprisings in the cities or with those among soldiers and sailors.

The progress of industrialization had been fairly steady in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. In 1897, the industrial enterprises numbered 14,154 with an annual turnover of two and a half billions rbl. Three hundred twelve factories employed more than 1000 men each. The government had extended the railroads, though insufficiently. From 1892 to 1902, the mileage of the tracks had

doubled to 64,000 kilometers. The oil region was linked with the mining districts of South Russia, the district of Rostov, the Vladivaskas Railroad with the sugar belt around Kiev. Low wages and expansion of home work brought a lasting boom to the Polish textile districts of Lodz and Kalisch. This development of industries attracted foreign capital. France pushed loans for political reasons, but English investments were leading. In 1896, sixty foreign companies took active part in the metallurgic and metal industry and in coal mining. This investment of 154 million rbl. had increased within a year to 223 million rbl.

The proletariat played its first political role as a class-conscious group in 1905. In January, 2183 local strikes were counted in 122 cities. This wave did not abate during the whole year. Russia suffered a craze for organization. Each of the newfangled associations paraded its members to attract new enrollments by showing courage in public and defiance of authority. The easiest way was to stage a walk-out. And out they went into the streets in daily increasing numbers: the workers, skilled and unskilled, followed by the clerks and bellboys on another day, the professional groups, the railroad men, the porters and stevedores, the officials—a strange motley.

“Organization, organization, for everything with legs on the ground,” screamed posters and billboards. The strikers often did not bother to make any demands. They struck because strike was in the air. “Everybody’s doing it, doing it . . .” Old revolutionaries, who were active in those days, can tell many a tale about the amazing requests for guidance made to the political underground factions. Not only the barbers, the doormen, the coachmen demanded speakers, organizers and leaders. Even the thieves presented their wishes. When none of the respectable radical factions acceded to their request for affiliation, they threatened to organize with the help of the police and to fight the revolutionary factions.

CHAPTER TWO

THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

I. BIRTH OF A SOVIET

IN OCTOBER, 1905, the railroad workers held a conference in St. Petersburg for the modest purpose of a "revision of the statute of superannuation-funds." In the tense political atmosphere of those days, the agenda of the professional meeting soon expanded into the political field. Growing in stature, the First Congress of Railroad Delegates discussed the problems of a Constituent Assembly, the eight-hour day and a political amnesty. Not only St. Petersburg but the whole of Russia started to prick up its ears. Suddenly a false alarm was given: "The delegates have been arrested." In spite of an immediate official denial, railroad men struck in Moscow, Tula, Nishni-Novgorod, Zaratov, Charkov, Kiev and later on also in Petersburg. In no time, traffic had come to a standstill. The railroad strike proved to be a powerful stimulus for other strikes.

The strike leaders of Petersburg copied the May textile strikers at Ivano-Vozneshezh in forming a soviet. By mid-November, 1905, this soviet embodied 562 delegates, representing 147 factories, 34 workshops and 16 labor unions. The Petersburg Soviet quickly gained authority among the working masses. In all industrial centers, soviets sprang up and took the lead. With the connivance of the police in Petersburg, the *Isviestja of Soviet of Workers Delegates* was published in printing offices confiscated "by order of the Soviet."

The soviet form was the socialist idea of a comprehensive, classless organization to serve as headquarters of a universal popular movement. The soviet differed from a political party in assuming governmental functions on the broad basis of a labor union. Its birth was an event of great historical importance, for this type of

organization was used as executive instrument for the founding of a new state in the Revolution of 1917.

The Petersburg Soviet was more than a strikers' headquarters. They asked the municipal authorities to provide more and better food for the workers, to stop the payments for the funds of the police and to finance the arming of the proletariat. They demanded abolition of the censorship. They protested against the state of siege in Poland and the martial law in Kronstadt. An ultimatum, calling for the suspension of death penalties imposed on leaders of striking railroad men, was actually accepted by the government.

"They behaved as if they were a parallel Government. They flooded offices and enterprises with questionnaires. The worst of it was that the fellows got what they asked for. Even the police gave them information." These observations of A. Gerasimov, the chief of the political police in Petersburg, are followed by a narration, how he encountered, while strolling through the streets in civilian clothes, a commotion of people at a street corner. When he requested a constable to arrest the agitators he got the answer: "Are you crazy? They are delegates of the Soviet!"

In some provincial towns, the political influence of the soviets, organized on the pattern of Petersburg, grew steadily. In parts of the country they took over the mayor's duties, controlled market prices, arranged popular courts, formed a militia and fought the Black Hundred. In Rostov, Charkov and Zornvovo, they even took up arms against the garrison.

For a while, the government stood pat. Not until November, 1905, was the chairman of the Petersburg Soviet, the lawyer Chrustalov-Nozar, arrested. A young man of twenty-six years, Lev D. Trotsky, took over. In unison with the All-Russian Peasants League and the Central Committees of the revolutionary parties Trotsky issued a Finance Manifesto. It exhorted the population to stop all payments on taxes, to consider void all state loans which were placed "during the open war against the people," to request payment of wages and obligations in gold and to withdraw all money from state banks and savings banks insisting also on payment in gold.

Now the government recovered strength for further action. While the soviet was debating on a new general strike, the members were arrested. This end of a regime of fifty days was followed, after a

short while, by the voluntary dissolution of the district soviets of Petersburg. The principal charge laid against the fifty-two delegates was that of "willful attempt to overthrow by force the Russian form of Government, established by fundamental law, and to substitute for it a democratic republic." Trotsky's defense was an attack against the prosecution.

... What does the prosecutor mean by the words "form of Government"? Have we really a form of Government? For a long time the Government have been at odds with their people. Their sole reliance is on the Army, the Police and the Black Hundred. There is no sovereign national power, only an automaton for mass murder. There is no other name for an executive machinery which is cutting the live body of our nation to pieces. If you want to tell me that pogroms, arson, crimes are Russia's form of government, well, then I agree with the public prosecutor and acknowledge that in October and November we took up arms against the Russian form of government!

Fifteen defendants were exiled, two sent to confinement in a fortress.

✓ Lenin recognized the importance of the soviet organization in a letter written in mid-November, 1905, published 1940. He proposed that the soviet of the workers' delegates should become the nucleus of a revolutionary government, and should either declare itself such as quickly as possible or nominate a provisional government. But they should expand by admitting deputies not only of other workers but also of soldiers and sailors, of revolutionary peasants and of all revolutionary democrats. Thus the soviet would become the executive of the democratic revolution.

In an article in December, 1905, Lenin again considers the problem. He characterizes the Revolution as plebeian-democratic. It had undermined the feudal system and realized the aims of all classes in the bourgeois society. In this sense it had been a common popular revolution.

He strongly recommended admitting peasants and democrats to the workers' soviet to increase revolutionary authority by such a, naturally, temporary alliance.

It became clear in October, 1905, that the main aim of the Revolution was the creation of a constitutional monarchy incorporating the principles of the French Revolution of 1792-93. The gains for the middle classes would not have been won without the unwanted help of regional and general strikes. This revolutionary weapon,

incompatible with liberal ideas, seemed to have been forced into the hands of the liberals by the proletariat. That was the remarkable innovation in this remarkable year: the use of strikes for political purposes! For the bourgeoisie, the mighty weapon of mass resistance was a boomerang which furthered their complete annihilation in a dozen years to come.

The general strike of December, 1905, was not as extensive as the October movement. In Petersburg, the strikers seemed tired. They lacked the former fighting spirit and were rather inclined to rest on their October laurels. The railroad men had gone on strike rather reluctantly. They did not succeed in blocking troop transports on the Nicolai line, the important connection between Moscow and Petersburg. So in December, the center of activities shifted from Petersburg to Moscow.

Here, the Revolution found sympathizers among the troops. The mutinies in the Black Sea and Baltic fleets were unco-ordinated and therefore abortive. But they electrified the public. They began with the classical complaints of all mutineers on board ship and ashore. The sailors on the cruiser *Berezon* had grumbled about the paymasters' graft, the bad food, the inadequate quarters. On *Ekat-erina II* the crew requested a rise in pay, control of distribution of maintenance, a reduction in the period of service from seven to three years—and the right to elect the cooks! Under the influence of socialist propaganda, the specific requests became gradually generalized and often politically tainted.

By May, 1905, sailors were calling for a Constituent Assembly and a democratic republic. This encouraged the socialist organization in the Crimea to plan action during the June maneuvers. The sudden outbreak of a mutiny on the battle cruiser *Potemkin* in Sevastopol stole the thunder of the show. Serge Eisenstein has used the episode for a film epic. The details and mechanics of this isolated uprising contains lessons of more than histrionic interest.

While the crew of the *Potemkin* had certainly been under the influence of socialist agitation, an incident of everyday life on board ship ignited the flame of sedition. Maggots had been found in the meat by sailors on K.P. The news spread and the cabbage soup was refused by the crew at dinner. The captain, Golikov, took the refusal as "breach of discipline" and summoned the guard with cocked rifles. The gloomy silence was broken by a sailor's cry, "Snatch

the rifles; get the cartridges!" Matuchenko had been a simple peasant who called himself a Socialist but who was looked upon with distrust by the small revolutionary cell on board. In the ensuing scuffle, Matuchenko shot the captain. Six officers were shot or drowned, the rest were saved. A committee was elected while the sailors scrubbed the blood-stained deck, the ship got up steam and, cleared for action, pulled up anchor and headed for Odessa. Hopes ran high.

The revolutionary committee expected all ships of the Black Sea Fleet to join them. This armada of six men-of-war and six torpedo-boats should gain a decisive victory over the Tsarist regime. In a significant gesture, Matuchenko took 1000 roubles from the safe, went ashore in Odessa alone and gave the cash to a general, who did not arrest him, for the captain's widow. When the mutineers found that only the torpedo-boat 267 sided with the revolt, the *Potemkin* took to sea again, leaving behind a stupefying legend of the revolutionary efficiency in capturing a man-of-war under the eyes of the authorities. The Red cruiser kept the garrisons along the coast on the alert. The batteries of Otchakov were moved to Odessa. The Admiralty ordered the fleet to give chase. Russian diplomacy applied for assistance to Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

The Tsar took the news calmly. He entered in his diary:

Wednesday, June 28. Hot, quiet day. Alix and I stayed indoors One hour late for breakfast. Reception on the dairy farm— Made a long rowing trip. Aunt Olga for tea. Took a dip in the sea Drive after dinner. Had bewildering news from Odessa, where battle cruiser *Potemkin* had appeared with mutineering crew who had killed officers, took charge of the ship and threatened the town. Just incredible.

When the fleet sighted the *Potemkin* under the red flag, the loyal ships showed signs of unrest. So the admiral decided not to risk an engagement The cruiser *Georgiy* at first joined the rebels but the officers got the ship in hand again. The *Potemkin* was left undisturbed on her roving itinerary from then on. At Constanza, the committee despatched proclamations to the "whole of the civilized world" and "all European powers." Being refused the right to buy provisions, the cruiser dashed to Feodosia. Here the rebels were intimidated by a volley of an infantry platoon ashore and withdrew again. They grew tired of meandering and getting nowhere. On July 8, they handed the ship over to the Roumanian

authorities at Constanza against safe conduct. Matuchenko took refuge in Switzerland for a while. As homesick as any true Russian, he could not resist the temptation to go home. Soon after he had crossed the green border, he was arrested, tried and hanged at Sevastopol, without having flinched. Bredichin, another sailor on trial and eyewitness of his last days, gives a moving testimony of the childlike simple faith of a peasant driven out of bounds when his belief was destroyed that justice should prevail.

The *Matin* correspondent cabled to Paris: "The Revolution captures a battle cruiser, a unique event in history, but does not know what to do with this success. One is forced to state, that the revolutionary organization is faulty." There was no organization which could be held responsible. Further isolated insurrections occurred at other naval bases. In Sevastopol, a Lieutenant Schmidt led a mutiny to an early end at the spur of a moment, figuring as "independent socialist." Local attempts were equally sporadic in the army. Though unsuccessful, they contributed more puzzles to officialdom.

In Moscow, soldiers and officers had appeared on the platform at mass meetings of strikers. In mid-December, 1905, a soldiers' soviet delegated a representative to the Workers' Soviet. The general strike was acclaimed with great enthusiasm. Groups of strikers took up arms and acquired further weapons by disarming the troops returning from Manchuria. During the first few days, the attitude of the garrison was doubtful. Troops refused to fire at the masses. The general feeling was strongly in favor of the strikers.

Maxim Gorky, at that time in Moscow, wrote:

Many believe that the revolutionaries have started the building of barricades. That is flattering, but not true. The barricades were built by simple local people who had nothing to do with any party. This is the most important feature of the time. The first barricades were erected in high glee and under cheerful laughter. In this merry work, the most piebald crowd took part the respectable gentleman in the valuable seal coat, the cook general and the odd job man, until yesterday pillars of the "consolidated power" . . . The dragoons fired a volley—a few wounded, one or three dead . . . an outcry of indignation, a unanimous cry for revenge . . . at one blow, the whole scene changed. There was no more merriment. Citizens began to build barricades in a serious, bitter mood, inspired by the wish to save themselves from Gospodin Dubassov and his dragoons. . . .

The troops at the disposal of Governor-General Dubassov mustered about 15,000 men. He judged 5000 of them as reliable.

The mass of strikers and sympathizers were also resolved on a bitter fight. The socialist parties called for the use of arms. Flying squads of rebels ambushed police patrols to get their arms. Instruction to civilians in tactics were given on posters. Fighters were not to form clusters, but were to attack in smallest groups with lightning speed. They should not entrench in fortified positions but use thoroughfares and street corners to fire a volley and disappear again. The barricades were designed only to block the movement of troops, especially cavalry, not for defense. The modern type of barricade fighter was born. The Moscovites eagerly adopted these methods of guerilla warfare.

In the first five days, the troops could hardly cope with the rebels. After that, the barrage of guns and machine guns won the battle for the regime. The toll of lives has never been accurately computed. Trotsky estimated the number of victims at 1000 dead and the same number wounded. The official report mentions 30 to 40 soldiers killed or wounded. Insurrections were not confined to Moscow but sprang up in Rostov on the Don, in Zornvovo, Charkov, Nicolaiev, Piatigorsk and in the Urals as well. In Novorossisk the soviet held its assumed power for some days. Its end was the same as in Moscow.

✓ The December uprisings were the climax of the Revolution of 1905. Their defeat marked the beginning of the workers' retreat. For the first time in Russian history a modern fight for political power had been waged not by conspiracy in the old style, but by combining a general strike and armed insurrection. This paralyzed the economic life of the nation. It had further historical importance. Analyzing the Moscow riots, all political parties revised their opinion of the essence of revolution. Conceptions were clarified in the historical melting pot. Debates went on for years. To us they may appear antiquated, sectarian and unworldly. In the light of the successful Revolution of 1917, the great importance of these discussions is evident.

Lenin was the most persistent advocate of a radical break with the entire past. In September, 1906, he engaged in a controversy with the "opportunists" who drew this moral, that one should never resort to arms or start a strike for political aims.

They were wrong. We should have used arms more energetically, more vehemently, more resolutely. One must show the masses, that it is useless to strike pacifically, that the fight must be in arms, without restraint. We must now at last declare openly and loudly, that political strikes are inadequate. We must propagate armed insurrection among the masses without shrouding this resolve in talks about "preliminary stages." To conceal the necessity of a desperate, bloody, destructive war as the first goal of the impending action would be to hoax ourselves and the people.

The strategist and tactician Lenin follows Marx, who conceived of revolution as art and of offensive as the offspring of bold courage. He derides those who "begin to simper with contempt when the discussion turns to 'squads of ten, three or two' because they do not realize that military technique enforces a change in tactics." Ten years later, under new social conditions, Lenin repeated his theme of the offensive, of the art of revolution, with the same pointed allusions to opposing ideas. He was then no longer the theoretical expert on revolution, but the leader of the successful Revolution of 1917.

2. LIP SERVICE TO LIBERTY

Since the Privy Council of December, 1905, had rejected the principle of universal suffrage, the Prime Minister, Count Witte, insisted that the electorate should at least be enlarged.

A new decree gave the vote to all tenants of urban dwellings. Agricultural laborers and workers in small industries were still excluded. To gain the support of the bourgeoisie, the government gave preferential representation to property owners and divided all voters into four classes with equal electors, in a percentage which was fixed by a government by-law.

To insure a genuine Russian spirit in the Duma, an intricate geometry was applied which deprived large regions in Siberia, Poland, the Caucasus and Central Asia of the right to vote as "insufficiently educated."

This use of government regulations to counteract the possible use of the newly granted liberties to the detriment of the administration is a time-honored device. It is often a game of hide and seek, though not quite as innocent if applied by executives who put the accent on power in the Machiavellian sense. Though the bureaucracy was not quite sure how to handle the parliament in

being, they soon found their depth and hit on a maze of bright ideas to ridicule the reluctantly accepted institution of the Duma and to render the popular representation innocuous.

A. Gerasimov, the head of the political police, describes this attitude in his diary. Having looked around for descriptive literature on similar institutions in constitutionally ruled countries, he requests of the Minister of the Interior instructions on how to deal with the political party factions in the Duma. He gets the answer: "What parties? We will not allow parties to appear in the Duma. Every deputy has to vote according to his conscience. For what are parties needed?"

Hitherto, Witte had followed moderate liberal views. When the Privy Council met in April, 1906, he seemed to veer and joined hands with Stichinsky, the spokesman of the aristocracy, in proposing counter-measures for subduing any signs of independence in the Duma.

"The fundamental necessities of the State must have precedence over reason and logic. It is wiser to put up with discontent and to fortify the position of the Sovereign now than to risk rioting throughout the Empire."

Further on—quoted from the protocol of proceedings which A. Slepkov published in 1923—Witte declared: "The Duma should not be permitted to discuss dangerous problems. Discussions of liberty, legality, civic rights are not dangerous. But debates about the rights of the Duma, the budget, the Government's borrowing policy, the prerogatives of the Tsar would be."

A State Council must sit as Upper Chamber to safeguard the conservative structure of the state, was the proposal adopted by the Tsarist counselors. Half the members of this Council were to be nominated by the Tsar, the other half were to be elected by the gentry (18), the church (6), industry (12) and the free professions (6). It was apparent that the Crown would always control a clear majority and thus could veto any bill passed by the Duma.

In other respects, the plan reserved explicitly the usual rights of all executive rulers—kings or prime ministers or presidents—to dictate foreign politics, arbitrarily declare war, issue coins and command the national forces without previous consent or interference by parliamentary bodies. Under cover of the glib phrase "special situation" the Tsar also reserved the right to raise loans

without consent of the Duma. Estimates of the imperial household, the army and navy and the National Debt Service were excluded from any approval by the Duma.

The Court lobby of the vested interests became angry and alarmed by the modest proposals of Count Witte. Marching at the double into active opposition, they decried the socialist proposals to give the peasants at least the *ostreski* (the land which squires had not handed to the Mirs as ordered under the Reform of 1861), not to speak of the further reform plans of the Liberals, as robbery, undermining the true spirit of property. Bolozov wrote of the "gang of robbers from the scum of the people," when he referred to the Duma. At least, the deputies were a bothersome group of redundant prattlers who dared to talk disrespectfully of the Tsar's ministers. The revolutionary mob should be taught a memorable lesson by punitive expeditions, martial law and other methods of pacification at the disposal of the police. As the Tsar had not taken an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, he could ignore the Duma.

The attitude of these irreconcilables among the gentry was the signal for the wavering bureaucracy, who the day before had been far more willing to grant concessions than the Prime Minister, to recover from panic behind the wall of darkest reaction. Auxiliaries were recruited from the bums and ragamuffins in the "Union of the Russian People." These forerunners of Blackshirts and Brownshirts and other colored paraphernalia of modern fascism beat up intellectuals, assassinated deputies like the Cadets Herzenstein and Jollos and even organized attempts on the life of the "Jewish mason" Witte. In the eyes of reaction, Witte was a revolutionist, who had put the Tsar under duress and obtained the imperial consent to the October Manifesto surreptitiously.

But the Court faction realized also that there was a weak point in the armor of the feudal system: the government finances. The budgetary deficit of 188 million rbl. in 1905 did not include the costs of war and retransportation of the troops from Manchuria. Count Witte, who employed the backing of the Duma, seemed the only man to negotiate a new loan from the old creditor, France. When this loan had been signed, in April, 1906, the Right no longer hesitated to put pressure on the Tsar. Witte yielded and the Tsar accepted his resignation, vesting him with the insignia of the



RECRUITS FAREWELL, 1885



COSSACKS VS. WORKERS, 1905
(Paintings by K. A. Savitzky)

Order of Alexander Nevsky. The cabinet members did not pretend solidarity.

The desertion of the colleagues to the camp of the men of yesterday, who to them looked again like the men of tomorrow, hurt Witte. He resented being called a weakling. "The worst crime I am accused of, is not to have made proper use of summary justice since October 17, and to have prohibited others to use it." But the petty game of intrigues, the personal rancor, the envy of inept officials and stuck-up aristocrats which he experienced like most of the retiring statesmen before and after, were only the accompanying cat-music. He received "ingratitude" because his services seemed no longer needed. The law of logics forced Witte's resignation because the period where his mediation had been useful had come near its close. He had tried conscientiously to amalgamate absolutism with parliamentarism in its most moderate form. There was no room for a moderate conservative at the top of the Russian social pyramid at a time when the revolutionary waves receded and the old-timers climbed up again.

The first Duma, met on April 27, 1906, and lasted for 72 days and 38 sessions. The 523 deputies who attended were divided into 26 political and 18 national groups. N. Borodin's statistics may not be quite accurate but they show how rapidly in spite of the absolutistic regime the underground political life had found corporate expression, ready for parliamentary action. The left wing of the Social Democrats, called Bolshevik—which in Russian means majority—the Socialist parties of Poland and Latvia and the Jewish Workers League had proclaimed abstention from the polling booths. But though the extreme Left was not represented, the assembly reflected fairly clearly the political physiognomy of the country.¹

In spite of the government actions preceding the opening of the Duma, the assembly considered itself a parliament under a parliamentary constitution. The address from the Throne contained no program, the government introduced no legislation. The Duma's

¹ The extreme Right had only a few members in the Duma, labeled neutrals. Progressive squires, merchants, industrialists and members of the free professions had delegated 13 moderate conservatives, "The Octobrists." Constitutional Democrats or Cadets represented the liberal and monarchistic middle classes in the largest group of 272 deputies. The non-Marxist Trudoviki, a peasant-labor party of farmers, zemstvo and municipal officials, poorer intellectuals and workers, numbered 107, the right-wing Socialists, Menshevik—which in Russian means minority—18 deputies.

reply to the address was rejected by the Tsar. The Duma proceeded to discuss two groups of problems, on their own. The heads of political discussion included abolition of death penalty and pogroms, inviolability of the person, freedom of assembly, restriction of reactionary police methods. In the economic and social sphere, agrarian questions, naturally, dominated. In debates on famine the atmosphere grew tense. The Cadets inquired sarcastically what specific changes the Russian climate had undergone in the last fifteen years to make it necessary to organize four huge relief campaigns. They squarely put the responsibility not on the weather but on the financial system which had pumped the last roubles out of flattened peasant pockets. Between droughts, therefore, the peasant had no chance to recover. Prince Lvov censured the government for having transferred the administration of the famine relief from the zemstvos to the incompetent central and local authorities. The Socialist Ramchivili recommended the Duma should refuse further funds to the government and appoint special delegates with funds to organize the relief throughout the country.

The Duma members and party organizations were overrun by deputations of peasants, letters and requests for interviews. Awed by the pressure from below, threatening to take the law into its own hands, the Duma tried its best to find a solution to the crisis in orderly form. A government offer to forgive 70 million rbl. arrears in redemption payments was laughed off by the peasantry, which favored a clean confiscation of all property owned by the "dead hand". the state, the crown, the church and the monasteries.

The Social Democrats were divided by two different opinions: Lenin was for the confiscation of the land of the dead hand and all individual property. G. Plekhanov and P. Maslov objected to such "nationalization" of the land and preferred a "municipalization," the handing over of all land except farmers' property to self-governing institutions for lease to the peasants, and the founding of co-operatives to run the former great estates. The Social revolutionaries, who were held in great esteem among the peasants, preferred to respect traditional rural living conditions. All rural working people were to have a share in the Common, profits to be meted out according to individual labor days on the Common. The Trudoviki called for the confiscation of all land owned by the dead hand and the squires, for distribution among the individual peasants.

The bourgeois majority of the Duma did not permit any of these radical proposals to reach the stage of debate. They recognized the deep unrest in the rural communities, but were conscious of the implications of any change in the rural setting for the industrial labor market. Russian industry had not been able to conquer large foreign markets and was chiefly interested in the domestic front. The larger farmers, who had more to sell than the self-sufficient peasants of the village and who accordingly could buy industrial products, were the mainstay of home consumption. For this reason, any wholesale confiscation of land was opposed by industry. There were further reasons. Distribution of land to the landless would check migration from the land into the urban world and the usual annual increase in cheap labor supply. The dividing of the big estates would endanger the bread supply in the cities.

The Cadets supported a partial confiscation of feudal estates at government expense to increase the number of medium-sized holdings. Their spokesman, Petrachitsky, found favor with the progressive squires. Their farming had been severely hampered during the months of revolution. They saw the danger of losing their whole property, if the hunger for land was not allayed. The specific program of the Cadets was an amplification of the Reform of 1861: as much land as was locally needed to be taken from the estates, indemnity to be paid in relation to the productivity of the soil rather than to the local rates, which might vary according to the intensity of the demand for land.

Count Witte's successor was the calm old routinist I. L. Goremykin. He undertook the task of making the Duma understand that, in the eyes of his cabinet, they had only nuisance value and their ideas of reform lay outside of their competence. When the Duma asked for the resignation of this cabinet, the government ignored it and submitted with grim irony such important bills to the House as "regarding the supply of a laundry and orange-house for the University of Dorpat" or "to agree on stipulations for the college training of women." The government, at the same time, started a controversy about the "seditious" tendencies of the Duma, and assured the public that it would safeguard the sacred interests of individual property by all means. The Cadet majority answered this challenge by declaring that the Duma was only intent on helping to restore public order peacefully.

This gave the government an excuse to dissolve the Duma on July 21, 1906. P. A. Stolypin, who had deputized for the Minister of the Interior since January, took over from Goremykin and re-established the "policy of the strong hand." Cadets and Trudoviki went to Viborg in Finland, to be out of reach of the Russian police, and constituted themselves as "Assembly of the People's Deputies," recalling memories of the exodus to the Trapeian Rock and the Cromwellian Rump. They called for a taxpayers' and recruiting strike in the "Viborg Appeal." The congress of Cadets commended it as an instrument to familiarize the population with the idea of "passive resistance."

Stolypin, a typical member of the wealthy gentry with a great contempt for chattering intellectuals who looked to foreign countries for guidance, a newcomer to politics but strong-willed and of great administrative talent, proceeded to intimidate the opposition. The 166 deputies of the Viborg Rump were summoned and put to trial. It ended in December, 1907, with a sentence of three months in jail for every one of them. Stolypin expressed in a report to the Tsar in December, 1906, his belief that "the execution of a few can save a general carnage." All members of his cabinet and the influential Minister of the Court, Baron Fredericks, supported the policy of official terror. The Prime Minister had judged accurately the public reaction to the dissolution of a parliament without traditional background. He derided the Viborg resolutions. When the citizens began to joke about the situation—"the deputies have gone to Viborg to bake *krinkel*" (a famous Finnish pastry)—he knew that he could safely rule with the Emergency Section 87 of the Fundamental Laws.

He, however, did not confine its use to legalizing the white terror. He seemed to realize that even a most thorough extermination of social complaints by force would leave myriads of germs in Russian soil. He was a landowner himself in the province of Zaratov, with intuition and practical knowledge of the rural conditions. So he used Section 87 to bring the land reform which bears his name into life. Given time, it would presumably have stood out in history as one of the greatest constructive social achievements in modern times.

Stolypin started to create a strong and wealthy class of farmers by releasing the individual peasant from the community bondage

in the Mir, allowing him to keep his share as personal property and to buy more land with governmental assistance from the neighboring estates. He believed that this new class would be loyal to the Crown, a conservative element in the village and a progressive buyer in the domestic market. More rural labor would be set free on the estates and available for the urban labor market with its growing demand. Bankrupt squires would welcome the chance to sell land against government bonds and regain equilibrium. It looked like killing three birds with one stone. Former governments had opposed any idea of untying the peasant bondage to the Mir. The easy way of making the community pay tax arrears of the individual peasant outweighed in the Treasury mind the increasing drawback to the national economy of antiquated farming methods.

The release of bondage did not break up the Mir, as only progressive peasants made use of the law. But it brought some neighbors to greater prosperity than others and fostered envy and enmity inside the village, which formerly had been pent up against the bureaucracy. So the community spirit of the village cracked. The measure served the regime for the time being and freed the peasant in all respects. The gathering clouds which would drown the prospects of property were not yet seen.

The Stolypin Reform did work according to the master plan. From 1906 to 1909, more than 10 per cent of the acreage of manorial estates was transferred to adjacents with the help of the Land Bank. Professor Tiunenev points out that whereas in 1906-07 only 2 to 3 per cent of these transfers were registered for individual holders, in 1910-13 the percentage had risen to 90 per cent. The average size of the lots acquired by peasants increased from ten *dessiatines* in 1907 to eighteen in 1913.

The new farmers bought more consumer goods than before; industry had bigger turnovers and a new influx of labor to the cities facilitated the expansion of enterprises. By and by, the opposition of the Grand Dukes and the most loyal "Union of Trueborn Russians," who had looked upon the Mir as the strongest pillar of the regime and upon the Reform, according to their leader Dubrovin, as a "gift for the Jewish masons," gave in. After a while, the fundamental changes which the Reform bill brought for the benefit of Russia became evident, though its practical working was

delayed and its development curtailed by the untimely war of 1914-17.

Stolypin reversed the whole trend of agrarian policy, following the ideas of the oppressed liberal platform. He achieved the goals which he had set himself. The villages numbered millions of prosperous middle-class kulaks within a decade, diverting political attention from the far-away Petersburg to local feuds. Industries flourished because of the increased rural prosperity and the released cheap labor flocked in crowds to the lights of the cities.

Stolypin did not live to see the reverse of the medal: The village proletariat was born and the urban proletariat increased in numbers. They grew class-conscious so that their forces could unite to overthrow the whole structure of life in the Russia of 1917.

3. OUT OF THE SPARK WILL RISE THE FLAME!

The problems which had come to the fore and remained unsolved in 1905 still existed. The axe or the noose, the pistol or the firing squad, can liquidate the human carriers of ideas and annihilate the cells of organization. But martyrs do not die and ideas are out of the executioner's reach. Unfulfilled dreams survived in Russia under the skulls of the peasants and workers, even without giving a sign of life or showing only a flicker of revolutionary zeal.

In the heat of revolution the peasantry had started an organization of their own as all other social groups had joined in the craze of associations. The Peasants League adopted radical resolutions endorsing a general strike in the land and collaboration with urban strikes and refused to deal with the squires. "We will become abstinent to prove that this is a sacred cause. The peasantry must be sober in the fight for soil and power." Well said and done. But the government's counteraction brought the movement to an early end. Nevertheless the seeds stayed and germinated.

Small in numbers, compared with the millions of peasants, the industrial workers had been brought earlier into close contact with political problems. Human solidarity, of a different kind than in the *Mir*, grew out of the daily chore in factories, company boarding-houses and canteens. Whenever the employees discussed working conditions, wages and bosses, thoughts could easily be turned to political issues. Even requests for the providing of hot water for

tea free of charge could be used to good purpose by political hot-spurs.

It had generally been taken for granted that a successful fight for the liberation of the peasants would bring about automatically the emancipation of the industrial workers from management dictate. Small groups of enthusiasts proposed separate action of the urban proletariat. A young student, Saslavsky, founded in 1875 the high-falutin "South Russian Workers League" in Odessa, to be joined exclusively by toilers of the fist, with the exception of the founder. The wholesale arrest of the group sealed the empty files for good in 1878. The "North Russian Workers League" in Petersburg proclaimed propaganda of mouth and pen as the only useful means of bringing pressure from below to bear on the political system. They too were soon brought to bay by the police.

A few years later the "*Narodnaja Volja*"—the people's Will—developed nihilist and anarchistic methods. The term "nihilist" was first applied to Bazarov, the skeptical, inverted surgeon's son in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. It was used later as a nickname for all those who were not satisfied with an existing order of things and wanted actively to change them by force—to a very heterogeneous class of people, ranging from bomb throwers to law-abiding zemstvo members who petitioned respectfully. The *Narodnaja Volja* sent missionaries into the country to "save souls" by bringing spiritual help to the idolized Mir and the muzhik, the backwoods peasant, who beat his wife but kissed the hands of the pope, the squire and the constable. When the local authorities objected to the requested attention to rural problems, the gentle missionaries took to terrorist methods. They too found an early end as an organization, when members were convicted of having slain Alexander II in 1881. But they left a heritage of underground heroism for sporadic successors, strictly disciplined professional revolutionaries, acting on orders from a central body, setting an example for rebel tactics. All these romanticists had no connection with the proletariat and recruited themselves mostly from the layer of students—the future doctors, lawyers, agriculturists, engineers and even priests.

Karl Marx had confessed that he had learned much from Chernichevsky, a leading voice of the radical Russian intelligentsia. Now there was a considerable influx of political theories from abroad

into Russia, with the German socialist teachers predominating. The fundamental laws of socialism, as set forth by Marx and Engels, were in Russia accepted as gospel. But the polyglot and eager Russians were not content with the German textbooks alone. They gathered a knowledge of modern literature in English, French and Spanish, relating to social problems, history and economics, superior to most of the contemporaries in other countries working for the same goal of learning. These students denied themselves the slightest comforts and became conspicuous pupils in the colleges and libraries in Berlin, Zurich, Geneva, Paris and Bologna. What a change has taken place in hospitality since the revolutionary guests have become hosts themselves! Prince Kropotkin could publish his gospel of sedition uncensored in England and the most fiery apostle of bomb throwing was never molested by Scotland Yard when he made public his detailed instructions for bomb manufacture.

The "Union of Combat for the Liberation of Labor," founded abroad, adopted the principles of the German Social democrats in the platforms of 1885 and 1887. The Petersburg circle of Blagojev, a Bulgarian student, did the same. They were the actual forerunners of a Russian Socialist party, which sprouted in numerous small circles in the year of the famine, 1891, and the following depression. Bit by bit, these cells developed a technique of propaganda to mass approach, united in larger associations and convened the First Party Congress at Minsk in 1898.

The central committee-in-being was immediately arrested with many delegates and several hundred members. One of the results was that the group of legal Marxists or economists, led by Peter Struve, S. Bulgakov and M. Tugan-Baranovsky, voiced in the *Credo* the theory that labor should leave politics to the care of the liberals and confine all activities to the material betterment of labor conditions with the help of the cells and the relief societies. This revisionism was strongly opposed by the orthodox Marxists like Lenin and Plekhanov.

The following five years were filled with debates on theoretical and practical problems. The socialist publication *Iskra*—the *Spark*—achieved fame under Pushkin's motto, "Out of the spark will rise the flame," dedicated to the Dekabrist of 1824-25. The Liberals published *The Liberation*, the United Social Revolutionaries *The*

Harbinger of the Russian Revolution and *The Revolutionary Russia*. The amorphous Russian student body was under constant surveillance by the authorities and naturally courted by the various revolutionary groups. For a change, one of these factions, led by Machaisky, decried intelligence as labor's greatest enemy. "Beware of the intellectuals, concentrate all efforts to increase the pay-check," he told the workers. All Socialists debated hotly on the true creed of Marx, with future leaders like Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Trotsky, Martynov in the fore. The former two edited the draft of a program for the 'Second Party Congress of Bruxelles and London in 1903. At the same time, Lenin came out into the open with the thesis: "What to Do!" now one of the historical documents included in the twenty-two solid volumes of his prolific writings.

Lenin, thirty years of age, was well known in revolutionary circles. Vladimir Illjich Ulianov, son of a high civil servant, had studied law at the University of Kazan, had been relegated in 1887 following the execution of his brother and sent to a village under surveillance. As extern, he had later been permitted to pass the law examinations in Petersburg and to practice law. Again arrested in 1895, he was sentenced to three years of exile in Siberia. He had gone abroad in 1900 where he became editor of the *Spark*. Thus he had passed through the school and high school of the Russian revolutionary of those days: underground work, jail, exile. Besides a short spell as propagandist by mouth, he had published numerous articles under a pen name and anonymously on party problems and a thesis "The Development of Capitalism in Russia." He had been an insatiable reader. When news came to him in the Siberian wilderness that E. Bernstein had published a new thesis on Marx, he pestered his relatives for months on end to procure the book. If the Bolsheviki had not succeeded to power in 1917 and Lenin had not become the co-founder of the Soviet state, he would have taken his rightful place among the leading lights of modern socialism anyway, a most sincere personality with a monumental polyglot storage of learning, filtered and enriched by his characteristic empiricism, a creative genius in his field.

"What to Do!" is one of the cornerstones of the future Bolshevik party and deserves more than a glance. The Socialists were at that time a mere handful of young harbingers. Lenin saw the future in grandiose shape. "History has now handed us a stupendous task,

more urgent and more revolutionary than any other problem of the proletariat in any other country. To fulfill this task, to destroy the most formidable bulwark of European—and we now may say—Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat.” It was the program of the future Comintern. Lenin was convinced that labor by its own power could never reach beyond the range of a labor union, working for better material conditions among workers. “The socialist creed has grown from the life work of theorists who were intelligent, educated members of the bourgeoisie, like Marx and Engels. In the same manner, in Russia the socialist theories were the brainwork of intellectuals, produced quite independently from the spontaneous growth of labor movements.”

Lenin was no mere thinker in the wilderness. He linked the Marx and Engels theories with the original finds of native apostles like the morose ascetic Tkachev, who insisted that Russia was not and never would be the field for a constitutional bourgeois state, and the gloomy hermit Nechaiev, author of the *Catechism of a Revolutionary*. Lenin had not yet had personal contacts with the European trade unions or the labor parties of the Continent and the British Isles. But his analytical knowledge was sufficient to describe the anatomy of a revolutionary body and the need for a central brain.

At the Second Congress of the Socialist Party, all the problems crept up which later confronted the victorious Revolution of 1917 when the creed was put to the first practical test of state-building. Lenin presented his drafts. Polish socialists objected to the right of national autonomy and withdrew from the congress when the demand was refused that the congress should veto the independence of Poland as contradictory to the unity of the proletariat of the world. Insisting on centralism as a guiding rule, Lenin only wanted active revolutionaries in the party fold, directed by a cell which should plan, decide and execute every detail. Rosa Luxemburg, the Polish firebrand of incorruptible honesty who was to play a leading part in German revolutionary circles until she was cruelly murdered in 1920, raised fierce objections. Blind obedience would ruin the party. She was right, as history proved by the fate which befell the Communist party in Russia after Lenin's death. Lenin carried his motions by a two-vote majority. The party split in two:

Bolsheviki and Mensheviki. But the rule that only activists should become or remain party members prevented more than a trickle of new members from joining up. So the Third Congress in London amended the statute again three years later with only the Bolsheviki present, while the Mensheviki held their separate All-Russian Workers Convention at Geneva. The call for unity was repeated at Tammerfors in 1905 and at Stockholm in 1906. Too many stumbling-blocks were on the crossroads. So the brethren marched on separate roads until the end of the Mensheviki at the hands of the victors.

As resolved at the Stockholm Congress, the Socialists participated in the election of the Second Duma. The Left won a remarkable success in the face of official obstruction. Of a total of 518, the Socialists occupied 65, the Social Revolutionaries 57, the Trudowiki 104, the Popular Socialists 16 seats. The former majority retained only 98 Cadet and 44 Octobrist votes, the extreme Right numbered 10 representatives. The trend to the Left was unmistakable. People expected that this strong opposition in the Duma would fight at least for the preservation of the constitutional liberties remaining to Parliament.

To achieve this end, the moderate parties tried to avoid any open conflict with the government. Behind the façade of parliamentary opposition, they moved steadily toward a compromise with the government. The Octobrists showed their cards quite openly. They upheld the demand for parliamentary legislation, but gave way in every other respect to achieve an unconcealed alliance with the power on the Throne.

When the newly elected Duma met, the socialist parties and the trade unions had already been declared illegal. The Left nevertheless used the floor of the Duma for intense propaganda on the issues of punitive expeditions, torture in jails, mortality on the transports to Siberia, which the conservative *Novoje Vremja* decried as "dangerous to the State." Though the government could feel secure, the bureaucracy was disturbed by the public debates in the committee and plenary meetings. The Public Prosecutor accused the Socialists of revolutionary propaganda among the services, and the Duma faction in particular of treason in organizing cells in the army. He consequently called for the expulsion of the whole socialist faction from the Duma and the extradition of 18

deputies for trial. While the committee debated this request, the government dissolved the Duma on June 15, 1907.

A new electoral decree, arbitrarily changing the quotas for representation in the four electoral groups, was published the following day. In the rural group the peasant representation was reduced by half, and the representation of the squires was increased by the same rate. The workers' group was eliminated and its votes were transferred to the group of urban dwellers. Nineteen large cities lost the right of representation. Reaction reached a new peak in this period. The Duma had dared to abolish courts-martial for political offenses. The government then established military county courts.² All traces of revolutionary successes were eradicated. The hangman's noose, Stolypin's necktie, became a symbol of the eighteen months of terror.

The election campaign for the Third Duma was conducted under the official terror. The Left was crushed. Only 16 Socialists and 60 Trudowiki survived. Among the remaining 437 deputies, there were 56 Cadets, 107 Octobrists, 122 moderate conservatives, 28 neutrals, 33 members of the "Union of Trueborn Russians," 39 monarchists. The government found a docile assembly, when the Duma met in November, 1907. For a number of years there was no effective opposition.

The electoral statistics did not reveal the prevailing political currents. As a rule, the peasants either voted for the opposition representatives, whom they know from former campaigns, or obtained from voting. The electors chosen by urban workers were 58 per cent socialist and only 2 per cent rightist. When former socialist deputies were tried in camera, in December, 1907, and sentenced to four to five years of penal servitude or to fortress for life, the proletariat of Moscow, Petersburg and many other cities protested, in the face of the police terror, by a day's strike.

Defeat demoralized the masses. The revolutionaries of 1905 had dreamt of overthrowing authority in a striking first effort, by the fraternization of all the oppressed classes, by hoisting the red banner on barricades defended by people forever ready to sacrifice their lives for the great cause of mankind. It was a barren dream. The days

² Military judges sentenced 2117 to death, 6020 to exile in Siberia for life, 3875 to hard labor, 605 of these for life, 2596 to penal servitude, 5751 to jail, 1307 to fortress confinement; 1114 editors were imprisoned and 978 newspapers and magazines confiscated.

had gone when men wished to be brothers today and not only tomorrow, when all wheels were stopped by the awakening giants of toil and sweat. Many had foreseen that the conflict would not be all honey-sucking. But the gray Ash Wednesday of the reactionary victory cast a deep gloom and despondency on the champions of freedom as well as on the profiteers in the wake of the Revolution.

Literature reflected the flight from disappointment into self-indulgence. The revolutionaries of the day before drowned their ideas in sexual excesses. Youth fervently acclaimed Szanin, the hero of Artzibashev's novel, the cynic in love and skeptic in life. The mystics, the anarchists, the poets who told fortunes in the ivory tower of pure art, crowded in the drawing rooms where the "revolution of all values" became just a game. Many chose suicide as the simplest solution of all troubles. The revolutionary parties lost many followers. Some turned renegade, others fell into passive despair. Treason, blackmail and provocation raised their ugly heads.

The revelation that the chief of the terrorists, Azev, was a police agent scattered the rank and file of the Social Revolutionaries and bewildered other circles. The police had planted their men everywhere. The informer Malinovski, later deputy in the Fourth Duma, sat in the very headquarters of the Bolsheviks. On the staff of the party organ, the *Pravda*, worked a police spy, Chernomazov. A number of old rebels took up brigandry, expropriating private tills for their own benefit with the methods learned in robbing public chests for the party funds.

No wonder the masses were discouraged. Tomsy, the veteran labor union leader, wrote at that time from St. Petersburg: "Some dozen of hundreds of militant workers may be left out of tens of thousands. The spirit of the working classes has suffered visibly under the whiplashes of the reaction. Even in class conscious families the urge for learning has found undesirable expression. Young workers learn for the sake of matriculation, to become intellectuals and to forget the workers." The unmistakable uptrend of young talent in that period originated in frustration of political aims, not in the desire to train the mind for any revolutionary fight ahead.

CHAPTER THREE

BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS

I. LENIN'S VISION

FROM his remote post of observation, Lenin stressed the timely and useful lessons to be learned from the unquestionably great defeat—lessons in historical dialectics, in the knowledge and the art of political warfare. "Friends are discovered in times of need and adversity. Defeated armies learn fast." He became an émigré for the second time in December, 1907. In a private letter he wrote from Lake Leman: "I have returned here, feeling as if I was to lie down in my own grave. To hell with Geneva, this cursed lair gets on my nerves. But what can I do!" The born fighter draws military conclusions. "The Revolutionary parties have still to complete their lesson. They have learnt to attack. Now this must be supplemented by the science of retreat. . . ."

How did the Bolshevik party emerge from this period of decay? Its leading members stuck to their old conception that the life of the party depended on strict conformity with Marxian doctrines. Only a homogeneous organization could give ideological substance a definite goal to the motley of popular uprisings. The more restless lieutenants reveled in intellectual exercises as a preparation for action. "To be radical means to tackle problems at the radices, the roots." They intended to test the maxim that "A theory can come to life in a given country only in proportion to the actual need felt by the people." Marx had said: "The weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons." His pupils took this as a direction to meticulously planned action. They not only hated actual deserters. They were intolerant, aggressive and, thus successful fighters against any trace of disloyalty to the creed or of deviation from its true principles. The counterpart of their dogmatism was the cunning skill, the dexterity which they applied to increasing their faction.

The Socialist ranks had reunited at the London Congress. Party organizations, including the editorial staff of the *Pravda*, were supposed to be reshuffled on the basis of parity. Separate cells were to close down. Believing that the reunion would be a short-lived experiment, the Bolsheviks kept their private organization intact and went underground in the very house of the party.

When, for instance, the Congress decided to refrain from further expropriations or raids on private and public tills, the Bolsheviks quietly continued to support highway men in holdups, receiving their share of the loot, and even organized such actions as Dzhugashvili (Stalin) and Ordzhonikidze did in the Caucasus.

The Mensheviks soon complained that the Central Committee of the United Party was starving on a budget of less than 100 roubles a month, while the Bolsheviks were receiving and distributing big money to their special units. Th. Dan, a prominent Menshevik, wrote later that "in those years the characteristic traits of the Bolshevik movement were developed—resolute team-work, the strictest internal discipline, complete amorality in dealing with outsiders."

The headquarters of the socialist parties were again located, after the failure of the Revolution, outside Russia. Controversial discussions grew into bitter, acrimonious feuds in the depressing atmosphere of exile. It takes life in exile to discover the real stature of character.

How to prepare for action was the principal problem. Should the Bolsheviks refrain from all legal means of propaganda and agitation and concentrate on underground work in the illegal cells, or should they combine the two methods? Lenin disparaged hiding in the dugouts of illegality and renouncing all forms of activity still permitted by the government because this would degrade the party to a sect. When the Otsovisia wanted to stop further collaboration of party members by recalling the Bolsheviks in the Duma, and the Ultimatisists wanted to coat the pill by merely requesting them to resign on their own account, it was Lenin who persuaded the party council not to boycott the Duma, or the coming elections.

Zinoviev, who was close to Lenin in the emigration and in the Soviet council, in 1923 wrote an official history of the Bolshevik party, in which he emphasized the importance of Lenin's victory. Had a contrary decision been taken, the party would have remained

an unknown quantity to the Russian masses and could never have achieved a hold. "The force of Bolshevism lay in the fact that at all stages it was able to drive a wedge into the masses and to give prepared answers to all the questions of the worker's daily life."

Similar discussions took place among the Mensheviks. The liquidators wanted to build up a great labor movement on the Western European pattern and to avoid all illegal maneuvers even when the Stolypin policy curtailed all legal means of propaganda. They increased the tendency of the Mensheviks to regard the former illegal work of their own executive contemptuously as the product of an obsolete past, wrote Th. Dan.

The opposing group of members vainly recommended undercover work, for which they had neither the funds nor the staff. The acerbity of the factional strife was only in part due to the temperaments of the leading personalities. The conflicting theory and practice of the two wings of the Russian Socialists depended also on the different conceptions of the future revolutionary role of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks insisted on the burning, invincible conviction that the distant, if not the near, future would be theirs, on forging a uniform will at any sacrifice, on throwing all the wavering elements overboard.

They were not downhearted in defeat. In every event they saw germs of great things to come. This was not crystal gazing. Radical in principle, in every oscillation of party ideology, they wrestled every day anew with the fundamentals. Each such questioning could have ended in a deviation from the dogma and a possible schism. These investigations were not conducted with a deliberate professorial attitude. Threatening the very existence of the party creed and its laboriously attained foundation, the Russian dialecticians were ruled by strong emotions and were free of dogmatic inbreeding.

The Russian intelligentsia had long been at home in the universities and libraries of Germany, Switzerland, France and Austria, where they studied closely the philosophical productions of all ages, driven by an avid curiosity. Their new discoveries they tested empirically by practical observation. The followers of Karl Marx applied to every subject the yardstick of historic materialism, the method that—as commonly misinterpreted—explains all facts in history by the nature of matter, ruling that material conditions

determine how man behaves and feels. Friedrich Engels refuted in a letter to Joseph Bloch from London (September 21, 1890) that Marx or he had ever said more than that in the last instance the history of production and reproduction of real life determined the issues. "Whosoever twists the meaning of this sentence into the fiction that the economic conditions were the only deciding factor, distorts it into a futile, absurd and abstruse phrase."

The Marxists were not free of a certain priggishness and were inclined to behave as the possessors of the genuine philosophers' stone. Beyond providing a method of research satisfactory to their professional honesty, historic materialism was their coherent philosophy, "the highest attainable at the present stage of evolution in the contemplation of life," as Plekhanov defined it.

Having finally arrived at a prescription for all the social evils of Russia, they promptly labeled any subsequent deviations from the righteous course as idealistic whims, metaphysics or mysticism, unworthy of modern men, let alone a revolutionary. Abstract wisdom, as unreality, unworldliness, was used as a term of contempt. This did not prevent some of the agnostics from being converted in the later life to religious creeds, as in the case of Bulgakov, now a high cleric at the Orthodox Church Institute in Paris.

Plekhanov and Lenin, though always restrained by Marx's opinion that philosophers have only interpreted life instead of changing it, applied the method of materialism to the study of intellectual history and of psychology. They investigated the religious problem before the idealistic revision of the Marxian doctrines was attempted in their own ranks by Lunacharsky and others. Lenin saw religion incarnated not only in the churches, but also in the mind of the masses. "Religion is a kind of spiritual cheap spirits, in which the slaves of capital drown their humanity and their claim to a tolerable life," is a coarser derivative of the Marxian pronunciamento of 1844: "Religious misery is partly actual misery and partly protestation against actual misery. Religion is the sigh of a vexed creature, the spirit of an inhuman period, the demon of unspiritual conditions. It is opium for the people!"

Next to Marx stood Friedrich Engels as lodestar. He had been raised in a Pietist home in the Ruhr Valley, where faith was held as an emotional, not an intellectual, attitude. In his teens he happened to be tutored for three years in the house of a Bremen

clergyman, G. G. Treviranus, who was a fervent adherent of Hegel's and Schelling's philosophies. Engels' later methodical instructions for thought and combat were followed to the letter by the Russian Marxists:

When we have cleared away the "supernatural" and "superhuman" we shall be rid of untruthfulness. The misrepresentation of the natural and human as supernatural and superhuman is the basis of all falsehood and mendacity; therefore, we must declare war on religion and religious ideas for once and forever, and we do not mind being called atheists or anything else.

The intellectual émigrés, who undertook a revision of Marxism, were oppressed by the aftermath of the Revolution. The only system available for their purpose was, of course, idealistic philosophy, a "link with all the religious bias of the bourgeoisie" in the eyes of the contemptuous Bolsheviki who derided it. Lunacharsky, Bogdanov and others scrutinized the Marxian creed by the standards of the German philosophers Mach and Avenarius, who taught that reality is constituted by substances of perception which vary only in intensity. They attempted to loosen the philosophical knots in Marxian history and economics and to wind the latter on the same skein with Neo-Kantianism, Machism and Empiro-Criticism.

Lenin combated such heresy vigorously. He thought the fight important enough for him to quit the editorial chair of the *Spark* in order to study philosophy and natural science in the British Museum. Within eight months of his study, the results appeared in a stout volume *Materialism and Empiro-Criticism*, which acclaimed anew orthodox Marxianism, and condemned bourgeois philosophy, and another "aberration," the "God-seekers" or "God creators."

Maxim Gorky had just written the *Confession*, a story of people seeking a new God, and Lunacharsky had said in *Religion and Socialism* that "Religion is enthusiasm, and without enthusiasm it is not given man to achieve great things."

These revisionists, together with "Otsovists" and "Ultimatists," founded in 1909 a separate group of true Bolsheviki. They opposed Lenin and his clan as well as the parties on their right. They found support on Capri, Italy, in the training camp of revolutionaries, later transferred to Bologna, while in Paris, Lenin, Kamenev and

Zinoviev trained workers, smuggled out of Russia and back again, as future agitators and propagandists.

Despite their private differences, all the Bolsheviks were working assiduously to wreck the union with the Mensheviks. Trotsky, editor of the *Pravda*, first at Lvov, later in Vienna, for a while pleaded for a middle course, and was violently renounced by the radicals as prejudiced in favor of the Mensheviks.

Many similar groups of dissenters in exile were either atomized or absorbed or discarded as historical curiosities, or returned to the fold of the victors. Among the Bolsheviks there gradually emerged a cadre of fighters, talented far above the average, trained in factional debate and intrigue, ready to compete with any other party, but having also learned the patience to wait. Pettyfogging discussions at first veiled the conceptions of the incipient party. The modern socialist Jacobins took years to form a concise system of power, and the nucleus of a hierarchic party was essentially different from any existing political organization.

This was a lay order of toughened men, to whom the party of their own creation became father and mother and home. They were prepared to confess any alleged sin and to face death to save the fame of their life's work. In later years, legends were woven around the days of the birth of the Bolshevik party. Then the faithful squad of veterans, the Old Guard, was lavishly given prestige and authority. Until they vanished from the scene in a calvary, in those early days they were merely sectarians, conspirators—criminals in the eyes of the Social Democrats. Their Western partisans often described their characteristics as essentially Russian, inexplicable by European standards, attributable to a mixture of alleged Asiatic defiance of death and stubborn idealism. This myth was connected indelibly with all revolutionaries in people's minds with the quip of De Maestre, the Sardinian minister in St. Petersburg: "Scratch the Russian and you will find the Tartar!" With all Russians, when K. Kautsky found no other argument he tagged the Brothers-in-Marx as "Asiatic Socialists." If one considers the influence of surroundings as important as heredity, and realizes a Russian tendency to melancholy and to correspondingly excessive vitality, the wide steppes without distinct horizon and the wintry blast of gales might account for the charm and the idiosyncrasies alike of the modern Russian.

The Russian Marxians became expert torchbearers of revolution with no intention of selling their birthrights. This game was to them not a Philistine's dream but reality itself. Here they beat their Western European colleagues. They computed the date of the revolutionary apocalypse mathematically. Their chances of victory were calculated by the rules of military strategy. The aftermath of victory was painstakingly forecast.

In every calculation the masses were the principal factor. The general staff of the Bolsheviks often anticipated the course of events and of opinion. But they never lost contact with the proletariat. Constitutionally opposed to compromise, they were nevertheless capable of any horse dealer's trick. If they compromised, it was not for long and usually a feint. The end justified any means. From a partner's point of view, it is an awkward creed.

Between the conferences of Stockholm in 1906 and Prague in 1912, the features of the leftist parties and their leaders were defined. The Bolsheviks were more successful than any competitors in the dissemination of information and propaganda inside Russia, because they were more active, unscrupulous and demagogic and controlled larger funds. Cheap caricatures used to show the Russian revolutionary as the eternal conspirator, begging in every European capital in shabby garb, a clown who might conceivably become dangerous for the Russian regime but never to the country of his refuge. Only a few observers noticed that these familiar nihilists and anarchists had become systematic planners, less sentimental than their forebears, better educated and read, more widely traveled, with a dynamic curiosity about the front lines and advertising columns, and the world machinery of politics and economics.

Finally, the Bolsheviks challenged the unity of the Socialist party in 1910 by declaring all former agreements with the other factions void. The opposing groups, including the Trotskyites, pleaded for condemnation of the Bolshevik action. But the wreckers felt strong enough and had the course set for a break. A Congress at Prague in 1912 constituted the independent Bolshevik party, led by a central committee of its own and freed of all connection with other Socialists, including the dissenters of the same faction. Trotsky wrote from Vienna in the *Pravda* that the break would have no significance in Russia as no serious activist would waste his time with abortive change. He was wrong. Other similar comments

greeted the new fledgling in Russia. The Bolsheviks found at once many sympathizers in numerous dwarf cells. The passive policy adopted by the Menshevik party officials made it impossible for them to fight the secession on equal grounds.

- ✓ From the close of 1909, Russia experienced a fair industrial boom. The domestic market felt the first benefits accruing from the Stolypin Land Reform.¹

Heavy industry romped ahead, formed trusts, made combines of bank and industrial capital and induced foreign capital to invest in 1910-14 on a larger scale. In the larger branches of heavy industry, English and French-Belgian capital had a monopoly of finance. Germany only held a strong position in enterprises for electro-technics and railroad equipment. On the eve of World War I, Russian metallurgical combines were the near-exclusive realm of the French bankers who also controlled 75 per cent of coal mines, half of the 40-per-cent-foreign share in the naphtha (oil) industry and 67.5 per cent of all Russian companies working with banking capital. Such an influx of foreign money called for a correspondent increase in exports and trading services. The Russian Volunteer Merchant Fleet took a growing share in shipping. In some respects, Russia was still considered by foreign banks as a colony and had to pay higher interest rates. Year by year Russia was drawn tighter into the orbit of the Western powers as the creditor countries wanted to secure the investments politically or at least see the loans repaid on political goods.

- ✓ In spite of all official oppression, the labor movement had survived with sufficient roots to sprout with the return of trade prosperity. Working conditions suffered by the discrepancy of wages rising only 18 per cent, while food costs rose 37.5 per cent from 1900 to 1910, with principal items as black bread and meat reaching 51- and 42-per-cent increases. The strike wave returned. Officially, in 1911 137,000 strikers were counted, in the next year 1,238,000.
- ✓ A new generation of students renewed the challenge of their elders to absolutism. They turned out in masses during the funerals of L. Tolstoi and the actress Komissarshvaskaja for a political

¹ The area under cultivation increased by 55 to 75 per cent and the average yield of crops improved throughout the country. The sales of imported agricultural machinery and tools to small farms rose from 17.1 million rub. in 1909 to 23.7 million rub. in 1913. Sales of sheet iron doubled from 1905 to 1913. Sugar consumption per head rose from 10 to 14 7 lbs.

manifestation, protesting at other times against corporal punishment in the prisons, the ill-treatment and mass suicides of political prisoners. In April, 1912, troops were employed to quell a strike at the Lena goldfields, deep in Siberia, 1250 miles from a railroad, taking a toll of several hundred dead and wounded. When the news reached the Russian mainland, workers marched out in sympathy and from then on retained the courage to strike. The "Union of Factory and Workshop Owners" stated that the figures of political strikes jumped from 4000 in 1910 to 8000 in 1911, and 850,000 in 1912.

Gradually the lethargy of all classes abated. The appeal for civic liberties was renewed by industrialists. They asked for reinstatement of labor unions as legal middlemen for quicker transfer of farmland. The Cadets and Octobrists raised the issue of the suspended constitutional rights. A critical atmosphere engulfed Prime Minister Stolypin, a massive man with a heavy gait and a rather brutal demeanor who was not accustomed to shifting his own stand between opposing forces. His life ended in September, 1911, in Kiev, where he was assassinated by an anarchist employed as police agent.

W. N. Kokovzov, the Finance Minister, became his successor. He was a pupil of Witte, an honest and erudite member of the Civil Service. He did not have the stature to impress his own stamp on affairs. Primitive but relentless, Russification continued in the same manner under Stolypin's successor. The bureaucracy ignored the simple lesson of the Revolution of 1905, that it was unwise to add political fuel to the social unrest by refusing equal political rights and cultural home rule to the border nationalities—the Ukrainians, the Finns, the Poles, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, the Georgians, the Armenians and the tribes in Central Asia and the Ukraine. In a speech to the Duma in December, 1913, Kokovzov repeated the declarations of the sacred unity and indivisibility of the Empire, the predominance of Russian nationality and the Orthodox creed as the two forces under whose benevolent tutelage Russia "has been born, has matured and lives." The Octobrists with Guchkov, and likewise the Cadets with Miliukov as spokesman, reflected this attitude of the government. Peter Struve, the Socialist, became the literary advocate of a Greater Russia.

When Kokovzov proposed to introduce a series of political

reforms on the basis of the October Manifesto of 1905 and to resume constitutional co-operation with the Duma he found strong opposition. The regular elections for the Fourth Duma did not change the proportionate strength of the political parties. The Right lost a few seats, the Octobrists held 99, the Cadets 58, the Trudoviki 10, the Mensheviks 7 and the Bolsheviks 6 seats. The Minister of the Interior, Makarov, the Minister of Justice, Checheglovitov and the Procurator-General of the Holy Synod, Sabler, headed the cabinet revolt, backed by the warmongers at court. Kokovzov tried many a compromise without success. He was forced to resign with the rank of a count in February, 1914, with the dark clouds of war looming ahead.

2. WAR OR PEACE

The cementing of the Entente Cordiale between London and Paris was one of the most decisive factors of modern world politics. The alliance of 1892 between France and Russia had left a door open for Germany to enter. As late as 1900, the entente was based on the fear of British aggression, while France was smarting under the defeat of Fashoda. The military convention attached to the entente agreement stipulated that in the event of a war between England and France, Russia should at once deploy troops along the Afghan border and strike toward India. At the same time, Great Britain offered Germany through Lord Salisbury and Joseph Chamberlain a mutual-security pact to retain balance of power on the Continent. The Kaiser did not want to take sides and shifted weight from one foot to the other, without sensing that this attitude caused more distrust than a clear choice. When Germany tried to join the entente in 1905, she found herself out in the cold. In the cabin of the imperial yacht, in 1905 off Bjorkoe on the Finnish coast, Wilhelm II and Nicholas II signed a hand-written document, stipulating a defense pact. "In case that one of the Empires should be attacked by an European Power, the other shall assist it with all its forces in Europe." The Tsar promised to take the necessary steps to inform the French ally and ask France to join the pact. Despite the signatures affixed on the spot, no treaty materialized. The Tsar's advisers pointed out that commitments with France had gone already too far and that the ties with France had become

too strong to allow Russia to risk an estrangement. During the last loan negotiations in Paris, it had been expressly stipulated that Russia would have to support France in any North African action against possible German intervention. In 1906, the military convention was extended as an undisguised instrument of action against Germany.

In the Entente Cordiale of 1904, England hoped to have a guarantee against German aspirations to challenge the British supremacy on the seas. She paid the same price as Russia by accepting all French conquests in Morocco. Russia frowned on this move of her French ally, as Great Britain was still an ally of Japan while Russia was at war in Manchuria, and feelings had run high after the Dogger Bank incident during Rozdhestvensky's cruise to the East. But England took great care to clear all outstanding issues in 1907-08. Agreements were concluded with Russia while Isvolsky was in charge of the Foreign Office at the Neva. Russia renounced all claims of interest along the Afghan border and was granted a sphere of influence in northern Iran. The delicate question of the Dardanelles was left open. But at a meeting in Reval in 1908, Edward VII and Nicholas II confirmed Russia's accession to the Triple Entente as partner with equal rights.

In this period, military experts in the capitals of Europe discussed with drawn faces the need for preventive attacks in preference to being forced to go to war when their neighbors had reached new peaks in armament. There was no difference in methods and morals between Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorff's eagerness to fight in the Balkans in 1907, and Lord Fisher's proposal in the same year to "copenhagen" by surprise the budding German navy, and the German General Staff's reproach to the Kaiser for having rejected the last possible chance of a preventive war in 1905, against the encroaching encirclement by great neighbors.

Responsible men aired their gloom without restraint, but did nothing to untie or cut the Gordian knot. The Ballplatz diplomats had so far kept to the advice Bismarck gave to Kalnóky: "Every step of Austria on the Balkans should be subject to the previous consent of Russia. Do not interfere with Russia's march on Istanbul!"

In September, 1903, at Murzsteg both Russian and Austrian Foreign Ministers had formally pledged a mutual understanding

A black and white illustration depicting a group of men in traditional Chinese attire, possibly during a historical event or battle. The men are standing in a line, facing right. Some are holding long spears or pikes, while one man in the foreground holds a trident. The scene is set outdoors with some foliage visible on the left. The image is heavily obscured by thick black horizontal bars, which appear to be redactions or censorship marks, covering significant portions of the scene.

	1861	1866	1871-75	1876-80	1881-85	1886-90	1891-95	1896-1900	1901-04	1905-07
In	45	4	6	10	27	2	8	24	42	50

before contemplating a change in the Balkans' *status quo*. Isvolsky, anxious to have more than a reluctant backing by the Triple Entente partners in his Bosphorus policy, offered Austria a secret deal when he met Count Aehrenthal at Buchlau in October, 1908. Russia would agree to the formal annexation of the former Turkish provinces Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been an Austrian protectorate for thirty years since the Berlin Congress, if Austria would accept the Russian claims for the Straits. It was a delicate proposal, as it ran counter to the Pan-Slavist encouragement given to Serbia. Aehrenthal consented, taking the tentative offer, rightly or wrongly, as final, and announced two days later the incorporation of the protectorate into the Double Monarchy. It was a surprise to the world and to the Russian Foreign Minister, who was going to negotiate with Paris and Whitehall for consent to the same scheme before considering the Buchlau deal clinched. Russia had to recognize the nature of the *fait accompli* in March, 1909, under the threat of Vienna to disclose the secret parley. Isvolsky felt cheated and bided his time. Going to Paris as ambassador in 1910, he became the most ardent sponsor of the Triple Entente. At the Palais Bourbon in August, 1914, when the declaration of war was approved, he could hardly suppress his exaltation: "The proudest day of my life . . ."

At Racconigi in October, 1909, Italy pledged her assistance to Russia in exchange for similar support of Italian aims in Tripolitania. In the Far East relations with Japan were consolidated by the Russian confirmation of Japan's "rights" in Korea. When Sazonov, who was to succeed Isvolsky shortly afterwards as Foreign Minister, visited Potsdam with Nicholas II in November, 1910, he was promised that Germany would not follow Austrian moves indiscriminately.

But on the whole, Russia's diplomatic progress was impeded, as long as England contemplated free passage for all nations through the Straits and frowned on the diplomatic bargaining over the Turco-Persian railroads. The Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, declared that England "would use all means to keep her position intact."

The dramatic tension in Europe increased. Publicists mobilized their resources. Editors wrote leading articles on the imminent danger of war. Raymond Poincaré's rise to power as Prime

Minister in 1912 and President of the Republic in 1913 brought a welcome turn in favor of the Neva's more aggressive intentions. So far France had cold-shouldered Russian approaches to the Balkan problems. The Quai d'Orsay had been more intent on alienating Austria from Germany than on Russian aims despite the support reaped in Morocco. France's new position was underlined in a letter of Isvolsky's in November, 1912, which Pokrovsky quotes in a thesis on the entente.

France has always claimed that Balkan events, considered to be purely local, would provoke, at the most only diplomatic intervention. She now seems to be of the opinion that territorial conquests by Austria would jeopardize French interests and disturb the general European equilibrium. . . . I did not miss the opportunity to remind M. Poincaré that the proposal to confer with Great Britain and us on the prevention of such conquests would demand a consideration of the practical measures to be taken. I gathered from his answer that he realizes that by such steps France could become involved in military operations.

Italy attacked Turkey in the fall of 1911 for refusing to cede Tripolitania. This assault started World War I, a snowball which rolled on into the avalanche of 1914. Under Russian tutelage, backed by military alliances with Petersburg concluded in the last two years, the Balkan states seized the opportunity of forcing Turkey out of Europe. The newly formed Balkan League started war in October, 1912. The Turks were defeated on all fronts. Austria feared the overthrow of the balance of power in the Balkans front and was only prevented by Germany from interfering in the war. When Bulgaria, far from Russian liking, neared in a victorious march the Golden Horn—Byzantium to the Greek and Russian, Constantinople to Europe, Istanbul to the Turks—Russia counseled moderation in unison with the other European powers. The First Balkan War was localized and closed the thirtieth of May, 1912. Dissensions among the frustrated victors led to a Second Balkan War with Bulgaria fighting Greece and Serbia, who were later joined for the kill by Roumania. Bulgaria lost part of her territory by the Peace of Bucharest on August 10, 1913, and left in disappointment the Tsarist sphere of influence.

As premature flashes of the accumulated international tension, the Balkan wars were clear writings on the wall. But none of the world powers were yet willing to risk a major conflagration except Russia, certainly less prepared than any other military might for

the gamble. The next phase of high diplomacy in Europe was a play for alibis. With fatalistic obedience, the poor actors in the forum assumed that pressure of forces beyond reach of men would take decisions out of their hands, a not unusual excuse for bungling the issues. Economic results of unbridled industrialization, need of growing populations for food and work, reluctance of the owners of the preferred stands to grant an open door to all competitors for markets—in short, the whole motley of social problems harassing all nations in the motor age, found no master minds with the courage to forestall the clash of arms.

Some of the statesmen leaned back with folded hands, waiting for miracles and taking consolation from the classics. Others called the looming danger by name to rouse fear. Some resorted to half-hearted concessions to stave off the crisis around the corner. Others laid stumbling blocks and traps for diplomatic moves. There were a few inveterate gamblers who did not object to stakes of a hundred million lives for the transfer of one and a half million from one flag to another, as in the case of Lorraine. But though all the nations prepared for the next Armageddon quite openly, in every nation men tried honestly to keep the world at peace. In general the military experts were agreed that armaments must be increased and modernized and paper combinations tested in inter-allied war games, to waylay any surprise move of possible opponents. Though American industries romped ahead of both English and German capacity after the turn of the century, the American market absorbed most of the goods, whereas coal from Wales and the Ruhr was engaged in a neck-and-neck race in France, Scandinavia, Italy and in all European ports of call.

Great Britain and Germany competed on other world markets, since the reunion of the German states had been given the benefit of a customers union, a larger domestic market and industrial expansion. Modern research and growing German trade called for stronger armed protection by the flag, pointing to the geographical position of the British Isles which dominated the sea approaches to the German ports. The resulting race of naval armaments naturally annoyed Great Britain, who in 400 years of strife had won against the Spanish, French, Dutch and Danish competition supremacy on the sea. To prevent a possible crash, Great Britain again sounded Germany on terms of limiting the size of the navies

in 1911-12. The visit of Lord Haldane, who asked for a reduction in the naval estimates but was offered only a year's general holiday in shipbuilding, did not alleviate the tension. Negotiations over other grievances continued in London and led to amicable agreements to the formation of the Nyassa syndicate for colonial enterprises, visualizing future partitions of interests in the Portuguese colonies, and to a squaring of accounts in Asia Minor.

Negotiations with the British interests came to a close with the signing of an Anglo-German convention, on June 15, 1914. Among other lesser points the German side pledged not to extend the Bagdad system beyond Basra, not to establish a terminal or harbor on the Persian Gulf and not to discriminate against British goods or passengers without the consent of Great Britain. An agreement had already been concluded between Berlin and Petersburg on German control of the Bagdad Railroads and Russian control of the North Iran Railroads in August, 1911.

When Turkey decided to remodel the services after the breakdown of 1913 and asked England for a naval mission, she turned to Germany for the military counterpart, having accepted French advisers for the public administration. Thus the Liman von Sanders Mission started, which Russia took up as a diplomatic test case, when the German general retired from the German army and was appointed commander of the Second Army Corps at Adrianople.

In a memorandum of December, 1913, Sazonov disclosed a preview of his plans. In case the diplomatic conversations on the Liman mission between Berlin and Petersburg should come to a deadlock and Turkey should not heed the Russian request to dismiss Liman, "a simultaneous occupation of certain points in Asia Minor by Russia, France and Great Britain and a declaration that the occupation would last until all claims had been granted, seems the most suitable method from the Russian point of view." Naturally, such a move would give Turkey the backing of Germany, Sazonov argued. So this action "would bring a solution of the problem to our Western border with all resulting consequences." He added in the stilted style of diplomacy, which prefers not to call the devil by name, "that in case, the Ministers of War and Navy should think it advisable to risk serious developments, and in the event that France decides to support us with all means and

that Great Britain will assist us efficiently, we should this very day enter into an exchange of views with these two powers."

Although Berlin gave way in a compromise on the Liman Mission, Russia proceeded with stirring up discord.

3. "BYZANTIUM MUST BE OURS!"

The official documents and diaries of the diplomats may give ample proof that the chair holders in the capitals of the European powers were blinded by many jealousies and prejudices at the turn of the century. But behind the Russian drive for the Bosphorus was more than a personal grudge of Isvolsky or Sazonov, more than the fervor of the Pan-Slavists, who were only a sprinkling on the surface of the people like other followers of the "Pan" craze. Dostoevsky's exhortation of 1877, that Byzantium should remain the focus point of Russian policy, had never been forgotten, as countless dossiers in the archives of the Neva capital confirm. In 1900, when the struggle of five decades for position between Great Britain and Russia was still unabated and no truce in sight, General Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, gave a frank view of future plans.

When we shall rule over the Bosphorus and the entrance into the Mediterranean, we shall be able to tackle the Egyptian question with energy and to make the Suez Canal an international thoroughfare. When we have gained this entry into the Indian Ocean, we can constantly threaten India. Russia's competition on the world market will intimidate the highly developed countries of Europe and America whose industries dominate the markets more than anything else. On railroads spanning Russia from the Baltic to the Great Ocean, we will extend our tentacles toward the Bosphorus, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. Russia will be a permanent danger with her inexhaustible riches to the industries of all ranking powers. When Russia with her quickly growing industries reaches the stage of overproduction like the other countries, she may be drawn into the terrible fight for markets. In this case the armed forces of Russia for the first time in history, might have to defend not our faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland, but mainly the interests of the Kings of sugar, oil, iron and dry goods.

In the Russian bureaucracy it was openly discussed that a war might bring a welcome diversion of public unrest to patriotic goals. The *Novoje Vremja* reported that there was "a smell like 1905." A more precise argument was one which Professor Mitrofanov used in a letter written in July, 1914, to the German historian Hans

Delbrück: "Whoever opposes the Russian urge to occupy the Straits, is eo ipso our enemy!"

This expansionist trend might be explained by the magnetism of geopolitics. Kjellen and Mackinder had already publicized the convenient threat of the Russian heartland to an attempt at world domination, when Russian diplomacy, after the defeat in the Far East in 1905, focused on the Straits under Ottoman rule. Simple trade statistics were a sufficient explanation for legitimate claims to the protagonists of conquest.

Russian foreign trade followed four sea lanes: the Baltic, the Black Sea, the White Sea, the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. Since the eighties, the trade on the Black Sea had won first place. Without it, the Russian trade balance would always have been passive. Grain, oil, manganese and iron ore had the shortest lane to the oceans through the Dardanelles from the principal centers of production in the Urals and the south of Russia. This situation gave a natural impulse to the imperialist trend to safeguard access to the oceans against blockade. The Baltic was a practically closed basin, the White Sea not wholly ice-free and the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan under the range of Japanese guns. The Mediterranean seemed to offer the best, if not the only, opportunity.

How did the partners of the new Holy Alliance react to such aspirations? Sazonov did not trust implicitly the cautious entente partners. He feared that Great Britain might prefer an amicable settlement with Germany "at our expense" and that France, though a loyal ally, might back out, as France "is inclined to sacrifice general political interests to financial gains." Though doubtful about the outcome, Sazonov conducted the daily work at the Foreign Office as if the decision had already been taken in favor of military aggression.

On January 13, 1914, Prime Minister Kokovzov presided over a conference attended by the Minister of War, General Suchomlinov, the Minister for Naval Affairs, Admiral Grigorovich, the Foreign Minister Sazonov and the Chief of the General Staff, General Shilnsky. Categorically, the representatives of the army announced that Russia was fully prepared for a war with Germany, not to speak of a campaign against Austria. Taking into account that neither facts nor figures accompanied this statement, it looked like the famous "ever ready" caption of Russian bureaucracy. At

this conference, the Prime Minister was the only one present to declare that war would be the biggest disaster for Russia and that greatest care should be taken to prevent the Empire from being drawn into any European conflict. He was soon dismissed. The conference resolved cautiously: "It does not seem possible to use force against Germany as long as an active participation by Great Britain and France has not been secured."

The next meeting, on February 21, 1914, with Sazonov in the chair, nevertheless already discussed the possibilities of an occupation of the Straits. The formulation of Sazonov, that the plunge into the Straits was not feasible except during a general European war was accepted. A series of technical preparations indispensable for an occupation of the Straits which might be necessary in the near future was to be launched at once. To the record of proceedings, Sazonov added a memorandum for the Tsar. "Our historic mission requests to extend a control over the Straits by taking possession. Most likely we shall have to achieve this in the course of a European conflagration. . . . The present aim of the Foreign Office is to create systematically favorable conditions for the jumping off."

One of the next moves on the chessboard was an instruction to the Russian Ambassador at Istanbul to suggest to the German colleague a straight deal: Russia forcing a subservient government on Turkey to gain control of the Straits by the back door, Germany exploiting Asia Minor. Berlin decided that it would be wiser to stay on friendly terms with England, remained deaf and continued the negotiations for a settlement of interests in Turkey with Paris and London, which was successfully concluded six weeks before the outbreak of the Great War.

There was opposition to the war party in Petersburg, though in no phase of enough weight to alter the course of events. P. N. Durnovo, the former Minister of the Interior, now member of the Imperial Council, handed the Tsar a memorial on the situation. He imputed that a decisive fight between England and Germany, for which for a long time both sides had made preparations, would be inevitable. England had to face the possible loss of the economic and political supremacy on the seas. The present constellations of European powers could very easily lead to a general European or world war. For such a fight between two power groups, lasting, presumably, many years, Russia was completely unprepared. Under

no circumstances should Russia join in the approaching conflict, considering, above all, that the true interests of Russia and Germany did not clash in any respect. The disregard of such fundamental truths would inevitably lead Russia to war in tow of Great Britain. The Minister of Justice, Checheglovitov, and Baron Fredericks, the most persistent advocates of the autocratic regime, but also some generals and diplomats, shared the views of Kokovzov and Durnovo and tried to convince the Tsar of Russia's and the Dynasty's real interests. To counterbalance the enforced resignation of Kokovzov and to paralyze the warmongers, they recommended the dismissal of Sazonov. Nicholas II was wrapped in his belief that he held the scales of European peace in his hands, and remained a passive observer.

The war party prepared public opinion openly and unashamedly with the help of the loud-speakers in the press and the Petersburg drawing rooms, still a formidable power in shaping policy. The strongest influence at the Court was exercised by the Grand Dukes Nikolai and Peter Nicolaievich with their consorts, the Montenegrin princesses Miliza and Anastazia, two ambitious daughters of Nikita, King of the Black Mountains, and sisters of Queen Helena of Italy. They were rabid anti-Austrians and nervous lest they miss a chance of humiliating Vienna politics. In the seductive atmosphere of manipulations by magicians, saints and quacks, men were reduced to figurines. The high-strung Tsarina, since the birth of the Tsarevich the First Lady of the Court, was raised as Princess Alix of Hesse in the provincial climate of the Court of Darmstadt. Still shy but ambitious, she had been swept from early Lutheran foundations by emotional fervor and had embraced the Orthodox faith with a convert's zeal. She was shaken by fear that the sickly heir to the throne, who suffered from the Hessian family disease hemophilia, would not live long. The "sunshine" of the neurotic Tsar, over whom she exercised great influence, had become the prey of the mystic currents which swayed Russian society sundering the crude materialism which ruled the day.

Byzantine traditions, defective sensuality, genuine religious impulses created a general neurosis. Spiritualists and hypnotizers, crystal gazers and occultists, the performers of indefinable miracles had the ear of any audience. Among them, Grigori Jefimovich

Rasputin, a shrewd peasant monk, became the last of a long line of bewitching saints. Since the Tsarina believed that his prayers had stopped the Tsarevich's hemorrhage from afar, he was accepted as the power behind the throne by the careerists at the court. To others, he was the "holy devil," who disgraced the country.

The Petersburg drawing rooms were a replica of the Paris salons of the Napoleon III period, where society was passionately engaged with rotating and talking tables, free love, big business and, occasionally, high politics. At the Neva, the same circles dabbled in mysticism, business and war preparations in these critical months of 1914. "Preventive war" was the slogan, in spite of warning voices pointing out that the army was in a state of reorganization, the navy incapable of convoying a single army corps across the Black Sea. The cream and the hub of society were likewise captivated by the glamor of "victorious war." Diplomats and politicians, grand dukes and crooks, officers and popes, bankers and actors, police agents and journalists, princesses and cocottes mixed freely in the circle of Prince Andronikov, subsidized by the Ministry of the Interior, Burdikov, the Master of the Imperial Horse, and supported by the speculative Manus, in the drawing rooms of the mistress of an unknown engineer, Baroness Rosen, and of Count Ignatiev.

On March 12, 1914, an article in the *Birsheviye Vjedomosti*, the Stock Exchange News, appeared with the theme: "We have nobody to fear, we are prepared." The ghost writer was the War Office. In a secret Duma meeting, the government asked for 110 million rbl. "for the urgently needed increase of the Black Sea Fleet."

Revolutionary movements broke through the surface. Strikes increased.² In the Duma, the Liberals revived oppositional spirit. The Socialists used the floor again for propaganda. Some of the deputies were expelled, others like Cheidse and Skobelov were indicted for "glorification of the republican regime." The visit of the French squadron, which brought the President of the Republic Raymond Poincaré and the Prime Minister Viviani, himself a Socialist, to Petersburg, was taken as an excuse to deal a new blow to the opposition. Labor papers and the few remaining labor organizations were suppressed. All political suspects were arrested.

² According to official figures, 3493 strikes with 1,327,897 men involved in the first half of 1914 against 2404 and 887,096 strikers in the whole of 1913.

A huge protestation strike in Petersburg led to armed clashes, extended to the provinces in many isolated strikes, until the general mobilization for the war restored domestic peace.

To be sure, the masses of the people could not have any forebodings that the state was already on the road to destruction. The thin layer of the workers who had been contacted by the revolutionary parties had not the faintest notion of the international entanglements. How should others know? Professor Tugan-Baranovsky confessed soon after the outbreak of the war: "In the beginning, the Russian peasant did not even know if the enemy was to be the German or the Frenchman and which one was to be the scapegoat. . . . He had no reason to hate the Germans as he does not read newspapers and does not meet them."

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand drove in state through the streets of Serajevo. The procession took a wrong turn, the cars slowed down. A Bosniak student of Serbian origin aimed a pistol and took the life of the heir to the Hapsburg monarchy and his Czech consort. Did the young fanatic know that he killed a man who was set on granting, after his succession, cultural autonomy and self-government to all nationalities in the fold of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire?

By July 23, clouds had massed over Europe. The men in office at the Ballhausplatz in Vienna, intent on humiliating Serbia beyond diplomatic repair, requested a short-dated answer of Belgrade. On July 25, Austria mobilized against Serbia, playing into the hands of third parties. Russia took the cue on the same day with a part mobilization against Austria and followed it up with general mobilization on July 29. A cable from the Kaiser warned the Tsar of the consequences. Nicholas rescinded the decree during the night but revoked the next morning.

In duty bound, professional military minds have to prepare plans for any possible emergency and combination without bias. Colonel Repington recalls in a chapter of his war memoirs. ". . . our military understanding with France 1906-1914; how the French military attaché in London, Major Huguet, found in 1906 the 2nd bureau of the French General Staff 'deeply engaged in an academic plan for the invasion of England,' when he came to offer close collaboration with the British Forces to prepare plans of combined action in case of a war with Germany."

In the decade preceding 1914, the Chiefs of Staff had grown more and more nervous lest the political leaders should underrate the momentum of rearmament gaining speed toward 1917. In the later days of July, they asked their governments for leeway to take precautionary measures in the fear that potential enemies of tomorrow should outwit them. Marshal Joffre had manned the Franco-German frontiers on July 28 without consent of his government. The First Lord of the Admiralty had kept the British fleet one-half mobilized at the end of the July maneuvers. The Chief of the German Staff informed Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on July 28 that a two-front mobilization timetable had been discarded in 1913 and that the safety of Germany depended on the immediate request to Belgium to grant passage of troops. The military machines warmed up overhead while the statesmen were contemplating. It may have been impossible for even greater men to keep cool heads in such an atmosphere of wild rumors, led by ancient feuds of Foreign Offices and their Excellencies the Vanities in official and private garb. The Italian snowball of 1911 rolled faster and faster downhill. Soon an avalanche buried the peace of the world for decades. Nine million men had to die in their prime during the first stage, 1914-18.

All General Staffs were ready to strike and win—they said. None of the experts judged that the march to the various capitals could lead to a world conflagration and be for more than a matter of months. The millions following the drums had even a lesser inkling of what fate awaited them and what the war was all about. They honestly believed they were defending their homelands in loyalty to their oath and birthright.

In Russia, one day of declaration of war was sufficient to swing the masses to a new goal—a phenomenon of mass psychosis—quite apart from the ballyhoo of the official propaganda. The students of Moscow and Petersburg, by tradition radical to the core, now formed the vanguard of patriotic demonstrations, marching under the battle cry "To Berlin, to Berlin," offering "as the most faithful lieges of His Imperial Majesty the expressions of undying love for the Fatherland." Yesterday, the streets had been crowded with grim battalions of strikers, insisting on inalienable rights of individual freedom. Today, gigantic processions of the same toilers carried icons, portraits of the Little Father and national banners

to the Winter Palace, where the blood of their kin had tainted the snow in 1905. There the people went to their knees in homage as the Tsar appeared on the balcony. Under the chorus of the Tsarist hymn, the panes of the German Embassy splintered with the missiles of the crowd. A unified Russia was again willing to go to war for Tsar and Fatherland.

Whoever has once watched the annual Feast of the Blessing of the Water on the banks of the ice-clad Neva, could explain the secret of the sudden change of emotions within twenty-four hours. Thousands of awed people listened on their knees in the bitter cold to the prayers of the clergy in gorgeous robes, their breaths rising to the sky. The Tsar, God's deputy on Russian earth, the Savior's own choice, stood out surrounded by the peers of the realm, the court, the diplomatic corps and high dignitaries in resplendent uniforms. Escorts of the black-bearded Horse Guards on black steeds, the double eagle spreading on the golden helmets, the blond Cavalier Guards on chestnuts, the snub-nosed Pavlovsk Life Guards on bays flanked the procession. The basses and boys' voices rang out in melodious persuasion. One does not need the Russian ear for music and eye for color to sense why centuries of poverty and of little liberty had not eradicated the traditional magnetism radiating from the mitre-crown and all it stood for.

The call of the bugles was answered without fail. As a mere precaution, the sale of vodka was banned for the duration.

War had come so fast after all that the cherished prize of the Straits had not even been properly underwritten by the Allies. With some hesitation, Great Britain signed the contract in March, 1915. France insisted on the exchange, note for note, of a guarantee for the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, before giving the pledge for the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to be wrested from Turkey at the future peace table. The documents were to be kept secret.

4. NINE MILLIONS TO DIE

In St. Petersburg everybody hoped for a short war. Stocks of war materials were expected to last for six months, which was 50 per cent in excess of the estimated need. Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, and Maurice Paléologue, his French colleague, predicted that the war would be over by Christmas. In September,

1914, the latter admitted that the Russians could not stand up to the superior generalship of the Germans, the weight of their ammunition and the excellence of their transport. Count Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, as early as September 14, 1914, bemoaned Germany's tragic fate in the two-front war. But when Trotsky in the same month asked Molkenbuhr, a leading German Social Democrat in Zurich what chance Germany had of coming through, he got the answer: "Within the next two months we will have beaten the French. Then we shall turn against the Russians and in three, four months, at the most, we shall give Europe a lasting peace."

The natural consequence in Russia of the united patriotism of all classes was a political truce. The former opposition in the Duma beat the drums for a war-aims program extended even beyond the conquest of the Straits. Castles in the air were plentiful. While German industrialists were demanding the Lowgwy-Brie basin to secure a larger hold of raw materials, Milukov, the leader of the Cadets, supported the annexation by Russia of East Galicia and Carpatho-Russia, West Galicia and Posen, East Prussia with Königsberg, Adrianople and the Marmara coast, Turkish Transcaucasia and Turkish Armenia. To lick the platter clean, the liberals added Istanbul and part of the Anatolian coast as strategically necessary for the defense of the Straits. What could be expected from other quarters in Russia when an enlightened mind seriously advocated the imperialistic policy to extinguish which once and for all in the better world to follow the war was fought?

In the Duma meeting of August, 1914, the necessity of war was solemnly attested. The factions of the bourgeoisie knew their patriotic duty. The Trudoviki opposed war credits, but Kerensky himself read a patriotic address. The Menshevist Manikov pleaded for war credits and a party truce, and was dismissed from his faction. The remaining Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Duma declared that they would abstain from voting on the motion for war credits, to prevent the public from interpreting their opposition to the motion as support of the Central Powers.

For the Left, the situation was difficult. Some of their leaders were on the way to the International Socialist Congress in Vienna. Others had been for a long time émigrés without overt contact with Russia. Others had been arrested and some of them deported to

Siberia at the outbreak of war. The confusion of opinion led to the formation of new groups. For the Russian Socialists, the German Social Democrats had been a model, a sound organization with a strong press, a powerful parliamentary group and great educational and theoretical prowess, a potent member of the International. Adding to this might the socialist "free" labor unions under the party's exclusive control, the Socialist party of Germany seemed an imposing force.

This stalwart body had voted in the Reichstag meeting of August 4, 1914, for war credits and a political truce. To the International this was treason. Trotsky reports that even the observant Lenin was surprised at the report of the socialist *Vorwaerts* which was shown to him at Zurich and "was firmly convinced that the issue had been counterfeited by the General Staff to intimidate the enemy."

Trotsky explains the disappointment of the Russians: "For us, the German Socialist party was the mother, the teacher, the living symbol. From afar, we idolized it. We spelled the names of Bebel and Kautsky with awe."

The Stuttgart Socialist Congress of 1907 had accepted a resolution sponsored by Lenin, Martov and Rosa Luxemburg calling on all Socialist parties and their parliamentary groups to employ all means to prevent war. If unsuccessful, they should promote a speedy termination of war by agitation and propaganda. At the Basle Congress of 1912 war had seemed so near that the Austrian Marxists were exhorted "to prevent an attack against Serbia," and the Russian and Polish workers told to "resist any warlike Tsarist adventure and any attack or plot against Armenia or Constantinople."

The confusion grew as majorities in the French, Belgian and Austrian Socialist parties accepted the thesis of national defense. In great numbers, socialist refugees of all the Russian factions enlisted in the French army. The Nestor of Russian Socialists, Plekhanov, led the movement. He gave as his reason the belief that a German victory would mean the destruction of European democracy. He also proposed a change of attitude toward the home government and acceptance of the party truce. The Lausanne Conference of 1915 saw the union of these Socialist patriots with the Social Revolutionaries in support of the entente.

Only a few émigrés failed to join the patriots. Axelrod and

Martov called the war "all-around imperialism" and refused to distinguish attackers and defenders. Neither victors nor vanquished, neither annexations nor indemnities should be the aim of all free people. Trotsky hoped for a reunion of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks on this ground. Lenin had been arrested in Galicia by the Austrian police in the first days of the war, but was released shortly afterwards through the intervention of the Austrian Social Democrats. When he came to Zurich with his wife, N. Krupskaja, he found only a small group of Bolsheviks, without influence in the emigration and without contacts in Russia. Lenin set to work on a treatise against the war, which was smuggled into Russia. "Peace is the wrong watchword," he wrote. "It is the cry of the popes and the little fellows. The national war should rather be transformed into a civil war. No sabotage of the war effort, no individual resistance of the national war, but mass propaganda."

Lenin declared that the majority of the Second International, corrupted by opportunism and reformism, had committed treason and destroyed the band of brothers. The interests of the Russian proletariat would be furthered by the defeat of the Tsarist monarchy and international chauvinism. The proletarian propaganda should advocate "revolution in Russia, the liberation of all nations and races subjugated by Russia, self-determination, a Russian democratic republic, the confiscation of all estates, an eight-hour working day, German, Polish and Austrian republics and a United Republic of Europe."

A manifesto written in October, 1914, published these aims in all clarity. But the Bolsheviks found at first no followers, either abroad or in Russia. Zinoviev, who belonged to the innermost circle around Lenin, describes the reception they got when they asked Robert Grimm, the left-wing representative of the Second International in Switzerland, to reprint a few passages of the manifesto. "He looked on us with deep regret as lunatics of a sort and said that he could not print documents of political madness."

In November, 1914, the manifesto had reached the Bolsheviks in Petersburg. The five Duma deputies and Kamenev, a member of the Central Committee, while discussing the document, were arrested. In court, they claimed to be opposed to the contents of the manifesto, especially to the fight against chauvinism and for revolution. All were nevertheless sentenced to deportation to Siberia.

Lenin continued to stress in his literary work the necessity of combating the narrow chauvinism and the nationalism which was increasing in all the warring countries and threatening to become a gospel. In understanding the Bolshevik attitude to the liberation of nations and races, an article of December, 1914, on national pride is of some historical interest.

We love our language and our country. We are the foremost fighters for the elevation of the toiling masses—nine-tenths of the population—to a consciously democratic and socialist life. . . . We have not forgotten that the great Russian democrat Chernichevsky, who gave his life to the cause of revolution, said: “A despicable nation, a nation of serfs, above and below—all slaves!” The acknowledged and the disguised slaves of the Tsarist monarchy dislike being reminded of these words. But we believe them to be words of real love for our country, of a love which suffered under the lack of revolutionary spirit among the masses. In his time, it was lacking. We are filled with national pride that this spirit is now alive though only to a small degree, that the Great Russian nation has also produced a revolutionary class, has also proven that she can give mankind impressive champions of freedom and socialism and not only types grovelling before the popes, the capitalists, the squires and the Tsar, not only series of pogroms, rows of gallows, torture chambers, colossal famines. . . . We, the Great Russian workers, filled with national pride, want at any price an independent and free Great Russia, a proud democratic republic treating its neighbors on the principle of human equality, not on the principles, degrading to every nation, of subservience and prerogative. To this end we say: “In the twentieth century one cannot defend the Fatherland, either in Europe or in the Far East, by any other means than the use of all revolutionary methods against the monarchy, the landowners, and the capitalists, who are the worst enemies of every country.”

The war led Russian chauvinism to wild excesses. Petersburg became Petrograd. Traditional pogroms hit those with German names and all foreign born. When the Supreme Command ordered unreliable elements removed from the border districts, the police deported Latvians, Lithuanians and Jews wholesale. Edmond de Rothschild complained in July, 1916, that the “Jews have been dreadfully harried in Russia. Two hundred fifty of their villages have been destroyed and 500,000 are wandering about homeless.” It was a mass migration of misery and despair. Whatever measures had been adopted in past decades of Russification were continued with increased brutality. The Poles were upset not only that none of the political liberties promised by the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander in Chief were realized, but that the country was invaded by

a horde of popes "ramming Russian Orthodoxy down the throats of the Catholic Poles."

The stubborn peasants fought valiantly and died in droves behind their captains and lieutenants in the same solid echelons as the Germans and French along the Aisne, Somme and Marne and the British at Mons. There was no difference in valor between the thick gray lines and the thin red lines of "heroes." But on the average the Russian generalship was below the European standard. The original Palycin plan envisaged a concentration of the bulk of the Russian armies against the Austrians in Galicia and a mere observation force along the German border. After the Austrians had been crushed by numerical superiority in man power, a strong thrust was to roll up the German forces through Silesia and Saxony toward Berlin.

Anxious to be relieved of pressure in the west, the French insisted that East Prussia should be invaded at once. Three armies were detailed with initial success. General Skoropadsky at the head of the Household Brigade, later Hetman of the Ukraine under German control, rode into Insterburg. The reverses that followed culminated at Tannenberg. Neither did the calculations of the German General Staff mature. After the setback at the Marne no more troops were transferred from the west front. The victory of Tannenberg could not be followed up by the intended drive between the Russian forces in the region of Warsaw and along the classic routes to Petersburg and Moscow. But the losses of men and equipment were severe enough by the end of 1914 to prevent the Russians from making use of their overwhelming superiority in man power.

The losses of officers, non-commissioned officers and even men were appalling, in round figures half a million up to the beginning of 1915. The reservists were absolutely untrained, hardly able to handle a rifle. There was such a lack of weapons that the newcomers could not be sent to regiments in the front line but were assigned to supply columns, clogging the wheels behind.

With rising anarchy in production, supply and prices, industrialists took the initiative. Guchkov and Konovalov organized a War Production Board to switch the heavy industries from peacetime work to war needs. Today the world is accustomed to the elaborate transformation of industry, agriculture and business in wartime. In the Russia of 1915, this new deal met the thinly veiled displeasure of the bureaucrats. The "All Russian Union of Zemstovs

and Cities" centralized contracting with small and home industries and organized care for the wounded, sick and refugees. Their delegates came into direct contact with the front and with local conditions at home. They saw the corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy. Before long, the liberal factions of the Duma regained courage to found a "progressive bloc" and requested a parliamentary executive in the interests of victory.

The government's reactions corresponded to the changing military situation. When the scales dipped, they were ready for concessions, convened the Duma and dismissed unpopular ministers. The slightest success in the field stiffened their backs. The Duma was adjourned, any compromise rejected, the former ministers recalled. This game increased the political tension in all quarters. Headquarters blamed the War Office and the Court, where the protégés of Grigori Rasputin still held the reins, for the reverses of the war. The Petersburg circle answered by forcing the dismissal of Grand Duke Nicolaï and his transfer to the Caucasus Command in August, 1915, persuading the Tsar to take over the Supreme Command with General Alexeiev as Chief of Staff. The shuffling and reshuffling of ministers and generals did not change the downward course of the economy.

The frivolity of the counselors who had insisted, according to the archives which the Bolsheviks made public in 1917, that Russia go to war unprepared though not attacked or even threatened with attack, did more to undermine the trust of the people in the regime than the actual losses of men, which a peasant population views more stoically than other nations. A simpleton could see after the first year of war that nothing had been prepared or planned for the needs of modern war outside the narrow realm of an army commissariat. The Russian granary of Europe was never more than a myth. Before 1914 Russian production per head of population was only one-half to one-quarter that of the other grain-exporting countries. Russia had exported to the detriment of domestic consumption, because the peasant sold under pressure of his creditors even before taking into account his own needs for food and feed. Higher consumption by the armed forces, lack of farm hands, the breakdown of transportation and the inflation of paper roubles were reasonable explanations for the dearth. As Russia could not blame a blockade or enemy action, the public blamed the government to the full.

The war stopped the benevolent progress of the Stolypin reform, which had been improving the productivity of peasant land. In the spring of 1915 up to 24 per cent less seeding was done, leaving out of account the 8½ billion dessjatines occupied by the Central Powers. The percentage of fallow land increased to 42 per cent by the end of the war. Quality of work and of seeds slumped progressively. There was scarcity of tools and machinery. No horseshoes or nails, no iron for repairs. Watermills and windmills stood idle. Implements from all countries, for example, scythes, had been imported from Styria or Solingen. The zemstvos tried to improvise the manufacture of scythes in sheds by home workers and encouraged Russian factories to take up the production of agricultural machinery. The competition of shell making and arms boring restricted the delivery of machinery to a trickle of 4 per cent of orders in 1916.

To the industrial sector, the war brought at first a superficial boom. All lathes and benches were in demand. Lack of foresight on the part of the authorities could not, however, be remedied by the War Production Board. The army mobilized all available man power regardless of the fact that of 7.5 million men called up in 1914-15 only 5 million could be armed. The lumber, oil and leather industries had depended on export markets. Distilleries closed down with the *monopolka* stores. Cotton mills, chemical and pharmaceutical factories lacked imported raw materials. Though the mass transfer of factories from Poland and subsequently occupied regions into the interior required an army of movers, there should have been enough reserve power to keep mining and war industries in full productivity. Lack of ability to improvise among the bureaucrats with their professional taste for red tape and private love of graft made a quagmire of the Russian economy in spite of seasonal and regional improvements.

✓Against this background, public morale quickly deteriorated. Revolutionary courage revived. A conference of commanders in chief at Headquarters in December, 1916, reported that "army morale was unhinged." General Russky of the Northern Command declared that Riga and Dvinsk were "two totally poisoned holes" and the curse of the northern front. General Brussilov, in command of the Southern Army Group, complained that the Seventh Siberian Corps had arrived from Riga utterly jaded and refused to attack. General Evert confirmed that the failure of logistics ruined spirit and discipline

in the army. The reports of the surveillance posts of the Military Police and of the Duma deputies were of the same tenor. In October, 1916, the police reports confirm, the wish for peace at any price was heard openly. The public was tired of the war.

✓ The legend of a stab-in-the-back, which was to become such an effective slogan in German postwar politics, had no foundation whatsoever in Russia, but played its role, nevertheless, in the Civil War to come.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION OF 1917

I. THE LITTLE FATHER WALKS OUT

THE Russian armies had retreated from Galicia and Russian Poland with heavy losses to positions on difficult ground. The outstretched line was held from the end of 1915 to the end of 1916 under adverse conditions, without proper equipment or sufficient artillery. The War for the Fatherland ossified in disconsolate trenches. Evacuated territory had been scorched. Whole villages were razed in a repetition of the policy of 1812, which had proved successful against Napoleon. But times had changed. As even certain generals later pointed out, the enemy suffered comparatively little from these measures, as he had ample rail communications behind his front line, whereas the morale of the Russian troops, who questioned the value of the devastation and regarded it as a sort of reprisal against their own people, suffered. The rising number of deserters carried this mood far across Russia.

The repeated drafts of new classes disorganized national production. There was no reservation or priority for skilled labor. In May, 1916, the Ministry of War warned Headquarters that "now more than 10 per cent of the population of military age have been drafted. The class 1918 will be the last reserve until Fall." There was no energetic action to relieve the pressure. The whole economy seemed to have fallen into a coma. The tottering regime lacked the regenerative power to overcome the accustomed jogging on in the old groove.

Rioting started in Moscow in June, 1915, releasing the piled-up tension. The mob pillaged German stores, smashed signs bearing non-Russian names and demonstrated in the end against the government. Judicious elements among the bureaucracy, the aristocracy and the citizens knew that the spreading of unrest would summon

the ghosts of 1905. It might bring discontented and hungry workers and the peasants in uniform up in arms not only against the regime but against all conservative elements. They set to work from different quarters to stem the incoming tide. Some wanted to speed up the war effort for victory. Others wanted to extricate Russia from the unsavory war, if necessary by a separate peace.

Sazonov won the support of the Minister of Agriculture, Krivoshein, in advocating that the government rely on the social forces and open the upper safety valve. A conference of the cabinet and the Supreme Command undersigned the proposal. At the end of June, 1915, the Tsar issued a ukase for a War Production Board, authorizing a special conference of departmental officials, representatives of the legislative bodies and industry to decide questions of army supplies. "I also consider it expedient to convene the legislative bodies at their early convenience so that I can hear the voice of the people." This archaically worded proclamation had not the desired effect. The dismissal of the Grand Duke Nicolai in early September, 1915, from the Supreme Command, and the Tsar's haste in taking over the baton increased public distrust, although Alexeiev, who became acting Chief of Staff, rated as the best strategist available in the higher ranks. The exchange of posts was interpreted as the result of Court intrigues. It is a fact that the Tsarina wrote to the Tsar at Headquarters at Mogilev: "Tell him to leave at once for the South. Quite a number of bad elements have gathered around him to make the most of him." The grand-ducal uncle was allowed to rest for three weeks on his estate before taking over the command of the Caucasus Army and the viceregal lodge from Count Voronov-Dashkov. The head of the diplomatic chancellery at Headquarters, Prince Kudashev, reported to his chief, Sazonov, that "the majority of officers believe that the Grand Duke Nicolai favored war to the end and, therefore, has been removed by the influence of the 'German' faction." The Grand Duke in the prewar days had been the focal supporter of the entente. So it was natural that the whispering campaign should hint that peace negotiations—reasonable in any war until successfully concluded—and "German" intrigues at the Court were responsible for the shake-up. An extraordinary meeting of the town parliament in Moscow protested, and M. Rodsjanko, the chairman of the Imperial Duma, adjured the Tsar in a letter on the Grand Duke's behalf to rescind decision. Others got

an inkling of the coming storm. "If only we are spared Revolution," groaned General Danilov, the Quartermaster General.

Whatever bubbles appeared on the surface did not rise from any stirring of the masses. On one side, the established keepers of old traditions insisted on extreme autocracy vesting all power in the person of the legitimate sovereign. On the other side, monarchists of the same staunch breed played with the idea of an insurrection to replace the Tsar by another Romanov, to save both the country and the regime. Members of the ruling class and the bourgeoisie in both camps tried to gain political power for the legislative bodies.

The real crux of the situation was the decay of Russia's military might. The General Staff could not prevent the rout of the Roumanian Army by Mackensen and the complete loss of the initiative. Enervating trench warfare was forced upon the Russians. General Gurko summed up the cheerless results at an inter-Allied conference in January, 1917. Fourteen million men had been drafted since July, 1914. Two million were dead or crippled. Two million had been taken prisoner. These four million had been the best trained fighters of the first line. Now there were seven and a half million under arms and two and a half million in reserve. But at the front only an infinitesimal part of the active soldiers and officers survived. This impressive statement was only known at that time to the top men of the entente. From individual knowledge of the happenings in tiny sectors of the front, at the depots and in the far-away homes soldiers and civilians alike sensed the presages of breakdown without the need of a Gallup poll. An offensive, to allow an outlet for the passive discontent of the masses, seemed inconceivable. Nobody could imagine anything but a stubborn holding on for a miracle. Long before the actual fall the cause was lost.

On the home front a majority of the Duma had formed a "progressive bloc," prepared to actively intervene in tangled affairs of state and demanding a share in a responsible executive, a cabinet commanding "general confidence." In 1916, for the first time in the history of parliament, the Duma was opened in the presence of the Tsar. This underlined the ceremonial character of the occasion, which had, anyway, been delayed for months, but by no means bridged the gulf between the government and the Duma.

✓At the Court the Tsarina held the reins. "Never forget that you are sovereign in your own right—Thank God, Russia is not a consti-

tutional state. . . ." And again, in March, 1916, she wrote to her consort: "You must not give way. . . . It must be your war and your peace, your and our country's honor, but on no account the Duma's. They have no right to thrust their noses into this business, not the slightest."

Goremykin, the senile and incompetent guardian of undivided sovereignty, the unruffled adversary of the Duma, whose presence on the government bench the liberal deputies felt as a deliberate provocation, had resigned. The nomination of Boris Stuermer, a notorious reactionary, as successor was construed by members of the entente and in liberal circles as an open move toward a separate peace with Germany and a confirmation of Rasputin's influence at Court. General Kurlov, Chief of Police, commented on Stuermer: "One cannot blame him for believing that the war with Germany was the greatest misfortune that ever befell Russia and never had any serious political foundation." The new Prime Minister represented the faction of the bureaucracy who were convinced that to continue the war would destroy the regime and their own positions. History in the meantime proved them right. They may have been influenced by a deep-rooted antipathy against western European democracy as represented by France and England. They advocated a break with the entente and separate peace.

The progressive bloc in the Duma was united only in the attempt to secure a hold on the government and to carry on the war. They did not dare to pass a vote of censure or to leave the road of opportunism. The Court's technique was simpler. Whenever the Duma expressed confidence in one of the Crown's ministers, he was replaced. This happened in March, 1916, to the Minister of War, Polivanov. Only one member of the team that held office at the beginning of the war still remained, a friend of the Entente who had opposed the shift in command and was no longer a favorite with Their Majesties: Sazonov. His foreign policy was supported by the big businessmen who were forced in their own interests to side against the autocratic regime, with which they had compromised for many decades.

Under Stuermer, there was no room for Sazonov. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, intervened in vain in his favor. In July, 1916, the Prime Minister took over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The rightist press hailed this step as removing the dangerous

fiction of a cabinet enjoying general confidence. The extreme Right became more and more aggressive, trying to popularize the idea of separate peace without undermining the regime. A member of the notorious "Union of the Russian people," Bulazev, a lawyer, published, and the censor passed, a provocative article with a heavy attack on England and Prime Minister Lloyd George. "The Entente are protracting the war unnecessarily in order to secure the extradition and trial of the Kaiser. England will fight to the last drop of blood in a Russian soldier." The writer was forced to apologize to the British Ambassador, but alleged that Stuermer, when instructing him to do so, had assured him that he shared his views.

The five months from November, 1916, to March, 1917, preceding the final collapse of Tsardom, brought neither the mass of the people nor the labor parties conspicuously to the fore. The parties of the Right tried hard to find a solution to stave off the approaching revolution and to save the country from defeat. Stuermer, vain and incompetent, had become Prime Minister thanks to Rasputin, who had "probed his soul." Stuermer at the head of the Foreign Office symbolized the Court's refusal to make concessions to the Liberal opposition and the intention to make a separate peace. Stuermer was therefore the principal target of attacks accusing the government of treason. Another of Rasputin's protégés was Protopopov, an Octobrist and deputy Speaker of the Duma. When he resigned to take over the portfolio of the Interior he was catcalled as traitor by the incensed Duma bloc. In Stockholm, in the summer of 1916 Protopopov happened to meet Max Warburg, the Hamburg banker, and discussed the peace terms of the Central Powers with him. After that visit, attacks against the government became more heated. Destiny decided that the Liberals who led the attack should dig their own graves. Without much effort and without great sacrifice Russia could have concluded a peace that would have given the masses the rest they craved, have left the monarchy shaken but intact and ready to submit to parliamentary rule. The Central Powers, who were looked upon as the defenders of reaction, had already furnished evidence that no absolute regime would be able to survive the war unchanged. The whole atmosphere in which the Russian Liberals lived was so poisoned with the characteristic superficialities of yesterday that they disdained the possibility of liquidating their engagement before the night of despair had settled down.

The Liberals stuck to the theme that the war was patriotic, just and reasonable. "I shall not make peace before the last enemy has left Russian soil," a proclamation of Alexander I in 1812, repeated by Nicholas II, was acclaimed by the Duma opposition. They saw the cause of all trouble at the front in the incapacity of the commanders favored by the Court camarilla. The army itself was supposed to be a solid and intact force, ready to fight under competent leaders. The gift of self-deception is so common in man that one cannot in fairness blame those blind upholders of liberal tradition. In public declarations the leaders of the liberal parties stressed Russian loyalty to the Allies' cause. The Speaker of the Duma, Rosdjanko, an Octobrist, declared untrue the rumors that a separate peace was under way. The leader of the Octobrists, Shidlovsky, was more cautious. "The Government have no serious objection to fighting a successful war." Miliukov, leader of the Cadets, earned applause with the indictment: "Stupidity or treason?" when he had laid all evils at the door of the cabinet and accused the Prime Minister of connivance with the enemy. The whole opposition cheered his charge of treason. On the surface, the attack was successful. Stuermer declared the rumors of a separate peace unfounded, and resigned. His successor was Trepov, the Minister of Transportation. After ten days of hectic debate he adjourned the Duma.

More than a decade had passed since the end of the Russo-Japanese War and the First Revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie had experienced years of comparative freedom. Yet they had kept memories of dangerous if short periods of the outbreak of popular emotions, of real power wielded by a proletariat and peasantry whose aims extended far beyond the democratic control of public life envisaged by liberals. This was a lesson to be read in the history of all great social movements. More than that, it had been vividly illustrated on the Russian body politic. Citizens of standing sensed that the social structure was again nearing a breaking point. They did not define the extent of the threatening break or the means to avert it. The rallying point for the liberals and awakening members of the aristocracy and gentry was the renewed conviction that the bureaucracy was outmoded and unable to administer public affairs. Common consent to this gave the ringleaders of the bourgeoisie new courage. A. J. Konovalov, textile manufacturer and member of the

Duma, later Minister of Commerce under Prince Lvov, ventured to state that the degenerate aristocracy had outlived its historic role and should make room for the bourgeoisie.

The Court circles had varied reactions. One section saw the only salvation of the monarchy, the dynasty and their own existence in peace at once. They were prepared to "betray the Allies," to cede every imperialist aim, Constantinople, Armenia and Galicia, at least for the time, and to pay a huge indemnity. Others, mostly military dignitaries, contemplated dethroning the Tsar, interning the Tsarina in a convent and "fighting to the victorious end." Being soldiers, they hesitated to acknowledge the real condition of the army but proposed a strictly constitutional monarchy as the beginning of political and economic reform. The frail young heir to the throne was to replace his father under the regency of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievich, who was to form a cabinet responsible to the Duma under Prince Lvov.

The technique of the Young Turks, who had deposed the Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1909 by a palace revolution, served as a model to men like Guchkov, the Octobrist, who had fought as a volunteer on the Boer side in South Africa and with the Macedonian guerillas, Terechenko, the sugar king and later minister, Krymov, the cavalry general. Members of the Zemstvos and the City League under the leadership of Prince Lvov and the mayor of Moscow, Chelnokov, actively circulated similar views. But the High Command, Alexeiev, Brussilov and Russky, were opposed to any action in wartime that might shake the military front, which "anyway, cannot be considered very stable."

A third section of conspirators, who naively believed Rasputin and his sinister influence to be the source of all evil, reached their goal. Prince Felix Yussupov, Grand Duke Dimitri Pavlovich and Purishkevich, a Duma member of the Right, acted together. The news of the assassination reached headquarters in Mogilev during a meeting of the War Council to which all Commanders in Chief had been called. The Tsar left at once for Tsarskoje Zelo. This thoughtless behavior roused the anger of those present. "They realized that time had come when the country needed another sovereign and the Army another leader," wrote General Danilov.

All these attempts were doomed. The plotters worked on a plat-

form not only too small but worm-eaten as well. The system they tried to preserve was unfit to endure.

Once before, the bureaucracy had felt the impact of a great force. In 1905 this stubborn caste had survived the earthquake. Not one bastion had been ceded, not one privilege lost. Now they were up against a far more complicated and difficult situation. War was being waged on home soil. The desperate feelings in the trenches traveled faster than they had from the reaches of Manchuria and Siberia. The disorganization of supply and production was common knowledge. All classes of society seethed with indignation over the lack of efficiency. The administration was surrounded by harsh critics. In 1905 they had fought with all the resources of officialdom. In 1917 they stood pat, relying in their conservative instinct on the law of continuity and the conviction of indispensability. The only actual danger they feared—marching battalions of workers and peasants—was not yet in sight. Political leaders looked farther ahead. "Has anyone of you delved earnestly into the history of the eclipse of the eighteenth century? Remember the France of those years! What a breathtaking picture and what a gruelling likeness! If you read the pages of history, you cannot escape the conclusion: These are our own days!" exclaimed Shingarov of the Cadets in the Duma.

Alexander Kerensky, the leader of the Trudoviki, warned: "We move in a maze of troubles unknown in the history of our country. Not political institutions alone, but the whole economy are chaotic."

Petrograd became once more the opening scene of rebellion. It was an industrial center with a fairly homogeneous type of worker. The economic crisis was felt earlier there than in the provinces. Illegal party agitators could contact sympathizers and find hiding with friends more easily. The war had ended all regular cell activities at its start. The Mensheviki were in favor of the participation of labor members in the War Production Board, the Bolsheviks were against it.

The latter had declared: "The revolutionary proletariat must attempt to transform the war into a civil war, in order to acerbate class feelings. The worst enemies of a nation are in its own midst: the Government, the native bourgeoisie." Only remnants of a faction remained, however, to carry on in dwarf cells under the

strictest cover and with grotesque difficulties. When Valeriu Marcu arrived in Petrograd in November, 1916, as Lenin's courier he could only trace a small group of faithful followers.

Small issues of leaflets were smuggled into factories. Shlapnikov, a member of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, repeated in a report of this stratagem Lenin's instructions on civil war after the Revolution of 1905. He added: "Our adversaries from the Cadets to Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries find fault with us for preparing a bloody adventure which will injure democracy by repelling the progressive elements of the bourgeoisie. They prefer to follow the Duma bloc in seeking a bloodless victory. We are free of such petty illusions and do not betray the proletariat by holding out hopes of victory without sacrifice." Before the anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution of 1905, January 22, the chief of the Petrograd Ochrana gave his opinion that "a number of arrests have decimated the underground movement. This year only a few isolated attempts to strike on the 22nd January may be expected. None will be organized."

About 300,000 workers did, nevertheless, strike on the day of anniversary in Petrograd alone. In Moscow, Charkov, Baku and Nishni-Novgorod similar strikes occurred. The government kept the Duma adjourned and arrested eleven labor members of the War Production Board. More strikes followed. The police received machine guns. Street demonstrations roused the masses in February and March to a pitch unknown since 1906. "Give us bread and peace," echoed the walls of the cities.

✓ The Tsar, who had stayed at Tsarskoje Zelo since the death of Rasputin, left the capital on the day of the first riots. From Headquarters, he ordered the Minister of War, General Beliaiev, to "suppress disorder in the capital within twenty-four hours." Petrograd suffered real hunger. The Putilov works locked out 30,000 men, who thronged the streets inciting other workers to quit. Clashes with the police increased. Cossacks and other troops, peasants in uniform without the stiff prewar training, no longer as eager as in 1914-16 to die for Tsar and Fatherland, showed signs of unrest. The grand dukes, the generals, the monarchists in the Duma sensed a climax of unrest and talked once more of the necessity for abdication.

While the Duma parties concocted various schemes of diversion, the masses had moved once again without leadership or instruction. They had no co-ordinated plan, no clear goal. They wanted peace and more to eat. History proves that only revolutions from above follow a line of prepared strategy. Popular revolutions start as local disturbances of the public peace. They spread if the time is ripe for spontaneous mass action. If not, they fade out, often without leaving a ripple on the surface. After a certain progress of mass hysteria a party can gain more support by newcomers who come out of the dark fired by sudden emotions.

March 12 was the date of victory for the Revolution. After the Arsenal and the Fortress of Sts. Peter and Paul had been occupied by the rebels, the police retained only a few isolated strongholds in the city. During the night, news came through that the Kronstadt fortress, which commanded the approaches to Petrograd by sea, had surrendered to the Revolution. The government had no other bastion to fall back on outside of the capital. This quick success surprised all political parties without exception, from the Court circles to the Bolsheviki. Court and bureaucracy had felt secure in all previous revolts behind the traditional buttresses of the state and had never experienced a victorious revolt. With a natural instinct of self-preservation they took to an elastic defense when pressed hard by the uprising. The news that soldiers had fraternized with the workers and joined in active operations was a painful deviation from the pattern of 1905, where workers, peasants and sailor-soldiers had made isolated insurrections without co-ordination.

This surprise compelled action. As the armed forces seemed to be no longer pillars of Tsardom, the solution nearest at hand was the abdication of the Tsar. Rosdjanko, the Duma president, wired to the sovereign: "The situation grows worse. Immediate measures must be taken. Tomorrow, it may be too late. This is the hour that will decide the fate of the Fatherland and of the dynasty." The Tsar did not believe him. The fat old Rosdjanko had written nonsense again. The generals were the next to move, with greater authority. General Alexeiev, the Chief of the General Staff, sent a circular telegram to all commanders of armies, suggesting that each should approach the Tsar directly recommending abdication. All wired their "most obedient" opinions that the Tsar's withdrawal from the stage would save the dynasty and allow the continuance of the war. They all suffered under an illusion. Most to the point was the

commander in chief of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Nepanin. "It is only with the greatest difficulty that I can maintain discipline. If the abdication is not resolved within the next few orders, a catastrophe will result."

Now the Tsar gave in. He abdicated in favor of his brother Michael. His last order of the day, never published, mentions the "war which must be fought to the end" and the "traitor to the country, who wishfully dreams of peace." Grand Duke Michael never succeeded to the throne. Again, a necessary step had been taken too late.

2. THE SOVIET AS SOVEREIGN

When the revolutionary energies of the proletariat and the regular soldiers combined in one action, the circulation of the state instantly clogged. The police force, although heavily armed, was unable to sustain political authority without the traditional backing of the armed forces.

The Liberal opposition to the regime did not see the trend of events any more clearly than the friends of autocracy. They were too near the scene. Besides, to choose the right course when history is turning over a leaf of the book is less a matter of experience and knowledge than of instinct. The defeatist of today may become the hero or the traitor of tomorrow. For decades the Russian middle class had bid for a share in the legislative functions of the Tsar. They intended to play the political game in strict adherence to the Western rules of constitutional monarchy, in which they would accept feudal survivors and the Crown as partners. The sudden uprising of the unguided lower classes of the capital on March 12, 1917, left no time for the intricate negotiations between the government and the Duma opposition to which both sides had grown accustomed. The Liberals were still striving for an amicable division of power when the Duma, by one of the last acts of the Tsar, was dissolved, and they meekly accepted the verdict. They convened in private meeting, doubtful of the legality of the procedure. Rosdjanko spoke to the former deputies of "the necessity of subduing the rebellion, though we do not yet know the size and strength of their forces." The Cadet Nakrazov recommended handing over the executive to a man of great popularity, to be assisted by representatives of the Duma. The Prime Minister, Prince Palycin, should be asked to

name the former Minister of War, General Polivanov, or General Manikovskiy, dictator. Only one of the Liberals present, Rehevskiy, felt the breath of the Revolution. He warned against delaying the decisions the people had been waiting for since the Court House was raided, and urged action.

Alexander Kerensky and Cheidse, leaders of the Trudoviki and Mensheviks, asked for power of attorney to proclaim solidarity with the Revolution. Miliukov, undisputed leader of the Cadets, opposed the motion on the ground that negotiations concerning the political administration should be excluded. The Duma was a legislative body, without the right to interfere with the executive. Even more definite was the Octobrist Zavich. "The streets cannot grant us any executive power. The Duma is the last refuge of legality. . . . If we act illegally, we lose the character of a legislative body, and the Duma ceases to exist." Reluctantly and on the eve of parting it was resolved to form a Provisional Committee of Action and to request members of the Duma to remain in Petersburg.

These debates took place while the streets were seething with excited masses and there were rebels on the steps of the Tauride Palais in which the Duma sat. Before trying to seize the reins themselves and accepting responsibility, they thought of a military dictatorship as the easier way out. How could they expect the masses to yield to such leadership? The Provisional Committee was not given power of attorney because the Duma had not been legally convened. Its only purpose was to bridle the Revolution, to restore order in the streets and the Duma's relations to the government and public institutions. The solution of the dilemma of legality came unexpectedly.

Rebels had entered the Duma building on the heels of the departing deputies, installed machine guns and posted guards. Without regard to parliamentary procedure, an Executive Committee of the Workers' Soviet was formed. A few hours later, posters informed the population that the same evening this committee would hold its Constituent meeting. "All formations that have joined the people's cause, must elect immediately one delegate for every platoon; all factories, one for every thousand workers; and the smaller factories, one for every unit." The Revolution did not wait for others to command. They wanted leadership and an executive organ. The political parties looked on and slowly attempted to explain the ex-

plosion. Mensheviki and Trudoviki looked to the Liberals for guidance and did not lead but were pushed forward by the events. The Bolshevik faction had been all but eliminated.

Salesky, a member of the Petrograd Committee, tells how, one by one, the members were arrested and how, at last, he shared the same fate. He thought that all was lost and that nobody was left to continue the work of the revolution. He was in jail on the twelfth of March. "Psychologically, I was totally unprepared. I did not know the relativity of the revolutionary forces." When the prison was stormed by the rebels he believed that the crowd had been lured into the prison yard to provide a better target. He waited to see the prisoners, who yelled in their cells, dragged down to the cellars for punishment. Only when the chief warden staggered through the corridor pale-faced and unarmed he sniffed a change. "I could not believe the successful revolution. All came so unexpectedly." A dense crowd of armed people filled the yard—workers, women, soldiers. Suddenly, he found himself in the street, free.

We ran along the quai. We met Broide and Gvosdev, the members of the War Production Board, also liberated from jail. "Where are you going?" "To the Duma." "And we to the workers' suburbs." I often recalled the first meeting of the day of liberation. It was symbolic. The Bolsheviks and Mensheviki, both liberated by the revolutionary workers, parted after the first few steps. We went to see the little fellows; others went to meet the Duma members who voted the very next day to recall the rebels to peaceful order.

✓ Notwithstanding many errors of judgment on the part of factions and individuals, there was concerted action by the masses and the reluctant politicians. Lenin in March, 1917, gave the reason for it.

Without the Revolution of 1905-07, without the counter-revolution of 1907-14 and the exacting self-determination of all classes of the Russian people and the people living on Russian soil, this correct definition of the inter-relationships of the classes and of their relations to Tsardom would not have been made in the eight days of the March Revolution of 1917. This eight-day revolution was enacted, if I may use the metaphor, after dozens of rehearsals and dress rehearsals. The actors knew one another, their rôles, their distinctions from A to Z, including the smallest differences in strategy and tactics.

One is tempted to add: the actors performed like marionettes in the hands of an unknown force.

✓ The new executive of the Revolution met on the evening of the proclamation. The men at the helm had learned at least some of the lessons of 1905 and lost no time in stabilizing their regime, organiz-

ing the food supply of the city and the military defense of the positions gained during the day. In every factory 10 per cent of the workers were drafted as militia under distinct defense commissars and empowered to act on the spot in all emergencies. Revolutionary guards were placed at the State Bank, the Mint, the Printing House and the tax collectors' offices to prevent the government from drawing funds.

With the grand lightheartedness of newcomers to responsibilities the Soviet had requisitioned the powers of sovereignty. They insisted, however, on keeping the division of power within the state intact. The sovereign required a government for purposes of administration. The old government was discredited. The Soviet had not yet men of their own who knew the ropes. So they turned to the only remaining body of standing and decreed that the Provisional Committee of the Duma constituted the legal executive.

David Low, the modern Daumier of London, would be needed to picture the Duma Committee when the Soviet message was delivered to the outcast legislators who could not make up their minds whether they were still entitled to act on the people's behalf or not. Suddenly, and by an illegitimate body, their existence was legalized and they were confronted with an administrative task. They succumbed to the greater initiative of the Soviet. "We are forced in the gravest hours to assume the task of restoring political and social order, which has been disrupted by default of the Government. Fully cognizant of our responsibility, we hope that the population and the Army will support the formation of a Government, which must have popular confidence."

In Moscow all troops had meanwhile joined the Revolution. A provisional Moscow Soviet had been formed and had called workers and soldiers to elect delegates. Thus both capitals were controlled by the revolutionaries. Most of the cabinet had been arrested, the most important public institutions in Petrograd occupied and a decree issued placing all members of the uniformed police, the secret police and the gendarmerie in custody. The High Command designated General Ivanov military dictator to restore order. He advanced as far as Tsarskoje Zelo with a battalion of veterans of the Order of St. George. Hearing that General Chabalov and the cabinet had been arrested and that the legal authorities had no longer a single army unit at their disposal, he returned to Mogilev.

The Duma bloc formed a coalition cabinet with Prince Lvov as Prime Minister, Miliukov as Foreign Minister and Kerensky as Minister of Justice. For seven months to come the proletarian sector of the population matured at increasing speed. The peasant masses awakened to realize their political prowess.

The Tsarist bureaucracy did not abandon the fight for existence, and retreated only step by step, trying to adapt themselves to the constantly changing situation. In the eyes of the bourgeoisie they retained the imposing stature of authority. The generals and the remnants of the officer corps, decimated by the years of war, stood solidly with the bureaucrats and struggled to arrest the decay of the front lines.

The first decree of the Petersburg Soviet, the Prikaz No. 1, ordered elections of soldiers' soviets in all army and navy units. It further stipulated that in all political questions the Soviet had supreme authority. Government orders would be valid only as they were in accordance with Soviet orders and resolutions. This was explained as merely a precaution against counter-revolution. However, it confused and disrupted the homogeneity of the troops both in and behind the front line.

Squires, financiers, industrialists and the mass of citizens might still differ in many respects but they were all ready to take the de facto power of the Soviets into account. The provisional government issued several proclamations with the intention of placating the masses, from the political amnesty to the extension of all the civic liberties in the Western catalogue to sailors and soldiers, from the abolition of all class, religious and national restrictions to the transforming of the police into a popular militia. Naturally, a general election was to be held for the Constituent Assembly.

Nevertheless, the government's slate was not clean. The question of the monarchy had been referred to the coming Constituent Assembly. Because of the dragging preparation of the elections, any radical opposition could agitate that this delay was deliberate. The common folk distrusted the bureaucrats, who for the most part remained at their desks, wearing red cockades to show their loyalty to the new order but representing by their very existence a link with the past. The masses had lost faith in the Tsar and the monarchy. They distrusted the provisional government. The smooth expression

of new ideas in the old forms of legislation and decree aroused further suspicion that they might serve as decoys.

The situation in military affairs was different. The Soviet's Prikaz No. 1 had been sanctioned by a No. 2 for the guidance of the services bearing the signatures of both the Military Committee of the provisional government and the Soviet. This was a blow against civic order as well as against the old regime and the officer caste. The fighting quality of the army suffered, and was not improved by Guchkov's proclamation at the end of March that "many German spies in grey coats have sneaked into your ranks spreading unrest and confusion." The phantom of the German spy remained a requisite of government propaganda, though it increased unrest in the ranks and resentment against officers.

Problems that immediately concerned the people—peace, better living for workers and peasants, land for the tillers of the soil to own—were by-passed as the government had no satisfactory answers ready. Their basis for existence was the mandate of the revolutionary masses. The members of the government, however, belonged by origin and by their former briefs to the classes whose sacrifices would have to satisfy the demands of the newcomers. Out of this dilemma sprang a strong impulse for the masses to march on to a more radical revolution.

The Mensheviks were bound by their theory that the only practical revolution was the bourgeois experiment that had been interrupted in 1906. They also believed that the defense of the Fatherland made a continuation of the war obligatory. A different view could, to their mind, be held only by the Tsarist bureaucracy, the generals or the "Bolshevist sectarians." The Mensheviks, who predominated in the soviets, attempted to form a coalition with the provisional government to guarantee civic liberties and to placate the revolutionary masses. They sensed that in spite of small numbers—in Petersburg 1500 to 2000, in Moscow 300 to 500 members—the Bolsheviks had certain chances to increase their hold on the masses by the popularity of their platform. They talked a plain language. "To have immediate peace, we must negotiate with the proletariat in all warring countries. The people must own all land belonging to the squires, the dead hand. Nobody should work more than eight hours."

Lenin, Zinoviev and other leading Bolsheviks were still in Switzer-

land. Trotsky, after deportation from France and arrest in Spain, had gone to New York. "A small collection of outcasts and defamed men," they kept the revolutionary torch burning with no little difficulty. Tenaciously they clung to the hope that their little cell would grow into a Third International. At the conferences of 1915 at Zimmerwald and of 1916 at Kiental, Lenin had formulated his accusation against the opportunist leaders of the proletariat who had delivered their comrades to imperialism at the beginning of the World War. At the Zimmerwald conference, Lenin was nearly alone in the request not to make a peace of mutual agreement, but to carry on the war into civil war.

Lenin's first reaction to the censored and scattered news of the March Revolution of 1917 was that this would be the first of a series of revolutions arising from the war, not the last. He was afraid that he would not quickly succeed in "getting out of blessed Switzerland." He mused on whether the Bolshevik faction in Russia would see events truly and resist the temptation to enter into a union with the Mensheviks.

In five "Letters from Afar," of which only the first reached Petrograd and was published in the *Pravda*, Lenin analyzed the problems of the party. It was a wonder, he said, that the Revolution had come into the open earlier in Russia than in other countries. In Russia, the disorganization of the economy had been greatest and, thanks to the memories of 1905, the revolutionary tendencies of the proletariat strongest. The speedy victory of the March Revolution had been due to a combination of heterogeneous class interests. Two separate governments had been the outcome: one formed by the capitalist squires and citizens who had organized themselves during the war, and an unofficial, weak and immature labor government in the Soviet. This March Revolution was a bourgeois affair. The proletariat must be told that they should rely on their own forces, their own organization and their own arms.

Lenin's precise argumentation of work and peace did not at once appeal to the Bolsheviks in Russia. It was only his personal conviction that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist revolution were immediate goals that won the battle for Soviet Russia.

Early in April, 1917, a train carried a group of emigrant Bolsheviks straight through Germany to Petrograd. In order to get home, they suffered defamation as "German agents." As return via Eng-

land had been blocked by the attitude of the French and British authorities, they accepted the offer which Fritz Platten, the Swiss Socialist, had negotiated with the German Minister in Berne. They traveled in a sealed car through German territory, realizing that the German authorities consented to the transit only in the hope of increasing the anti-war agitation in Russia. In 1936 Ludendorff protested against the legend that he had recommended this step. "Lenin was brought from Switzerland to Kopenhagen on the recommendation of the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg who, as I learned later, had been approached by Parvus-Helphand, Scheidemann, and Erzberger. The General Staff had merely to sign the traveling papers. As the political leader requested them, there was no reason for the Supreme Command to refuse. I had not heard of Lenin before."

In the night of April 3, the group arrived in Petrograd and was received by a guard of honor from the Baltic Fleet. Armored cars brought them to the former residence of the dancer Kshezinska, now the headquarters of the Bolsheviki. Lenin listened, half-smiling but impatient, to many speeches of welcome. He was in a critical mood. From Switzerland he had already written a philippic against the party members "who have often acted a deplorable rôle by repeating memorized slogans nonsensically instead of studying the peculiarities of new realities." He now took up the challenge again, abusing the notorious formula of support for the provisional government "insofar as" and gave a new battle cry "No more support. Fight for the Socialist Republic!" Kamenev replied that though one might agree or disagree with Lenin, "with him, the ingenious and accepted leader of our party, with whom we will march onward to Socialism, has returned to Russia."

The April Congress of the Bolsheviki represented 79,000 members. The ranks had swelled since March 12, but there was no homogeneous organization. In many places cells were united with Mensheviki. There were many dissensions among the party members. But the more important items of Lenin's April platform concerning war, the agrarian problem and the attitude of the party toward the government were unanimously accepted. It was stated that the government's pledge to renounce annexations was merely a paper promise. All secret treaties should be annulled. All nationalities should be granted a free vote to declare if they wanted to form independent states or join in association with some existing state.

The resolution on the agrarian problem stated that all estates should be confiscated in favor of the peasants organized in peasants' soviets, and that the peasants should take immediate possession of all land.

Lenin succeeded in giving the party his stamp. Though wavering friends had to be convinced, the reorientation of the home guard was secured. He no longer wanted to expel dissenters but to argue them into agreement with him. Now he could begin to prepare the struggle for power, to expand the organization and to persuade the bulk of the masses that their salvation was the peasant-proletarian state, not the bourgeois democratic republic. In the soviets the Bolsheviki were at that time only a small minority. Steadily their hold was increased by tireless propaganda and agitation.

The first open conflict inside the Petrograd Soviet broke out on the question of war. It became a conflict that could not be solved by a compromise. The bourgeoisie had compelled the Soviet to declare its hand by the end of March. Their proclamation steered a course between the attitude of the provisional government and the impatience of the masses. Since the "gendarme of Europe," the pillar of reaction in the world, had tumbled down, there would be no need to prolong the war. But if the German and Austrian people should not be able to stop hostilities, "the Revolution would not retreat before the bayonets of a conqueror and would not give way to any military pressure." The provisional government was encouraged by this to give an official statement. The war was to be continued and the enemy, who had occupied large parts of the country, driven out. "Free Russia does not intend to dominate other people, to rob their national inheritance or to occupy foreign territory by force. She wants lasting peace on the basis of self-determination by the people of their political fate." These principles were to be the foundation of policy, while obligations to the Allies would be fulfilled.

The All Russian Soviet Congress of mid-April was so strongly influenced by the need to defend the Fatherland that it considered the government declaration truly democratic. Though stripped of rhetorical ornaments, it was a promise to continue the war in accordance with the Tsarist secret treaties. In a note to the Allies, Foreign Minister Miliukov underlined this naked truth, repudiating

"the nonsensical conjecture that Russia is prepared to make a separate peace with the Central Powers."

3. KORNILOV'S MISADVENTURE

One may accept the fact that the provisional government honestly believed in the actual possibility of Russia's actively participating in the war. The tired troops were to get pep talks. The decimated officers' corps were to be rejuvenated and democratized. The tremendous numbers of deserters who were demoralizing the hinterland were to be rounded up and brought back to the front without punishment, except for the worst offenders. It was found difficult to realize these aims.

The troops in the cities considered themselves the vanguard of the Revolution. In their constant contact with the masses they were strongly imbued with political ideas. Many vagrant soldiers joined them, others left their units and went home without waiting for demobilization. The general disorganization did not permit a survey. By common declaration of the Soviet and the government, the Petrograd Soldiers' Soviet, "who had liberated Russia," were not to be disarmed but left in possession of guns, machine guns and armored cars. The Petrograd garrison had at its own discretion deposed and commissioned officers, though the Prikaz No. 1 only gave this right to the soldiers' soviets.

The heroes of the Revolution had lost their taste for the continuation of war. Even more important than the mood of the troops for the possibility of continuing the war was the economic condition of the country. It furnished ample material for the Bolshevik agitation after the government's declaration on the war, which had lacked all psychological finesse.

The Government is bound hand and foot to imperialist French and British capital. All their declarations are fraudulent. Any personal changes will be useless. The policy of the Soviet is illusionary, a petit-bourgeois policy. The only salvation will be the unconditional adherence of the proletariat to the cause of taking over the sole power of the State. This will give courage to the proletariat of the world and end the war.

This revolutionary thunder from Lenin and his friends touched the most vulnerable spot in government policy. Between the wish for peace and the policy of the government no compromise was

possible. This the masses felt so instinctively that there was little need of party agitation. When in the April phase of the Revolution the government adopted democratic emblems and conducted the well-meant campaign of defensive war, its members were well aware of the danger that civil war might break out over the question of peace, even if the front could be maintained by disciplinary methods.

Street demonstrations in Petrograd and Moscow gave the answer. Armed platoons and marine guards marched through the streets with posters: "Down with the Provisional Government! Down with Miliukov!" There were counter demonstrations: "Down with Lenin! Arrest Lenin! Trust the Government!" After several clashes and volleys the General commanding the Petrograd District, Kornilov, ordered the Artillery School to send out two batteries. The following episode is a clear illustration of the triangular relations between the army, the government, and the Soviet. Kornilov's telephonogram was first discussed at a meeting of officers and soldiers, who resolved not to execute the order. Then a delegation was sent to the General to ask if he had secured the Soviet's consent before issuing the order. This had not been the case. Kornilov was forced to withdraw the order in writing after a few hours.

An attempt to reduce the Petrograd Soviet to a formal parliamentary institution, at least in questions of foreign policy, also misfired. When the government's declaration on the war was to be discussed, the Executive Committee of the Soviet voted 34 to 19 to proceed to the order of the day. But in the same breath they resolved that control over the Foreign Minister must be tightened and that no official pronouncement or document should be issued without the previous consent of the Soviet. The diplomatic service had also to be radically altered. A plenary session of the Soviet approved these resolutions with only 13 votes in opposition. A few weeks later Miliukov, refusing the portfolio of education, resigned as Foreign Minister, and Guchkov, as War Minister.

Kerensky took over the War and Navy departments in the first coalition cabinet, in which the Socialists in a minority held five portfolios. The difficulty of finding a real balance of power between the liberal elements and the Socialists mounted, with fundamental differences of opinion in the growing national crisis. The honest intentions of individual ministers could not overcome this cleavage. The Bolsheviki voted against Socialist participation in the

government, pointing out the anomaly of two executives working side by side. They concentrated their efforts on winning a majority in the Soviet to take over the executive themselves.

How would the front react to the Revolution? This was the principal question facing the coalition. The March Revolution found the men in the trenches apathetic. News was scarce. The pamphlets dropped by German planes were their first information of the events in Petrograd. There was the same surprise as in the interior. There was a mute understanding along the whole front that no offensive would be fought. The peasant army used the instrument of passive resistance in typical peasant fashion. The old Tsarist army had practically ceased to exist, and was transformed into a mass of dumb peasants who agreed that they wanted no more war. The Bolshevik ensign Krylenko recommended the support of the provisional government "as long as they did not betray the interests of the working classes." He failed to find followers. In this first phase of the Revolution the soldiers were not interested in anything but their relations to their officers. The remnants of the old discipline gradually faded out. Fraternization with the enemy rapidly grew.

In spite of all reports on the weariness of the troops, the government had taken up the plan for an offensive, prepared in December, 1916, for the spring. It was launched in June, a more than risky undertaking in view of the commander in chief's contention that an offensive would be feasible only after a reorganization of the army and an improvement of the food situation. Headquarters later gave the excuse that "our obligations toward the Allies forced us not to refuse all action," and that "the numerical superiority in men of 4:1 and in artillery gave some hope for success."

On a front of roughly 41 miles, 31 divisions and hundreds of guns of all calibers were concentrated. The army committees, the political commissars and the delegates of the Petrograd Soviet had joined in the preparation of morale for an all-out effort. When the Congress of Soviets met to discuss the situation, Lenin explained with acrimony the importance of the fraternization of the armies in the trenches as a revolutionary instrument which would be ruined by an offensive. But for a few friends, he remained alone in his opinion.

To bring public opinion behind the war effort, the provisional government approached the Soviet Congress for their support of

the intended offensive. Kerensky delayed his departure to the front because "he felt it absolutely essential for the moral effect of the order to attack that the Congress declare their explicit opinion on this policy." The Congress complied with this wish of the Minister of War and voted for the offensive.¹

Vetoing a demonstration planned by the Bolsheviks, the Congress itself initiated a general parade of half a million people, in which Bolshevik slogans dominated the scene. "All power to the Soviet!" "Down with the capitalist ministers!" "No separate peace with the Germans nor secret treaties with the French and British capitalists!" "No offensive!" The masses cheered them.

The offensive got under way on July 1, 1917. The Soviet Congress congratulated the "revolutionary Army, steeled in the flames of the Revolution," and Kerensky proclaimed the opening of the attack as a day of revolutionary triumph. When after three weeks of fighting the offensive petered out, the toll of the Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Armies was 37,500 dead; 36,000 Germans had been taken prisoner. The Germans counterattacked, broke through the lines and forced the Russians to retreat. Headquarters blamed lack of stamina and obedience. "Instead of executing orders to the letter the soldiers discussed their wisdom and feasibility at length." Officers were shot, and the front was paralyzed by weary men who wanted to go home to live.

At this time, the term Bolshevik had already a flavor of defamation. Soon it was to be used as synonymous with treason and espionage for Germany. The collapse of the June-July offensive had further revolutionary repercussions outside the army. It damaged the authority of Kerensky, who had previously enjoyed great popularity. Indignation surged among the workers, renewed suspicion among the little bourgeoisie. Countless rumors filled the air about the restoration of the death penalty, the government's intention to dissolve whole units and bring revolutionary guards to the front, the maltreatment of soldiers.

In this heated atmosphere, a machine-gun regiment heard unidentified rumors that it would be dissolved and sent delegates to the factories asking for support. Thus started the July riots in Petrograd. The masses went into the streets. The leading Bolsheviks, who

¹ Of 1090 delegates, 385 were Social Revolutionaries, 248 Mensheviks, 105 Bolsheviks, 32 Internationalists, 75 independent Socialists, 345 neutrals.

did not wish to see the people bled white in fanciful uprisings and coolly calculated the relation of the social forces of the time, tried unsuccessfully to block any action. Workers and soldiers linked arms as before. In many clashes there were dead and wounded. Alarmed by the scare of a movement to arrest the government and the Executive Committee of the Soviet and bring armed pressure on the soviets to take over the reins, the government acted energetically. Its followers were mobilized, with the army units that remained at least partly loyal. Unauthenticated documents were published to show Lenin's treasonable relations with the German government and General Staff. Such framing had happened in Russia before and would happen more than once later. From the Ministry of Justice, the newspapers were fed with disclosures of the treason and espionage of the Bolsheviks and the immense bribes they received from German sources. In spite of the obvious absurdity of some such reports, many volunteers were found willing to execute lynch justice. The party was declared illegal, many members were arrested, among them Trotsky, Lunacharsky and Kollontai, but were later reprieved. For months, Lenin and Zinoviev had to live in hiding, at first in Petrograd and later in Finland.

Though the attempted blackmail was overwhelmed within a few weeks by the new revolutionary wave, the accusations served for a long time as a favorite weapon against the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik party lost partisans as well as camp followers in this wave of persecution. "All reports from the provinces are in unison that our popularity is in rigid decline among the masses. One finds even outright animosity. Our canvassers are beaten up. Some organizations in the South no longer exist," writes W. Jakovleva, a member of the Central Committee. The persecutions sifted the chaff from the wheat. There remained a more loyal brotherhood from which, after the victory, came the bulk of trusted Soviet officials who got things done because they were afraid of nothing. Up to July, the party had owned 41 newspaper organs with 320,000 daily issues. After July, circulation was halved. At the end of August, the central organ, *Pravda*, was only printed in 50,000 copies.

Within a few weeks' time, a reverse trend gave the party new prestige. Trotsky could write: "Chased, persecuted, blackmailed as we are, we have never grown in numbers more quickly than just now." The reports of the civilian and military authorities labeled

all mass actions Bolshevik, evidencing the renaissance of the party. The Sixth Conference of August, 1917, underlined Lenin's appeal: "We are no charlatans. We must have no fear of being a minority as long as we keep near the masses."

Being the only ones who talked of peace as an immediate necessity for the Fatherland, they soon talked their way back into the hearts of the people. They told them that in all countries the July offensive had encouraged the forces of chauvinism, that German peace feelers had been withdrawn. They explained the economic chaos from lack of planning and the need for nationalizing the means of production. As it was evident from the want and famine that a great deal was wrong with the existing system, they found more willing listeners than before the start of the offensive. They hammered it in that the bourgeoisie favored the continuation of war in the interests of international capitalism, that a proletarian revolution was the only chance for the peasants to get land and the workers to get bread and peace.

Lenin believed that it would be a quixotic policy to repeat the battle cry "All power to the Soviet," since the government's firm hand seemed to have intimidated the other Socialists into acquiescence, even if a military dictator were to take the reins. The intended appeal to the Soviet was struck off the order of the day at the August party conference, and the masses were instead exhorted to prepare for the armed overthrow of the Kerensky regime.

The government had changed toward a stronger authoritarian composition after Prince Lvov and the Cadets in the cabinet resigned over the question of the autonomy of the Ukraine. Kerensky retained the portfolio of War when he became Prime Minister and set to work at once on the threefold program of internal reforms, restoration of fighting strength and securing the government against rebellion. He promised elections, autonomy for the zemstvos, municipal self-administration, the abolition of civilian ranks and decorations, decrees for the introduction of the whole socialist catalogue of workers' rights, insurance and welfare and labor, representation in plant management and in labor exchanges. To prevent an offhand solution of the land problem that would endanger national defense and the food supply to the cities and would run counter to the legal foundation of the state, all specific problems were to be solved,

until the Constituent Assembly should pass an agrarian reform bill, by land committees appointed by the government.

It was a program of good intentions but it did not satisfy any group in the turmoil of the time. Six months of revolutionary unrest and the setback on the front had not relieved the home crisis. The note circulation had jumped from the prewar level of 1.6 to 14 billion rbl. Many factories stood idle for lack of raw material or fuel or because of the absenteeism of nervous owners who had become panicky in the face of the combined animosity of the labor unions and the unruly factory soviets. On the large estates, spontaneous actions against the squires had curtailed production. Peasants' soviets had sprouted even in Siberia and begun to regulate the distribution of the confiscated lands, regarded by all peasants as their legal property. None of them believed in the government or the paper rouble. Farm hands were at the front. Peace was needed to bring the new land into shape by getting the boys back home. Who had wanted war anyway? They sulked and produced less. "We will see how they will fight on an empty stomach" was a favorite slogan of the countryside.

The bourgeoisie did not intend to give in. In their belief Kerensky had, at least in theory, every chance to pull their chestnuts out of the fire, even if he burned himself to death in this task. The millionaire Rjabushinsky gave the theme:

The state must rely implicitly on the industrialists and merchants. The Government must be bourgeois and act as such. It may be that we can only recover from the crisis by the bony hand of hunger and misery, which will incite the masses to take the false enemies, the democratic soviets and committees by the throat.

The Kerensky program, although carefully phrased and a paper promise only, was far too revolutionary for their taste. They ogled the old Duma, the Imperial Council, the old bureaucracy and the candidates for military dictatorship and waited coolly for a suitable moment to liquidate the Revolution, which had solved the necessary task of overthrowing the monarchy and had become more or less a nuisance. The Kerensky regime was useful as a decoy. Since it had taken the initiative toward a combined action with the reactionary generals, it could be supported the more easily.

Kerensky was brave enough to try strong methods—punitive expeditions against the peasants, martial law against strikers, courts-

martial in the army—to cope with the cancerous disorder. He restricted the activities of the soviets, who lived under the illusion that they held the bridge between the discontented masses and the bourgeois parties and that they were thus able to stem any counter-revolution by their pivotal position.

At the meeting of the State Council, which was convened in Moscow in August, Kerensky announced that the government would defend Russia against the enemy to the end and safeguard the new order of the state with steel and blood against all anarchistic and counter-revolutionary conspiracies. The interest of the bourgeoisie was already focused on the personality of General Kornilov, earmarked by the preliminary conference of leading monarchists, Octobrists and Cadets as the man of tomorrow.

The British Ambassador considered Kornilov “a far stronger man than Kerensky. If he could strengthen his hold on the Army and if the Army could be restored to a strong fighting factor, he would be the master of the situation.” The Allies had not been very helpful to the interim governments, and had just launched at the Inter-Allied Conference in London “a stern protest against the continuation of disruption and anarchy in Russia.” The government replaced Brussilov as Commander in Chief by Kornilov. General Denikin records in his memoirs that the country looked to him as the coming dictator, partly full of hope, partly with hostile suspicion. After six months of trial and error, the bourgeoisie saw no other help than a dictator’s direction out of the blind alley. Kornilov had the clear and simple approach of a soldier to all problems. Discipline, including the saluting of superiors, should be restored, the power of command assured in the hands of the experts, railroads and war factories militarized, the death penalty introduced in the hinterland as well as at the front. “A series of decrees issued after the uprising by men alien to the spirit and needs of the Army has transformed the front into a mass of mad men who want to live forever.” Kornilov openly threatened a march on Petrograd and moved troops nearer to the capital, whereas the “Bolshevist” Latvian Rifles were sent to hold the hopeless positions around Riga.

German troops crossed the Dvina at Uexkuell on September 2 and marched into Riga the next day. Diamandi, the Roumanian minister in Petrograd, told Bratianu by telephone of a conversation with Kornilov, whom he had left under the impression that the General

intended to use the news of the fall of Riga to increase the pressure for a restoration of discipline as a way to power. At Headquarters, preparations were made quite openly for a Council of National Defense, which was to take the place of the cabinet, an organization with dictatorial powers. "A personal dictatorship was not palatable to the public!" Kornilov remarked later.

News was spread that the Bolsheviks intended new riots. Everything was set for a smooth walkover. "Nobody will defend Kerensky, all is prepared," wrote General Krasnov. There is a touch of human comedy in every *coup d'état* that fails. The officers in charge of plans were convinced that a few battalions would smash all resistance. They were soldiers who wanted orders and order. They hated politicians who fomented disorder by discussions. To them the political orientation of a new regime and its membership were unimportant. Dabbling in politics without knowing the most primitive essentials, they preferred the persuasive voice of force to effect and maintain a change in public affairs.

The schedule asked for encirclement of the capital by reliable troops—mostly Cossacks and the "Wild Divisions" of Caucasians under General Krymov—the resignation of the Cabinet, the proclamation of martial law, the dispersal of the Soviet, and finally the formation of a new government by the Commander in Chief. Prince Lvov informed Kerensky of Kornilov's final demands but not of his intention to put the noose around the necks of the political leaders, and offered his good offices as go-between. Kerensky realized that the union with Kornilov would leave him in second place. He had put Prince Lvov under arrest and asked the cabinet for powers. They were granted by his colleagues, who made extraordinary mediatory advances at once, backed by the entente diplomats. Kerensky applied to the soviets for support. The cabinet resigned, and in hasty negotiations a new combination, Kerensky-Kishkin, was born.

Kornilov answered with a manifesto accusing the government of being a tool in the hands of the Germans and the Bolsheviks. The "Savior of Russia" ordered his troops to march on Petrograd. The Soviet mobilized the workers' militia. The railroad men interrupted the deployment of the Kornilov forces by bringing traffic to a standstill. The Bolsheviks tossed the ball to the masses: "This is a fight for the defense of the Revolution, not for the Kerensky Government." Moscow and the provinces also rose against Kornilov.

Red Guards were called up. The most efficient weapon was the agitation by countless delegates who were sent to the front to fraternize with the regular soldiers and persuade them to disobey orders to march. This propaganda blocked the advance on the capital. Of the 6000 officers whom Kornilov previously had dispatched to Petrograd in secrecy to make contacts, but who had presumably misunderstood orders and had used their ample funds in a preposterous fashion for contacts in night clubs, not one appeared on the scene. General Denikin later complained. The Kornilov episode ended before a bullet had left a rifle. Kornilov was put nominally on trial and Kerensky took over the High Command with General Alexeiev as Chief of Staff.

The General's coup was not abortive because the leaders were incompetent, though their political intuition was poor, or because only officers were actively engaged. All attempts to restore the old order were doomed in those months from March to October by the typical sterility of the bourgeoisie, who feared a courageous reform and hoped to save their existence by patching up. Kornilov's enterprise had considerable backing. The entente had promised political and military assistance. British armored cars followed the Krymov vanguard on the roads to Petrograd. The bourgeois parties of the Right down to and beyond the Cadets had pledged their loyalty to the new man in advance.

Paul Miliukov wrote of the two camps between which there could be no conciliation or understanding. There was truth in this opinion, which permeated the masses and led to a strong revival of revolutionary fervor in the wake of the successful defense of the armed workers. Suddenly, Bolshevik propaganda found again a favorable seedbed. The peasants were roused by the argument that Kornilov wanted to bring the squires back to the manors. The soldiers were encouraged to turn against their superiors who were suspected of preferring the rigid forms of discipline which the *Prikaz* No. 1 had abolished and of waiting for the opportunity to enforce them again. The soldiers' soviets gained in importance and cockiness. Nationalist ambitions in the border provinces found new hopes in the defeat of Kornilov, the representative of Great Russian autocracy.

The bourgeoisie could not forgive Kerensky for turning to the soviets for support. He was accused with documentary proofs of

having participated in plans for a military dictatorship. This press campaign soon overshadowed the Kornilov episode by incessant hammering at Kerensky, whose hold on the public had increased in the rebuttal of reaction.

4. KERENSKY ON THE BRIDGE

The workers carried arms to their homes and their jobs after the Kornilov adventure. The soviets became more militant and the masses more revolutionary. Time played into the hands of the most radical faction of the Left, the Bolsheviki. They reaped the reward of having foretold a military counter-revolution. From Lenin's Finnish refuge letter after letter, coolly and vehemently reasoned, poured into Russia. His scrupulous care in scanning the news and his creative imagination enabled him to lead the party of professional revolutionaries from afar with undisputed authority. A brilliant educator, he had no equal in this circle of shrewd minds.

Lenin found that his order of the day to concentrate on fighting the counter-revolution had been interpreted as support of the Kerensky regime. He took pains to destroy such a conception, because he also feared that the tactical change in the party's attitude might encourage unprincipled expediency in the future. "Even in the face of the occupation of Riga and Petrograd, we will not become the defenders of the Fatherland before the proletariat has assumed power, before the secret treaties and agreements with the international bankers have been torn up, but only afterwards. Until then, we fight for the proletarian revolution against the war." He stressed the necessity for focusing propaganda against Kerensky rather than against Kornilov but warned against bringing Kerensky down before the situation was better in hand for the accession of the Bolshevik party.

His uncanny gift of compressing fluctuating mass feelings into the language that the masses understood secured him a strong following as a symbolic personality. He was hated for that very gift by old Socialist friends. Plekhanov, who had been his teacher, scolded bitterly at a meeting of the State Council in Moscow: "Lenin, of sinister memory, has fallen so low as to call upon the proletariat to grasp the power of state directly." It cannot be denied that the blackmailing of the Bolsheviki as German agents had done Lenin as well as

the party great harm and was chiefly responsible for the setback encountered between March and October.

Lennin did not overrate his fellow men. Undaunted, he fought back, destroying false legends and laying down the law of the future. He drilled his platoon of lieutenants with infinite precision for greater problems. He warned them in September, 1917, against rigid, artless tactics. If their foes pictured the Bolsheviki as dour dogmatics and sectarians, they should be surprised by sudden flexibility. The criticism was a flattering compliment, he said, because it acknowledged the party's stature. But compromise was right and meet in every situation as long as the party did not lose sight of its essential aims. In September, he saw an opportunity for such a temporary compromise. Why not offer the next-door neighbors, the Mensheviki and Social Revolutionaries, support for a government, responsible only to the Soviet? The Bolsheviki could not possibly participate in the government while the situation was not yet ripe for the rise to power of the proletariat and the poor peasants, but they would assist a socialist government to achieve peaceful reforms on condition that they should have freedom to agitate and that the Soviet delegates underwent new elections.

It was a theoretical proposal, and nothing came of it. Kerensky, who now headed a directorate of five after the downfall of the cabinet, leaned more and more to the bourgeoisie who held the economic trumps. Perhaps, too, the other socialist parties smelled a rat. The benevolent offer of support coupled with the demand for new elections was too barefaced a ruse. Elections would to all expectations bring the Bolsheviki a larger number of seats. As backers of the government they would no longer be confronted with the espionage scare.

The chaotic situation in the domestic markets boded ill for any regime. Black markets flourished. Ceiling prices could not be enforced for lack of honest administrators. All types immortalized by the cartoons of the French Revolution descended like locusts on the hungry population. Peasants with bags of wheat, the notorious *miechotniki* bootleggers, roamed the country, and were inexhaustedly dodging the police. They brazenly traveled on the rails, preferring the troop trains where they found willing helpers among the peasant soldiers. This plague curtailed the deliveries of grain so severely that the government had to discuss strong measures and began

requisitioning despite the unpopular consequences for the regime. Black distilling took a further toll from the country's granaries. Actual famine let prices soar.

Wholesale speculation raised its head in proportion to the mounting anarchy. In August, 1917, 62 new companies holding a capital of 205.35 million rbl. were registered at the Stock Exchange against 52 from March to July. In September, 303 new companies were formed with a capital of 800 million rbl. The old companies issued new shares. The ticker lagged day after day when the general public was drawn into the vicious circle of gambling fever. Retention of goods by the production firms increased the scarcity and turmoil. Konovalov, the Minister for Trade and Industry, complained in a letter to Zavin that the oil firms did not disclose the proper figures. Nobel had reported 82 million poods, delivered 65 million and had been found actually to have stored 150 million. Masut was a minor sinner. reported 47, shipped 37 and had 54 million poods in storage. A state coal monopoly had been introduced in August, 1917, but the government could not enforce it. Millions of poods were lying at the pit heads, and factories had to close either because of lack of fuel or in protest against government regulations. The representative of the South Russian coal industry openly declared that this was the proper attitude as long as the government could not or would not guarantee the personal security of the management. According to incomplete figures, 231 factories shut down in August and September; in October, in Petrograd alone 40, in the Urals one-half of all enterprises. "There is no more authority in the factories, so the owners are forced to close, their only weapon left." Productivity had sunk to one-half of the prewar high. Inflation of the rouble was a natural result.

Tugan-Baranovsky proposed a compulsory loan of 10 billion rbl. He did not find approval with the experts of the Treasury, who preferred a rise in railroad tariffs and monopoly duties on sugar, matches, tea, coffee and *machorka*, a cheap tobacco. In October, the rouble equaled 10 per cent of prewar value.

Transportation was the other peril. In July 200,000 freight cars and in August 248,000 were lacking. In October the daily average of loading was down to 16,627 cars, one-third below the 1916 average. The officials blamed the labor unions and the railroad board, which

had certain rights of control, for interference, and recommended martial law for railroad men.

In the countryside illegal proceedings had paralyzed many districts. In September and October the unrest spread all over Russia. "Rioting increases, the destructive elements dominate everywhere. Their victims are the well-to-do peasants as well as the squires," stated the executive of the Squires' League. It is significant that the trouble—devastations and arson—were more frequent in those regions where in 1905 punitive expeditions had restored order. The return of the deserters from the front, the news that the Little Father had resigned and the lessons drawn in the past decade gave the revolutionary revival a stronger flavor, augmented by the fact that the Stolypin Land Reform had deepened the social gulf between the kulaki and the village poor. Military and judicial actions failed to dampen the peasant's emotions. Rural land committees were powerless to enforce legal procedure.

Another problem made life uneasy for the government. The Social Revolutionaries had the strongest following among the peasant masses. But their leader was Chernov, the Minister of Agriculture. He had proclaimed the revolutionary program which the peasants practiced and the government opposed.

Alarmed by the rising tide, the government formed a new Land Committee to carry out the proposal of the Social Revolutionary S. Maslov, a former member of the cabinet. All land owned by the dead hand should at once be turned over to a leasehold bank which should also administer all the squires' properties already let out in lease to the adjacents. Rentals would in the future be paid to the leasehold bank, which would hand them on to the private lessors. The squires were furthermore advised to hand the remainder of their estates to the same authority, which was to be established with every local land commission. The plan was discussed too long as usual so that it did not get to the stage of realization. The discussions did not stop the uncanny policy of the peasants.

Lenin saw that it was impossible to execute the Marxian program in the traditional rural setting and warned of experimenting before the time had shown whether the Russian village was ready for socialization and the class differences between the various strata had sufficiently deepened.

We must claim the immediate nationalization, that is, the transfer of all deeds and titles to property to the State. The soil cannot be allowed to pass from one hand to another. The central executive must issue decrees on soil conservation, forestry, melioration and on the size of farms, but should leave the decisions of usufruct and rentals strictly to the local peasant soviets.

The masses took up this parley. "Down with the Provisional Government! All power to the Soviets!" In a combined meeting of the executives of the workers, peasants and soldiers' soviets, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries parried this thrust with the proposal to call a congress of the organizations of democracy and the local self-governmental institutions. The motion was carried and the "Democratic Conference" assembled at Moscow on September 27, the last attempt of the doomed democracy to abate the waves licking at its feet.

Trotsky appeared at the Democratic Conference as spokesman for the Bolsheviks and attacked the motion for a coalition government.

The masses have at last become class-conscious. The possessing classes are intent on decapitating the leadership of the masses by trapping the most influential leaders, leaving the unleashed elements to their own fate or to be smothered. There should be no more room in Russia for a coalition between socialists and the possessing classes. Such a coalition would be either the climax of political nonsense or of an uncanny scheme.

He went on to say that a bourgeois government would provoke the Revolution but that the Socialists could not take over sole power and that the appointment of an arbiter, a dictator, a Bonaparte would be the best solution to fill the place now held by Kerensky. "Only lack of courage among the democrats has created the vacuum in which he stepped." This attitude increased the differences in the Menshevik party. A majority had voted against participation in a coalition, but the members remained in government posts. As a result, the Mensheviks were disunited in the coming action and lost out.

The Social Revolutionaries suffered from dissensions in the agrarian policy. The left wing led by Spiridonova, Proshian, Bizenko, Nathanson, Schreider, Kamkov later joined the Bolsheviks. The dissensions among the two largest socialist groups drove the masses like lost sheep into the camp of Lenin. The Bolsheviks were not slow to increase by radical agitation the newly won grip on the public. When

Trotsky claimed the need of arming the proletariat, he was asked: "Why?" and retorted:

Number one, to create a real bulwark against the counter revolution, against the next and stronger Kornilov. Number two, to enable the workers to defend their Fatherland in case the request for an honorable peace would be rejected. You may be assured that in such a case the workers of Petrograd and Moscow would fight with a lion's courage, unsurpassed in Russian history.

His vision has come true.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1917

1. THE LAST STAND FOR DEMOCRACY

NEITHER the Democratic Conference nor the "abortive Kornilovade," as the Bolsheviks christened the Preliminary Parliament, gained influence on events. The gulf between the classes widened and the population lost interest in attempts at compromise. The Bolshevik danger, a few months ago only a potential source, became a reality overnight. In this impasse, the liberal parties acted with clear heads and without sentimentality. The situation was not at all hopeless. The Kornilov adventure had defamed the monarchy. So the Liberals encouraged the government to change the front window and proclaim a republic. A new press campaign against the Left revived the slogans of the treasonable Bolshevik past. The *Rabochij* newspaper was suppressed because it had agitated a relentless campaign against the Kornilov followers, and all committees formed for the same reason were dissolved. General Korvinichenko was sent by Kerensky to Tashkent to quell the revolt of the Soviet, with the order: "No negotiations with the rebels! No more wavering and most resolute measures!"

The Cossacks, who had negotiated with the government for a separate electoral group, were willing to form a South Eastern Association of Cossacks from the Kuban, Terek, Don, Astrakhan and North Caucasus in preparation for a campaign against anarchy. The settlements of the privileged and richer Cossacks compared favorably with the average Russian village. Their social structure was intact and General Alexeiev was right in calling the region "relatively quiet and in an orderly state."

Petrograd was the hotbed of sedition, the acknowledged revolutionary center. As seat of the government offices and agencies the capital had always been a welcome target for the first attacks

in a revolution. The government decided in September to transfer the central administration to Moscow. Rosdjanko, the Speaker of the Duma, answered the objection that the remainder of the federal institutions would be doomed with the sneer that he would be glad to hear that these institutions were destroyed as they had only brought evil to Russia. The revolutionary press used this speech and the alleged intention of the government to leave Petrograd to the mercy of the Germans to bring public indignation to such a pitch that Kerensky denied in the Preliminary Parliament that a transfer plan existed and promised to convene the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd. For further appeasement, the Duma was officially declared dissolved.

A conference of "personalities of public standing" in Moscow repeated that the government could not ride on more than one horse and that there was only the choice between the Bolsheviki or a Ministry of Salvation recommended by Rosdjanko. At the same time the Cadets, the Cooperative Societies and the Association of Municipalities held conventions and joined in the debates of the conference, which showed a definite trend to the right and under the influence of Generals Brussilov and Alexeiev requested the restoration of the old military discipline, limitation of the rights of soldiers' soviets, elimination of fraternizing officers and an extensive propaganda in morale.

There is only one way to go: the suspension of civic liberties during a temporary state of emergency. A difficult way indeed is the necessity to bring the public back to order and peace. The state of emergency cannot, of course, be declared by local authorities even if they would be the revolutionary soviets, but by a central body giving the reins into one hand. Without a centralized authority of military character, the continuation of the war would be impossible.

The agitation of these conservative forces concentrated on dividing the masses of the workers, soldiers and peasants by stressing the differences of interests. *Rjecz*, the Cadet organ, had already (in May) sounded the melody: "What is the Army, what are the peasants going to say when they hear of the exorbitant demands of the workers for higher wages, requesting the Government to subsidize two to three million workmen by raising the monthly wages by 200 roubles? We are heading for the abyss." The front agitation ran on a popular line: "The soldiers in the trenches work

24 hours a day, loafers in the workshops only 8 hours." The military equipment was in a pitiful state. Half-naked soldiers, without boots and underwear, in ragged gray coats were a common sight. Waste paper took the place of socks and boots. Rifles were slung with a bit of string, the khaki summer uniforms could no longer be replaced by heavy wear. Large sectors of the front line suffered from hunger. Soldiers sold their outfits partly for food, partly to avoid being called to attack.

The government agitation among the soldiers found a response. Many deputations from the front appeared in the factories to investigate. It was found necessary to curtail such interference by appointing a special committee to report on the industrial situation. As was to be expected, the investigators found the principal reason for low productivity in the lack of raw materials and fuel which disorganized all production.

Forced by the natural trend, the government could not keep to the middle of the road despite the fact it had combined Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries and Cadets. Nor could it lean to the Left as long as it insisted on staying in the war. Kerensky floated between Scylla and Charybdis. He had lost the confidence of the proletariat, who called him a traitor, when he was compelled to introduce stern measures for the sake of public order. The bourgeoisie distrusted the former leader of the Trudoviki Socialists as a republican and revolutionary. He had to take the responsibility for all acts of the generals and the reactionary bureaucracy, for the police raids against revolutionaries, for the punitive expeditions against peasants and the grain collections in the country, for the reintroduction of the death penalty at the front and for the countless proclamations for the continuance of the war. He was blackmailed as Kornilov's competitor in the rôle of dictator. The Left as well as the Right would not forget that he had told the Petrograd Soviet: "I do not intend to be the Marat of the Russian Revolution. Within the next few days, Nicholas II will be brought to a port under my personal supervision and will go by ship to England." The Left had exploded and the Soviet executive had induced the railroad men to prevent the departure of the Tsar, whom Kerensky now sent to a Tobolsk retreat in Siberia. The Right reproached him bitterly for having announced his good intention, thereby bringing disaster to the imperial family. The generals and the bourgeois colleagues saw in Kerensky the doubtful character of the Kornilov episode.

In September, General Alexeiev wrote to Milukov in righteous indignation:

Members of the Government endeavor to persuade the public that the Kornilov affair has been nothing more than the insurrection of a handful of generals and officers in an attempt to overthrow the Government and take their places. . . . The Kornilov action has been no secret for the Government. Kerensky's participation is incontestable. Why these people have withdrawn when the action started, why they redress their word, I do not know. . . .

Kerensky was in a most unenviable position. On the Right he was merely considered the provisional head of the provisional government, the vanguard in the field of defense, the first to be sacrificed without vital losses among their own ranks. With the Left he was the principal target of the Bolshevik attacks, a welcome personification of the enemy class against whom the masses could be easily mobilized, as the first short-term goal, saving the revolutionary breath for further action. Only those may throw stones on the Sir Galahad of the Russian Revolution of 1917 who survived the same plight without failure.

The still mighty army, ragged as the troops looked, was a considerable factor in the calculations of the Revolution and the counter-revolution. Millions were standing under arms and could dip the scales in favor of the side which they backed. The Bolsheviks had achieved in September, 1917, a stage of success such that they could count on revolutionary manning pools on the northern, western and southwestern fronts. The strategists of the Right relied for a time on the troops at the Roumanian front until reinforcements from Siberia infiltrated the ranks with the revolutionary virus.

The generals decided in summer, 1917, that there was no more chance to count on the bulk of the army and undertook the task of organizing selected volunteer formations as shock brigades. They could serve the double purpose of cementing the tottering front and building the backbone of the counter-revolution. General Brussilov was the father of this idea. In Petrograd a recruiting bureau was opened with branches in all major cities, and a huge propaganda action was launched to attract volunteers. The shock brigades were better clad and fed than the remainder of the army. Prikaz No. 1 was not applied in these units. Strict discipline prevailed. A special oath bound them to implicit obedience in and out of duty to any order given by a superior.

After the initial successes in recruiting these guards, General Brussilov commented in a report: "The civil war looms over our heads and can break out any moment. . . . Now is the time for action. These volunteers will save the Fatherland from anarchy and disruption." The Kornilov intermezzo interrupted the flow of recruits for a while. But 33 storm battalions and an armored-car squadron had already joined the front line. The attempt to recruit praetorian guards in the factories failed. In the Obruchov Works at Petrograd 1000 volunteers had enlisted and undergone basic training. Then red tape interfered. When they were at last to leave for the front for further training, army headquarters received the laconic message that it had to be assumed that the volunteer battalion in the meantime had joined the Red Guards.

In October, the storm battalions mustered about 50,000 men with a high level of training and fighting valor. After the finale of the Second Revolution many of these units joined the White armies together with the formations of the Knights of St. George. Kornilov had intended to form an infantry regiment in reserve of these decorated veterans on each front and to combine them to a special brigade. The idea as such was not new. It had led to the formation of praetorian guards, the Preobrashensky and Semenov Regiments of Peter the Great, Household Brigades and the S.S. units of notorious death's-head fame. But it was executed with energy and courage in those troublesome months.

The government took up the plans of the generals and recruited protection guards among the civilian population. Women were recruited for "death battalions." One of them was active in the defense of the Winter Palace in November. General Dovbor-Musnicki founded a Polish Volunteer Corps consisting of 17,000 officers and men which Kerensky later hoped to use against the red Petrograd. He also counted on the Caucasian "Wild Divisions," the Haidamaki Regiments of the Ukraine, the Cossack formations under Ataman Dutov and Kaledin, and the Czech Legions. All these formations were recruited from the border provinces or were foreigners like the Czechs. In central Russia, the Revolution had already contacted the bulk of the masses, leaving no room for the counter-revolution.

The strongest support of the citizens was found in the Association of Army and Navy Officers, who had written on their banner the

fight against seditious propaganda in the services and against Bolshevik agitation and worked assiduously on the young minds in the officers' candidate schools. Under the Tsarist regime, professional officers joined cadet corps or officers' schools in childhood or attended the Junkers schools after some years at a high school. Guards officers were taken exclusively from the former category and had never mixed with common folk. While in the cadet units nearly 90 per cent were of noble origin, the Junkers schools had a large number of outsiders. Way back in 1892, of 3474 officers, 1392 were commoners, among them 527 of lower middle class and 342 of peasant birth. After 1905, the Junkers schools were dissolved and candidates entered directly after high-school graduation in three-year courses. The mobilization of 1914 flooded the army with thousands of newcomers who in ordinary times would never have dreamed of attaining commissioned rank. Threatened with the loss of the cherished golden epaulettes and the class distinctions by the Revolution, these boys became the fiercest defenders of the old regime.

From the conservatist viewpoint, the latent and open infection of the home garrison was an acute danger. They were indeed the backbone of revolutionary training. Regular instructions were given to the "Red Guards," the armed volunteers of the factories who also procured arms from the depots, the authorities on an exchange of 1½ million reservists, who were to go to the front against loyal veterans. The Russian leaders were far more active in this respect than the German High Command in the corresponding period of November, 1918. Despite all disorganization, the civilian and military authorities achieved great results in this process of shifting an endless stream of reservist companies to the front and bringing back shock troops, reliable sergeants and officers to fill up the home garrison.

Bolshevist propaganda did its best to undermine the newcomers' morale in the home garrison and used the exchanged reservists on the front as cells for agitation to end the unpopular war. Lenin's exhortation after his arrival in Petrograd from exile: "What do you get from war?—Wounds, suffering, hunger, and death!" had made the round along the weary front. For the first time, the ruling classes found the continuation of the war a burden too heavy to shoulder. Terechenko, the Foreign Minister, advocated a radical change of policy by substituting for "War to the victorious end" the milder

form: "War to the limit of endurance of the Army." Burzev's newspaper was also authorized to state that a committee of the Preliminary Parliament had discussed the question of separate peace with Germany.

As a further precaution against a cloudburst, the government organized local home guards of representatives of the zemstvos, the judiciary and military administration. A mobilization plan against anarchy was drawn up with dislocations of troops, especially of cavalry, toward the centers of revolutionary activity in the capitals. The minutes of the government meetings were filled with reports of the General commanding the Petrograd District, General Polkovnikov and his aide, General Bagratuni. The cadets' schools were mobilized and loyal civilian groups like the Students' Motorcycle Corps and the Bank Clerks' Committee received arms. The military authorities executed the orders of the government but showed little initiative of their own. The military administration worked as slowly and inefficiently as the civilian. Orders were issued as in the old days, without regard for the fact that many of the local administrative organs no longer functioned. When the armed workers' units appeared in public places for exercises in September, the Minister of the Interior, Nikitin, decreed that they should be placed under police surveillance to prepare for their disarming if they should become aggressive. On the other hand, the local militia should register their arms for a survey. Before the ministerial decrees had reached the police stations, the Revolution had swept everything aside.

In September and October, the attitude of the generals and the liberal parties gave the impression that they underrated the actual prospects of the Bolsheviks, who openly discussed their intentions and dreamed of a short-term lease of a possible success in Petrograd. But there might have been another hope behind the slow motion of defense measures: to let the revolutionary impetus sweep away the Kerensky regime, weak in its contradictory combination, and so get the road cleared for a deft counter-stroke from the Right, establishing a new homogeneous rule.

Despite the inner difficulties Kerensky acted. Strategic points of the capital were permanently occupied by cadets and loyal troops. The seat of the government was manned by 37 officers, 700 cadets, 75 men with 5 armored cars, 6 guns and 19 machine guns. All looked well on paper.

Over the question who should attend the Inter-Allied Conference scheduled for November 10 in Paris, Kerensky and the Petrograd Soviet came to blows before Great Britain officially denied that there would be any talk on war aims. The Soviet insisted on delegating a representative with the instruction "No annexation, no indemnities, right of self-determination of peoples." The Allies vehemently objected to the Nakaz declaration of the Soviet. When General Verkhovsky, the last Minister of War, stated that the Russian army could no longer fight and that the republic should press on the Allies the need to offer peace, the Soviet in turn attacked the proposal as an independent feeler for a separate peace and forced Verkhovsky to resign, leaving Kerensky in sole military control.

November 1 was the expected date of the cloudburst. Nothing happened and the government made plans to storm the Smolny Institute, the Bolsheviks' headquarters, on the twenty-fourth to forestall an attack. The Minister of Justice gave orders to arrest the Bolsheviks at large who had been released on parole after the July action "if they had indulged in criminal propaganda." The Bolshevik newspapers *Rabotshiy Putj* and the *Soldier* were confiscated, the last of a list of seventeen publications with the same fate during July-September. In the night of November 5-6 General Levisky handed to the Chief of Staff of the Dukhonin Army the personal order of Kerensky to direct all Cossacks from Finland and the whole Don Cossack Division to Petrograd. Before they started to march, the revolutionaries had occupied the government buildings. Kerensky was outside of the capital to concentrate the forces, never to return.

2. LENIN WINS

Since his return from Zurich in April, Lenin had forced his party to march on the road he had traced in his vision. His uncompromising policy had swollen the ranks from a wavering platoon to a formidable army of followers in September, though the general had to stay underground in renewed exile and could convey his ideas only by clandestine mail. He could not yet give orders, only recommendations. He wrote incessantly day by day in the last stage of preparations.

Lenin had worked on his standard book *State and Revolution* in August and September in spite of the daily correspondence. He got

as far as the chapter on the lessons of 1905 and 1917 but had no time to finish this work, published in 1918, because he had been hampered by the eve of the Revolution and had found it more pleasant and useful to take part in the experiences of the Revolution than to write about them. At the end of September, he appealed to the masses in a larger essay, "Catastrophe Ahead," to realize that the ineffective alliance of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries with the bourgeoisie had to be overthrown by a union of poor peasants and proletariat, and began to hammer into the heads of his inner circle, the Central Committee, his conclusions that immediate preparations had to be made for the final action by a series of letters.

The first letter was written between the twenty-fifth and the twenty-seventh of September, analyzing the general situation in every detail of the distribution of forces, the necessary strategy and tactical preparations. In the soviets of Petrograd and Moscow the Bolsheviks had obtained a majority of seats. "Now is the time to take over the supreme power. The majority in the revolutionary bodies is sufficient to sweep the enemy from the throne, take this place and stay there." He refrained from giving a date, as he foresaw the need of convincing the members of the headquarters of the coming Revolution before he could go into action. He reminded them of Marx and the art of rebellion. This letter was read in awe and apparent consternation. The discussion was postponed *sine die* for a meeting concerned with tactical matters.

But it was properly voted as to whether the letter should be copied for distribution among the most important organizations or merely the original kept. The latter proposal was accepted by six votes, four dissenting and six abstaining. It was further resolved to instruct all members active in the military committee and Petrograd Soviet to resist any revolutionary action. Lenin recalled in the second letter why Marx had spoken of revolution as art.

A rebellion can only be successful if carried on not by a conspiracy, not by a party but by the most advanced class backed by the revolutionary fervor of the masses. One has to look for a turning point in history where the vanguard has reached the climax of activity concurrent with a low in the ranks of the enemies and the wavering rows of the uncertain friends of the Revolution. Time is ripe for action when these rational conditions have been ascertained.

Lenin gave further tactical instructions. The Bolshevik faction in the Democratic Conference should "not look on their numbers nor

be afraid to leave the wavering to the wavering. They are more valuable to the cause of the Revolution in the other camp than in our own which can only use unconditionally devoted men." In a short declaration the Bolsheviks should announce the coming action to save the Revolution and proclaim peace to all people, the soil for the peasants, confiscation of profits, strongest measures against the scandalous sabotage of production by the capitalists.

Having read the declaration aloud and called for the decision to act, not to talk, we must send the whole faction into the factories and barracks. There is their place; there is the nerve center of life, from there the Revolution will be saved. There is the motor of the Democratic Conference. If the question is clearly put to the Conference; either acceptance of our program or rebellion, and at the same time our men are concentrated in the factories and barracks, we will be able to choose the right moment for action.

Lenin had come to the conclusion that it had been unwise for the Bolsheviks to partake of the meetings of the Democratic Conference and Preliminary Parliament. The boycott would have been better. So he tried to correct the past by making a forced bid and persuading the faction to contact the masses and stay with the local soviets and labor unions outside the councils.

His letters were followed by memoranda and essays in prolific penmanship. "History has made the military situation the most important political problem. It is wrong to await decisions of the Soviet Congress of the Constituent." The article "Advice of an Outsider," published only in 1920, applies Danton's formula, "Daring, daring and once more, daring," which Marx had taken up, to Russia.

It means for us coordinated, a most sudden and quick offensive against Petrograd from outside and inside, from Finland, from Reval, from Kronstadt, from the labor suburbs, the offensive of the whole fleet, concentrating on superior force against the 15,000 to 20,000 or more home guards and kadets, the "Vendée" troops of Cossacks. . . . Our forces the Navy, the workers and the troops have to be combined to enable us to have the immediate occupation of telephone and telegraph offices, the railroad stations and bridges without regard to possible losses. . . . Small detachments of our shock troops, the Workers Youth and the best sailors have to seize at one blow the important centers—a task which will require great courage as they have to die before the enemy can pass. The success of the Russian and the World Revolution depends on the first two or three days of the coming battle.

Zinoviev and Kamenev led the opposition in the Central Committee against this course which they called the "tactics of conspiracy" while promoting "tactics of the faith in the natural energies of the

Russian Revolution." But they had to admit that among the masses a strong support for an armed rebellion was coming to the fore. Lenin had returned under cover to Russia on October 23 and during the next days convinced the Central Committee in person to follow suit and to agree that the time had come for the harvest. Only Zinoviev and Kamenev insisted that the gamble was too great, resigned from the Committee and explained their attitude in Maxim Gorky's newspaper, *Novaya Zhizn*, in public. The "strike breakers" were not excommunicated as Lenin had requested because events took their historic course to victory. As never before in history, the preparations up to technical details for the insurrection were fervently discussed in the periodical press, in the workers' meetings, in the soviets and among soldiers and sailors.

The strongest expression of a revolutionary initiative was to be found in the Red Guards. They were the volunteers from the factories. They received instruction and arms from regular sergeants. Now they were given by the October conference of the Petrograd Soviet a statute as "military organizers of the proletariat." The volunteers had to be recommended by the labor unions, the factory committees or socialist parties. Instructors were presented by the special military units of the Bolsheviks. Before these self-made sergeants and sergeant majors went out, they were trained in courses which attracted members of other cities and even others from the front. The Red Guards may not have lived up to the highest military standards but they were flesh and blood of the proletariat and made up in fervor what they lacked in technique. Their rifles leaned against the lathes and benches they were working at while they waited for the signal to march.

The influence of the Bolsheviks among the regular troops had grown by leaps and bounds. Since the occupation of the Oesel Island by the Germans in October, Petrograd had become a primary war zone. The anxiety of the masses in the capitals naturally reflected on the garrisons. To prevent pre-dated actions, the party had to put the brake on the regular units.

After the new elections to the Petrograd and Moscow soviets had given the Bolsheviks a clear majority, they announced that the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress would be convened in Petrograd in the first week of November "to take over the Government of Russia." The Petrograd Soviet delegated a Military Revolutionary Com-

mittee to take over command of the garrison and to oppose any transfer of troops from the capital to the front, without the explicit consent of the Committee. Delegates were sent to the units in town and deposed the government commissars.

Trotsky, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and the Military Revolutionary Committee, took pains to declare that the Committee would only be an organ for the self-defense of the Revolution and that the garrison and the proletariat had only to give the Soviet Congress the armed forces necessary to down the provocation of the government. But the Menshevik opposition insisted that the Committee would be nothing less than the instrument to take over the power of the state.

They were right in judging that their passive rôle would soon change to an active one as High Command of the Revolution. The Bolshevik faction had nominated a Committee of Five, among them Stalin, Sverdlov and Dzierzhinski, for the leadership of the armed action. In the course of events, the authority of the Soviet Committee under Trotsky grew to such proportions by the *élan* of the attacks that the Party Committee was more or less playing the rôle of a General Staff, whereas the political executive was in the hands of Lenin assisted by Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.

On the first anniversary of the October Revolution, which took its name from the old-style calendar, thirteen days behind the Gregorian date, Stalin wrote:

The whole work of the preparation of the rebellion was under the personal direction of Comrade Trotsky. One can state for certain that the party has to thank Comrade Trotsky mostly for his quick maneuvering of the garrison to the side of the Soviets and the Military Revolutionary Committee's efficient organization of the work.

The commissars of the Soviet reported on November 2 and 3 that the majority of the regiments had declared allegiance to the Soviet and unanimously adopted a resolution that the garrison no longer recognize the provisional government and obey only the orders of the Soviet. Their patrols took up guard in the streets. On the following days, sailors were fetched from Kronstadt and the cruisers *Aurora* and *Zarja Svobodi*—"Dawn of Liberty"—made clear for action.

Lenin had discussed the date of action again on the third with his

friends without getting agreement. The Soviet Congress was due to convene on the seventh. Lenin, convinced that the blow should fall before one had to face the uncertain chance of a vote, wrote his final appeal to the Central Committee on the evening of the sixth. "It is as clear as can be that delaying the uprising now really means death. The people have a right and a duty to decide such questions by force, not by vote. . . ." He went over from his hiding place to the Smolny Institute the same night. He had written enough.

In the last hour the government received the support of the Mensheviks, the right wing of the Social Revolutionaries and the All-Russian Peasant Congress by a resolution which exhorted the soldiers and workers to keep peace and order. It was in vain. When the revolutionary forces advanced with Red Guards, artillery, naval units, factory workers, the defense of the government crumbled with few exceptions.

At 10 A.M. on November 7 Trotsky proclaimed the downfall of the government.

The power of the State is in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee. . . . The cause for which the people have fought is secure. immediate offer of a democratic peace, abolition of property rights of the squires, the control of production by the workers, formation of a Soviet Government Long live the Revolution of the workers, peasants and soldiers!

This time the Revolution acted swiftly, resolutely and systematically without undue haste. Technically, the uprising had not yet succeeded. The Preliminary Parliament sat in the Marinsky Palace; the Ministry of War had not yet been occupied. In the Winter Palace the ministers were defended by the Cadets and the women's death battalion. Kerensky was on the way to lead troops against the rebels. But not for long. The Marinsky Palace was cleared by a few soldiers without further ado, but not before the meeting had resolved to publish a protest against "the irresponsible elements who had deprived the representatives of the provisional Council of the Republic" of further activities by threat of bayonets. The Ministry of War surrendered without fight and the control over the direct communications with Headquarters was secured. During the night the Winter Palace was stormed and the ministers were arrested. With pride, Trotsky told the special meeting of the Soviet at noon:

We have been told that the rebellion would lead to pogroms and that the Revolution would drown in floods of blood. We do not know of a single victim.



ROYAL FAMILIES IN ENGLAND, 1909

Brown Brothers

Edward VIII

Nicholas II

Edward VII

George V



L. TROTSKY

LENIN

International News Service

A. KAMENEV

I do not know of any other example of a revolution where such immense masses were concerned and so little blood has been shed. The power of the Provisional Government, Kerensky at its head, has already deceased and awaits only the friendly broom to be swept clean. . . . We were awake the whole night and could watch over the telephone the noiseless work of the Red Guards and the revolutionary soldiers. The bourgeois has soundly slept and did not know that one power in the meantime had been relieved by another. . . . The Government must be an instrument for the liberation of the masses from any form of slavery. The best heads of the intelligentsia will realize that their working conditions will be better under Soviet rule. . . . The workers, peasants and soldiers must feel that national economy is their own economy. This is our foremost principle for the acclaim of power. The introduction of compulsory universal labor is one of the next duties of the Government.

After Trotsky, Lenin took the floor. For some hours he had been waiting at the Smolny Institute. His speech was short. No fanfares, a simple statement of the *fait accompli*, a concise announcement of the tasks ahead. A distinct accent was put upon the international importance of the Russian Revolution and the link with the world proletariat. "The old state organization will be felled at the roots and a new one built in the soviets." As a problem of the day Lenin saw the immediate proposal of peace and the liquidation of the war. "But we all agree that to end this war so closely allied to the present capitalist system, it will be essential to fight capital to the utmost. In this fight we shall have the support of the world's proletariat in Italy, England and Germany which has already started to move. . . ." Again Lenin repeated the hint of the international importance of the fight for peace. "Immediate peace will find a spontaneous echo everywhere among the proletarian masses. To justify this confidence we shall have to make public at once all secret treaties." He concluded his message to the Congress with his land program.

We shall gain the confidence of the peasants by a single decree which destroys the property rights of the squires. The peasants will grasp that only by the union with the workers peasantry can be saved. We shall set up the control of production by the workers. . . . We shall now proceed to construct the proletarian socialist order in Russia. Long live the socialist world revolution!

These first messages of the Bolshevik leaders contained all the program work of agitation and propaganda in the last decade. They were not yet pronounced in the form of decrees. The background was still obscure. Many followers even in the inner circle were frightened by the range of the sudden success in the capital. Fight-

ing was still going on. Kerensky was supposed to return with reinforcements of loyal troops. No news had come from the front and the countless cities in the provinces, from the opposing parties and their counteractions. Certain only was the fact that the time for compromise had passed. The proclamation to the masses was a pledge which could not be redeemed. The fight was on.

Lenin did not doubt his victory. The Bolsheviki had their finger on the pulse of the people. They sensed the daily changes in their moods and gauged the grades of revolutionary maturity. The trouble Lenin took to keep in constant touch with the little fellows is revealed by the Finnish Bodyguard Rachja. "On his behalf I visited factories, barracks and meetings, heard the opinion of the workers and brought him the text of the resolutions. When I came back in the evening, Vladimir Illjich questioned me on every detail of what I had heard and seen."

This extra sense of forebodings gave the Bolsheviki the superiority in those critical days. That is the reason why the objective picture of the October Revolution is different from any other historical uprising, conspiracy and *coup d'état*. What looks like conspiracy has been the natural secrecy of military preparations. Kerensky in his memoirs calls the leaders of the uprising in Smolny "traitors," and complains that the other parties neither had trusted the power of bayonets nor had taken other precautions. That he and all anti-Bolshevist parties looked upon the October Revolution as a mere rebellion was a wrong calculation which explains their failure.

The Bolsheviki transferred the parliamentary forum from the Petrograd Soviet into the All-Russian Soviet Congress, elected on a nation-wide basis. The list of attendance showed 390 Bolsheviki, 179 Left and 60 other Social Revolutionaries, 80 Mensheviki.

The first meeting was held on the evening of November 8 when the victory of the proletarian revolution had not been confirmed. Into the executive were delegated, in proportion to the number of deputies, 14 Bolsheviki, among them Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krylenko, Kollontai, Rykov, Antenov-Osvejenko, Rjasanov, Lunacharsky and 7 Left Social Revolutionaries. The other socialist parties refused to participate under protest against the Bolshevik usurpers. Martov recommended the postponement of further discussions until a delegation elected *ad hoc* had negotiated with the dissenters for the formation of an all-democratic govern-

ment. Trotsky parried with a motion to condemn the shilly-shallying methods of the dissenting parties and their attempt to break up the meeting by obstruction. It ended by leaving the Bolsheviks, the Left Social Revolutionaries, the peasant Soviet deputies, a large part of the delegates of army committees and the Polish Socialist party in sole control.

The Congress felt better when more and more news poured in of the progress of the Revolution. The first telegram of recognition came from the northern front. News of the occupation of the Winter Palace, the arrest of the ministers, the guarding of the approaches to the city by the Red Guards and the going over of two motorized battalions from Kerensky to the new Revolution followed during the session.

The first act of the Congress was to proclaim that all power of the state would go to the local soviets and then it addressed the army: "The Soviet Congress is convinced that the revolutionary Army will protect the Revolution against any attack by imperialism until the new Government has succeeded in achieving a democratic peace. . . . The Government will give the Army all necessities by resolute requisitioning and by taxation of the rich."

To prevent the Socialist opposition from gaining ground, the Bolsheviks concentrated on the task of undermining the hold of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries among the masses and of exposing them in the eyes of the followers of the Revolution. The bourgeois parties did not constitute an immediate danger. The Congress passed a declaration against the criminal attempt of the dissenters to weaken the front at a time when Congress, the vanguard of the masses, defended the Revolution with arms in hand against the pressure of the counter-revolution. The July offensive which had brought the army to the edge of an abyss had been prepared by the same forces responsible for the support by the government of the death penalty and popular treason. This attack was intended to make clear to the people that any compromise with the socialist neighbors was to be ruled out. The Bolsheviks did not wish to be hampered in forging the sword of Revolution by any contradiction to the work of the brain trust, trained in many years of seclusion.

The second and last meeting of the All-Russian Congress lasted from nine in the evening to seven in the morning. A government

was formed and two decrees on peace and the agrarian problem which Lenin had drafted were unanimously voted.

The Soviet of the People's Commissars, The Sovnarkom in the contracted nomenclature favored by the new order, counted only Bolsheviks among its members with Lenin as chairman. He had reached the first goal, the sanction of legality for all future measures. Without gestures, he read the first decree on peace, asking for a "just and democratic peace without annexations and without indemnities." It proposed an armistice of at least three months, repudiation of secret diplomacy and publication of all treaties signed or confirmed by the Russian government between March and the eighth of November. "All secret treaties as far as they were aimed at preserving benefits and privileges for the Russian squires and capitalists, at the conservation or extension of Great Russia's annexations, are herewith declared unconditionally void." This proposal was not only addressed to the warring governments but in departure from all international rules of the game also to the workers of all warring countries, especially in England, France and Germany, referring to their class-consciousness and revolutionary past. It used a language which was a *novum* in diplomacy.

The second decree, on landed property, was part of the dynamite which the Bolsheviks used to blow up the crumbled foundations of the former state. Its contents were mostly negative. The decree destroyed the whole class of squires as the heirs of feudalism. It confiscated all land without indemnity in favor of peasantry. But it said nothing of peasant individualism or new collectivism. It was simply a copy of the program of the Social Revolutionaries with the untold goal to get the peasant masses away from the strong influence of these old champions of the peasants' cry for land. The Bolsheviks plainly compromised in this respect. They gained the most valuable support among the peasants and soldiers in the first most critical stages of the young growth of power by this shrewd move. In his speech Lenin adroitly took the bull by the horns.

I hear voices telling us that the decree and the corresponding regulations have been composed by the Social Revolutionaries. What about it? Does it matter who composed them? As a democratic regime we cannot pass by resolutions of the lower popular strata even if we would not agree with them. In the blaze of life, in the practical administration of the new law the peasant will recognize what is right. And even if the peasants would continue to follow the Social Revolutionaries and if they would thereby get the majority of

seats in the Constituent, we would still say. Be it as it is. Life is the best teacher and proves who has been right. Life forces us to approach the great current of revolutionary creation in the drafting of a new form of State. The old regime tries to solve the land problem through administrative acts of the unchanged Tsarist bureaucracy. Instead of solving the problem, the bureaucracy simply fought against the peasant interests. The peasants have learned much in these eight months of Revolution. They want to decide themselves in all questions of landed property. . . . Russia is so large and the local conditions vary so much that we believe the peasants can decide better than we what there is to do. It is less important if they decide in our favor or in favor of the Social Revolutionaries. Essential is that the peasantry gain the conviction that there will be no more squires in the villages and that they are entitled to solve all questions themselves, to form their own life.

Lenin swayed the whole Congress. He had won the day. In November, 1916, there existed no Bolshevik party of great numbers in Russia. It was a romantic myth, the legend of the squads of veteran fighters underground. There was one man who saved the situation for the radical Revolution. It needed both, the great man, born for this chance, and the historic occasion, the lull between two epochs, where this man could arise. "We all had wrong ideas," Stalin modestly confessed. And Molotov adds: "We have to admit that we neither had the clarity of mind nor the firm resolve which this revolutionary moment needed."

3. NEW WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Lenin's Revolution was far from consolidation. He worked at a hectic pace and forced his collaborators to the same exertions. The series of decrees of the first weeks which he and Trotsky personally drafted proved a stupendous stamina. During the night of November 8-9 the opposition took heart. Besides, a number of citizens without official party label and all Socialist factions who had marched out of the Soviet Congress formed a "Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution" and declared the terror and the oppression used by a single party against the democratic majority as illegal. "Do not trust the Petrograd Soviet and its organs. All power to the Constituent."

The opposition intuitively felt that it was indeed a question of life or death. So they decided to fight for their ideals, their mode of living, their traditional customs against the rule of the mob, against the danger of being devoured by the masses. With this Revolution

they could not compromise, after the new men had openly proclaimed that the new society had to rise from the ashes of the old. They issued a counter-declaration. "The Bolsheviks have started a civil war, threatening to throw the country into indescribable horrors of anarchy and counter-revolution and to forestall the Constituent which will guarantee republican order and will grant popular property rights once and for all."

The Bolsheviks had experience and excellent staff training in all political matters from the theoretical and practical skirmishes in revolutionary warfare. They also were versed in the theories of economy and government. But the reality of life had given them no experience in administration of the hundred needs of society. They had to learn it the hard way. It was not a straight one. They had to step back, turn corners, often in danger of forever losing when the experiments proved to be failures.

The most pressing problem which called for the attention of the Sovnarkom was what to do with the Army. It was hardly a question of taking action to keep the army intact. The immense heap of millions at the front simply melted away. They wanted to go home and they went without orders. The declaration of peace had sounded like an accomplished fact and had started the rout toward home. The best that the new authorities could do was to bring some system into the spontaneous demobilization, either under the old commanders or under a new set of superiors.

The few units which Kerensky had succeeded in concentrating near Petrograd had been beaten by armed workers and revolutionary troops. Within a few days, armed resistance had ceased in Moscow. The troops at the front followed the armistice appeal of the government. It looked as if the Sovnarkom would have less difficulties than expected. Only a few clouds warned of the coming storms and cloudbursts.

At headquarters in Mogilev, General Dukhonin, just over forty years of age, deputized for Kerensky, whose whereabouts were unknown since the unsuccessful skirmish at Gachine on the eleventh. He was tacitly assured the backing of the Allies by the military mission which addressed protests to Russia for violating the accord by talking of separate negotiations to the Commander in Chief over the heads of the Sovnarkom. Dukhonin distributed these protests among the troops in the form of leaflets and openly declared that

he could not execute the orders of the Soviets to propose an armistice across the trenches. But the men of the hour had radioed in electrifying words the army's authorization to negotiate terms and to cease fire. "Soldiers, the question of peace is in your hands. You will not suffer counter-revolutionary generals to sabotage the great cause of peace but protect them from lynching unworthy of a revolutionary Army. . . ."

The garrison of Mogilev had taken the law in their hands on December 1 and arrested their chief. Krylenko, the Commissar of War, arrived with a sailors' guard to take over the High Command and protect Dukhonin, who had helped Generals Kornilov, Denikin, Romanovsky and Lukomsky, the latter White leaders, to slip out of the Bychow prison in time. He himself, however, remained. Despite Krylenko's intervention, Dukhonin was killed by the infuriated guards in front of his train.

Petrograd, the center of the Revolution, became an infested, haunted city within a few days. The former militia had disappeared. The city was now a prey to bandits and hooligans. Cutthroats meted out justice as they saw fit. The Red Guards were called out to take over police duties and to guard the warehouses and supply transports through the city. The chronicler Podvoisky refers to the fact that the mob comprising many thousands had broken into wine cellars and that to prevent a drunkards' pogrom, they dumped millions of buckets of wine and spirits into the sewers.

The old bureaucracy organized deliberate sabotage of administration. When Trotsky, who had been appointed Foreign Commissar, arrived at the Foreign Office to take over, six hundred officials walked out. The tellers of the State Bank refused to pay on orders of the Soviets.

"We found a small group of officials who very amicably greeted us. But there was nothing else—only empty desks and rooms and plenty of locked lockers. We started to feel our way—often near despair!"

Lunacharsky writes of his entry into the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment. Another Bolshevik, Lazis, started to take over in the Ministry of the Interior. "We did not know what to do first and had to appeal to the porters. We questioned them on the working methods of the departmental chiefs and gradually got some ideas. These veterans, who often had served for two decades under a dozen different bosses, were surprisingly well-informed."

Nikitin, the Minister of the Interior under Kerensky, had warned in advance: "The Bolsheviki have no able men. If they should succeed in usurping power, we shall not collaborate. They will be isolated." The telephone girls started the game. Clerks of posts and telegraphs, of the banks and of a great many offices followed the strike. News service from the province stopped dead and the capital was flooded by wild rumors. The Teachers League called up the teachers "to stand up openly against the Soviets for the defense of liberty and enlightenment." Schools in Petrograd were without teachers. The executive of the Railroad Brotherhood remained in opposition. Among the citizens were circulated subscriptions for the participants of the campaign.

The government employees elected a strike committee, the League of Leagues, which announced that the strike was necessary, after the Bolsheviki had by brutal force usurped the supreme power and had tried to take over the administration of the state. The Committee of Salvation backed the strike by declaring that it would be illegal to cede administrative functions to the Soviets.

The Military Revolutionary Committee, the only reliable power behind the throne of the Sovnarkom, warned the bourgeoisie of the consequences of the political strike. "They play with matches. The difficulties created by their mass resistance will fall back on them. The rich and their handy-men will be deprived of the right to buy food. All stocks and all the property in their possession will be confiscated."

The warning on November 23 was repeated for three days without result. Officialdom was firmly convinced that the usurper's government would soon break down and that it was their class duty to help drive out the Bolshevik spook.

The sabotage of administration was aimed at the nerve centers of everyday life and had become a matter of life or death to the newcomers. It had to be overcome either by a change of personnel or by reforming the existing agencies or by a completely new organization. The giving way of the officials and the later form of adaptation was another method of sabotage less aggressive but even more dangerous for the new overlords.

It all led to the decision of the Soviets to destroy the old system and build a new state machinery. The Sovnarkom followed the Paris Commune of 1871 by decreeing that all its members and those

of the Central Executive Committee would draw a maximum salary of 400 rbl., later raised to 110 rbl. for every family member unfit for work. The same decree established the rule that salaries of the responsible officials should be near the ceiling of average wages. To remove the old machinery and then replace it was easier said than done. Who knew enough of the fundamentals of administration in the provinces to face the hundred-fold problems of the Revolution with equanimity? Lenin encouraged the party members: "Nobody can help you. Take the work into your own hands. Start right at the bottom, do not wait for others! Cooperate and you will succeed."

The local soviets were requested to form party organs corresponding to every governmental branch or office. To gain public acclaim, despite the natural errors of the new bureaucracy, it was decreed that once a year all public agencies had to submit accounts to the public. The government saw to it that the masses were kept in revolutionary exultation and fed them day by day with new items of legislation to prove that the proletarian state had the materials to build a new world and order. The decrees spoke the language of Revolution. They were propaganda and repeated the message in the form of ukases that the old was gone never to return. The Declaration of Rights was the announcement of universal liberation:

Liberated are the peasants from bondage to the squires because the estates are liquidated. Liberated are the soldiers and sailors from the autocratic rule of the generals and admirals because the superior officers will in future be elected and also be dismissed by universal vote. Liberated are the workers from the whims and moods of the capitalists, for from now on the workers will control production in the factories!

Constant hammering of the terse slogans had effect. Who would later recall that they had not come true without suffering from the new whip?

The problem of nationalities had harassed the former governments in different ways. The Tsarist regime had chosen Russification by force as the practical solution. The February Revolution in its various stages had not dared to touch the hot iron. The People's Commissars took the courageous step of proclaiming the liberation of all former ties with Russia for all nationalities and races that wished to avail themselves of this liberty. "Equality and sovereignty for all the people of the Russias. . . . Free right of self-determination, including the right to separate and form a new independent

state. . . . Repeal of all and every national or national-religious privileges and restrictions."

Not only along the borders but also inside Russia this right was executed. For instance, later the German settlers on the Volga whom Catherine the Great had invited and who had preserved in peasant fashion, like the Pennsylvania Dutch, the traditional traits and native customs, were prompted to form a separate republic with Marxstadt as capital. But there is no evidence that they or others would have been allowed to use this freedom but under Soviet tutelage. When Georgia took the same liberty and elected a Menshevik government it did not last long. Riots broke out at a convenient time when Soviet troops were near by. When they invaded the territory of the republic and the Turks were asked to come in, too, as good neighbors to drive them out again, the Georgians one morning woke up to hear that both parties had agreed to divide the country and oust the legal officeholders. That was the end of the revival of Georgian independence. It was liberty on paper in political matters but cultural autonomy in the end, again with a proviso. What to read and write, the Moscow censors had to decide. There is a fly in every Soviet ointment. But the decree of liberation radiated a magic appeal around the globe and was to become one of the principal propaganda assets of the Soviet Union.

The Sovnarkom issued day by day well-prepared decrees of the first order. Workers' militias were to be formed by the local soviets with arms from the military district commands. All class distinctions and decorations, all ranks and insignia were abolished. The property of the Imperial House was confiscated. State loans were declared void, the share capital of the former private banks became state property. Nationalization of banks, an eight-hour day, production, financial and sales control by the workers' committees in all enterprises employing people—these were traditional demands. Another decree legalized revolution tribunals with unlimited power to act in any case of counter-revolution or sabotage. The members of these courts were to be elected by the Central Committee of the Soviet Congress for a period of three months but could be recalled any time. All decrees except those of historical or cultural interest were given a propaganda introduction.

As soon as a question of everyday life turned up a decree was

formulated, though in many cases the authors knew that only a part could be executed. In the first instance, it had to have propaganda value, to tell the people that the Soviets were on the alert and knew the popular needs.

Lenin wanted every work that was tackled to be of lasting value. As a great revolutionary he esteemed historical tradition [writes Trotsky]. Whether we stay in power or are thrown out, nobody can foresee. At any rate and under all circumstances, we have to bring as much clarity as possible into man's revolutionary experience. Our successors will take further steps with the help of our drawings. This was the principal idea of the legislative work of the first period. From this vantage point, Lenin impatiently requested the immediate publication in Russia of the classics of socialism and materialism. He also insisted on erecting many revolutionary monuments though in the simplest form of busts or memorial tablets in all cities and if possible, in villages also, to secure the memory of the acts of Government and to leave deep impressions on the minds of the people.

The shaping of this powerful propaganda amazed the onlookers. The *Rossija*, the anti-Bolshevist newspaper, admitted:

There is no event, no apparition, not a moment or single instance which the Bolsheviki omit to influence foe and friend. All leaders of Bolshevism place their brains and their gifts at the disposal of Agit prop. Beyond this circle, eminent authors, poets, actors, musicians, singers, artists, sculptors, painters get orders. The streets, the fences, the walls, the windows of stores and street cars, the stations in all cities are nearly all covered with poster-newspapers, slogans and cartoons. One has to mete out justice to the enemy. The newspapers, full of energy and enthusiasm, talk propaganda. The posters are colorful, poignant and ingenious, the appeals flaming, the slogans and citations caustic and effective.

This was the outward impressive picture. But it did explain the phenomenal success. Lenin later referred to this sketch.

The White Guardsmen love to write that the Bolsheviki make excellent propaganda and spare no money for agitation. But the people have lived to see many kinds of agitation, some by the Whites, some by the friends of the Constituent. It would be ridiculous to believe that the people have joined the Bolsheviki because their propaganda was smarter. Not at all. The reason was simply that their agitation told the truth.

This "truth" was not only the bleak reality, the plain current story of everyday life. It was a new epochal idea, uncouth and rude in action but essentially honest in its messianic fervor. The technique of propaganda and the craftiness of the methods and instruments

played a rôle. But the success of mass influence was due to the right appeal to the masses and individuals.

4. RED AND WHITE ROSE GO TO WAR

The opponents of the Bolsheviki had placed great hopes on the Constituent Assembly. The elections gave relatively favorable results. The Bolsheviki had formerly demanded the convoking as long as Prince Lvov and Kerensky were at the wheel. It could not very well be assumed that they would turn around and annul the elections. Indeed, the Soviet government chose a different, more pedagogic way to get rid of the democratic gathering which had no room anyhow under the proletarian dictatorship.

The Bolshevik press was told to present to the public the aspect that the elections had not been the expression of the popular will. Not even a formal concord existed in the will of the voters and on the composition of the elected because the Social Revolutionaries had offered a uniform list of candidates but had split after the election.

The polling between November 25 and December 9 showed that the new government had a majority in the capitals and a few big cities where there was any proletariat to speak of, but in 54 out of 79 regions they received only 9 million votes against 21 millions for the Social Revolutionaries of a total of 36.25 millions cast. According to arithmetic, this was a clear majority for the neighbors. The Constituent met. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets moved priority for the "Declaration of the Rights of the toiling and exploited people" and to sanction the fundamental gains of the October Revolution. By 237 to 135 the motion was rejected. The Bolshevik deputies left the assembly after some delay, followed by the Left wing of the Social Revolutionaries.

It was January 20, 1918. The Central Committee was in session when the news of the exodus reached them. Lenin wrote at once the decree of dissolution.

The Constituent Assembly which was elected on lists made out before the October Revolution, represents the old order when the compromisers and Cadets were in power . . . The working classes had to learn from their own experience that the old bourgeois parliamentarism was outmoded and unable to proceed with the realization of socialism. To yield the actual power of the

Soviets to the Constituent would mean the breakdown of the October Revolution of the workers and peasants. The Constituent Assembly is dissolved.

The Assembly had in the meantime adopted the Land Reform of the right Social Revolutionaries and were listening in the early morning hours to the Speaker's peace appeal to the Allies which sounded out of date in view of the actual events at Brest Litovsk, when a sailor with his rifle slung over his shoulder climbed up to the rostrum and whispered into the Speaker's ear: "Let us close the meeting." Obediently Chernov rose and adjourned, protesting "against the brutal force!" The majority gave up without a fight.

In the capital the action of the minority found firm approval. "The mass meetings in the factories and barracks were packed. Only Bolshevik speakers took the floor. Nobody of the Opposition was to be seen. I could hardly gain a hearing when I answered Zinoviev. They listened sullenly, without any interest. We were vanquished," wrote Boris Solokov, a bourgeois deputy.

The dissolution of the Constituent was a heavy blow for the opposition, who had lost their last platform for parliamentary proceedings. There was only one other way left: to meet force by force. So the war of the Red and White Rose started by the final parting of the Russian Socialists. The Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and other Socialists gave the White counter-revolution the political substance for the programmatic appeal to the public which the mere call for restoration lacked. The issue was left open, whether at the end of a victorious opposition there would be the restoration of the monarchy in the autocratic or constitutional form, or the democratic republic. The issue for the Bolsheviks was simpler: "All power to the Soviets." So they won in the end by the clearer program and the greater enthusiasm of their followers. But because Socialists were fighting on both sides, the feud was prolonged to the extirpation of one side, and the issues were so complex that the common people could hardly find room for judgment.

Until January, 1918, the proletarian Revolution marched on fairly unimpeded. Armed opposition was easily quelled. The economic decrees squarely hit the capitalist system. In the country the peasants, rich and poor, confiscated to their hearts' delight. But during the breathing spell for the outcome of the Brest Litovsk negotiations for a truce with the Germans and Austrians, the Soviets felt the need to put a stop to the cessation of all trade and production. "There

has been enough expropriation and chopping up. We have to have a look around and take account for a while." Lenin issued a ruling. Control, supervision, calculation, planned distribution of production and food, saving of popular strength, concentration of power and elimination of waste should be the directives of action. According to the economic plan, the majority of factories and other enterprises should remain in private hands, though under state control, executed from above by trusts, syndicates, combines, from below by factory committees. The Soviets wanted co-operation by the capitalists for management and reconstruction of industries.

There was no standing plan to follow. In the coming years of civil war and intervention one tried simply to survive from one day, one week, to the next. The economic organism of Russia was hewn to pieces. The Soviet state was just a rump with two-thirds of the former population, the largest part of metallurgic industry, three-quarters of the textile manufacture, but only 45 per cent of the wheat area, 37 per cent of barley, 33 per cent of meat industries, 23 per cent of pig iron, 10 per cent of coal, 8 per cent of sugar production.

The loss of Baku and Grozny deprived the Soviet rump of oil, the Czech Legions' uprising severed the connections with the Volga granary, the ore mines of the Urals, the Siberian butter and the cotton fields of Turkestan. There could be no question of regular production, with the towns and factories changing hands so frequently. In Kiev, the authorities had changed sixteen times since 1914 by now. The food trains of the workers took all grain of the land for the Red Army and the starving cities. The Poor Peasant Committees, which had sprouted in the summer of 1918 aside from the village soviets to assist the workers' expeditions in collecting the grain, started their own war against the well-to-do peasants.

During the second half of 1918 more and more factories were nationalized to keep up with the demand for the Red Army, and mass production on the former estates was attempted when the production of war material and food had reached the lowest level since October, 1917. Instead of production control by the workers' soviets, government managers took charge. Free trade was established. The Soviets tried to let co-operatives take its place. In the cities, whole settlements were confiscated and declared national property. Cumbersome excessive centralization with plenty of red tape reveled

during this period of war communism less from the free will of the Soviets than as a product of the emergency caused by the civil war, the blockade and the intervention. Once installed it became an indigenous growth. The expropriation degraded the capitalist to an inferior status outside of society. He had no right to vote or other citizen privileges.

Compulsory labor was obligatory for everyone who wanted food. Who does not work, shall not eat. Citizens were mobilized for the defense or for community work like procuring firewood. There was strong emphasis laid on collectives in supply, barter, farm production. The independent artisans were asked to form artels, the nationalized houses were changed into house communes. Ration cards had to be introduced to check consumption and food riots in queues. The food ration, the *pajak*, became the nightmare of the hungry people.

Supplies were poor in every one of the three classes in which the population was divided, but in the lowest group, members of the bourgeoisie were below starvation point. During the first period of free-for-all confiscation, furniture, clothes and other consumer goods were taken from the houses and given to the workers. Hoarding and barter destroyed all legal trade besides the official policy of driving the traders out of business. Money could not buy a thing any longer. This natural communism of the early savage period characterized the completely disorganized civic life. The villages tried to shut themselves off from the urban centers. There was no equivalent for the products of the soil as there were soon no goods left for barter. The kulak, the rich peasant, joined the counter-revolution to keep alive. Lenin appealed for the crusade against the profiteers, for the daily bread against the kulaki. He did not live better than the poor. When Radek was booed in a Moscow factory at a mass meeting on account of the higher rations for the other Kremlin occupants he took up the challenge with such great courage, proving the need for the rulers at least to keep fit to survive and plan for the masses, that he turned the "downs" into cheers.

Epidemics added to the toll hunger took. In 1920 more than two million in European Russia alone fell sick of spotted fever. Seven and a half million people were counted in the same year suffering from typhoid, scarlet fever, malaria, cholera, diphtheria and small pox. People fled from the cities. Even the crows who used to circle

around the domes of the Kremlin in such numbers in winter time were said to have shunned the doomed town.

The terrible times of misery, during which the Red Armies had somehow to be fed and clad at the expense of millions of civilians, this "heroic" period of the Revolution, brought so many losses to the population that there was a natural comeback from the deep. The surgeons at the Kremlin, where meanwhile the government had centralized all business, operated without anesthetics on the live writhing body and gave the new order a thorough trial to gain confidence. It was the greatest research plan carried out without a flicker of the cool and scrutinizing eyes. But as only gigantic natural catastrophes, never man by himself, can destroy all regenerative power within society, the comeback was delayed, interrupted but not drowned. Regeneration was assisted by the tremendous stimulants which the communist idea brought into the amorphous mass of young Russians.

When the first signs showed, that the bottom of the downfall had been reached, Lenin pointed in December, 1920, to the plans for the future.

As long as we lived in a country of small peasants, capitalism had a surer economic foundation than communism in Russia. One must not forget this. Everyone who has watched life in the village, knows that we have not yet uprooted the origin of capitalism, the roots of our domestic enemy, who thrives on the small capitalist economy. To undermine this foundation we have to change the technical basis for modern mass production by electrification. Communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country.

In 1921 the war communism reached its end because the peasantry took to active measure of mass resistance. The workers struck as in Tsarist days. The rebellion of the sailors at Kronstadt, peasants' sons who had watched the starvation in the villages and distrusted the foresight and administrative wisdom of the Kremlin, shouted "Down with the dictatorship of the Communists. Long live the Soviets!" and convinced the new rulers that a change had to take place to prevent a political reversal.

The tax in kind was introduced in place of the obnoxious, the compulsory grain collections which had caused the wrath of the peasants, to appease the countryside. Lenin retreated "We do not retreat this time to adapt us, to reorganize, to change the course, but only to advance after the retreat with greater energy." With

the loosening of the restrictions on the agrarian sector and the return of the peasant to the markets, conditions of life in the cities eased. Foreign capital was granted a new lease from which industrial reconstruction greatly benefited. One may say that the great Plans of the future would have hardly got into stride without this period of replenishing by freer trade.

Against the "enemies of the state" whom the regime outlawed and the military interventions of various counter-regimes the Red Guards took the chief part. But the inner front found countless difficulties to cope with; the offensive indoors had many disguises. When the world at large had voiced complaints about the ruthless procedure of the policing, Lenin wrote an open letter to the workers of America:

. . . the British bourgeoisie have forgotten their year 1649, the French their 1795. The terror was just and justified when the bourgeoisie used it for the liberation of the chains of feudalism. Now the terror is criminal and cruel when the workers and poor peasants use it against the bourgeoisie. The terror was just and justified when it was used to exchange one system of exploitation by a minority against another. But the terror became a stupendous crime when it was used to replace the exploiting minority for the sake of the working classes, the poor peasantry.

He could not state that in the end the minority of capitalist exploiters would be replaced by the minority exploiting party bureaucracy.

It was significant that for the sake of greater effect of the argumentation Lenin accepted the moral justification of terror as tenet, resisting the temptation to excuse the use of force in self-defense with its dubious stamina. When the first security police force was founded in 1917, the Bolsheviki did not trouble much about the terror question in their sovereign disdain of their political enemies. They knew that the enemies would not give in and would fight. So they took counter-measures such as the revolutionary courts, before which openly avowing adversaries could be arraigned. In September, 1918, a decree of the Soviets ordered enemies of the state to be isolated in concentration camps.

As late as December, 1918, the "Extraordinary All-Russian Commission for the Fight against the Counter-revolution, the Speculation and Misuse of Official Authority" was installed—in abbreviation called W. Ch. K. The later renowned Cheka had to ferret out all

conceivable enemies of the people without regard to the person, party members included, and bring them before the courts. The punishment was to be confiscation of property, arrest, withdrawal of rationing cards, publication on the list of enemies. The death penalty as the highest punishment was not listed under "measures." When later introduced it was for a long time restricted to bandits and persons who had provoked persecution, a somewhat expendable nomenclature, until orders were given to execute all persons connected with conspiracies, mutinies and White Guards.

Red mass terror started when Lenin's life was threatened by the Social Revolutionaries and Uritzky and Volodarsky had been assassinated. A circular telegram to all local soviets from the Commissar of the Interior requested stern counter-measures.

Done with weakness. Done with sentimental considerations! All Social Revolutionaries now locally have to be arrested at once. A large number of hostages have to be taken from the bourgeoisie and the officers, at the slightest provocation or attempt at resistance or a move among the White Guards' adherents mass executions have to take place without fail. . . . The hinterland of the Red Army must at all costs be cleared of potential enemies and White Guards under cover, of all criminal conspirators against the authority of the proletariat and the poor peasantry. No wavering, no uncertainty in the liquidation and the use of mass terror!

The radical treatment of this new policy, taken up in retaliation or on the initiative by other rulers and students of Accent on Power who discarded standards of decency as cobwebs of an ignominious past, has cost the life of millions, at first in Russia, then wherever the creed that violence is more persuasive than discussion took hold around the globe.

The Cheka policy served its purpose in Soviet Russia to eradicate countless cells of conspiracy or, looking at the reverse of the medal, of self-preservation, all organizations where opposition to the regime could breed. It began at a time when the young state was encircled on all sides, fighting for its right of existence. The Whites did not show more clemency. The deterioration of the sword into a butcher knife was caused by the lack of psychical stamina on the part of the swordsmen and their lords and by the general decline in the code of public morals we have been forced to watch or experience during the last decades. Human life no longer counts.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN STRAITS

I. BREST LITOVSK AND RAPALLO

LENIN's attitude to the problematics of Brest Litovsk can be found in a marginal note written in February 1918:

If we would have as many disciplined battalions as resolutions on the need to carry on with the war, we would be able to stand up against the Imperialists of the whole world.

The actual agreement on terminating hostilities on the eastern front was signed on March 3, 1918. Since November 27 the Germans had allowed the Soviet delegates to harangue and bicker on the terms in strange contrast to the "unconditional surrender" dictates of Compiègne of 1918 and 1941, which lasted as many hours, as months in Brest Litovsk. The Peace of Brest Litovsk is of no major interest for history as this political instrument never deserved the name. Both principal parties did not intend it to be more than a truce "until the conclusion of general peace," the Germans said. "Until the opportunity arises to give notice," the Soviets whispered. Here we are not concerned whether the policy of Brest Litovsk was right or wrong from the German or Allied point of view. The Russians at that time could only accept the final dictate.

But the handling of the delicate situation amidst a seething country, without a military instrument, surrounded by enemies, gives not only a vivid account of Lenin's rise to dominance but of the dexterity of the Soviet leaders to turn about. They can change foes and friends without the flicker of an eye.

Under this heading the records of Brest Litovsk and Rapallo have more than factual interest. Berlin and Vienna had formally accepted the Soviet appeals for an armistice as basis of negotiations on November 29, 1917. Since May, the terms of the Central Powers had been

drafted and approved, clearly showing the desire to end the war on one front. The Soviet delegation was less concerned with a quick settlement. They wanted publicity and a platform to foment world revolution, the only weapon they could at least try to use. Since fraternization had started on the whole eastern front, the Bolsheviki had distributed into the German lines *The Torch* and many pamphlets printed in German. Lenin himself was under the illusion that the proletarian masses in all warring countries would fall for the appeal to end war by revolt.

To the amazement of later historians, the German High Command agreed after a fortnight to the proviso that the fraternization was to be organized as follows: Two to three discussion centers in every divisional sector though not more than twenty-five men without arms from each side at a time "for the exchange of views and newspapers." This subtle propaganda was soon to be repeated a hundred times by the immediate exchange of the civil prisoners and the military prisoners of war, unfit for military service, who had diligently been prepared in their camps for the new order.

By December 20, 1917, five delegations met at Brest Litovsk around the peace table. Joffe, Kamenev, Sokolnikov were the Soviet mouthpieces. "We began peace negotiations in the hope of arousing the workmen's parties of Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as those of the Entente countries. For this reason, we were obliged to delay the negotiations as long as possible to give the European workers time to understand the main fact of the Soviet revolution itself and particularly its peace policy," wrote Trotsky later in *Lenin*. Over the practical end of the formula "peace without annexations and indemnities" there was heated discussion, after it had been conceded in theory by the Central Powers. During the Christmas recess the entente powers should be questioned on whether they would adhere to one of the conditions stipulated by Germany. But before the conference adjourned for vacation, it had become clear to Kuehlmann, Czernin and General Hoffmann, the man with the big stick of the Eastern Front Command, that the Soviets believed this formula would return Russian Poland and the Baltic states to Russia. This was in line neither with the wishes of the Greater Germany advocates, who dreamt of a ring of friendly monarchies from the Baltic to the Black Sea, nor with the nationalist sentiment of the people in these regions who had suffered from the Russifica-

tion policy in Tsarist Russia, nor with the benefits Germany had drawn from the occupation in the economic fields during the Allied blockade. So Joffe was told that the Central Powers reserved the right to separately negotiate with the nationalities outside Russia proper.

Trotsky addressed an impassioned note to the entente between the years begging them not to sabotage the general peace. He stressed the point that the Central Powers had agreed to evacuate all occupied territories. So the entente could no longer fight them with the claim of liberation. He threatened a separate peace and revolt. "If the Allied Governments in the blind stubbornness which characterizes decadent and perishing classes once more refuse to participate in negotiations then the working class will be confronted with the iron necessity of taking the power out of the hands of those who cannot or will not give the people peace."

The Allies did not reply. The Soviet leaders were disappointed but still believed that the world revolution was on the march. Lenin alone now saw the need to reverse the policy in order to save the Russian Revolution from drowning. But he needed further time to educate the Central Committee and to consolidate the domestic position. So he persuaded Trotsky to lead the delegation for Brest Litovsk to delay any decision to the utmost. While telegrams were exchanged with Kuehlmann asking for the transfer of the conference to Stockholm and the Entente was abused for abstaining, Trotsky sounded the unofficial observers of the Allies and the United States on the practical reaction to a break in negotiations with the Central Powers. Colonel Raymond Robbins of the Red Cross and General William V. Judson recommended the acceptance of Trotsky's proposal to let Allied officers check the embargo against deliveries of goods to Germany along the Russian front. The latter's report concluded: "The time for protests and threats addressed to the Soviet authority is over, if it ever existed." But nothing came of it. President Wilson issued the Fourteen Points on January 8, the sixth, dealing with Russia, "assuring a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing." The memorable message had no effect on the Brest Litovsk scene.

When talking was resumed on the spot which the Germans had chosen, Trotsky excelled in repartees with Kuehlmann. The dialectic struggle dragged on for weeks without any further result than that

the attitude of the German High Command became tense. The hope of the Soviets that the January strikes in German ammunition centers would amount to a real rebellion quickly abated. Kuehlmann did not grasp the easy opportunity to present Germany as the champion of the Western world against the Bolshevik danger and the debates droned on. From the Soviet viewpoint, the appearance of an independent delegation of young Ukrainians, representing the Rada, the Ukrainian People's Republic, and actually concluding a separate peace in February, was annoying because it deprived the Soviet territory of the flow of grain which Austria and Germany requested as price of the bargain. But in their innermost minds they did not think in terms of territories as long as the fomenting of revolution seemed to have a chance to work.

When General Hoffmann had made clear the intended border line, Trotsky went back to Petrograd on January 18 at the mutual request of Lenin and Stalin with the proposal to follow the line: "No war, no peace." Let us refuse to sign and give up the front in passive resistance! He held it impossible for the Germans to attack after the truce. Lenin had grave doubts that Trotsky's complex theory would work. No less was he opposed to the proposal to stage at once a revolutionary war against the Central Powers. In dramatic discussions Lenin fought hard in his sincere belief that peace had to be made at any costs, if the Revolution was to survive. This was the principal necessity. Nothing else could count at the moment. But it needed a complete change of policy. The public had been told that the proletariats of other countries would follow suit, that the promised millennium of social justice were around the corner. When an informal party vote was taken Bukharin could book 32 and Trotsky 16 votes. Lenin was left with 15. He now agreed to give Trotsky a free hand under the condition that if he failed, Trotsky would not support the Bukharin thesis of the *levée en masse*. Trotsky went back to Brest Litovsk to do his best, refused to give anything in writing and played the recalcitrant until, incensed by the Ukrainian peace agreement, he indicted the imperialism of the Central Powers and announced passive resistance.

The Soviet delegation returned to Petrograd in high fettle. Trotsky reported to the Central Committee on February 13 that a German advance into Soviet territory was out of the question. His attitude was unanimously condoned. Lenin was still alone in his

fear that there would be a bad and sudden drop in the general mood.

Within five days, the dream of no war, no peace had vanished. The Germans advanced on February 18 capturing Dvinsk and Luck without the least resistance by Russian troops. The bourgeoisie even welcomed the liberators from the Soviet yoke.

When it was reported that German planes were droning over Soviet cities Lenin repeated his warning: "We cannot joke with war. To write notes to the Germans is now a waste of paper. History will condemn us for betraying the Revolution when we had time to sign peace. It is too late to send our feelers. . . . All the Germans are after is grain. After they have taken that they will depart. . . ."

The working quarters of Petrograd bristled with indignant volunteers. Trotsky had requested Captain Sadoul of the French Military Mission to obtain a formal answer from the French Government whether France intended to assist the Soviets in the defense against the Germans and by what means. In the afternoon of February 22, the French note drafted by General Missel was delivered. The exact contents are unknown as the document has disappeared. Trotsky reported at once to the Central Committee of the Party and proposed a resolution to wage a defensive war against the invaders and to accept for such purpose Allied support as a matter of expediency without entering into foreign obligations and without giving up the Soviets independence in foreign politics. He found strong opposition. Lenin was not present but had sent a message: "I beg to give my vote in favor of the acceptance of potatoes and arms from the imperialist Anglo-French bandits." Six votes were cast against, five for the Trotsky proposal.

The following morning at 10:30 Germany announced additional peace terms, among them complete independence of Poland, the Baltic States, and the Ukraine from interference in domestic affairs by Soviet Russia. The Central Committee met with the agenda: Acceptance of the peace terms, Lenin, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov recommended, Bukharin, Dzierzhinski, Uritzky and Lomov opposed the submission to the dictate. Trotsky declared that he would vote for the revolutionary war against the Germans if an unanimous vote could be secured. When the final vote was taken, Lenin had his way: four against, four abstained, seven for the acceptance.

Lenin had further to face the Petrograd Congress in the Tauride Palace. Shouts of "traitor" greeted him. He remained unruffled. "Let us beware of becoming the slaves of our own phrases. In our day wars are not won by mere enthusiasm but by technical superiority. Give me an army of 100,000 men which will not tremble before the enemy, and I will not sign this peace." He had an answer to every query. He did not convince all but got his vote.¹ The last hurdle to take was the Executive Committee of the Soviet Congress. Lenin arrived about 3 A.M. Just four hours were left before the ultimatum expired. The ayes were 116, the noes 84 with 26 abstentions. Lenin left at dawn amidst shouts of "German spy" and "Judas." The Pravda of the 24th carried the Twenty-One Theses on Peace which his friends already knew. Now the people had to learn them. He did not find rest from vile attacks even by old friends. Bukharin, Radek, Krestinsky, Uritsky, Pyatakov, Kollontai left the fold and founded the "Communist" to push attacks on the old friend home.

Lenin summoned the Seventh Congress of the party with fifty selected old-timers to take up the challenge and blamed the dissenters for having prevented him from signing the earlier offers of Germany which had been less harsh. "If this treaty is far more crushing, they are to blame." With his lashing tongue he enjoyed the debates in his way. Though intolerant of stupidity, he allowed the freedom of discussion, feeling safe enough in the realm of his brains. The final battle for ratification by the All Russian Soviets Congress was due on March 14 in Moscow. Two hundred delegates of the Russian common folk listened to the great spellbinder in the Hall of Nobles. "I shall now speak for peace. It will be ratified," Lenin started. For more than an hour he explained to the simple minds of the audience. They understood him better than the professionals. He repeated the peasant words which had been exploded during the day. "Do you want war or do you want peace?" He gained a majority of 784 to 261 votes.

The defeated Left Social Revolutionaries staged terrorist acts to bring relations between Germany and the Soviets to a break and to enforce the start of a revolutionary war. Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador, was assassinated on July 6 by two of these

¹ A meeting of the Bolshevik and the social revolutionary leaders broke up without coming to a resolution.

terrorists. Marshall von Eichhorn on July 30 was another victim. Germany did not misuse the occasion to put pressure on the government and destroy the Soviet regime by military action as Lenin feared. He was severely wounded himself by an attempt on his life and Uritsky was killed in Petrograd on August 30.

While Karl Helfferich, former Vice Chancellor, was in Moscow for a week as Mirbach's successor, he was approached with the Soviet offer to open a corridor for German troops to pass near the Finnish border against the Allied concentration in the Arctic, while help was begged in the South against General Alexeiev's volunteers massing south of the Don. It was a sign for the speedy recovery of Soviet diplomacy from the Brest Litovsk shock, which anyhow left only a passing mark on history, a "forgotten peace" as John W. Wheeler Bennett calls it.

Enforced peace will bring no side salvation and satisfaction. There will always be winners and losers but signatures written under duress have the tendency to fade quicker. The German High Command was certainly in a plight. Austria suffered from sheer famine and had started to launch peace feelers behind the back of her ally. The Caucasus and the Ukraine were the only granaries in reach. One should have said openly that the occupation of these regions was a clear matter of expediency dictated by war and would only last until the universal peace instead of using the screen of Ukrainian independence for inroads into the genuinely Russian territory.

A new conference had already been called in August, 1918, to transform the dictate into a mutual pact, Krassin and Joffe attending for the Soviets, Nadolny and Stresemann for Germany. As Ludendorff insisted that the Don Republic should be free to come under German tutelage, the negotiations were protracted until cut short by the armistice of Compiègne in November, 1918.

The powers met at Genoa on April 11, 1922. Chicherin offered economic co-operation and Russian disarmament, as soon as the other powers should disband their forces. Barthou, the deputy of Poincaré, protested violently that the question of disarmament was raised. Chicherin retorted that this statement had been simply the answer to M. Briand, who had mentioned in Washington in 1921 that the Red Army was the chief obstacle to French disarmament. England

at that time supported the Greeks against the Turks, who, in turn, were backed by France.

Lloyd George was very anxious to get some results at Genoa. He had already encountered severe criticism at home for intending to deal with the Soviets, so he poured oil on the waves by proposing to form subcommittees for all major issues.

The next day, the British presented to the Political Sub-Committee a memorandum which stated in clause six that Russia had the right to claim damages from Germany but not Germany from Russia.

Barthou suggested to Lloyd George private conversations of the Allies with the Russians at the Villa de Albertis. Lloyd George complied. The Political Sub-Committee was adjourned sine die and the Russians were enticed to a series of talks behind closed doors. On Saturday, April 14, Joffe and Rakovsky of the Soviet delegation gave Baron Maltzan a detailed account of the proceedings but repeated the intention of signing the Russo-German pact drafted in Berlin. Maltzan informed E. F. Wise of the British delegation in the presence of Dr. Hilferding that they had lost hope that the British memo would be adapted to German needs and had therefore agreed to separate talks with the Soviet delegation.

On Sunday morning at 11:15 Joffe rang up Maltzan and asked the German delegation to meet him at 11 A.M. at Rapallo. The discussions with Lloyd George had come to a deadlock and the Russians had decided to sign the Berlin draft. Rathenau, Maltzan, Simon and Gauss reached Rapallo at noon. After lunch, Litvinov, Maltzan and Gauss prepared the final agreement, while Rathenau went to visit a friend near Portofino Mare, where he could not be reached by telephone. When Rathenau returned at 6:30 he was informed that Lloyd George had urgently requested to see him during the afternoon. He said "*Le vin est tiré, il faut le boire,*" and signed the pact. After his return to Genoa, Rathenau informed Sir Basil Blackett of the British delegation of the result. Lloyd George staged a thunderstorm show, pretending to have been double-crossed by the Germans.

The Russians considered Genoa a success. It was the first time that an international agreement had been sealed with the Soviets as equal partners. But the bitterness inside Russia caused by the long-standing outlawry rankled for a long time. Vassili Chicherin,

the son of a career diplomat, nephew of a philosopher, a lover of music who in Mozart was worshiping the incarnation of beauty, and Maxim Litvinov, the shrewd and superior negotiator with the infidels, as Foreign Commissars did not resent manners, if they saw a goal worth while.

In modern diplomacy, the Soviets blended native horse sense and ruthless propaganda methods with old traditions. They have still to find their masters. They despise glib talk and joviality and suspect sinister thoughts behind fawning by foreigners.

2. THE HOUNDS AND THE HEDGEHOG

For years the Alsatian deputy in the French Capital, S. Grumbach, led a campaign against the Soviet rulers with the ridiculous reproach that they had committed treason by signing the terms of Brest Litovsk as "final refund of German advances in their favor." The realistic policy of the Bolsheviks may have stultified outsiders and incited short-term politicians. But there was a coolly designed policy behind their actions in every phase. Sir George Buchanan certifies that the Russian army was atomized, resistance a farce, so that the Bolsheviks had to sign any terms of dictation at that time. In the most crucial days of haggling with the victors Lenin signed the birth certificate of the Red Army on January 28, 1919.

The No. 104 decree of the Council of the People's Commissars, the Sovnarkom, gives the reasons for a new army in its introduction. "The Old Army was a class instrument of the bourgeoisie for the oppression of the toilers. The change of the political power into the hands of the working and exploited classes is necessary to form a new Army as mainstay of the Soviets and as foundation for the transformation of the standing army into an armed population. Their task in the near future will be the support of the maturing socialist revolution in Europe." It clearly stipulated that the industrial workers should have preponderance over the forces. "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is to be created of the most class-conscious and organized elements of the working classes." The volunteers had to be 18 years of age and needed recommendations by the army committees, the labor unions and other democratic organizations, which had accepted the Soviet platform, by party organizations or two members of such institutions. For the

"next transitory period" they had to be chosen from the workers and peasants, who did not employ hired help. Other citizens should not have the privilege to bear arms.

Trotsky was commissioned to carry out the reform. His organizing genius worked wonders. The flow of decrees drafted by his pen was immense. It again proves that individual capacity for work increases tenfold when the task in front is great enough to tap hidden sources of strength. Maybe Trotsky's ambition rankled around the figures of Carnot, the founder of the armies of the French Revolution, and of the first general staff organization which achieved world fame. Sklansky, who later drowned in New York City while a member of the Amtorg, was his most able aide. While leaving the build-up of the army organization to Trotsky's discretion, the Central Committee reserved the right to decide all matters of policy and strategy.

A soviet of German prisoners of war, a forerunner of the Free Committee of 1943, took up residence in the vacated German Embassy in Moscow. Only one of the members later took part in politics inside Germany.

The Red Guards were gradually merged with the remnants of the field armies. If whole units wanted to join the Red Army, there had to be a poll by name of every member. There were no separate partisan units of Communists outside the Red Guards. In a transitory period legions of former prisoners of war from Hungary, Austria and Germany were attached to the new army.

The disruption of transport and supply and the lack of grain-producing regions in the nucleus of the Soviet state made it advisable to form territorial units that could more easily be fed off the land.

On February 21, 1919, a special organization for agitation in the army was set up, the future Political Army Administration, a copy of the commissars of the French Revolution, which was responsible for revolutionary integrity among the soldiers and officers. After the old army had been officially demobilized, the Sovnarkom announced the need for conscription of all citizens for universal labor and service in socialist patriotic defense in a decree of April 22, 1918, explaining that the tenacious opposition of the bourgeoisie against the new regime made it impossible to include the parasitic elements of society in the army, as it would paralyze the units.

Leaders rose from the Red Guards and the ranks by display of

personal valor. But Trotsky soon realized that eagerness and courage alone did not provide sufficient ability of command in the field, and the dearth of officers had to be met by exceptional measures.

The stupendous losses of 1914-17 had deprived the Tsar's army of most of the junior active officers. The thousands of high-school students who had taken their places after three months' training naturally lacked experience and authority. They tended to become sticklers for discipline and parade, and soon became the laughing-stock for the rebellious men. When the Revolution threatened to destroy the coveted *décor* of golden epaulettes which they would hardly have worn in normal times, they sided for the most part with the Whites and engaged in bitter fight as soon as they were released on parole by the Soviets. The remainder had a hard time to avert suspicion when serving in the Red Army. They were considered as former state employees and therefore did not come under the category "enemies of the State," the label for all former gendarmes, police, Court officials and those citizens who had lived from hired labor or unearned income and who were not eligible for military service.

It would be wrong to assume that the soldiers of the Tsar had turned against their former superiors in unwarranted atrocities. Sir Alfred Knox, the British military representative in Petrograd, noticed that the officers mostly disappeared from barracks and units in the days of the February Revolution but that "the mutineers looked up at the windows, now crowded with officers and clerks without showing signs of hostility." Many officers were arrested in the hectic period but the soldiers discriminated in their treatment. Professor Legras of Dijon, who spent 1916-18 with the Russian army in the field, testifies to "the very remarkable instinct of the soldiers—they only turned against the drunkard, the bully, the slug-gard and the marauder. The other officers were soon reinstated and promoted."

Only after the individual attempts on the lives of Soviet leaders and with the news of the White terror did the Red partisans react with the same cruelty. To relieve the tension caused by the use of Tsarist officers political commissars were given the double task of supervising the experts and protecting them against suspicion by the rank and file. They were all members of the Bolshevik party and paid the same heavy toll of life as the regular soldiers during the

crucial years of civil war and Allied intervention. The first volunteers came mostly from the factories. Within a fortnight after the publication of the February decree 100,000 men had registered. In December, 1918, conscription had bolstered the ranks toward the goal of 1,000,000 men. The United States observer, Captain Lionel Steffens, reported on April 2, 1919.

The Soviet Army consists of 1 to 1 1/2 million men between 17 and 25 years of age. A great number of Tsarist officers occupy executive positions but are under the supervisors of the Party. Nearly all lower-grade officers are workers. Discipline is restored and the men no longer look like beaten dogs. Equipment such as shoes, uniforms, rifles, machine guns and light artillery is excellent though there are no refined instruments.

Even more important was the morale. The men attacked tanks with bayonets, hand grenades in bunches—and guts. In the end that won all battles for the Soviet.

The *Militärwochenblatt* No. 356-64 justly points to the fact that, though it was said up to the fall of 1919 that Chinese, Latvians and Bashkirs had to drive the Red regiments into battle, the same troops had downed Yudenich's, Kolchak's and Denikin's units one after the other. Their weapons had rusty spots but Trotsky's really admirable performance in a devastated country had opened the road for the Red Army to become "the strongest military force in Europe."

Skirmishes with the advancing German armies in the Ukraine and extensive battling between Don and Caucasus with Cossacks, rich settlers and mountaineers under General Krasnov assisted by the Germans started the continuous fighting of the next years, where the Soviet hedgehog in his camp between Volga and Dnieper, which covered only one-sixteenth of the later Soviet Union, was constantly harassed by the hounds of the counter-revolution and intervention.

British and Canadian troops, later joined by Americans under General Graves, landed in Murmansk in March, 1918, followed by the landing of the Japanese in Vladivostok. In May, the Czech Legions, who were composed of former Austrian prisoners of war and on their way home via Siberia, were persuaded to turn back and fight their way through the alleged hostile Soviet territory along the Trans-Sib Railroad to the west. The Soviets had offered them free conduct after delivery of their arms. In the Urals they joined the Kolchak force of the Omsk provisional government which the



THE SOVIET TERRITORY IN FALL 1918

Admiral had formed as "supreme leader of the Russian State" under recognition of the entente.

The Left Social Revolutionaries started a revolt in Moscow, Murom, Yaroslav and Rybinsk. In August, British troops under General (now Lord) Ironside occupied Archangel and seized Baku and Askhabad in the south. General Denikin assembled a White army of volunteers in the Kuban region. The Red Army, directed by Military Revolutionary Councils at the various fronts, hastily formed army groups and corps to stave off the most dangerous attacks. The Germans stood pat on a demarcation line from the Baltic to the Sea of Azov and needed no attention. A concerted drive was threatening in the east by a White army at Orenburg, the Czechs at Omsk and an Allied force at Cheliabinsk. In August, 1918, the Czechs took Kazan, to lose it again in September. Voroshilov retreated with the Tenth Army to Tsaritzin, prepared by Stalin for the defense in front of the 30-mile width of the Volga. The town held. By mid-October, the Volga Basin was cleared of the Czechs and Whites. The northern front had frozen. The revolutions in Bulgaria, Austria and Germany forced the Germans to evacuate the Ukraine and the Caucasus and to leave Poland. But the change to the benefit of the Soviets was not for long as the Poles took up positions along the former German line.

At the beginning of 1919, the military situation looked desperate for the young Soviet Republic. The country was ravaged by famine and lack of essential commodities as all production had been converted to war needs. The brotherly feud between the Red and White Rose rocked all foundations of civic life. Relieved from the pressure of the German might, the Allies had immense stores and numerical superiority of ten to one at their disposal. Having proclaimed war against the usurpers of the Tsarist power there was barely hope for the miracle that the action would not be pursued in real earnest. But God was this time not with the stronger battalions.

The United States had reluctantly dispatched a token force of 4000 men to the Archangel front. Trotsky had promised the American observer, Raymond Robbins, up to March 5, 1918, to defy the German peace terms by letting the Soviet Congress delay ratification, if the United States could guarantee help. Lenin had waited until the last moment before entering the Congress Hall for a

favorable reply from Washington and London, where Bruce Lockhart had recommended the same action. Only after the vote was taken did the cable from Washington arrive with the message that no effective aid could be given.

A concerted action by the old army was out of the question even with the best of material help from the Allies.

When the Council of Ten at Versailles had resolved that it would be impossible to wipe out or subdue the Soviet government, Wilson sent W. C. Bullitt, at that time member of the peace delegation at Versailles, on a special mission to Russia on February 22, 1919. The later ambassador to Moscow and Paris knew that Canada had already decided to withdraw the Canadian troops from the Arctic and that General Ironside had asked for reinforcements, holding his 15,000 men to be in a hopeless plight.

Bullitt received an offer by Chicherin, the Foreign Commissar, and his deputy Litvinov of an armistice within a week and peace negotiations to follow within another week. The Soviets were willing to accept responsibility for the Tsarist foreign loans. The representatives did not hide their deep suspicions of France's attitude, which already had prevented the Prinkipo conference scheduled for February 15 and insisted on the blockade of Russia by land and sea bringing starvation to the cities. Petrograd received only 15 carloads of food against 60 needed and Moscow the same proportion. Bullitt returned to Paris and recommended the deal as he had the Soviets firmly intrenched since the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries had rallied behind them for the sake of national defense. "No real peace can be established in Europe and the world until peace is made with the Revolution. The proposal of the Soviet Governments presents perhaps a unique opportunity to make such peace on a just and reasonable basis." President Wilson was inclined to follow suit but news had come of successes of the White forces. Lloyd George found the opposition in the House of Commons too strong. He later even denied ever having had the intention of a deal with the Soviets. So the matter was dropped.

Bullitt resigned in May, 1919. His comment has historical interest.

Our Government has consented now to deliver the suffering people of the world to new oppressions, subjections and dismemberments—a new century of war. Russia, the acid test of good-will, has not even been understood. Unjust decisions of the Conference in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary,

East Prussia, Danzig, the Saar Valley and the abandonment of the freedom of the Seas principle make new international conflicts certain.

Was he wrong? The Soviet territory was nearly completely encircled by the mixed forces of the entente and the counter-revolution. Ironside stood in the north, leaving only a gap between Archangel and Perm. Admiral Kolchak held the Urals, the Cossacks dominated the Southeast, General Denikin the South, the Poles controlled the West and General Yudenich closed the circle with the White Guards and Baltic volunteers toward the Baltic.

Kolchak was the first to renew the offensive in early spring, 1919. His right wing was soon blocked to the north but gained considerable ground in the direction of Ufa, Simbirsk and Samara. By May, Red Army groups under Frunze, Tukhachevsky and Kubyshev had deprived him of these gains and driven him back to the Kama and Bielaya region. Siberian farms, incensed by requisition of their stocks and by conscription, had in the meanwhile formed guerilla bands and severed the communications in the rear. Trotsky now intended to throw the bulk of the eastern armies against Denikin's southern front to relieve the pressure on Moscow. But the Central Committee overruled him. Kolchak was pursued until his forces were decimated. The Czech Legions negotiated through the Revolutionary Non-Partisan Committee at Omsk for free conduct. This was granted against delivery of arms and Kolchak. In his headquarters in a railroad car, decorated with the flags of all Allies, the brave but theatrical admiral was taken prisoner, courtmartialed in public and executed. The Czechs reached their homeland without further interference. Siberia was in Soviet hands west of the Yenesei River by the end of 1919.

In the Northwest, Yudenich had steadily marched on toward Petrograd since Easter with 156,000 volunteers, taking Gdov and Pskov in his stride. In June, the fortress of Krassaya Gorka on the Gulf of Finland mutinied in the rear of the Seventh Red Army and forced the Reds to fall back. By October 20, Yudenich had reached the outskirts of Petrograd. But now armed workers and their womenfolk rushed out in defense. Trotsky stopped the fleeing regulars, showing the same gift in organizing a stand with his back to the wall as Stalin in Tsaritzin the year before. The miracle happened. Within a few weeks, Yudenich had retreated into Estonia.

The Soviets were now free to tackle the principal danger of the

year. Denikin had advanced in a wide arc stretching from the middle Dnieper to the Caspian Sea, had captured Tsaritzin, the Ukraine and the Donbas and had reached Tula in September with his officer regiments in a direct threat to Moscow, only 120 miles to the north. The Don Cossacks, protégés and protectors of the Tsarist regime, were his mainstay. Marmoton led them in enterprising pincer rides behind the Soviet lines. It was the last time in modern warfare that massed cavalry fought saber to saber, horse to horse.

Trotsky and Stalin, who had become members of the War Council of the southern front, disagreed on the counter-measures. Trotsky wanted to attack Denikin from the Volga bend at Tsaritzin through the arid Don steppes with the goal of Rostov-Novorossisk. Stalin emphasized the importance of regaining the communication lines of the Donbas and the assistance of the friendly miners and steel workers by the longer thrust against the line Orel-Kursk. He won. The newly formed Budjenny Cavalry Corps succeeded in breaking through the bulge of Denikin's arc, pushing the White armies south to Rostov, which "the saber heroes" captured early in 1920. By December, the Red Army had swollen to three million men, improving day by day the craft of war under fiery leaders. The Eleventh Red Army under Kirov took Tsaritzin back and went down in a clear sweep to Georgia, where the remnants of the Whites were interned. The Twelfth Army had meanwhile recaptured Kiev. Other units freed Transcaspia.

Peace feelers by the Soviets were rejected by the Allies in December, 1919, and February, 1920. Plans had been drawn up for a new drive from Lake Peipus down to the Sea of Azov, where Baron Wrangel, who took over from Denikin, concentrated new forces in the Crimea. The co-operation between Wrangel and the Poles, who distrusted the Tsarist general and his program of restoring Great Russia to her old borders, did not work too well though they had been promised Bielo-Russia and the Ukraine. The Poles started their offensive on April 25, 1920, having prepared public opinion throughout the winter by spreading rumors that the Soviets were going to overrun the new Poland in the coming spring. Even the cautious London *Times* hinted that Trotsky had stirred Poland by fifth columnists to start war. Petlura, the Hetman of the Ukraine, had concluded an alliance with Poland. At first, all went according to plan. The Poles advanced on a 300-verst front from the Ovruch to

Shitomir. Kiev, mother of the Russian cities, fell into their hands on May 16, changing hands for the ninth time since 1914.

The Poles requested restoration of the old borders of 1772 with Smolensk, Mogilev, Gomel and Kiev in this "Crusade against bolshevism." A. Harrison wrote in the Manchester *Guardian* on May 8, 1920:

The Poles go out for Napoleonic adventures which will awaken Russian nationalism and will lead to a war of revenge. Such a war would bring bankruptcy to the whole of Europe, a risorgimento to Russia and a conciliation of Germany and Russia. The Wilson treaty has already changed into a military hegemony Foch-Pilsudski.

General Brussilov called on the Red troops to repel the invaders. The Kremlin repeated the message of 1918 that it was the patriotic duty of Bielo-Russians and Ukrainians to resist the foreign intervention, and cabled to the League of Nations that "the criminal Polish invasion has found the assistance of various members of the League" and requested an investigation on the spot of the charge that the Pilsudski armies were supported by France with ammunition, officers and money. Backed by the renewed national fervor, the Soviets took to the offensive. The Budjenny Cavalry, well-clad in booty uniforms, armed with light tanks of British make left behind by Denikin, fought a brilliant guerilla warfare around Belaya Zorka. The wily staff sergeant, best rider in the Tsar's army, had borrowed an idea of the renowned guerilla leader Machno, who fought against all in treks of thousands of peasant wagons, initiated mechanized warfare by mounting machine guns on droshkys, the Russian type of horse buggy and hansom, and on peasant carts. Rydz-Smigly, the unlucky Commander in Chief of the Polish army in 1939 and at that time in charge of the Polish army in the Ukraine, saw the danger of being cut off and blew up the Dnieper bridges and Kiev.

On May 16, the Soviet counter-offensive had reached the Dessna line. The Northwestern Army under young Tukhachevsky took Lepel, crossed the Beresina and reached Minsk on July 10, the gates of Warsaw in August. Budjenny's army had meanwhile advanced to Lvov. On the whole 1000-verst front the Polish armies faced annihilation by the vigorous Reds.

Poland had approached the entente for immediate help on July 13. Lloyd George advised Patek, the Polish Minister in London, to

accept the Soviet terms, which Chicherin had formulated in a note to Whitehall. They included exclusion of damage claims, strict adherence to right of self-determination in the Wilson sense, no interference in domestic affairs, if Poland should become a Soviet state, return of the Polish Corridor to Germany and participation of Berlin in the peace conference. Terms were increased on August 11 by the demand that Poland should have not more than 60,000 men in the regular army including staff officers, deliver all arms, resign any war industry and reserve the railroad to Grajevo-Loenigsberg for Russia.

Millerand, the French Prime Minister of the day, met Lloyd George at Hythe in Sussex on August 9 to find a formula for the entente without reaching an agreement. Elections had lately shown that the public resented the costly intervention. Plans for a thrust of the British navy into the Baltic had to be dropped. France feared German-Russian rapprochement and had recognized the Wrangel regime in the Crimea, which England refused to do. Paris doubted anyhow the sincerity of the Soviet peace offer and suspected "oriental duplicity" behind the move. The military experts of France, Poland and London predicted that a reorganized Polish army should be able to throw back the "ragged heaps of the Reds."

Pinsk and Vilno were captured by the Soviets between July 16 and 28. Two thousand Poles retreated on German territory and were disarmed. The High Command had been streamlined. Kamenev became Commander in Chief with Lebedev as chief of staff. Tukhachevsky had the western, Budjenny the Ukrainian, Yegorov the southwestern command of the field armies. General Maxime Weygand left Paris for Warsaw and took charge of directives. The tide turned against the Soviets. The advances had stretched the make-shift lines of communications beyond breaking point. An acrimonious debate started after Trotsky's downfall on the question as to who was responsible for the final failure. Trotsky was called a traitor for having omitted to put a brake on the generals in the field who had dashed head-on without due regard to their rear.

The decision to carry on the war into Poland violated the principle of national independence and was taken by the Central Committee against the recommendations of S. Kamenev, the former Tsarist colonel who was the military Commander in Chief. The Bolshevik leaders entertained hopes that Poland would accept the

Soviet form of state. This would bring the Soviets right to the border of central Europe. As neighbors of the German proletariat, the world revolution might have a real chance of victory in Europe.

The Soviets asked for peace to have their hands free to turn against Wrangel's army in the South. The armistice was signed on October 12. Wrangel had successfully advanced from the Crimea in June along the west bank of the Dnieper through the Ukraine up to Kahovka. Then his cavalry was defeated by Yegorov, who forced him to the defensive. When Budjenny's cavalry joined Yegorov's units, Wrangel retreated to the fortified Crimea, on November 7-8. The Reds stormed the Isthmus of Perekop and drove the foe into the sea.●

The civil war was virtually over on the third anniversary of the Revolution, though for two years isolated uprisings and guerilla fights flared up across the country. Vladivostok was not relieved before October, 1922.

Social Revolutionaries fomented riots among the peasantry, which teemed with discontent over the land policy and grain collections. The Kronstadt rebellion of the sailors in March, 1921, came from the same source. In the Ukraine and along the Polish borders and Finnish Karelia were countless bands engaged in guerilla warfare, anarchists and White Guards in fierce competition under daring leaders such as Tiutiunik, Machno, Bulak-Balakhovich. In central Asia and the Far East the Soviets also only gradually gained control.

Why did intervention fail?

In the feud between Red and White Rose, common language, common breed and family relations were superseded by the bitter hatred of the class foe. The Whites fought, in the beginning a heroic stand for Fatherland and church, traditions and spiritual values against savage upstarts and anarchy. Then they deteriorated into bands of marauders, after thousands had died marching in solid columns with flying standards against machine-gun fire, officers as well as privates. Profiteers of all descriptions in their wake sold real and imaginary stocks and properties on paper in wild gambling in the cafés. No Jews were among them as they were persecuted with the start of the counter-revolution in the accustomed manner of the pogroms. Pilfering in any form was encouraged under cover of requisitioning. Peasants were flogged in public. British correspondents and the *Taegliche Rundschau* reported from Riga that rounded up

workers had to dig their own graves in trenches before wholesale execution. Atrocity stories were naturally galore. An adolescent boy had boasted that ten Red nurses had been shot. It was found to be mere fiction. But the poison had been injected and gone through the world. Following the liquidation of the imperial family in Ekaterinoslav, though the regicide did not stir the depths in Russia, the world at large was prepared to accept gossip on Red cruelties at printed value. The Revolution certainly did not spare lives in the fight for the Soviet existence.

The pages of Alexei Tolstoy's brilliant if not always accurate novel and of Mikhail Sholokhov's *Silent Don* gave enough proof of the butchery in the bloody vendetta war. The Reds had the upper hand as they fought for a new order of society, which promised to give the underdogs what, to their best belief, had been withheld by tyrants against natural law. The Whites fought for the upkeep of privileges which had fallen into the dust when the foundations had given way under the stress of war, not torn asunder by revolutionary zeal of malcontents.

The Allied troops suffered from the lack of a reasoned policy. Lord Bertie writes in his diary on January 26, 1919: "One of Isvolsky's arguments in favor of his Archangel scheme, which the President of the [French] Chambers Budget Commission liked, was that the forests in that country are of enormous value and could be held as security for French money advances." The boys who wanted to get home quickly after "the real war was over" and were shivering in the Arctic, were not keen on serving an extra term for the pawnbroker's sake. If President Wilson's Fourteen Points were to be the foundation of the better world to come, why butt into other people's houses and try to dictate a rule to them with bayonets?

The Bolshevik germs proclaiming freedom for all oppressed classes and races had spread like wildfire not only in the defeated countries. Hungary and Germany were natural seedbeds but sympathizers were found on every coast. In Korea the Japanese had trouble too. A mutiny in the French squadron led by André Marty forced withdrawal of the ships from the Black Sea. Auxiliaries from the border states looked askance on the Tsarist generals for the reason that their program of restoration of Great Russia endangered the newly won independence of the nations on the fringe. They were,

at any rate, only interested in the liberation of their own land, not intent on marching beyond the border.

There is one principal lesson to be learned from the failure of intervention. The success of such a military enterprise depends on the backing by a substantial genuine body of nationals in the country which has to be invaded to balance the historical experience. History loves to repeat tragedies and tragi-comedies. All foreign military help for the restoration or introduction of a political order is of doubtful value to the assisted side. In Soviet Russia of 1919-20 there was no consolidated backing for intervention in favor of democracy. The imaginary forces of the Right and the Center had vanished with the breakdown of organized civic life.

3. "IF POLITBUREAU ORDERS . . .

" . . . you will act as a midwife," was a standing joke in the Moscow of 1920-23 among government workers.

In the wake of Lenin's rise to the top of revolutionary power, local soviets had usurped power across the length and width of the industrial heartland of Russia. Sprouting like mushrooms from meetings in village inns, corner stores, factories, shipyards and railroad sheds, they ran wild for quite a while. The first wave of destructive enthusiasm receded when violence was no longer fun. The ban on vodka held good at that time. "Russians are by nature docile and gentle, when sober." A new cosmic rage broke out, when the White terror and the threat of armed intervention against the Soviet territory again roused the adherents of the Soviets. Civic life was warded in a vise of terror. The ragged, undisciplined bands scarred and scared the country with assumed authority. Their interests seldom went beyond the parish fences. The lack of co-ordination among the local Soviets endangered the very structure of the Soviet dreams. So Lenin was forced in June, 1920, to centralize the administration and to deprive the local soviets of executive power. "If the administration is not run by experts, the Soviet Union will go on the rocks."

Most of the old Tsarist bureaucrats had left their posts under the impact of revolutionary soviets, had gone into hiding, were ferreted out, impeached and liquidated by death and deportation. A new breed of officials, who could not get more training than a slight polish before they were let loose on the public, appeared by the thousands.

Party membership was essential for the political administration. During the first fifteen years nobody was admitted to the party unless he was of proletarian or peasant origin, professed the atheist views of the party line and could prove to have no relations with old-timers. In the post of the industrial and distributive administration, non-members of the party were used until young party recruits had been put through the paces.

The most pressing need of the reconstruction period was the feeding and clothing of the masses in order to administer the "no work, no food" law. The people were grouped in three classes on the basis of labor cards. Soldiers, government officials and workers in essential occupations received or were entitled to receive a daily ration of $1\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. of bread, other workers were allowed $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. and idle people $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. But all children were fed on top rations in nurseries and schools, regardless of origin. Lenin too lived on one meal a day. The fairness of the system relieved the political unrest and won respect for the Politbureau. Discontent was shrewdly diverted by blaming the aftermath of the War of 1914, the breakdown of transportation by the corruption of Tsarist officials, the Allied blockade and armed intervention and the foreigners in general.

The Politbureau had emanated from the Central Committee of the Communist party as chief executive. It was no brain trust but a club of loyal lieutenants. Its origin was the Cabinet of People's Commissars, the Sovnarkom. In due course, the control over the local administration was so tightened that no detail in a Siberian village was executed, no tea-party guest in a Soviet consulate abroad received, without previous approval by the Kremlin. The Sovnarkom expanded with the increase of business in the largest political and commercial department store of the world from 18 to 43 divisional heads under one general manager. The ant heap of the lower rank and file grew out of any comparison to the Pentagon or Sears Roebuck, using in the clerical staffs of the industrial plants up to nine times as many clerks as in comparative offices in the United States and England. "Fight for time and punctuality" was the slogan of a Time League, founded to bring more discipline into office routine. Members were pledged to carry a watch, be punctual to the minute and report defaulters. Special sections were formed to streamline office work. But the disease of reddest tape was not overcome when the war of 1941 drowned the rationalizing campaign.

Molotov, who was for a time Prime Minister of the USSR before Stalin took over, reported in 1939 that the political administration numbered $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions and other government officials $9\frac{3}{4}$ millions with their family members, equaling 14 per cent of the population. Nearly all of them are under the age of forty. They have grown up in the Soviet world, shut off from any contact with life outside the compound. They are devoted to the master who lifted them out of millions and freed them from the misery, lethargy and illiteracy of humble homes. Proud of their office dignity and zealous in the pursuit of any task, the Sisyphus work to feed and clothe millions was beyond their power. No organization could have mastered it in bare Russia, stripped of most of life's necessities. Who wonders that millions were left to die of want, that errors of planning should arise to billions of roubles for sheer lack of training confused and eager minds to the limits of nature? It was the great tragedy of the Russian transition that the executives were stragglers in their own land, jumping at wrong conclusions in the narrow party school which had not had time to extend beyond the primary stage. Thanks to the native intelligence which was abundant among the healthy young people surviving the hunger decade, the ship was not wrecked in the storms.

The Kremlin took great care to maintain the fiction that only two groups of people could be classified in the Soviet Union: the urban and the rural workers. It is a fact that the members of the Communist party are a class separated from the remainder by virtue of holding all responsible jobs. When Wendell Willkie came to Yakutsk, one of the eleven provinces of Siberia, thirty-four times the size of Pennsylvania, he found that all men in executive positions had been taken from the party caucus. Membership in the party was confined to limited numbers. Only during the war the annual entries jumped from 233,000 to 752,000. But neither must it be forgotten that half a million members were expelled during the purge years 1933-38. There are not more than one per cent of the people who have actual control over the welfare of 180 millions. And only a few at the top of the hierarchy have a real voice in shaping policy. The masses still appear browbeaten and apathetic in front of the formidable administration. They do not any longer hear Lenin's voice: Russia is a Soviet state disfigured by bureaucracy. Moscow has conquered Russia as Paris did France in 1793. But after 150

years rural France rebelled for the first time against the centralized administration. The patience of peasantry does not count the years.

The victors of the Revolution follow the creed of the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov* who tells Christ.

Oh, we shall convince them that they cannot be free till they renounce their freedom in our favor and submit to us. . . . Remember the horrors of slavery and confusion to which this freedom brought them. . . . We will give them a quiet, modest happiness, the happiness of feeble creatures . . . and they will all be happy, all the millions, except the hundred thousands who rule over them. . . .

They dealt with everything in life, from the production of hairpins to instruction in philosophy. The common folk could not escape from the spider's web into a corner of their own. To get rid of the autocratic Tsarist bureaucracy they had helped to overthrow the regime and found themselves more enchained than before.

The wicked giant, Leviathan, whom Thomas Hobbes—the father of all of us, Marx had called him—had created in 1651, restless in his desire to pile power on power, was certain that he had solved the problem of squaring the circle and was angry with those whom he could not convince. The eager crowd of his Russian pupils were of the same breed. In spite of millenniums of contrary experience, that it is impossible to reduce human society to one level, as Leo XIII formulated it in the encyclical on conditions of labor in 1891, the shock brigades of the new order believed that nothing was impossible for the human mind, if only the human will was strong enough. They were under the constant threat of the death penalty if an action misfired. "What happens if you do not make good?" "I shall be liquidated," was the stereotyped answer. Opportunists were mixed with those who were drunk with power and others who were burned up with ambition to give their best in service to the people.

It is of lesser importance if this bureaucracy already has attained a class-conscious feeling of being a separate entity in the social body with individual traits, or if it simply represents a social group without class distinction. The bulk of the Civil Service lives on the scale of a factory worker in the same income class, though they are white-collar workers in the eyes of the locksmith and the chimney sweep. More and more of the higher-ranking officials, not only in the managers' and engineers' group, have reached far larger income brackets since the 300 rbl. ban on Soviet income was lifted. In addi-

tion to salaries up to twenty times the average amount, they received better living quarters, automobiles, country houses, they can buy jewelry and furniture of quality and can give their children a higher education, since neither the last three grades in high schools nor the colleges are any longer free of charge. For special work in writing, for inventions and proficiency in profession, cash premiums up to 100,000 rbl. are freely granted. As in the case of the armed forces, an elite of officials is allowed to live a distinctly more comfortable life than the masses.

There is reason for the subjects of the Kremlin rule to suggest that the new bureaucracy lives from the fat of the soil like the old, that the social surplus has been wasted by red tape and that only the gigantic resources of the country have allowed Russia to endure the incompetence of the administration. But these voices are mute. Criticism is limited to the working of the mechanics of the system. The sole control of the functioning of the political and social body lies in the hands of the Premier. The popular vote in the first and only election after the inauguration of the Constitution showed 97 per cent of all votes in favor of the party candidates. "Is this not a sure sign that the leader rules of the people, for the people, by the people?" says Dr. Goebbels.

Stalin can also insure his arbitrary power by other means. Besides being the Supreme Commander of all armed forces, he commands the highly trained NKVD, the State Police which has grown out of the Tsarist Ochrana, the Cheka of the Revolution and the G.P.U. of the chrysalis stage of his regime.

Police terror in various forms has been a very ancient custom of expediency. Saadi, the Persian poet of Bagdad in the thirteenth century, tells in *Gulistan* the story of the terror-stricken fox who was running as if for his life. When asked what he was afraid of, he replied: "I hear the authorities are going to press a camel into service." "Well, what of it, you are not a relation to the camel?" "Be silent," the fox answered. "If a malignant policeman out of evil design should say: You are a camel, who would be so solicitous of my relief as to order an inquiry into my case? And even then, he who has been bitten by the serpent may be dead before an antidote could be brought from Iracq."

Since deportation of suspects was introduced in 1827, administrative exiles have had a place of honor in Russian minds. Not less

than 79,099 unfortunate victims were deported in the first decade. Until 1878 local authorities did not need to advise the Minister of the Interior of the number of arrests. Whoever encountered the displeasure of the local police chief could find himself overnight in a chain gang on the road to Siberia. If, by one of the many blunders, the wrong man with a similar name was caught in the net, he encountered the same fate. Tsarist authority was not inclined to admit errors. This habit must have been a contagious disease, for Mother Russia up till now has not got rid of it.

Administrative arrests were made under the same motto in Soviet as in Tsarist times, as in fascist Italy or under the Hitler regime. The Cheka, which had at its disposal special troops for wholesale executions and neither had time nor wanted to take time for careful scrutiny, was reformed into the State Political Administration, the G.P.U., after the blood baths of revolutionary fervor in the battles between the Red and White Guards. The new organization was a corps recruited of fourfold-tested volunteers who lived and worked under the strictest code of secrecy and discipline. Vested with discretionary power in and out of the courts, which were placed under police jurisdiction, the G.P.U. acted swiftly with or without trial. Foreign agents were its prey as well as all opponents of the regime at home. The G.P.U. decided who was an opponent. An immense network of agents and informers spread over the country into families, factories, farms and every business and government office.

Until 1927, the State Police concentrated on ferreting out former Tsarist officials, the intelligentsia, White Guards sympathizers, traders and non-Communists. Then came Stalin's drive against Trotsky and his friends in which for the first time the G.P.U. was used against party members. "Defeat the counter-revolution!" Four millions of voluntary helpers swelled the ranks of the "dragonards." When the First Plan was under way, defects of the economic organization became a public scandal. The Kremlin could not do wrong or be wrong. So the G.P.U. was told to work on a purge of wreckers. In the dark of the night, men in executive positions were caught in the dragnet, accused of deliberate plotting of sabotage and convicted. Soon the public clamored for the heads of their assistants, foremen and clerks. Thousands were liquidated or exiled or sent to the labor battalions in the Arctic to stifle further inquiries as to how the wrecking had reached major proportions.

A new wave of persecution followed liquidation of the kulaki. The State Police started grand construction schemes to get the victims out of the way: railroads, irrigation systems, canals, harbor buildings. It happened that an engineer was arrested and deported to the job in question when part of a construction in progress needed a special expert. Normal industrial output dropped to an embarrassing low because of the indiscriminate G.P.U. arrests and the flight of most of the skilled technicians and managers into jobs of less conspicuous nature.

Stalin had presumably watched the rise of the G.P.U. to overwhelming power not without misgivings. Praetorian guards and police chiefs are potential adversaries of all dictators. When the restricting of Gestapo activities was pressed by the Economic Council, Stalin made his Magna Charta speech in June, 1931, and reshuffled the police generals. Genrich Yagoda, the counterpart of Heinrich Himmler, was superseded by an old friend of Lenin, Akulov, who stopped wholesale arrests for terror purposes. Within four months, the new acting chief of the police was downed by the intricate Fouché system and Yagoda was back at the job. A typical trait of Stalin is a vengeful memory. When forced to retreat he does it in the Lenin manner: Step back and jump farther. Two years later, Akulov was made attorney general to "supervise the legality and propriety of the acts of the G.P.U." He could grant reprieve of any G.P.U. verdict. Army officers, engineers and members of the Foreign Office could no longer be arrested without consent of the Central Committee. A cloud broke over the head of the G.P.U. when it was found that the Assistant Commissar of Agriculture, Konar, alias Poleshuk, was a Pole who had been a Warsaw agent for thirteen years. Economic conditions improved with the more restful atmosphere. In January, 1934, the G.P.U. was remodeled as Commissariat of Internal Affairs—NKVD—and the law courts were given more jurisdiction. After a delay of six months friend Yagoda was placed in charge of the new Commissariat. His fate was sealed when Kirov, the Bolshevik leader at Leningrad, was shot by a government official who had belonged to the Trotsky opposition and recanted. Stalin fired the G.P.U. staff in Leningrad on the spot for neglect, then waited with the amazing patience and genius in timing which make him a big man in public affairs. Yagoda was used to stage the first trials of the new

wave of persecution which started in 1931, when a new economic depression roused the public. In September, 1936, he was transferred to Posts and Telegraphs, the notorious deathhouse for fallen archangels. At the greatest of the purge sessions, March 2-13, 1938, the executioner who had sent millions to an unknown fate sat in dock, accused of treason and conspiracy with foreign powers. His successor Yezhov disappeared also after the last purge. Thoroughly combed of the Old Guard, the police was put on a strong leash.

The terror had served two nearly perfect purposes: It had drained the pool of potential competitors for the *aura popularis* to the bottom. It confused the party caucus by seeding distrust in every community. Why should the local colleague be free of suspicion when the shining lights of the firmament had confessed in public their lifelong treachery? The only safeguard against being suspected in turn was the untiring declaration of unswerving loyalty to the supreme leader. This accounts for the steady fawning and servile behavior in public and literature so oppressive to non-oriental onlookers. No criticism was allowed except of minor defects of mechanism.

The second success achieved by the master mind in the Kremlin was that the masses were driven into docile apathy regarding other people's fate and were only intent on keeping in step to save their own necks, even if they did not believe that Stalin was right. The youth had lived in turmoil and strife and did not question Stalin's authority. They had even accepted the cruel break-up of family ties, modeled on the medieval Jesuit doctrine of Johannes de Dicastillo: "If a father is injurious to the State and the common weal, and there is no other way of averting this evil, he would permit the son to slay his outlawed father."

It would be wrong to assume that state or secret police institutions have merely the function of suppressing repulsive movements or public opinion. They also gauge individual and public sentiments to find the breaking point, make their Gallup polls, investigate cross sections of the communities, read the barometer of political pressure by tapping wires or thumbing through mail in the style established by the Marquise de Pompadour. In this respect they are indispensable to totalitarian rulers who cannot rely on parliament voicing the mood of the people.

It was not a bed of roses the Soviets had chosen. The reverses of

their haphazard policy invariably forced their hands to turns and twists.

Lenin had, as always, the courage to confess: "Life has shown us our mistake. Our attempt at the transition to communism sustained a defeat more serious than before." His favorite scheme of electrification as the first step in the industrialization had been made law as the Ten-year Plan in December, 1920, but had also to be postponed with all other long-term ideas because of the practical breakdown of economic life. All cross wires were entangled. Ruefully, the Communist party reverted to a co-operation of private enterprise and state monopolies. Whatever planning went on was confined to scientific gathering of control data of the existing resources.

An immediate revival of resources took place on the reopening of old plants. In Leningrad, the population had shrunk from 3 millions in 1913 to 600,000 in 1921. Most of the frame houses had been chopped up for heating, no pipes could be used. Only one-sixth of the factories continued makeshift production.

In 1922, the whole investment value in industries amounted to 2 billion rbl. By 1929, the prewar figure of 10.5 billion rbl. had been reached. The increase in production—one-third producers', two-thirds consumers' goods—up to 1928 was 10 per cent above the 1913 level. Agricultural production had suffered from the draconic requisition system of war communism. It left the peasants with paper roubles for which they could get no goods, as all stores were closed. So they had to barter for often useless goods. Annoyed, they reduced acreage for seeding to avoid the confiscation of grain. The change to the N.E.P. imposed a fixed quota for every region of a food tax in kind or five times the value in cash. The yield rose within a year. By 1928 all types of livestock had increased over the census of 1913. Slowly the venerable three-field system was changed to crop rotation though the peasants were reluctant to use modern farming methods justly and urgently advocated by the Communist theorists.

Only a few thousand collectives and state farms were the proving ground for the agronomists of the new school of mechanized grain production in giant units. The hundred million individual peasants seemed to enjoy the new freedom of legally selling to the free and black markets in town, and produced more. The Soviets frowned on the dangerous capitalists and bit by bit restricted the N.E.P.

Between good and bad seasons the rule had been a gap of up to 40 per cent. When a new famine hit the Volga Basin and the Ukraine in 1928, the planners in the Kremlin again got to the fore with the request to go back once more to coercion, forcing the peasants into collectives for a thorough mechanization to overcome the handicap of varying seasons and the danger of peasant capitalism.

Lenin stressed the need of insuring a new, steady flow of goods between the cities and the villages and allowed private artisans and traders to again compete with state stores and co-operatives which in 1913 had counted 17 million members in Russia. Small factories, restaurants and drugstores were leased by the government to courageous bidders. The wooden faces of the cities disappeared. Goods were again shown behind plate-glass windows. Cabarets and gambling dens competed to attract the new flood of roubles, causing irate Bolsheviki to curse the N.E.P. vermin. The two systems of enterprise did not blend as well as they could under normal times. There were not enough goods to go round and the competition between the retailers caused profiteering and hoarding. But the goods, which had vanished under war communism, had returned, and the authorities gave way to import about half of the amount of consumers' goods which crossed the border in 1913. Foreign trade remained the government monopoly established by the Revolution in the Narkomvnestorg.

Wages had not been paid according to work done or skill but, according to the social dogma, for the family needs. It was one of the master strokes of the new school, and productivity dropped near the bottom, with the workers preferring to go back to their villages in search of the better life. When the N.E.P. clearly differentiated wages for unskilled, skilled and specialist labor, the masses willingly returned from the countryside, where hunger had played great havoc, and drew more millions after them. From 1922 to 1929 the industrial and office workers increased from 6.6 to 12.2 million employees, about 14.5 per cent of the working-age people. Socialized wages, which meant health, service, light, heat, lodgings, school fees, free of charge, were retained as a socialist triumph. After 1928, rent was charged varying with the size of the apartments, which had been built with the general revival of trade.

On the whole, the results of the New Economic Policy were appreciated by the population. Commodities were to be had but at

higher prices and in still unsatisfactory quantities. Contact with the Western world had been renewed, after years of complete seclusion and depression. Freedom of trade led to great confusion, but the standard of living rose surprisingly quickly when millions of farmers felt liberated.

4. RUSSIANS LEARN FAST

"The Russian is conceited," wrote Tolstoi in *War and Peace*, "precisely because he knows nothing and does not care to know anything, since he does not believe it possible to know anything fully." Apart from the native peasant shrewdness in hiding knowledge, the seer of Yasnaya Polyana would no longer claim that today's Russians want to remain dumb though they will hardly conform as yet to his standard of literacy.

Statistics cannot represent the cultural background and intensity of knowledge of a literate people.² To know how to distinguish letters and figures and to put them to understandable use cannot be called literacy. Like a constitution, the skeleton of an educational system needs at least a hundred and fifty years to assume flesh and blood and for culture to permeate the social strata unless the cultural tradition itself is ancient, as in China, India, Arabia and western Europe. Skeptics might call modern education an attempt to produce trained minds in excess of the capacity of brains, judging from the poor results of the last and present century.

Nevertheless, the Soviet record in the fight against illiteracy is impressive even within the narrow limits of a mechanical perfection of eyes and fingers in readin', 'ritin' and 'rithmetic. The importance which the Soviet authorities placed on mass training, which is not yet education, has been evident. It was accentuated by the insistence on political propaganda in the very beginning of conscious living. Children in Russia are taught even the fundamentals with a view to political training. They do not learn the ABC by the apple, bee and cat pictures but have to start spelling Lenin, Stalin, Soviet, Red

² Russia had the following number of pupils:

	In Cities	In Country
1914-1915	1.8 million	6.1 million
1937-1938	8.6 "	20.8 "
Third Plan	12.4 "	27.7 "

Army. All first readers are dipped in party doctrine, which does not consider tolerance a virtue.

In the farthest corners of the Union posters in all colors, inscriptions in eighty-odd languages and idioms demanded attention in public places, factory sheds and canteens, farmyards and railroad cars: "Learn to read! . . . Brush your teeth! . . . Follow the leader! . . . Keep your lathe clean!" The people, having lived so long in sullen apathy, did not seem to resent the incessant hammering on their skulls. Classes for older people allowed millions to learn to read, if not to write, after they had long passed school age. In all large factories, the illiterate workers were at least taught to read and understand factory rules and instructions with the help of picture posters. The national budget showed a steady increase in the expenditure for cultural training and insurance for workmen from 9.2 billion rbl. in 1933 to 30.8 billion rbl. in 1937 and 53 billion rbl. for the Third Plan period.

The spiritual excitement the Soviets brought to their grown-up subjects has outshone any travail, any miscalculation, any cruelty under which they suffered. A tremendous wave of idealism flooded the country, brought new light into doubting eyes and carried makeshift teachers through the recurrent surf of stupidity to the backward millions in untouched regions. The value of this training may be superficial and the warning of Lenin left unheeded. "Nothing is more dangerous for people than to know but the names of things, not the deeper meaning. All that is repeated without further investigation becomes a phrase and leads to imbecility." Quantity and quality of teachers cannot very well have been adequate to the task if one recalls the difficulty of finding sufficient teachers for rural primary schools in Canada and the States. But a lasting thirst for knowledge has been thoroughly roused.

With the young, the results of spanning even sparsely populated regions with a vast network of schools and colleges have been conspicuous. Wendell Willkie tells how he got a laugh out of Stalin by warning him that he would one day have educated himself out of a job if he went on educating the Russian people. The raising of the educational level has been a cornerstone of the Soviet success in keeping a hold on the masses.

For twenty years the Soviets tried co-education. It was the pride of the suffragettes that equality of women was literally accepted

in Russia even in military service. More than one-half of the army doctors, dentists and the medical staff are females. In heavy industries, 18 per cent, in light industries up to 70 per cent of the total employees are girls and women. Nonetheless, co-education was stopped in July, 1943, by a decree which pointed out the differences in maturity and in future occupation—boys to be trained as soldiers, girls as housewives and mothers.

In Russia today no schooling is left to the decision of the individual mind. From court philosophy to fundamentals, care is taken that only officially approved and reapproved facts are taught. There seems to be a uniform attitude to life among the young, moving and frightening in its rigidity. The robot mind does not deviate from the dogma unless told, does not question orders nor the tag placed on foreign opinion which occasionally trickles through the tight barriers that make Russia a closed shop.

"Where is a medal without a reverse?" Karl Marx asked in *Capital*. In this respect his Russian pupils have vulgarized his doctrine by teaching in black and white formulas. This pretested and predigested food is implicitly accepted by the awed millions. They will never read of other recipes. Only books conforming to the Kremlin line, at the moment not itself invariable, are read in Russia. Others have been burned or purged or rewritten. This is quite a job, with fourteen million books stored in the Lenin Library at Moscow down to half a million in the Yakutsk wilderness. No foreign books are printed or imported without official approval. But Upton Sinclair and, in a lesser degree, Mark Twain and Jack London, have been printed in millions of copies, even if only a dozen American authors are read at all. The Soviet Writers Union is obliged to produce only "works of high artistic significance, saturated with the heroic struggle of the international proletariat, reflecting the great wisdom and heroism of the Communist Party." Nevertheless, public demand has persuaded the authorities to allow the reprint of the classics of the world literature from Homer to Shakespeare and Bismarck's *Thoughts and Memoirs*.

To be fair one must remember that censorship has existed in Russia under all regimes so that in the Golden Age of Russian literature all controversial problems were clad in fictional disguise from Pushkin and Gogol to Pisarev and Turgenev. Still, the Russian intelligentsia was well read and versed in the doings and history of

the world at large even if deprived of the right to express unfettered views. What can the young Russians know about their neighbors today in their air-tight seclusion?

Scientific research has been the one realm where the Soviet control interfered least, in pure as well as in applied sciences. Russian scientists had a world renown in old times. Modern standards are not less high. The Academy of Sciences directs fifty-four academic centers and more than a thousand research laboratories throughout Russia. Men like Professor Pavlov, with his work on conditioned reflexes, or Lyssenko, who has developed the treatment of germinating seeds insuring an optimum of growth in any climate, are abreast of standards of world repute.

Geology leads in expeditionary and exploratory work of science with unrestricted funds for research. History has a place in so far as propaganda requires, and the historians bow to orders. If one asked a Russian scientist what work is done outside the political sphere, he would answer that nothing in life could be accounted unpolitical. That is the end of discussion, and of freedom as the Western man knows it.

The Soviet citizen has, of course, quite a different view. He is persistently told that all workers abroad are slaves of capital and are invariably exploited. He says: "Is that freedom? I enjoy freedom from the need to make any major decision in my life. Everything is planned so I need not worry about the next day or year. I shall always find work to do and bread to eat. The State will care for me when I am sick or decrepit. I can concentrate all energies on the job before me without worry of what to do next."


For this idea of freedom the Russians have been ready to die. The youth has been trained for two decades in Puritan ideals: Duty before happiness, discipline before liberty, service before profit. How easily these principles can be misused in totalitarian systems to forge a whole nation into a formidable weapon in the hands of one man representing the state, we see with regret. The Komsomol, the largest youth organization in the world through the compulsory law for everyone to join, has served as a model for Mussolini's Ballila and the Hitler Youth, though differently attired. The individual is nothing, the family comes second. The state is all. To insure blind obedience, no chance is left to let young thoughts roam about on their own. The young ones are kept busy day in,

day out with exercise and learning. The exclusion of all interests outside the party fold tends to make them conceited and cocksure. If this is a drawback in human relations, it is a benefit to the modeler.

They were not taught the grand idea of the Boy Scouts to help a neighbor by a good deed every day without personal gain. But they were willing to sacrifice their own lives at a nod from the leader. It was easier to train them this way in Russia than under Hitler or fascist rule. All their lifetime they had known nothing but privation. As money had value only as an instrument to acquire goods and could not buy more goods in Russia than were available, their minds were not distracted from duty to society, as seen from the Soviet point of view, by dreams of money-making. Their ambition was directed to learning well to get a working place, to be promoted so that they could wield power over others by the grace of the party.

The Soviets avoided the mistake of destroying the old gods and tenets without creating other objects of veneration for the masses who want to pay genuine homage. Mother Russia has been enthroned in greater glory than before. Now the faithful can worship before the altar of Patriotism when they grow tired of reverencing incarnate science in machine and motor. Young Russians cheerfully look into camera eyes. They have thrown off lethargy and are teeming with vigor and with great schemes.

Newspapers got a stronger hold on public imagination with the progress of learning and cultural autonomy. In the Ukraine, 922 dailies spread news and enlightenment from the Kremlin in 1939 where a single one could appear in 1914. About 500 other newspapers are printed in 67 languages and dialects besides the metropolitan papers. *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Red Star*, *Farmers Weekly* issue editions in more than six figures. Displayed under weatherproof glass covers in remote towns and villages they represent the chief instrument of official dissemination in the country. The substitute for the deceased Communist International, the "War and the Working Classes," has added a valiant weapon to the government's arsenal. More unbridled discussion of pending international issues gives fuel to hopes abroad that from now on politics may be discussed, a departure from the take-it-or-leave-it policy of the Kremlin. So far, nothing leads to the assumption that there will be published a single word inside Russia which does not conform with the views of the



YOUTH PARADE IN RED SQUARE, MOSCOW, BEFORE LENIN'S TOMB

ruling body in every respect. If seemingly contrasting views appear in print, one may be sure that this is part of a plan. The Kremlin does not leave anything to chance.

For the same reason, art is looked upon as one branch of political propaganda. If poets are allowed a wider range of expression, they have to make up for such license by appropriate insertions in other places. The great Russian writers from Pushkin to Tolstoi are reprinted in millions of copies when they can be dressed as revolutionaries in their own right or as victims of Tsarist persecution. Leo Tolstoi, the apostle of passive resistance, does not exactly fit into the garb of revolutionary activism nor Pushkin, the courtier, in the uniform of a regicide. Anna has to tell Bunchuk in *Quiet Flows the Don*, the only epic written on the Revolution, how beautiful life would be under socialism. "No more war, no more poverty or oppression or national barriers, nothing. . . . Would it not be sweet to die for that? . . . The last thing I shall feel will be that triumphant, disturbingly beautiful music of the future." With the new turn to patriotic themes the range of subjects will increase and censoring will be easier.

In early revolutionary years Alexandra Kollontai had a certain influence by the code she offered in *Ways of Love*. It was a fiery attempt to lead love life into other channels than the norms of the old society. Today, they already sound old-fashioned. Families had been torn asunder in the years of wars and revolution. Family ties were subjected to strong assaults by stormy petrels of both sexes. Equality of women was tried in every path of life. Overcrowding in shelters, corners and rooms, and no privacy were the fate of most people. It helped to create a hectic atmosphere, but hardly more colorful than during the aftermath of war in other countries where equilibrium was not restored until after a period of wild excitement. Russians have a hearty carnal spirit, robust and earthly tastes. There are no more angels on Russian soil than in any other bucolic race. Literature does not describe them too daintily.

It would be wrong to assume that the violent outbursts into escapist excesses met with the approval of the leading Bolsheviki. Bukharin castigated the public unsparingly. "Nihilism has no place among us. We have to crusade against drinking and certain sexual laxness."

Divorce was easy under Soviet laws of 1919. Marriages could

be dissolved by a magistrate if one party announced his intention to separate. The other party did not even have to be notified except by the posting of the decree on the blackboard in the courthouse. But no modern apostle up to Bertrand Russell has achieved more than a shaking off of cobwebs from the traditional respect of cultured nations for the institution of marriage and a monogamic family life. Since 1936, new divorce laws have stipulated a father's responsibility for his offspring and their mother and put a curb on changes in marital status. By decree of 1936, abortion has been more strictly supervised. Social indications, still a legal claim for consideration, are no longer compelling.

Russia had never been temperate. The Tsarist government had distilled and distributed a monopoly brandy, the famous vodka, with an alcohol content up to 40 per cent. A home-brewed surrogate was drunk and bootlegged by the peasants. Lenin had furiously condemned this tax practice as immoral and heinous. At the beginning of the war in 1914, the government had prohibited the sale of vodka. The Soviets confirmed this law. But bootlegging of black distilleries could not be stamped out even by the death penalty. So the Soviets restored the monopoly in 1923 and legally allowed the production of the "poison which in a few years would convert the country into a cemetery" as a means to prevent the peasants from wasting grain and adding to the state income. The younger generation was kept too busy to indulge in drinking bouts. Wendell Willkie assures us that there was plenty of vodka at every meal during his visit and usually no water in sight. The climate accounts for a larger appetite, anyhow, for solid and liquid food.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RUSSIA, THE SOVIET UNION

1. BLAST FURNACES HAVE PRIORITY

IN PRE-SOVIET Russia there had never been a systematic survey of natural riches. It was a greater gamble for the Soviets to count on sufficient coal, ore and oil resources than to assay all other unknown factors of the truly gigantic Five-Year Plan. Hundreds of surveying parties were sent out by Moscow for geological exploration, and many of the best scientific minds in the world enjoyed the unlimited means put up for research. Eighty of the ninety-two items on Mendeleiev's table of elements have been pegged in Russia.

The survey cannot include unblocked reserves, and Russia will depend on prospecting luck the same as the Dome mine shareholders and the owners of Miami copper. The surveyed resources reveal that the finds of coal and ore are not excessive compared with the world's deposits. The total coal resources of all the Russias are estimated at less than those of Wyoming State, the unmined ore deposits one-fifth of the United States holdings. The Siberian iron-ore deposits amount to 4 tons, the Swedish to 390 tons per head of the population, according to the Soviet Academy of Science.

There might be the same chances of discovering new fields and blocking new veins on Russian territory as in the United States and other surveyed countries. But some reckless gambling took place in the heyday of the Soviet stampede for the industrial primacy of the world. In capitalist economy, these failures are paid for by private persons. In Soviet Russia they were debited to the public. This difference has to be borne in mind when comparing results in figures. But there is one other point to be considered. When a manager or foreman bungles in capitalist enterprises he is fired. Even if the shareholder loses money, he cannot enforce refund from the responsible management. In Russia, the leading men

are apt to lose job and life for failures even if not personally responsible since the irresponsible collective management has been abolished.

"Socialism is cooperation plus statistics" was a favorite slogan with the Soviet theorists. Lenin's pet project in planning was the electrification of Russia. He founded in 1920 the State Planning Commission, the Gosplan, staffed with eminent scientists to gather data for a thorough survey of Russia's resources. The Imperial Technical Society had prepared a great mass of blueprints between 1907 and 1914, from the Dnieprostroi Hydro Dam, the later pride of the nation partially destroyed in the scorched-earth policy during the retreat in 1941, to the Turkestan-Siberia Railroad, also constructed by the Soviets. But until 1925, the surveyors were too busy collecting the control of quota figures on which they intended to base the future long-term plans. From then on, a carefully designed annual control budget for Russian economy in all branches was composed for a year ahead. The scientists in charge used the genetic method for research, believing that natural economic laws should still rule in Russia as in the outer world, underlining the limitations of enterprises in the given space. The first half-dozen painstaking projects for a long-term policy were rejected by the Central Committee, the supreme authority of the party, who took a bolder view and cut down the time limits. "Our task is not to study economics but to change them. There are no fortresses which the Bolsheviks cannot storm." A maximalist program, the First Five-Year Plan, was promulgated in May, 1929.

What the older industrial countries had achieved in fifty to sixty years, the Soviets wanted to do in ten years if not less. All other considerations were waived but the need to put Russian economy on a war basis comparable with the strongest neighbor, to stave off attacks or to back world revolution. So the first stage was set for steel, iron and metallurgic industries to the drastic exclusion of manufacturing consumer goods. Machinery was imported for the tooling up, foreign experts hired to overcome the chronic shortage in skilled labor. Instead of slowly passing from blueprint to model to mass-production stage, the blueprints were immediately transcribed into giant constructions. Naturally, the results were legions of breakdowns, infant diseases of technical and managerial nature, misplanning from top to bottom. The four years in which the goals

of the First Plan had been reached, at least on paper, were a huge kindergarten experiment. But the whole appplecart of private enterprise was not upset with one stroke of the pen. Small industries and private trade were allowed to function side by side with state-owned enterprises. The collectivization of the peasantry was also only gradually enforced. Together with the use of reserve stocks of pre-Soviet times, this eased the strain on the population, which was rigorously kept on the low level of near-starvation. It would have been impossible for the authorities to achieve even the poor results they did, but for the genuine enthusiasm to which they were able to rouse the by nature apathetic Russian. Production was costly because of faulty organization, unequal labor, inadequate workload.

It is easy to point to the thousands of known errors, the low productivity of so many giant plants compared with the output in the old countries. The Ural-Kuznets Basin Kombinat had to haul coal and iron ore to meet over distances up to 2000 miles. The cost of carrying a ton of coal to the plant ran up to \$7.59 against \$1.66 at Lake Erie ports. The *Pravda* of January 24, 1941, mentioned: "The steel plant at Magnitogorsk fails to fulfil the assigned tasks. On the whole, 1940 proved to be a very disappointing year; long shutdowns, poor technical management, poor discipline, general failure to work on schedules." The report to the Supreme Soviet of February, 1941, on the shortcomings of production made no bones about the difficulties which the body politic encountered right up to this war in their ambitious programs.

The enthusiasm of the young peasants to work as mechanics was responsible for part of the failures. American advisers who returned told no end of stories of the eagerness of the apprentices to rush through the paces without regard to routine, schedule or cleanliness, wrecking tools and machines in utter carelessness, causing recurrent losses by refusing to wipe off filings, which consequently burned out bearings and motors. They gathered in bunches at the slightest excuse to watch the taking to pieces of a new machine. On top of these adolescent habits, they were fond of telling the teacher or foreman about his job.

The nursery period has not yet come to an end, for the Supreme Soviet saw the need of issuing a decree on July 10, 1940, fixing criminal responsibility on the heads of industrial undertakings and

on the technical personnel for turning out products of poor quality. Persecutions of leading figures in all industries from People's Commissars to foremen have been a standing item of public life. They were the scapegoats which the system of one-man control needs to excuse failures before the general public. These purges upset for a long time the production program. They did not solve the real trouble—that the Plans had not allowed time for the gradual training of skilled labor and had not prevented political bosses from interfering with the business.

In the Second Plan, the political aims to crush any remainder of potential capitalism in all paths of economy led to a ruthless socialization of agriculture. This drive was outwardly successful. But out of the ashes, new strata of society appeared. At first the party bureaucracy, which included every business manager, later the officers' corps and the wealthy kolkhoz families. It became less a planned economy as blueprinted by the Gosplan scientists than a centralized business like a combine of enterprises cheaply bought by inflation or political profiteers like the Hermann Goering Works.

There has been more anarchy in the rise of Russia to an industrial power than in any of the capitalist, profit-taking economies. Special orders, extra special orders, forms in duplicates harassed everyone. Nature and eternal progress of research forced changes which had not and could not have been foreseen when the law was laid down for a Five-Year Plan. It was the law, not a direction, that was written in the Plans.

The principal consideration of the militant Bolsheviki in the goose-step planning has been to distribute industries, as much as geologically possible, with regard to the defense of the Union. Since they had once had to fight bitterly against foreign intervention, the shaping of an efficient war industry was relentlessly carried out. A total industrial defense plan was drawn up under the Second Plan and placed under the supervision of Defense Industry Commissariats, secluded from the public and foreign observers to such an extent that nearly all estimates of the Russian war potential have been wrong guesses.

It meant a complete reversion of Tsarist policy for another reason: the bringing of industrial life to the border districts of the Soviet Union in order to foster their political allegiance to Moscow. The Tsars had done all in their power to keep industrial develop-

ment centered around Petersburg, Moscow and in the Ukraine by preferential freight rates, bank rates, building of railroads and canals, disregarding location of raw materials. Textile mills were banned from Central Asia where the cotton was grown, because the authorities feared losing their grip on the outlying regions if they should prosper with local industries.

The Soviets mapped a survey of all raw resources throughout the vastness of the Union and started under the Second and Third Plans to spread industries into the remotest regions, if it would be useful for making areas independent in wartime, and to exploit local riches by manufacturing on the spot. Without this foresight, Russia would have been unable to make the Far Eastern Army completely self-contained in keep and material to check possible invaders in the East or to stem the Nazi invasion after the loss of the Ukraine and Crimea and the damage done to the districts west of the Volga.

In the old days, 90 per cent of the coal mining was done in the Donbas, all mining in the Urals and the Donbas, oil tapping in the Caucasus. The Second Plan set out to change this picture as completely as raw materials would allow. One-third of the allocations for plant constructions went to Siberia and Central Asia, one-third to new regions between the Volga and the South and only the remainder to Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine. Giant plants were put up in the wilderness which only stood on clay feet and proved failures. But numerous smaller industries more than made up for wrong decisions, bringing woodworking and paper industries to White Russia, sugar, canning and rubber factories to Armenia, to Kazakhstan, the Kirghiz Republic, and textile industries to Central Asia and the Volga belt, oil refineries to Turkmenia, Tajik, Uzbek, Azerbaijan. Mining of non-ferrous materials was started around Oirитай in Central Asia, Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, Kadamjai in Kazakhstan and in Armenia.

The dislocation of industries has proved to be a wise move in all respects. It has done more than the grant of cultural autonomy to rally the discordant border republics behind the Moscow regime. The intensive cotton growing in Central Asia, the exploitation of ores and new plants for aniline dyes, synthetic rubber and machine tools made the country by 1938 independent of imports of rubber dyestuffs, cotton and non-ferrous metals. The craving for huge records, often only for show, did not serve economy well except

for backing the morale of the workers, who were kept under a continuous barrage of poster slogans and other incitement.


At the introduction of the Third Plan in 1939, Molotov admitted, while setting the goal "to catch up to and overtake the United States," that Russia was greatly behind in production per head of the population of hydro, pig iron, steel, coal, cement, cotton and woolen fabrics, footwear, sugar, paper, soap. In cotton cloth, the Union produced only one-fourth of the per head output of the United States, Japan and England, in paper only one-eighth. When the stocks of old times had been depleted, the dearth of consumer goods became the weakest point in the Soviet armor. There had been stocks surviving through the period of chaos. In 1928 the Oka Shipyards still had paint in quantities to last for forty years at full capacity.

Since the war has stopped all other activities, the populace will have to be content with the hope that the General Plan for fifteen years, which was drafted by the Gosplan in 1930 and approved by the eighteenth Congress of the Party in 1940, will make up for the shortage.


Government stores, the sole retail and wholesale traders in the cities, have been in deep water since private trading was liquidated, in 1933, for the second time in Soviet history. It was Lenin's hope that the well-established prewar consumers' co-operative stores could be groomed into a model of a socialist distribution system without any other aim but service to the public at lowest prices without profit for the owner or manager! When the private store competition had been liquidated, the formerly efficient co-op stores deteriorated to government agencies. Being purged of all non-Bolsheviks and run by party members who were no longer elected by co-op members, they promptly started a fight for position with the managers of the new government stores. Now the old co-ops serve the countryside and the official counters of the towns. All manufactured goods were sold on a commercial basis on rationing cards until January 1, 1936, whereas 70 per cent of the food was distributed through the official channels and the rest by the kol-khozes directly. The trade which was handled in 1912 by more than a million free competing units has been taken over by 15,000 stores for 50 million urban dwellers and 200,000 co-ops, for the 120 million rural customers, with an odd 20,000 itinerants peddling the "trade

U.S.S.R. HAS DEVELOPED A SELF-CONTAINED ECONOMY


RELATIONS OF IMPORTS TO HOME PRODUCTION



CAPITAL INVESTED IN THE FIVE YEAR PLANS IN NEW AND RECONSTRUCTED PLANTS (IN BILLION RBL.)





VALUE OF TOTAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN BILLION RBL. (VAL. 1926-1927)



VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF HEAVY INDUSTRIES 1938 = 104 BILLION RBL.
= NINE TIMES AS HIGH AS 1913


MACHINE AND METAL WORKING INDUSTRIES

VALUE IN BILLION RBL.




ELECTRIFICATION

CAPACITY OF POWER STATIONS IN MILLION KW. (LOWER CURVE)
ANNUAL OUTPUT IN BILLION KW (UPPER CURVE)



17.2 млн. квт
мощность
электростанций




OIL INDUSTRIES

OUTPUT IN MILLION TONS



REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF OIL WELLS 1937



OIL PRODUCTION IN THE REGION BETWEEN VOLGA AND URALS "THE SECOND BAKU"




- ▲ Районы нефтедобычи
- ▲ Районы глубокого разрезочного бурения на нефть
- Возможные нефтеносные районы

OIL PRODUCTION IN MILLION TONS





РАСПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ПО РАЙОНАМ ДОБЫЧИ НЕФТИ
в процентах



© Издательство «Лес»

CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

PRODUCTION IN BILLION RBL




deserts." It is an extremely sparse network of retail trade serving between 500 and 1000 people per unit against 86 in the United States.


The principal reason for the shortage of goods is, of course, the lack of attention which the Soviets paid to this branch of national economy, to which the least intelligent members of the party were usually assigned. It was only eyewash when the Sovnarkom, the Soviet cabinet, resolved on January 7, 1941, to take the necessary measures to satisfy the legitimate demands of the people for the necessities of life, after having stated that "the population suffers from a chronic shortage of clothing, knit goods, shoes, dishes, furniture, needles, lamps, toys, stationery, nails, roofing iron, bricks, wagons, harness, locks, shovels, brooms, stove and window fixtures. The merchandise on hand lies in the warehouses and is not delivered to the localities where there is an unsatisfied demand."

The importance of the rails which carried between 75 and 80 per cent of the Russian traffic seemed to have been forgotten by the planners. When the demands of the sudden industrialization on passenger and freight traffic became apparent, it was too late to catch up, and a serious stoppage of work in all quarters resulted. Through the devastations of the civil war period, not less than 8000 bridges were destroyed and had been repaired by 1925 and an increase of nearly 30 per cent of mileage achieved. But in the following five years new construction was confined to the Turkestan-Siberia Railroad of 900 miles, facilitating the exchange of lumber and grain against cotton and minerals. The existing railroads were not adequately maintained or double-tracked. Equipment for the traffic which trebled and quadrupled with the start of the First Plan could not be delivered in time.

Contemporary reports give a vivid picture of the waiting in ticket queues, the rotting of carloads at the gates of the cities, the congestion on all sidings and the astronomical figures in delay of deliveries. The Railroad Brotherhood was blamed soon for the lag in production schedules by everybody. In 1931, the whole Transport Commissariat was fired and a fundamental reconstruction and overhaul planned. But only near the end of the Second Plan period was the problem tackled in earnest under Stalin's brother-in-law, L. Kaganovich, a very able administrator, with a still modest share in new mileage. Under the Third Plan three and a half times the ap-




PAPER INDUSTRIES
OUTPUT IN 1000 TONS




SUGAR INDUSTRIES

OUTPUT IN MILLION TONS




GRAIN ELEVATOR CAPACITY
IN MILLION POODS



Один икелъ обозначает
800 илландских пудов зерно

LIVESTOCK

AT THE END OF
SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN INCREASE PLANNED
DURING THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN



propriation of the First Plan was assigned to railroad traffic and new strategic lines. Second trunk lines and raw-material feeders from Asia were built, of which 3300 miles were in operation when war broke out. The density of the rail net is still only a particle of the mileage in the United States, Central Europe and England. It will take decades before Russia can hope to surpass her neighbors in this respect.

Waterways could have played a great rôle in deputizing for rail traffic, as a look at the map will suggest, but motor traffic could not take trucking loads to a large extent as highway construction was lagging behind schedule. One must bear in mind that in January, 1930, there were only 17,500 automobiles and some 6000 motor-cycles in the whole of Russia, an average of one car to 8000 people as against one to 4 or 5 people in the United States. Dirt and gravel roads have still the upper hand on roads suitable for motoring.

The low cost of air lines gave air transport priority in traffic. The sudden rise of air-minded youth and the propaganda of the Osoaviakhim brought vigorous support for these schemes by the public. In 1932, the air lines in operation, with 36,000 miles' regular coverage, were only surpassed by the United States. One-third was fitted with night beacons. After the war, it may be expected that the surplus of planes and pilots will be used not only in spanning the full length of Eurasia but in extending traffic into China and across the Northern Route to Canada and the United States in regular service. Pilots and ground crews have proved to be a challenge to any competitor. Weather service has been established all along the Arctic coast.

The horrors of polar ice are gradually being overcome. The Goldschmidt-Barnes findings proved that thermite can dissolve ice barriers. The annual Karian expeditions have systematically explored square mile by square mile in the Arctic circle and the tundra. The moss-covered eternal ice fields in northern Siberia are crossed by motor and propeller sleighs. The population of Igarka in the Polar Circle has within five years grown from 200 to 14,000 people. The Northwest Passage to Murmansk, open all year, and Archangelsk-Molotovsk, free of ice in the summer, has become a major route in the war. The Northeast Passage from Bering Strait to Pork Dikson on the Yenesei and Novy Port on the Ob River and the mouth of the Lena River is open in August-September.


REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA

RAILROAD TRANSPORT

MILEAGE IN 1000 KM.

TRUCKAGE IN BILLIONS M/KM.

1913 65.7 58.5



WATER WAYS

TRANSPORTED IN BILLIONS M/KM.



SEA

RIVER



1932



1937



1942



AUTOMOBILES REGISTERED

IN THOUSANDS


1913 8.8



1933



1937



1942

TRUCKAGE WILL BE 4.6 TIMES HIGHER UNDER THIRD PLAN

Before the war a hundred freighters swapped cargoes annually with the river boats which go down to the railheads of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and on the Ob to the Urals. Radio news of ice movements, modern icebreakers and a permanent plane patrol along the 3000-mile coast facilitate the modern venture of making the exploitation of billions of long tons of Siberian timber more feasible. They have shared the fate of many other natural riches of Russia that they are still too remote for commercial accounts.

The Soviet system has proved that a socialist economy can exist even among national economies of different tagging. But there is no room in the world for any system that denies the fundamental traits of the savage man. All systems have to meet the changes in elementary knowledge and the iron rules of Creation.

2. THE KULAK DIES

The wounds of the Second Revolution healed nowhere quicker than in rural Russia. Under the brighter aspects of the N.E.P. policy peasantry had settled down to a renewed faith in farming. The squires had left for good. Though the land titles had not been handed over to the peasants, nobody thought of his strip of soil and the fruits thereof, but as his own. In this conviction all peasants were united: the rich peasants, who owned more than ten acres, some cows and horses and who raised cattle to maturity for breeding, the *bedniaki*, the poor peasants with some land, who lived from hand to mouth as did the farm laborers without land. In between stood the *seredniaki*, the middle-class, called well-to-do, peasants who kept a horse and one or two cows.

All peasants felt indignant when the government enforced grain deliveries at lower than market prices and limited the right to rent land from neighbors, to hire help and to sell products in a free market. They could not get the implements they needed for love or money, nor the modest consumer goods they had been able to buy in the bad old days. What else could they do than sit back, work and seed less when the government took all but the barest food? One result was that a shortage of flour, eggs, milk and butter was severely felt in the cities during 1927. The impasse threw the Soviet economy into a new crisis. Should the Soviet leaders give in, slow down industrialization, cut out red tape and let the peasants have their

way in private enterprise? Even such a fundamental change might not save the regime from complete collapse. It would not allay the danger that for years to come the peasants would live better themselves but would not deliver the surplus which the big estates had produced for the urban population and the export trade. Before 1917 the squires had contributed 50 per cent of grain the cities needed, the kulaki 22 per cent. The remainder had been delivered by the twenty-odd million small peasants.

The alternative for the Kremlin was to clamp down on all private farming, to force all peasants into collectives or state farms and to run the agricultural sector like the industry and public utilities by the bureaucracy from above. The Soviet decided on the latter course. It was not revolutionary rescindment which led the Kremlin to embark upon the dangerous revival of antagonism to the regime among peasantry.

When the Commissar of Foreign Trade, Weizer, visited me in the fall of 1931, he gave frankly as one of the principal reasons the necessity seen by the Soviets in 1930 to increase armaments to the limit, when they found that after the Wall Street collapse of 1929 the United States as well as England tried to save the domestic equilibrium in their realm by self-defending measures of higher tariffs.

The Kremlin guessed rightly—as we know now—that the economic repercussions on the remainder of the world would lead to a tension in Europe which would be solved only by a world's marketing agreement or by new wars. The Kremlin had taken the latter as a more probable outcome. For such an emergency Russia needed more industries, more man power released from farms and more grain to finance the Plans. The First Plan of 1928-32 approached the delicate, gigantic scheme of collectivization cautiously. It figured that in the first stage not more than 10 per cent of the 26 million individual holdings could be turned over to collectives. Actually the pace was set by local enthusiasm and brutality at a far higher rate.

Three forms of collectives were developed: Co-operative comradeship, *artel* and commune. The first form socialized the land but left livestock and other property in private hands. The second form, the *artel*, took all land, buildings and stock from the peasants for common use, except the family quarters and poultry. The commune was organized without a trace of private property. Families were

cared for according to their needs, all living and eating in a Community House. The Degania experiment on Lake Tiberias in Palestine, which has developed a high level of prosperity, has proved that only a society with a very high cultural background and members with the same standard of intellectual life can lead such a community life without friction.

"We do not propose to wage war against the well-to-do farmers who do not exploit others, as we do against the kulaki" was the tenor of the declaration of war against capitalistic farming. The drive against the kulaki was cruel and bloody to deter the remainder from dreaming of any future in individual progress and prosperity. After December, 1929, the kulak was outlawed and had to register with the police. It was declared a public duty to despoil every kulak, to chase him out of hiding or disguise. All vestiges of the Stolypin Reform, which had within a few years' time created five millions of prosperous farms without bloodshed, were wiped out. It meant the transfer of just as many million families from a cherished life on their own ground to death or forced labor in the far Arctic or Siberia.

It was easy to rouse the same envy against the more efficient village neighbors as against the squires of old. When Lenin had promised all land for keeps, the village had lustily joined in the splitting of the estates. But this time the poor did not enjoy the booty for long. Strong pressure was brought upon peasantry to form collectives. The white sheep who joined the official plan voluntarily were promised lower taxes and rates of interest, higher distribution of consumers' goods and seed. The reluctant were threatened with loss of electricity, irrigation water or voting rights or with outright confiscation. By October 1, 1928, 550,000 families had joined collectives. The number rose ten times within the next year. But the majority of the peasants of 1930 felt more than irked by the change in policy and resorted to arms.

The troops were called out in spring, 1930, but wavered when it came to firing on their own kin. The Kremlin withdrew, taking Lenin's advice: Step back to take a longer jump. Stalin gave the signal in a spectacular speech on "Dizziness from success" which all newspapers carried on March 2, 1930.

The collectives cannot be organized by force. That would be stupid and reactionary. One of the most important prerequisites for a vigorous collective movement is that it should be voluntary and adapted to the diverse conditions of the different parts of the Union. . . . To provoke the peasant-collectivist by socializing his home, all his cows, all his small livestock and poultry, even before the artel form of collective has become firmly established—is it not clear enough that such a policy can be useful and advantageous only to our enemies?

A shrewd move of the dictator! Within a fortnight decrees by the Central Committee were published: no more forcing of peasants into artels or communes, no more socialized dwellings, small livestock or poultry, no more mocking of religious feelings and closing of churches. Voting lists should be corrected and bazaars reopened for the free sale of products by peasants.

In the following years the government was torn between the need to get the funds for the rapid industrialization by excessive demands for grain taxes from the peasantry, easiest to collect by forcing collectivization, and the fact that living conditions on the land became so desperate that the productivity sank in spite of modernization of farming. The majority of households did not get more than 270 lbs. of bread per head as allotment from the collective in 1932. Now Stalin gave way to the age-old longing for property among the peasants and allowed a family a homestead of one-half to two-and-a-half acres of land, where a family could keep a cow, goats, bees and poultry, and toil and benefit to its own delight. This was solemnly decreed in the "Stalin Code" of 1935, without saying whether the allotment should become family property, to be inherited by coming generations. In the peasant mind it is automatically his property.

The collectives suffered from the ruling when the peasants turned enthusiastically to their new homesteads. In 1937 the average peasant spent on the kolkhoz land only 38 labor days, in some collectives less than 20. But with greater mechanization, the collectives managed to increase the grain and industrial crop production anyhow. The benefits of the homesteads were not confined to the individual owners. The dwarf farms produced one-quarter of the whole agricultural production of 1938, in livestock 70 per cent of the total, in garden trucking 11.3 per cent, even in grain 9.2 per cent. There are no official figures given as to how much of this production went into urban consumption. But one can draw conclusions from the

official reluctance to publish such figures when in 1939 the *Socialist Agriculture* and the *Planned Economy* were rebuked for exaggeration of the part which stubborn individualists played in the supply of city markets.

The brutal measure of 1920 had played havoc with the livestock of the country. Peasants refused to deliver their precious holdings to the community, gorging themselves with meat before going vegetarian. Official estimates quote one-half of the pigs, one-third of the cattle, sheep and goats and 60 to 75 per cent of the poultry being slaughtered in the battle of freedom which the peasants lost. The average collective never succeeded in competing with individual livestock raising. In the production of meat and meat products, vegetables and milk produce, berries, honey, eggs and mushrooms, the hard-slaving families worked the same miracles as the Finns, Danes, Chinese and Japanese on similar dwarf holdings.

The bureaucracy remained unsatisfied in spite of the undeniable success of the homestead policy. On May 27, 1939, the Central Committee of the party decreed new measures of "safeguarding public land from being squandered." No more mercy for any excess in the size of the farmsteads! So the peasants must have tried to increase their holdings. The amount of livestock allowed to be raised, of fodder and pasture was restricted and the obligatory deliveries to the state increased. The people took it lying down, but growled. To pacify the countryside Stalin changed the entire system of relations between state and collectives on April 16, 1940. Formerly the government had taken a fixed share of 60 to 65 per cent of the harvest of every collective. If a collective did better than others it paid more to the tax collector. The individual collectivist did not have the slightest personal interest in increasing production as long as he feared that all would be taken by the state. From now on, in a timid revival of Lenin's food tax of 1921, the state would only collect fixed norms, pro rata of the acreage, slightly varied to regional fertility, of any produce grown or raised on the kolkhoz, except dairy products. In January, 1941, the same system was applied to milk and butter.

The second step toward inciting personal interest in work on collectives by the Soviet authorities was an intricate bonus scheme, introduced in the Ukraine on December 31, 1940. All members of the Kolkhoz were formed into shock brigades. Each team had to

deliver a team quota. Part of any excess production went to the teamsters. For dairymaids a similar bonus was devised. 5 per cent of a calf's gain in weight, 15 per cent of milk above the quota estimates were hers. Hog breeders got every fifth suckling above plan. And so on in a deep kowtow before capitalistic whims of the irreparably savage peasant mind. A. Yugov cites a speech of the Communist party leader in the Ukraine as a sample of the change of mind in official quarters:

Thousands, tens of thousands of people set an example by doing exemplary work. We know them, respect them, applaud them. And now, in addition to praise, they will get a dozen suckling pigs—that is very good. . . . And here, even if we speak of the "loafer on principle," why, this will set him on fire, even he'll begin to stir and won't be able to lie still. . . . In serving his own interests the kolkhoz member will work better for the kolkhoz and thereby through his own private interest, he will be strengthening the kolkhoz economy of the kolkhoz order, of our Soviet Government.

For special work on the kolkhoz such as tractor or harvester service, the norms of a labor day—the accounting unit—were multiplied. The new methods proved beneficial in the short time before the present war upset all plans. The chief source of real co-operation remained untapped. All measures on collective farms were still decreed by order of the Politbureau. "Attention! Form threes . . ." The spirit of barrack squares works less well in peaceful farming. Livestock does not thrive on regulations.

The Moscow brain trust had their own playground on the state farms. When all estates were liquidated in the first weeks of the Revolution, several well-managed large estates were taken over as a running concern by the state, with the idea of operating them as grain factories to secure the supplies for the cities. Through poor management these sovkhosy were working at a great loss, but the failure of adequate collections of grain from the disorganized countryside seemed to make it worth while to try state farming on a larger scale, while pressing the bulk of peasants into the nominally co-operative kolkhosy.

The first goal of the Five-Year Plan, to produce 60 million bushels of grain on state farms, was reached in time, in spite of the experimental upheaval. By 1939 the sovkhosy were delivering 144 million bushels, about 18 per cent of the marketed grain of the year. But the business was never profitable. At first the source of failure was seen

in the excessive size of the farm units. In 1934 a decree limited the size of a state farm to a maximum 37,500 acres of arable land. But in 1939 the Eighteenth Conference of the Communist Party still complained that the financial losses and the mismanagement had not been eliminated and that most of the produce was eaten up on the spot. Professor Liashenko came to the conclusion in 1932 that the yield of grain was higher in the sovkhozy than on peasants' land, but so was the cost of production. The dream of red-taping farm management completely did not mature. The collective remained the mainstay of agricultural production. At the start of the year 1941, 289 million acres, equaling 99.3 per cent of the arable total, were worked by collectives. But they were far from being a co-operative enterprise. The party gave tight instructions and the local party manager had to guarantee the execution.

The Russian peasant was trained in endurance and lived on a lower standard—black bread, sour milk, cucumber and cabbage soup—than any European peasant. The state exacts a rigorous toll of the gross harvest on top of the 40-per-cent tax deliveries in kind, by charging the kolkhozes for local administration and services of the MTS. Every kolkhoz has to set aside fixed amounts for seed, fodder, insurance, depreciation. Only after another 10-per-cent personal tax has been deducted is the rest of the cash and kind income distributed to the members, according to the labor days spent on the community land. In 1933, only 32 per cent of the cash and 38 per cent of the grain yield could be distributed by the average kolkhoz as wages and maintenance. That was below freezing point and forced the Soviets to decree that at least 60 per cent of the cash income had to be guaranteed to the members. All looked well on paper. This did not bear fruit in a large number of kolkhozes as taxes continued to be collected in the old manner. But rations improved when the allotment to members in grain for a labor day was raised after 1935 from 2 to 4 kilos. The peasants took to white bread and urban food tastes and began to forget famines.

Among the kolkhozes, there was a great difference in income, varying with the soil and the chance to grow industrial crops. The Soviet press played up the fact that 610 kolkhozes had passed the income class of one million rubles in cash during 1937. These kolkhozes represented one-third of one per cent of all Russian collectives. More than one-half of the number—310—were situated in the

pleasant and fertile valleys of Uzbekistan and Tadzikistan. The counterpart of the millionaire collectives was 6.7 per cent of paupers, who earned below 5000 rbl. in cash. In 1937, the last year for which official figures are available, the average kolkhoz had an income of 60,000 rbl. in cash, not more than 172 rbl. per head of members. No wonder that the homesteaders worked so diligently to make some sort of living.

To give consummate judgment on the results of the far-flung scheme of collectivization, a period of fifteen years is not sufficient. One has also to take into account the immense rush of all actions to reach the decreed goals, and the fact that managers of collectives were under constant threat of being liquidated if they did not achieve the quota.

From the bureaucratic point of view, the collectives have definite advantages over the individual system of farming. It would have been seemingly impossible to induce the twenty million peasants outside the kulaki class to adopt modern methods of farming within the time limit of the ambitious program of industrialization. The streamlining of the farms set 7 to 10 million men free for the manpower pool of industries and public works. Without the millions of labor troopers to which group the former kulaki were degraded, a number of giant public enterprises in the far North could not have been tackled. More than 3.75 million acres of new soil were opened in the North for hardier crossbred wheat. The average yield rose, aided by the overriding of old boundaries, plowing up of narrow strips and pooling land for wholesale operations. This left more to collect for the state. It was a hundred-fold easier task to comprise the units into one per cent of the former individual farms and collect the taxes from the chairmen of the kolkhozy, holding them as hostages by the neck. Without enforced collectivization the industrial crops would not have reached the high which made cotton textile industries, oleo refineries, sugar and tobacco processing virtually independent of imports, which could not have been paid for in the years of priority for heavy industries.

The drawbacks of this policy were the costs of the erroneous trials leading to a goal which will never be an end of the journey. Untrained mechanics ruined equipment with the disregard of children for other people's property. Managers of collectives were chosen from the party fold and had to learn organizing before the

chaos could be untangled. But the seasons did not wait for the end of the lessons. The radical extinction of the cattle breeders brought about a scarcity of meat and breeding stock which could only slowly be repaired.

The experience on the spot which the government gained in mechanizing work on the state farms encouraged the People's Commissars to refund part of the exorbitant tax collections in kind to the peasants in providing the capital outlay for an immense program of mechanization of the collectives. A system of machine-tractor stations was spread across the country. These MTS numbered 6538 by 1940. They had huge repair shops and were running 454,000 tractors and 125,000 harvester combines—unknown before 1925—while plowing, seeding and harvesting all collectives and many individual farms against payment in grain or other produce. Flour mills and oilseed gins were also run by the government. For the homesteaders the trucks of the MTS were the only means of reaching city markets since the itinerant peddlers had dropped out of business. To judge the tremendous progress one must remember that at the time when the Stolypin Reform got under way in 1910, only one-third of the Russian peasants had steel plows. The remainder still used wooden shares or crooked sticks. Nearly all harrows had been of wood. While in 1916 99.2 per cent of the drawing jobs were done by animals, only 34.8 per cent of farm drawing was not mechanized in 1938. The mechanization had also a great political effect. It attracted the peasant youth to the party fold more than anything else.

It is a vigorous breed that has survived the starvation years, curious to handle any mechanical device thrown into its lap. The peasants jumped into the tractor seats, tore the rubber tires into shreds within a month, forgot to grease the bearings. But they picked up easily and muddled through. They saw no bounds for the imagination in their joy of work. Albert R. Williams tells the story of proud Yel-shanko, typical of the younger generation in all Russia. "If God did not send the sun and rain, we would not have the crop," the old peasant says. The young one answers: "Some day we will be able to get along without rain."

When the young wine matures, it will be like the old vintage. The young ones will ask one day like their elders: Has not the peasant been degraded again to a serf in this loudly heralded era of libera-

tion? He cannot plan on his own, has to take orders and execute them without questioning. The Soviet peasant is nothing more than a minor government servant, even if he stands at the top of a kolkhoz or the provincial control of farming. But the only time when a Russian peasant could call himself free was the short span of kulak expansion between 1907 and 1917.

3. WHO FOOTS THE BILL?

The Soviet leaders had learned from history, and one of the first acts was the occupation of the State Bank. They inherited from the provisional government emergency notes, the "Kerenki," apart from the war rouble notes. The inflation had already reached the abyss of the assignats period of the French Revolution. Soon all White Russian governments printed their own currency. The result was complete monetary anarchy during the civil war. In 1922, Sokolnikov succeeded in stabilizing monetary economy. Popular notions that money was no longer needed and that the state could feed, clothe and entertain the people in kind were promptly discarded. G. T. Grinko, the head of the Treasury, admitted in January, 1931, and economists like V. Dyachenko in 1933: "Money is still the great organizer for the accumulation of wealth for the country, a powerful lever for the development of socialist construction."

In November, 1922, a new bank note, the chervonetz, equaling ten gold roubles, was brought into circulation, which gradually made the war rouble note disappear. The issue was supposed to be covered by 25 per cent gold and 75 per cent short-term commercial bills. Since 1930, Treasury notes are issued with the bank notes at par, neither to be exchanged against gold or foreign exchange.

In the first years after the stabilization of 1924-25, the new issue of chervonetz was moderately restricted. With the birth of the First Plan, the inflationary rise could no longer be stopped, as billions of roubles had to be advanced for construction of plants that could not deliver the goods in exchange for a number of years. The government made the frontiers airtight against transfer of roubles and securities and kept the rouble abroad stable by regulating exports of gold, grain, oil and timber through the state monopolies. In 1937 gold production had reached 16.2 per cent of the world's total. Grain was exported without regard to famine conditions whenever imports of

machinery were needed, not for dumping reasons, as often alleged abroad when markets were suddenly glutted with goods. In some cases, goods imported to Russia at high prices were re-exported at low prices when the foreign-exchange account at the Treasury had run low.

During the First Plan, the issue rose to 1.5 billion rbl. against an estimate of 400 million. During the Second Plan the tide receded. Since 1936, no more emission figures have been published. It can be assumed that the war emergency will have upset the manipulated currency in no less a degree than the Nazi system of Dr. Schacht.

Since Socialist parties had come to the fore, bankers had been the bogies for all usury and expropriation which capitalism stood for. Cartoons had hammered the slogan into the mass mind. Many theorists believed in the personification of the evil. As no transactions could be made in the turmoil of war, communism and civil war, the banks became empty shells and were liquidated. Whatever the monetary theories of the new rulers might have been in private life, the force of nature compelled the retreat to international respectability and the accepted Italian methods of banking and accounting, budgeting and controlling. Today the Moscow Treasury is as strict and dominant as the correspondent desks at Whitehall and Washington. The dictatorship of the Finance Department was constantly bewailed by the rest of the administrators.

In 1921, the Gosbank, Bank of the Soviet Union, was founded, followed by a number of special banks for co-operatives, agriculture, foreign trade. The Gosbank alone has the right to issue notes and supervises, since the credit reform of 1930-31, all government agencies by the "rouble control." All settlements between agencies of any kind exceeding a sum of 1000 rbl. have to be made by check, no promissory notes are allowed. This means that any credit advance for permanent investments or commercial transactions has to have the consent beforehand of the Gosbank, which alone can grant a credit account.

As all clients were just another part of the same bureaucracy, there were constant bickerings between the bank heads and the managers of enterprises on the question of proper credit quotas. A great deal of delay in construction and operation of plants was booked to the frictions it caused in every branch except in the sector of war industries where the High Command decided. Even

here the new order showed the same climate as capitalist enterprises, where the treasurer and the managers are so frequently at loggerheads and everyone tries to have the final say. The Gosbank kept the strings of the purse in hand and forced the business executives to keep their financial house in order and forget the canny days of the revolutionary twenties when every wild idea could be experimented on if the political pressure was strong enough.

Every effort was made after the monetary reform of 1925 to balance the national budget, the summing up of all economic activities of the Union, by streamlining the budgets of the kolkhozy, stores and factories up to the huge combines and trusts. This vast centralization naturally added to the overhead of every enterprise and resulted in costs of production which could nowhere compete on the international markets except by taking losses on another government account. The national budget shows the rapid rise of turnover in plain figures, if fluctuations in the currency are not taken into account.

Where did the Soviet Union get the money or goods for the budget needs? In the well-established fashion of all regimes: from loyal or subjugated subjects in the form of tax collections in kind or cash, of voluntary or compulsory private or institutional loans, from foreign investors in the form of short- or long-term credits to be paid in goods or to be written off.

The chief items of taxation are the sales or turnover tax, netting usually 60 per cent of the total state income, and the profit tax, following with 12 to 15 per cent. In 1940 social insurance tax and personal income or inheritance tax yielded each 5 per cent. A time-honored socialist slogan had pretended that indirect taxation was anti-social. Until 1929, the Soviets hesitated to dispose of the 86 different taxes and excise duties and to accept the "price mechanism" which advocated a fixed mark-up on the cost of production as the easiest way of collecting the dues. The turnover is levied once. The tax is included in the selling price at the rate of 50 to 90 per cent on all commodities and articles of mass consumption except when sold by peasants or kolkhozy in the market.

Taxes on manufactured goods vary from 1 to 5 per cent. The government sets all prices, salaried incomes and bonuses and taxes arbitrarily and is therefore sole master of systems. The most expedient tax is, from this point, the best. Constant pressure on the

state enterprises to reduce costs of production has not led to a parallel reduction in taxation but has swelled the Treasury by the simple means of keeping the turnover prices steady and adding the profit tax to the tax burden. What might be still left in the tills of the enterprises is drawn upon by various loans, mostly allotted to the managements in semi-voluntary form. Individuals are approached by means of wage reductions or by visits of party members and tempted by lottery features and interest payment. Government bonds must be deposited with savings banks and cannot be sold with official consent. Loans have been issued regularly since 1927 in quickly rising amounts from 200 million rbl. to 11,200 million rbl. in 1941. The government will not have experienced any more difficulties than any other regime in financing the war effort by increased borrowing. News of large individual loan holdings by collectives or individual members is meant for home consumption in war bond drives.

Savings banks have to play the rôle of assistant treasurers of the government as all cash balances have to be invested in government funds. There was one branch for about 40,000 inhabitants in 1940. As they pay 5-per-cent interest and are the only means of getting a return for the part of the pay check a Soviet citizen cannot spend in goods, there has been a steady increase in deposits from 315 million rbl. in 1929 to nearly 9000 million rbl. in 1940, which appears in the Treasury budget under income from loans. It therefore depends on the future revaluation if the deposits will remain real savings. As Russians cannot buy real estate or goods or stocks, they have to take it lying down anyhow.

The next largest item on the income sheet is the revenue from the individual taxes. They include special excise duties on textiles, sugar, kerosene, matches, tea, already taxed by the sales tax, a progressive tax for urban people which exempts earnings of 1800 rbl. per year and takes 4 per cent up to 12,000 rbl., 8 per cent up to 20,000 rbl., 25 per cent up to 100,000 rbl. and 50 per cent above 300,000 rbl. On paper, the capitalists on the wage scale seem to be far better off than their colleagues under the old-fashioned regimes. But what they can get in goods is far below the foreign standards. Their wealth remains mostly paper value. The rural population has to pay an agricultural income tax, modified in 1941 and now supposed to charge an even 10 per cent of individuals without exemp-

tion. Local taxes are levied on buildings, cattle, dogs, woods, market license fee.

The last in the scale, the inheritance tax, has not come into a significance yet and is providing local revenue for cultural purposes. It takes up to 90 per cent of 500,000 rbl. and above. But in case of the owner's death allows only a limit of 50,000 rbl. to be left to the next of kin.

For the import of the machinery which was indispensable to the survival of Russian economy and the expansion of the Five-Year Plan, the Soviets needed foreign credit in addition to the forced exports of raw materials. As the Soviets had repudiated all loans to the former regime and about 7 billion dollars were held by small investors all over the world, the foreign banks and governments closed the door to any negotiations on new credits. It did not help the Russians to recall the historic action of the French Convention in 1792: "The sovereignty of the people is not bound by the treaties of tyrants" or to point out that the Tsarist loans had been used to suppress the liberal movement. The markets of the world remained closed for long-term transactions. It would have paid the Soviets to reach a settlement as the rates or interest for the following short-term credits—between 7 and 10 per cent—and the 30-per-cent excess price for the imported goods were an insurance premium against renewed defaulting and included a considerable margin for the refund on old debts.

The Soviet government fulfilled all credit obligations to the letter, which allowed great profits to the speculators abroad who bought the Russian promissory notes at a discount of 16 to 30 per cent. After Rapallo, several short-term loans were arranged at Berlin. In October, 1925, the German government guaranteed the exporters to Russia 60 per cent of contracts of a total of 200 million Rm. Nearly the same amount was insured to between 50 and 75 per cent. In April, 1931, and June, 1932, the coverage by the German government was increased to 75 per cent but only for 33 to 29 months, no longer for 48. At the beginning of 1932, Germany had lent Russia 250 million dollars, the United States and Great Britain each 60 million dollars on a short-term basis. Dr. Schacht, who had not been at the head of the Reichsbank during this period and was ex-officio critical of government policy, predicted in April, 1932, at Duesseldorf that the billion Rm. credit was already frozen and could only be liquidated by dumping of grain and raw materials, as the

Five-Year Plan would have to fail on orthodox banking forecasts. When the Nazis fetched him back to power he quickly found unorthodox methods to his own liking.

The actual costs of industrialization in terms of money are of less importance for judging the Plans than the labor conditions and the sacrifices imposed on the population as a whole. The workers who had scattered during the chaotic period to their home villages to find some means of subsistence had flocked back from the skirts of their stepmother, as Stalin termed the village, to tour the cities in search of work when the N.E.P. policy had shown a revival of industries. There were about 2½ million unemployed when the First Plan scheduled a total employment of 15.2 million for the end of 1932. Besides swallowing this labor surplus, the excessive needs for man power during the execution of the First Plan led to recruiting in the country and to a heavy increase in female labor. If clerical and technical management had been available in ample numbers, the tremendous over-endowment of workers in all the sprouting new plants might have been cut down to a more normal employment figure.

About 20 per cent of the steel workers had been in work before 1914 and knew their business. All others had to be trained with utmost patience. They had keen minds, learned quickly, were strong and hardy people but mostly came from the backwoods, knew nothing of team work or shop discipline, had hardly seen an electric bulb, and kicked their machines like oxen, according to a decree which imposed prison penalties on mechanics who were found guilty of "wanton cruelty" to machinery. Learning the feel for machinery proved a costly affair in time and man power.

The great push from above for completion of construction and starting operation in new plants did not allow for systematic training. The Electrozavod factory in Moscow finished construction one and a half years ahead of schedule but the quality of the electric bulbs was so poor that they burned out or fell out of the screw caps in no time. The productivity of Russian labor had been low in Tsarist times, between 25 to 40 per cent of the average worker's output in the United States, England and Germany. But it has to be taken into account that neither modern manufacturing methods nor modern machinery had been in great use and man power did many jobs done by machine abroad. Under the Plans, brand-new equipment and modern assembly lines had been installed

by foreign advisers, who knew their job. The mastering of the technique of running the outfits was the real problem in the pressing need for lowering costs of production which the official propaganda cried out incessantly. In 1937, a Gosplan committee declared the average productivity in the Soviet Union was 40.5 per cent that of the United States and the report of Malenkov at the Eighteenth Soviet Congress in 1941 shows it still at a low level, lower than in any capitalist country. If one compares staff figures of American and Soviet plants, it cannot be otherwise. *Industry*, the Soviet organ of heavy industries in July, 1940, compared a Pittsburgh mine and the Lenin mine. With one-third of the output, the Russian mine needed double the miners, eleven times the technicians, eight times the clerical staff and twelve times the supervisors. In electric power stations nine and a half times was the average excess in Russian plants compared with 35 European and United States stations in 1939. In steel, the excess goes down to two and a half to four times.

While the prewar labor hours averaged between nine and twelve, the Soviets decreed the eight-hour day during the first days of the October Revolution and six hours for youths of 16 to 18 years and miners. A new labor code of May, 1929, further decreased the working time to seven hours in a six-day week. The rationalists in planning had their way in 1930-31 when the continuous working week was decreed, three shifts taking seven hours for four days and one day rest, workers and clerical staff alike. This meant a staggering of recreational periods, and the museums and entertainments enjoyed a more constant flow of visitors. But there was the only benefit which could be quoted at the end of ten years when the return to the wisdom of the Bible setting was decided upon. The clockwork resulted in an abnormal waste of machinery and tools as it did not provide for enough time to attend to repairs, lubrication and cleansing. The night shifts were usually slack, supplies between factories were unco-ordinated. The workers themselves could not enjoy the rest days with their families or friends and resented the disjointed and unpredictable timetable. Absenteeism, always a crux in Russia, grew and led to further distortion of production. In June, 1940, the five-day week was officially abandoned "for the time being" and the Sunday restored to old glory as the rest day for all alike. At the same time, the working day was raised again

to eight hours and when war broke out to two or three hours overtime.

When persuasion and propaganda alone did not bring enough labor recruits from the countryside, the kolkhozes were forced after 1932 to send a fixed percentage of their members to factories. In 1940-41 the youth from 14 to 17 years were mobilized for compulsory training at factories and commercial schools and a compulsory service of four years at any job assigned to them. Female labor had contributed more than a third to regular employment before the war and is now ahead of all other countries under war conditions.

Wages played a minor role in labor conditions in the early days of the Soviet Union. Living quarters, health service and food were provided by the factories or municipalities without or with an insignificant charge. The workers received first-class rations with their families. If they did not get much on cards, they were assured preference. This system of socialized wages gradually broke down. In 1928, rents had to be paid for lodgings, at first according to income, later to the kind of dwelling. Streetcar fares, gas, light, water dues were added to the bill in due course. Taxes were introduced. When rationing was abolished on account of the breakdown of the distribution system in 1935 the cash wages became as important as in other countries.

A comparison in money value with workers abroad is impossible, and even the basis of real wages cannot be properly estimated as Russian workers had all their life a far lower standard of living and still did their work in a steady flow. The vigorous feeling that the future will reward all sacrifices of a lifetime goes a long way toward a satisfactory standard of living.

In the early days a limit of 300 rbl. monthly was the ceiling for wages to members of the Communist party, from the Premier down to any local official. Only literary work could be paid extra besides privileges in kind. Since summer, 1932, the ceiling has been lifted. Between skilled and unskilled workers, easy and hard work, there was little differentiation. But in spite of minimum wages, the allotment of fixed wage quotas to the trusts and combines who had to subdivide the ratings allowed no uniform payment to labor. Migration of workers who roamed the country in search of better luck and the good life reached fantastic proportions. Stalin attributed this

curse of production to "leftist equalization of wages" in his speech to the industrial executives on June 23, 1931 "You will find few enterprises where the labor turnover has not been 30 to 40 per cent during the half or even a quarter of the year."

The method of A. Yugov is a sound approach to a basis of comparison. He has divided the cost of a normalized weekly "food market" as compiled by the Soviet labor unions in 1928 into the monthly wages of a Moscow worker. If 1928 wages are taken as 100, the real wage has declined to 32 in 1935, risen again to 44 in 1937 and to 54 in 1939. The comparison does not mean that the food has actually been bought as there has not yet been a guarantee for people outside the orbit of soldiers and war workers, including the bureaucracy, that food was available in Soviet Russia but for the staple item of bread.

This state of the food situation, a race between the completion of the Third Plan and exhaustion of the human body of Russia, has not been relieved by the war and the loss of arable regions by occupation of the Nazis. A Brooklyn girl reports that she lost fifty pounds in weight within eighteen months in Moscow, her diet consisting of bread, rationed tea and a three-inch cube of black flour with a cabbage soup of frozen potatoes. On the black markets, potatoes fetch ten times the ceiling price of 8.8 cents, two pounds of meat cost a month's pay of 300 rbl., butter is up to 350 rbl. against the ceiling of 25 rbl. Poor peasants were known to live on sawdust mixtures of bread in Tsarist times, with meat and butter confined to holidays. Now the population is not spoiled in this way. By 1937 the average consumption in Russia was one-third of the United States figures in meat, two-fifths in sugar and milk.

"Butter and boots have gone into the Dam," workmen used to laugh when the Dnieprostroi was under construction. Would other nations besides the Chinese and the Japanese endure such privations as patiently as the Russians? The whole nation has heavily invested in its economic outlay in a fundamental idealism.

In housing, people had to be content in the first decade of Soviet rule with conditions which in other countries would have meant permanent walkouts or general strike. Here again, the Russian proletariat had been accustomed to a low standard. Overcrowding in living quarters and company boardinghouses, lack of change of



Soefoto

THE STALIN STEEL WORKS IN KUZNETSK

underwear and suits had been a standing plight of Russian workers. Most of the peasants had shacks and sheds as dwellings.

In Petersburg in 1908, 43 per cent of the married workmen and 70 per cent of the bachelors lived in the corners of one room. The confiscation of big houses by the Soviets—a revolutionary slogan of great renown—made life miserable for the owners and the new tenants, who had to share kitchen and conveniences and to walk far to work. They were stacked up to the attics with fighting parties, but under the three Plans up to 20 billion rbl. were appropriated to house building. Whole settlements sprouted, covering 225 million square feet of living space. In 1941, 86 per cent of the workers in Leningrad and 90 per cent in Moscow had a separate room or even an apartment. While rent used to take 19 to 23 per cent of wages in 1913, the present budget item amounts to less than 5 per cent.

The craze for community houses and kitchens has quickly abated. In Stalingrad, which grew from 40,000 to 600,000 inhabitants, immense settlements were built, with no individual kitchens, to save the women from house slavery. For children, who were separated from the parents, special houses were erected. For some hundred houses one community kitchen and dining hall was provided. These stony expressions of the new order disappeared after 1934 and were mostly altered into familiar old-style homes.

In clothing needs, still more privations had to be endured by everybody except the armed forces, the bureaucracy and the war industry workers. The manufacturing of shoes and fabrics, faulty for many years at the start of autarchy, could never cope with the most conservative demand either with or without rationing cards, which were reintroduced in the big cities in July, 1941, when shoes, dry goods and overcoats had completely disappeared from the counters. Soap, towels, tobacco, cosmetics and other necessities of civilization have been out of reach for so long that the new generation does not feel the pinch because they have never known anything else.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RUSSIA UNDER STALIN

I. THE COMINTERN SCARE

THE Bolshevik party has never denied that they used the members of the Third International to foster world revolution, that they assisted the Communist parties in other countries by money, propaganda and agitatory material in their bid for power. From 1919 to 1923 large numbers of the world proletariat, millions accounted for, looked to Moscow for guidance and practical help. When the party of Russia had become the state party and sole power, they did not sever the connections with the international brotherhood but placed the power of the state at the disposal of the Comintern. Despite the united efforts, in no other country did communism succeed in rising to power.

When the winter rebellion of 1918 got under way in Germany, Soviet Ambassador Joffe boasted of his activities in helping the revolutionary Liebknecht faction to win popular support. When a conveniently breaking box in transit revealed proofs of the conspiracy, diplomatic relations were interrupted. The Soviet Republic of Bavaria was a short-term affair. Uprisings in the Rhineland, in Hamburg and Saxony were fomented by Comintern agents, Zinoviev and Radek taking an active interest, but reached nowhere beyond the local stage. Since 1923 interference by Moscow has ceased to incite mass revolt. But the Communist factions of the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet pursued under Comintern orders a strictly negative policy. The arch-enemy was the Social Democratic party, the "Social Fascists!" Voting for the dissolution of the Prussian parliament, partaking in the streetcar strike of Berlin in the critical year 1932, they, together with the Nazis, swung popular favor toward a totalitarian regime and reduced the parliamentary majority of the Brüning government to a narrow margin. What was

the result? Hitler showed his gratitude by staging the Reichstag fire, liquidating the Communist party—throwing part of the followers into concentration camps or death cells and accepting others into his fold. The proletarian cause had been sacrificed to the whims of foreign remote control. Nothing has helped Hitler more than the blind following of his avowedly most bitter enemies. He shrewdly started in 1933 to raise the bogey issue of Bolshevik danger into international politics. How easy it was made for the Nazis to thrive on the slogan “Savior of Europe from Bolshevism” we have lived to see.

In Italy the Fascisti stamped out communist activities, which had inaugurated the great strike and factory occupation of 1920 and consequently maimed the powerful Socialist party of Italy, by the successful bluff of the March on Rome in 1922. By implying that the Comintern was a living proof of the permanent threat of communism, Mussolini and the Fascist party remained in possession of a powerful whip.

China saw practical results of Comintern work when Michael Borodin, alias Grusenbergh of New York, who is now editor of the *Moscow News*, helped to unite Communist groups with the Kuomintang National party under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. This intervention ended in 1927 with a swift *volte-face* of the Generalissimo, who liquidated the young Reds as ruthlessly as the Bolsheviks their opponents and drove the Soviet liaison out of the country.

In France, the Comintern had a strong following despite the recurrent changes in French policy requested by Moscow. The Front Populaire of Léon Blum was deadlocked by the refusal of the Comintern to partake in the efforts to raise war production. As soon as an alliance was signed in Paris in 1938 the Kremlin demanded a complete turnabout in support of the French government. Again, a reverse was ordered after Munich with the instruction to obstruct any war effort in France. The reasons why are still bitterly discussed in French quarters. Democrats insist that Stalin wanted to hand a crippled France as bait to Hitler to divert Nazi attention from Russia and to gain time to prepare Russia better for the holocaust, if unavoidable.

When Franco led parts of the army in revolt against the Spanish government under Largo Caballero in 1937, the Spanish Communists fought loyally against the rebels as partners in the government

coalition. After many months of waiting the Comintern offered assistance by supplies and military leadership, but still halfheartedly. Then the Russians started on orders a chase of Trotskyites, honest revolutionaries who were blackmailed as Franco allies, in the Spanish rank and file of Communists. Gerard Brenan offers the explanation that the Russian comrades did not understand the Spanish revolutionaries, undisciplined natives, ferocious and gentle under the same skull. "The Russian emissaries put their faith in bureaucratic uniformity and from every pore exuded a rigid totalitarian spirit. Their appetite for power was insatiable and they were completely unscrupulous." As final result the Comintern withdrew from Spain, leaving the Republic a victim of non-intervention. With Léon Blum in power, the Soviets could have brought France to the side of the Loyalists in Spain if they had exerted pressure in this positive way. It would have prevented Mussolini and Hitler from earning an easy victory and presumably have put a definite brake on their further ambitions.

Great Britain has lived through a Comintern attempt to assist the striking coal miners by a general strike appeal and cash in gold. The strike fell flat when the public took to self-defense. Diplomatic relations were broken off under public pressure in the same year of 1926. When resumed after ten years, feelings were still sore in the British Isles and a timely rapprochement was impeded until the present gallant stand against the Nazis swung the sentiment around to embracing the bear.

In the Baltic states and Finland, once a victim of Soviet aggression in a lone fight as loser, and in the Slavonic brother nations the Comintern had no success except when force had drowned public opinion. In Hungary, the Béla Kun rebellion of 1920 rankles still as a strong deterrent among even the common folk. In Greece, the Metaxas regime thrives on the communist ghost.

The negative success in the sponsoring of world revolution and of a rise to power of the international proletariat has not added to Soviet prestige. Abroad it has done great harm to the other Socialist parties. The Comintern delighted in militant orthodoxy blaming Social Democrats and labor parties for co-operating with parliaments and governments. Adhering in slavish obedience to the Moscow party line, the puppet Communists made an easy target for attacks. It was not difficult to rouse resentment against foreign inter-

ference and treasonable conduct in any country. The mere existence of a Comintern provided enough material for propaganda against Bolshevism on the European continent, in Mayfair and the City of London.

Most labor parties were thus paralyzed in their legitimate efforts for an advance of social reform and legislation. Deep bitterness was aroused on the part of the moderate leftist parties. Herbert Morrison, the British Home Secretary, was outspoken in his summary after the break-up of the Comintern "The Communists still believe in revolution by violence. They still believe that bloodshed is necessary. The trouble with the Communists is that they have a dual-purpose mind. They tell you one thing and mean another. If they really agree with our policy, I cannot see any need for their separate existence. If they do not, they are humbugs, applying for affiliation."

By distorting the issues, the Comintern not only became a "drag on national working class parties," as the dissolving resolution of the Comintern belatedly states, but drove tens of thousands of disappointed young workers into the arms of Hitler or Doriot-Déat. The Comintern efforts were not only mostly wrongly directed but often running on different tracks. When Russia pleaded in Geneva for the application of sanctions against Italy for the sake of Ethiopia, oil deliveries went on from Batum in full swing to the aggressor.

Why did the Comintern fail abroad? The appeal to the masses: The cause of the Soviets is your cause. Arise, ye damned of the world! was a powerful one. But when the Russian section of the Comintern had won prominence and control of the Russian state, it forgot that Communist parties abroad needed complete independence in strategy and tactics to reach a similar goal. Power-drunk, the Kremlin insisted on a strict party line which badly translated Russian experience into other languages. It also prescribed that the interests of the Russian state had to be the guiding principle of all Communist parties in other states. When, furthermore, all vacillations of the Kremlin policy in the inner circle were transferred to the foreign cells, the masses in the other countries gradually lost faith in the wisdom of the Comintern executive, who in spite of all denials were mere stooges of the Kremlin. After 1940, the Comintern lost all usefulness as an instrument.

The First International faded out of existence, when the General

Council was transferred to the States after the downfall of the Paris Commune. The Second International was wrecked in 1914 because the members had claimed the peace of the world the principal aim of the organization. It was a unique event that an International dissolved voluntarily. The reasons are fairly evident. The goal of Stalin, to build up socialism in one country, did not need the Comintern as the cells abroad had no power of their own on account of the wrong trend of development.

When Russia became an active partner of the United Nations in the war effort and the receiving end of a long and steadily extending lend-lease line with a rising flow of goods free of charge, the shadow of the Comintern lay embarrassingly across the roads. Russia waited until victories in the field allowed a withdrawal from the past without undue loss of Soviet prestige. Long before he ordered the writing off of the nuisance value, Stalin not only had allowed patriotism and national hero worship to take the place of the battle cry "Workers of the world, unite!" but had done his best to promote the new values. Everywhere, puppet governments and Quislings have been a poor investment.

The Comintern was not a new or an illegitimate invention of the Bolsheviks. There had been a First and a Second International of Socialist Parties. There has been intervention in the open and in disguise in neighborly affairs whenever a neighbor felt strong enough to take a stand. Military attachés have been exchanged by all civilized countries for the express purpose of preparing unofficial interference in cases of emergency.

The border line between altruistic mediatory or egoistic imperialistic intervention in the name of peace and humanity is often invisible. "Every Frenchman in arms should be shot and if but a hair fell from the head of the King, Paris should be razed to the ground" was the appeal to the princes of Europe in 1789. Alexander I of Russia took to supporting the principle of crowned legitimism in Peru, Bolivia and Mexico. Metternich's Holy Alliance refused to deal with governments that did not adhere to its principles and pledged mutual support against liberal reformers in any member state. A Russian army squelched the Kossuth rebellion in Hungary in 1849 at the bidding of the Austrian Emperor. Modern methods of intervention use the medieval weapons of dagger and poison as

well as the paraphernalia of dive bombers and tanks, propaganda and fifth columns.

The dissolution of the Comintern is the discarding of an outworn instrument. It will not mean a social truce between allegedly opposing political or economic creeds even if the "deep difference of the historic paths of other nations" is explicitly acknowledged. It does not say that the Kremlin will confine politics to a purely Russian sphere of interest. Governments-in-exile and Free Committees on foreign soil not only are existent in their own right but by their very existence are serving a useful political purpose of their hosts. The Comintern had in later years been only an auxiliary instrument of foreign politics.

"No more secret diplomacy" had been a battle cry of the Russian revolutionaries in 1917. It then could happen that a zealous worker opened the archives of the Foreign Office in Petrograd by force, thumbed through the files, packed the documents marked "Secret" together in a load and drove to a printing press giving the order to copy them as pamphlets so that the world should learn about the sinister dealings of the Tsar with the Allies.

The diplomatic fight for recognition has been a long and tedious struggle. Foreign debts, moral indignation, resentment of Comintern activities and its permanent denouncing of the Versailles Treaty delayed the formal acceptance of the Soviet rule as well as open-minded good-neighbor relations. Litvinov, cooler than most of the comrades, renowned as realist, notwithstanding his tempestuous manner, had early discarded any hopes for a parallel world revolution in support of the Soviets. He increased the prestige of Soviet Russia by frequent appearances on the stage in Geneva. When the Kremlin after Hitler's rise to power in 1933 had made a turnabout toward the League of Nations, he became quite a curtain raiser in international audiences. No pacifist pleaded disarmament more persistently, though he was hampered by the opposite trend of re-arming at home. He was sincere in his belief that Hitler should be checked at all costs by closer collaboration between the Soviet Union and the western powers, since the refortification of the Rhineland had shown the Nazi intentions to bully the neighbors into submission one by one. He had urged collective security. But though the principal spokesman of the Narkomindel for ten years, he was not the chief. He was retired, when Stalin decided to play

with the Nazi team. Negotiations had been under way on parallel tracks for some time between the Kremlin and the different European powers.

Great Britain and France had pursued in the years of appeasement—a term as misleading as any slogan—a policy of slow retreat in the face of aggression by Japan in Manchuria, Italy in Ethiopia, the Axis in Spain and the Nazis in Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin pretended to feel snubbed by the reluctance of Great Britain and France to accept assurances in good faith that Russia was prepared to fight Hitler and defend Prague. The 1938 agreement of Munich roused anew Soviet suspicions that Europe would be divided without Russia's vote. Stalin warned in March, 1939, against the "Anglo-French war mongers," who wanted the Soviets to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. When Poland received the British guarantee, Stalin found himself suddenly master of the European situation. He now could choose his dummy, either stay strictly neutral, assist Poland and the entente against aggression, or join Hitler in the partitioning of Poland. At first he offered to assist Poland by sending two armies along the flanks toward eastern Prussia and Lvov. The Poles were askance and insisted that they could fight their own battles. London hesitated, because Stalin asked for the right to occupy the Baltic states. A British mission to Moscow took the long route, arrived without powers of attorney. The Nazi Ambassador added fuel to the smoldering discontent by passing agents' reports of any off-the-record remark the Prime Minister in London made over the week ends, to the Kremlin, offering his good services at the same time. In the end, Stalin sided with the Nazis on August 23, 1939. He provided Hitler with the proof for his wavering generals, that the danger of a two-front war had been removed and that his gamble through four years had been an all-round success. When Poland succumbed under the heavy blows dealt by an invader superior in all respects, especially in the disdain of moral restrictions on total warfare, Stalin joined in at the kill and occupied half of Poland. More than one million Polish men, women and children were deported by the Soviets to the Arctic and Siberia or prison camps.

Russia not only allowed the transport of raw materials and soybeans from Manchuria but delivered cotton, manganese, pig iron, oil and fodder under the terms of a trade agreement to the Nazis.

Domestic and Comintern propaganda joined the Goebbels chorus. The Greeks were accused of having provoked Mussolini's attack on Albania and Greece. The Comintern instructed all foreign subsidiaries in the anti-Axis countries to slow down war production. When George Dimitrov, the secretary general of the Comintern who had been violently abused by Goering during the farce of a trial at Leipzig for arson, exculpated the Nazis for the invasion of Denmark and Norway many an ardent though docile Communist lost his trust in the Comintern for good.

All Russian gains from the short-lived Hitler alliance were drowned by the partner's ambushing assault of June, 1941. When Russia joined the United Nations in defense of her own interests Lend-Lease began to flow poorly despite good will, as supply lines had to be defended and constructed against a hundred odds and the United States could only gradually switch into war production gear. There has been some misinterpretation of the value of this help inside and outside Russia, adding acrimony to the discussion of a Second Front to be established across the English Channel. Admiral W. H. Standley, the United States Ambassador in Moscow until the fall of 1943, who prefers the straight seadog approach to problems in the gentle navy manner, opened the way for a better understanding by demanding of the Kremlin authorities a broader release of facts. Freedom of press is not known in Russia.

2. SCHOOL FOR BATTLE

When civil war and the campaign of intervention subsided, Trotsky introduced new defense laws. Under compulsory universal service there were more recruits than equipment. Thus lots were drawn by the draftees for terms of two to four years, in cadre divisions of the regular army according to the branch of service. The remainder of the annual draft and two million reservists were called up for six weeks' to three months' training in territorial units, a kind of National Guards, wearing regional cockades and emblems. At the same time, a gigantic scheme of pre-military training in schools and colleges was initiated. The Osoaviakhim has turned out millions of boys and girls trained for aircraft and chemical warfare, parachuting and first aid. By 1935 thirteen million members were on the rolls. Some 122 schools for gas warfare, 60 pilot schools, 241 glider

schools besides hundreds of glider camps were claimed to have been established throughout the country. In 1940, according to Soviet figures, thirty million young folk had been prepared for total war, not less than eight million had taken part in ski-running contests.

The idea of a non-professional army was cherished in all Socialist parties of the Continent. This deeply rooted tenet was supposed to be the most practical asset to pacifism. However, no more compromises were made in the officers' ranks. Soon after the civil war period, the officer corps was again reserved for professionals and cleared of amateurs. The Red Guard commanders, colorful partisans and proved in countless battles and skirmishes, were neither well read nor versed in military science. If they wanted to be retained, they had to go through the grilling of brains prescribed for commissioned rank. No party proficiency, no favoritism helped to promotion. Outstanding men like the tailor Muralov and the staff sergeant Budjenny, who had been already commanders of field armies, were sent to the "Workmen's Faculty" with other self-made generals to improve in scientific standards or received private tuition.

A few Tsarist officers had joined the Bolsheviks in the Kerensky period while the party was outlawed. But the bulk of officers had remained strictly aloof, waiting for a turn of the tide, and did not even go so far as to pronounce neutrality like the Household Brigade of the Guards. There were naturally strong suspicions among the victors of the Revolution against the class which most manifestly represented the fallen regime. But two decades have been sufficient to erase all distrust and to bring all attributes, all institutions of the defamed past into life again. The latest phase has been the revival of the Junkers schools, symbol of an officer's cast with a lifetime career aloof from the common folk. Young boys from the age of 8 to 17 can choose one of the nine Suvorov Military Schools. Sons of officers and soldiers have preference in admission.

Among those officers who threw in their lot with the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution and found a ready-made berth were General Adjutant Brussilov, Chairman of the Supreme War Council, the military attaché in Paris, Count Ignatiev, today commentator on the staff of the army newspaper *Red Star*, Colonel of the General Staff S. Kamenev, later Chief of Staff and Marshal of the Soviet

Union, the lieutenant colonels Kork and Uberevich, later generals, Guard's General Baranov, who was made Inspector General of Field Artillery and his aide Colonel Janikovsky. Among hundreds of junior officers was Tukhachevsky.

Trotsky decided after the bitter lessons of the civil war to swell the ranks with further experts by mobilizing all former officers in the Soviet Union regardless of creed. He was energetically scolded by partisans who put pressure on Lenin. When Trotsky was asked by Lenin whether the army could not do without the potential enemies, Trotsky retorted: "Do you know how many men are serving with us? Maybe 30,000! And only one in 500 is a possible traitor!" Lenin took his side. As the years passed, the recruits of the military colleges and academies, who had passed through stiffest examinations and had been approved by the party, replaced the old-timers, who are now left in service only as teachers in the technical institutes of old renown.

It was not an easy job for the Tsar's officers to be advisers and ghost writers to Soviet chiefs. But it was even more difficult for unit commanders. Every move of the military leader was watched and checked, every order had to be countersigned by a representative of the Soviet government with power to overrule any decision. These members of the Political Army Administration were the successors of the political commissars of the French Revolution. Without them, the civil war would hardly have been brought to a victorious end. They had a delicate task which they executed mostly roughriding during the years: to control the military commanders down to the company leaders, to protect them on the other hand against unruly demands of the soldiers' soviets, to look after the welfare and the political education of the troops. But they too carried a noose around their necks. In case of retreat in battle the commissar was held chiefly responsible and was accordingly reprimanded and shot, the commander only in the second place. There was plenty of room for friction in this double-barreled command. Eighty-five per cent of the full generals, 45 per cent of lieutenant generals, 41 per cent of the colonels and captains were party members as far back as 1925. In 1926, the commissars were demoted to assistants to the commanders, a combination of intendant chaplain and morale officer. Since 1936, the commissars have been entitled to enroll in special staff schools for future transfer to the military career. A revival of civilian control

came after the Tukhachevsky eclipse of 1937, when a Supreme Defense Council, a three-forked command, was formed in every military district by the local party chairman, the political district commissar and the commanding officer. But by 1940, the single command of the military had been reinstated. The party cell, which in old Tsarist tradition had run the economic life of a company as *artel*, was replaced by the sergeant major.

Severe examinations in all branches of the services forced aspirants for higher ranks to extensive studies in military science. Generals and lieutenants had to live in barracks which also provided family quarters. There was no leisure. Only the passing of the manifold examinations and implicit obedience to the party creed would insure advancement. It had been a hard life even for the youth who had grown up watching millions die in the struggle of the Soviet regime for survival. But their life had compensations. honor and glory.

Were the rank and file different from their fathers? In *Napoleon's Invasion into Russia in 1812* Eugène Tarlé reproduces a descriptive letter of an eyewitness. "We live opposite a recruiting center. Every morning thousands of peasants awaken us. They weep until their heads are shaved. But as soon as they are inducted, they begin to sing and to dance. They say: 'There is nothing to grieve over, for such is God's will.'"

Nowadays the recruits seem to weep less. Tears have dried out in the terrible past. They are more sober than their forebears. But the skulls are still shaved. They are no supermen though, only fit boys who have survived in the fiery revolution.

They have learned to read and write with few exceptions, whereas 75 per cent of their fathers were called illiterate. Their military training was a race against time. It is impossible to make up for lack of erudite tradition in two decades. In the old army no sergeant was supposed to read a map. The party used the opportunity to mold the whole younger generation in party philosophy and dogma through army training and special school grants with great shrewdness. Lavish reading rooms, libraries, debating clubs on lines similar to ABCA, the remarkable innovation of free discussion in all army units on current affairs adopted by the British War Office in 1942 under the guidance of J. B. Bickersteth, the warden of Hart House, Toronto.

The same curiosity helped to train the mechanized army. The

average Russian always showed a native ingenuity and an often childish leaning to novelties. Ordnance chiefs came from the same stock, young themselves. When an unknown technician showed a design for a propeller sleigh in 1920, tests were made immediately. One of the foremost Russian engineers was killed at the start. The model was accepted. There was no bias or prejudice against modernization of weapons or any introduction of new ideas.

Russia has been rightly proud that no limit was set to ideas or money for any military innovations. Other armies discarded cavalry after prolonged debates whether horse or motor should be chosen. Russia took a combined horse and motor force as the practical solution. The forty cavalry divisions of 1940 had each 3500 saddle horses, 10 horse-drawn batteries, 42 armored cars and tanks, anti-tank rifles instead of lances, the most modern radio equipment and their own air squadrons. If the Cossacks and Kirghizes still lacked general education, they knew how to ride, how to use every fold in the field and how to shoot.

The "Field Service Regulations" of 1937, which laid down the modern Russian operative and tactical principles, were praised by the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (No. 3, 1938), as "most modern and up to date." Soviet analysts explained the principal strategy as active defense, defending territory inch by inch, bleeding the enemy white and wearing him down by sacrificing surplus man power, alternatively counterattacking in quick thrusts and withdrawing, trying to get into the rear of the enemy to destroy communications.

This is the famous Clausewitz theory of mobile defense, trading space for lives. Karl von Clausewitz with many other Prussian officers had gone into Russian service in 1806, after the defeat of Jena and Auerstaedt. During the campaign of 1812, at 32 years of age, he was chief of Count Pahlen's cavalry Corps and greatly influenced the Russian tactics against Napoleon's invasion. The strategical lessons that he learned in adapting timeless military wisdom to the space and climate of Russia have secured him a lasting place among the great military minds.

The Soviet army considers unity of command the alpha and omega of tactics and certainly saved a lot of practical error by this means. There was no petty jealousy, no bickering among the various branches, no competition between senior and junior services. In

Soviet Russia, all branches developed anew without traditional encumbrances. The tactical modern needs determined the rules for the organization, not vice versa.

The Russians held first place in using tanks from the early nineteen-twenties, long before General Fuller and de Gaulle pressed for the progressive use of this weapon. After Walter Christie, who failed to find grace with the United States Ordnance Department, sold his caterpillar patent for tanks to the Soviet army in 1931, the Russians romped ahead of the world in tank production.

The present warfare has shown the limitations on the use of tanks, their appalling mortality in battle, their dependence on huge trains of supply and mobile repair stations. Up to one-third of the strength of a tank squadron has to be withdrawn from the front line per average week. Tanks and trains are all equally vulnerable to dive bombers and guerilla warfare in the rear. The Russians again were quick in designing another supplementary weapon: armored and heavily gunned planes and tanks on wings for use against pillboxes and tanks on the ground.

The Russian air force, the development of which is not less imposing than the achievements of the artillery and motorized ground forces, is also entirely home-made. Rapallo initiated a period of co-operation between Germany and Russia extending into the military field from 1922 until 1929. A mission of generals and engineers surveyed the ground and a liaison bureau was established in Moscow in May, 1922. German officers were to supervise the manufacture of airplanes, chemicals, ammunition and hand grenades. In exchange, German flyers were entitled to be trained by German instructors on Russian airfields. Numbers of Red Army students came to Berlin to study military science and to exchange views on the lessons of modern warfare. Junkers-Dessau, the pioneer in metal planes, erected a branch factory in Moscow for a yearly production of 600 planes but did not find working conditions satisfactory and closed down after 1925. The co-operation practically ended in 1928. The Reichswehr had no modern technical equipment to offer for study and the Soviets now turned chiefly to the United States.

The German army had a healthy respect for the Russian steppes and the military potential of its neighbor.

Russia has taught us, first, that an empire of great dimensions is not to be conquered—which might have been easily known before—secondly that the

probability of final success does not in all cases diminish in the same measure as battles, provinces and capitals lost, but that a nation is often strongest in the heart of its country, if the enemy's offensive has exhausted itself, and with what enormous force the defensive then springs over to the offensive.

This was written by Karl von Clausewitz more than a century ago.

General Dr. von Niedermayer, who had been military attaché in Moscow from 1933 to the war, wrote in December, 1939:

In Brest Litovsk, German and Russian commanders have reviewed their troops in a combined parade. German and Russian history are closely knit today. In the North and South the giant Empire is unassailable. A repetition of the Crimean War is out of the question. The front in the East is, to a great extent, relieved of pressure. In the West an agreement on the spheres of influence has been reached. Russia has regained the Baltic glaciis and secured her position on the Arctic Sea and around Leningrad. Versailles and the days of intervention are nightmares of the past.

Like Napoleon in 1812, Hitler gambled and lost. Russia must be either subdued with lightning speed or conquered in Siberia. This, if at all possible, is certainly impossible in a two-front war. The blitzkrieg, a favorite theme of Russian strategy which claims the seniority in its invention, has failed. The end is a foregone conclusion. The riddle remains to be solved why the learned German generals allowed the Austrian lance corporal to overrule their better judgment.

If the Russian army did not reach the qualitative standards in equipment the military leaders had set as a goal for 1936, it was solely owing to the lag in Russian economy. The critical observation of the actual crisis in productivity seemed to have caused a reaction among the generals, confirmed and tested party members without exception even to the point of thinking. For the safety of the Soviet state it seemed necessary to remove the bungling political caste, as far as can be judged from later events. On June 1, 1937, the axe fell instead on the heads of the military, after Tukhachevsky had been relieved of his post as Chief of Staff and Vice Commissar of Defense and relegated to a district command.

The findings of the court-martial have not been made public. The official version, that the defendants besides planning the liquidation of Soviet leaders had treasonably conspired with foreign powers, cannot stand up under closer scrutiny. What could a man of Tukhachevsky's stature gain from conspiring with foreign general staffs? What honors could he expect beyond the marshal's baton,

which he already carried? It has been alleged that the Gestapo and the former Deuxième Bureau of the French General Staff had collected damning evidence and placed it at Stalin's disposal. The Gestapo has notorious fame in framing and could have found it worth while to give a warning lesson to the German generals in order to prevent Tukhachevsky from finding pupils in a successful action. There is reasonable doubt that the Deuxième Bureau, the French intelligence, had more convincing material to offer. Tukhachevsky had an undisguised professional admiration for the work of other Clausewitz students. To counteract the possible danger of closer collaboration, an astute Frenchman might have tried his hand in a counterfeit. Secret services have resorted to less unscrupulous methods through many centuries. In July, 1931, the German Chancellor, Dr. Brüning, closeted with the French Prime Minister Pierre Flandin and M. Pietri during the return journey from the London Conference, was confronted with alleged evidence of German rearmament. Three hours later M. Briand poked his head into the compartment and requested to hear the outcome of the cross-examination. M. Pietri answered: "The Chancellor could definitely prove that the secret dossiers were erroneous."

The two leading German military publications coldly scrutinized the disappearance of most of the members of the Supreme Command and the chiefs of the Russian army, navy and air force. Agricola wrote in the *Militärwochenblatt* No. 10, 1938:

The Soviet regime had suddenly to face an unexpected situation when the Tukhachevsky rebellion was disclosed at the very last moment by the notorious general Skoblin. The fate of the Kremlin hung by a silken thread. In the strictly guarded trial it became terrifyingly clear that most of the elder Army leaders, considered the most loyal supporters of the regime, had joined Tukhachevsky. Stalin's henchman and brother-in-law, Lazarus Kaganovich, was known to have been warning of a possible uprising for a long time. He had objected to reforms on which the military experts had insisted, like the abolition of the political commissars and had predicted that a purely military command would one day lead to Bonapartism.

The *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* No. 32, 1938, took the view that "Tukhachevsky with the help of the best of the army leaders had intended to overthrow Stalin and to clear the chaotic state of affairs in Russia in the style of the summer 1794 in Paris. The ensuing purge of the army, the reinstatement of political commissars and the considerable increase in their numbers can have but

one meaning. There has been no espionage but only an antagonistic spirit against the present personal regime. After the eight highest-ranking leaders had been liquidated by the usual bullet into the back of the head, the provinces were purged at one blow. According to reliable information from Moscow, about 1200 officers and sergeants had disappeared from the garrison by January 1, 1938. Yegorov replaced the undoubtedly very gifted Tukhachevsky as Vice Commissar, the Tsarist Colonel B. Shaposhnikov, a colorless and from the military point of view mediocre personality listed for retirement, became Chief of Staff. The Red Army, which had had several good and intelligent leaders in 1937, was totally deprived of leadership by the end of the year. Heroes of the civil war, who had been removed by Tukhachevsky, and Triandafilov, reappeared. Their military knowledge and performance is not equal to the importance of their high position, judged by western European standards."

None of the substitutes has stood the prolonged test of the war in active command. Of the old-timers are only Generals Konev, who commanded a cavalry division in the civil war, and Vatutin, a veteran of World War I, still in active command of an army. A large reservoir of youthful, very able and resourceful generals give the Supreme Commander a wide choice for the leading posts. All of them have passed with honors the mill of the systematic training of brains which was the pivot of the Tukhachevsky period.

3. CALVARY OF THE OLD GUARD

It may be assumed that Lenin did not die without qualms for the future of the Soviet state. In the months when he had to lie prostrate, bullets lodged in his crippled body, only his mind unparalyzed, his pen traced the issues foremost before his eyes to administer efficient service to the people for the glory of communism, and to raise the educational and cultural standard of the Russians.

He confessed to having gambled without knowing what the outcome of his revolutionary recommendations would be. He wrote a testament without designating a successor. Lenin was a genuine Great Russian, though a spiritual cosmopolitan. He sensed that Russia needed a leadership that instinctively understood the Russian people and would avoid the errors of zealous partisans.

Around him were Trotsky, the uncompromising explosive, bril-

liant orator, writer, organizer, the Polish honest revolutionary veteran, Felix E. Dziershinski, the inexorable executioner of the Cheka, Joseph Stalin, the strong-willed but ambitious Georgian, Zinoviev, a faithful comrade of the years in exile, and the cultivated L. B. Kamenev, both Russians but lacking in character, a detail which could not be overlooked. There was the solid Rykov, who had wavered like the rest in the critical times of 1917, the firebrand Radek, adopted for his journalistic gifts. And there was the real scholar Bukharin, but very young, just thirty-five.

What was there to do but leave the reins to a collegiate authority? When Lenin closed his eyes in January, 1924, Trotsky was absent in the Caucasus. He did not return in time for the funeral. The triumvirate Stalin-Kamenev-Zinoviev, with Stalin in the pivotal position as party secretary, was not slow in shifting Trotsky's friends from important positions in the bureaucracy and in discharging his first aide in the War Department. The party conference of May, 1924, passed a unanimous vote of confidence for the triumviri. There was not a Trotskyite among the delegates, nor was Trotsky himself elected. Only Nadesha Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, rose to his defense. This would not have saved him from immediate downfall if it had not been for the symbolic memory of "Lenin and Trotsky," revered by the youth, the army and the little fellow in the street.

Trotsky hit back by publishing in the state's stationery office two volumes on 1917, and the permanent revolution, with a vivid record of how Kamenev and Zinoviev had deserted Lenin in the days of decision. The censors passed it. It was a trap. Now the bull fight was on. Trotsky's past was raked up. How could the former Menshevik, the empty phrasemonger, who had quarreled with Lenin on a thousand occasions in the years of emigration, dare to raise his voice? In January, 1925, he was dismissed as War Minister. When he had recovered from a prolonged illness he had to beg for a job at the Kremlin. His opponents gave him three top assignments in the planning of industrialization that promised to drown anyone in details.

Trotsky advocated speeding up the industrializing of Russia at the expense of the 75 per cent peasant population who would never support socialism anyway and fomenting revolution in other countries to save Bolshevism from being encircled and squeezed by the

capitalist powers. He led an acrimonious campaign against the official party line, which gave new concessions to the peasantry. The communist rank and file, trained to consider unity the chief asset of their policy, became annoyed by the bickering when the regime's economic difficulties mounted in 1926. Trotsky retreated with a promise not to indulge any longer in factional strife. But what is bred in the bone comes out in the flesh. He held secret meetings, and used every mishap at home and abroad for agitation against the top head of the party.

But the tide ran against the inveterate rebel. The failure of revolutionary commitments abroad also dealt a blow to Trotsky's prediction that socialism if confined to Russia would remain a stillborn child. So what? asked the party members. He failed to arouse the masses any more. The tenth anniversary of the Revolution passed without notice of him. Soon he lost the red membership card by expulsion from the party. He was no longer the man of whom even Stalin had said: "All the practical work of organizing the insurrection has been done by Trotsky." At the funeral of A. A. Joffe, who had committed suicide as protest against the persecution of the opposition, Trotsky faced the crowd amidst insistent cheers at a street demonstration of his followers in Moscow, the last time he was seen in public. On January 17, 1928, special agents carried him to a train that took him into exile at Alma-Ata near the Chinese border.

Stalin had won the bitter struggle of titans. Both had quoted Lenin in support of their opposing views on the timing of communist policy. The feud was the more bitter as it was a family feud, concerned less with principles than methods, dates and petty considerations. Personal dislike added fuel. Consummate intelligence, brilliant penmanship, artistic sensitivity in Trotsky clashed with superb horse sense, peasant shrewdness, supreme will power in Stalin. Both men were unsentimental and unscrupulous. Stalin seemed still to fear the magnetic personality inside Russia and deported the defeated foe to Turkey. Here he lived on the Isle of Prinkipo until Moscow brought pressure on Ankara to expel him. He found refuge in Norway but was ousted again at Stalin's insistence and was finally invited to Mexico by the only government which defied Stalin's wrath.

Trotsky's death by assassination did not end the venomous quarrel. The last words of the dying man were: "The revolution marches on." Soviet history has been and is being rewritten to purge the records

of the last vestige of Trotsky's work. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia has been reprinted in all sections containing references to Trotsky. There is hardly a book left today in Stalin's empire in which his name can be found. All things are done on a great scale over there.

But for his premature death, Lenin certainly would have prevented this family feud. After it broke out Stalin operated with infinite patience until all those he had marked were caught in the spider's web. He timed his actions perfectly, he enervated his victims by a slow-motion process in which elastic and unpredictable attacks alternated with pardons for repentant sinners. His principal instrument was the Special Police. But the GPU chiefs were unsure of their own heads. Two men with records of hundreds of thousands of victims fell prey to the executioner in time like the masters of the French guillotine.

Zinoviev was exiled to Siberia in January and came back in June, 1928, to write laudatory articles on Stalin. In 1934, he was sentenced to ten years' exile. On August 14, 1936, he was tried for his life and shot. Kamenev, who was condemned at the same trial, rose after sentence had been passed to admonish his three sons to serve under Stalin's banner.

Rykov, Bukharin, Tomskey and Sokolnikov had applauded Stalin in his fight against Trotsky. They have since been liquidated. Rykov was Prime Minister from 1924 to 1930 as Lenin's successor. His high office did not protect him against bitter attack by the party. After his dismissal he held no office until he was given the Posts and Telegraphs, renowned as a rest house for men in disgrace. When he was implicated as a conspirator in the Zinoviev trial, he was again dismissed and some months later arrested. He had been in prison for a year before he appeared at the monster trial of March, 1938. Yagoda, Chief of the GPU, was given the office of Posts and Telegraphs when Rykov was fired. He was condemned to death at the same trial as Rykov.

Bukharin, editor of the *Pravda* and one of the most talented Bolsheviks, was arrested in 1937. Two Social Revolutionaries, alleged assassins of Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador of 1918, appeared suddenly to testify that Bukharin had attempted to kill Lenin and Stalin in 1918. He was one of the principal figures in the March trial in 1938, where among fifty-five defendants on trial for treason, twenty-five were leading figures in the party. In the Western orbit,

equality before the law and in courts of justice, the right of a defendant to have his choice of a learned counsel for defense, to call witnesses, to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution and the right of appeal have been among the valued possessions of free men, the goal of our forebears for centuries. In the Soviet trials none of these common safeguards were provided. It is true that in other countries in which autocratic regimes have taken charge of mankind, either publicly or in disguise, these cherished conditions of freedom have vanished too. Even with this comparison in mind, it is rash to call the proceedings of 1936-37 justified or partaking of elements of justice in terms of the Hague Tribunal. Under law like the Anglo-Saxon codes, no defendant may be forced to indict himself. He may not even plead guilty in case of a capital defense. It is up to the prosecution to prove his guilt. Uncorroborated testimony, especially in oral form, given by state witnesses who may have to save their own necks, is not sufficient proof. If, from this neutral point of view, the procedure before a Soviet court is lacking in essentials which people in democratic countries expect, there may yet have been reasons that forced the Soviet regime to waive human rights again as in the years of their rise to power.

Why should the prosecution prefer this monster process to the quiet liquidation of opponents of the day's regime by a merciful bullet from behind? Why should the defendants have publicly confessed deeds which, except for the sin of refusing allegiance to the former comrade who had won the race, they could not possibly have committed?

The prosecution had fairly clear aims. Stalin had to be extolled and Trotsky defamed, because the halo of the eternal rebel, the coadjutor of the immortal Lenin, had not faded sufficiently to allow the Kremlin to feel perfectly secure during the years of economic plight. Things had not run smoothly with the second Five-Year Plan. The people groaned deeply. Stalin may have been forced into the rôle of the infallible Son of Heaven by the insistence of the Trotskyites that he had always been wrong. The public had become accustomed to the propaganda that all economic mishaps, miscalculations and shortcomings were due to the deliberate work of saboteurs, conspirators, foreign agents and enemies of the state. The trials of foreign engineers and of leading Bolshevik managers of industries, the wholesale execution of railroad men, foremen, clerks and artisans

—thousands accounted for, more thousands just disappeared—of millions of kulaks and other “enemies of the state” belonging to the eliminated capitalist class, had given propaganda an easier public mind to work upon than in other countries.

The great purge of the army, navy and air force of June-December, 1937, had been done on a scale which made similar actions of historical renown look trifling. In all the St. Barthelomew's Nights from the first to Hitler's fratricide of June 30, 1934, innocent men had been assassinated galore for their beliefs. Tukhachevsky and a few of his associates had been tried in camera. But thousands were liquidated without any farce. It can safely be assumed that beyond the circle of relatives and in spite of the GPU terror, the public has asked whether such trusted lieutenants of the Revolution, a hundred times selected, could really have committed crimes of espionage and treason. How was a Soviet citizen ever to sleep in peace again after having heard that for two decades most of the apostles of the Soviet creed and of the military leaders lied, plotted with foreign enemies of the state and double-crossed each other while pretending to lead Russia to new and greater heights in the council of the nations?

To prevent unrest from spreading the Kremlin devised a grandiose scheme surpassing Goering's clumsy Reichstag fire in 1933, which had been justly ridiculed by Moscow propagandists' public confessions. This might kill two birds with one stone· eliminating any danger of Trotsky's resurrection and putting the blame for failure in economic planning on arch-criminals abroad, foreign governments interfering again with Russia's peaceful rise to prosperity. Could the evidence procured during the trials be accepted at face value?

Trotsky from his exile denied the charge that he had ever tried to sell his own creed and all that he had toiled for to fascism. Why should he lie? When Emil Ludwig, the itinerant, untiring interviewer of the dead and the living, questioned him in 1931 on the Island of Prinkipo, he is said to have answered that there could be no change of the Stalin regime except following successful foreign intervention or an unfortunate war. He did not say that he would be a party to any such upheaval, but merely stated Stalin's strength correctly. Why should a man of Trotsky's political integrity, who had not much life to expect, fake facts? He was tired, lived in exile without means of communication across the GPU borders, he knew that even abroad all steps of any visitor to his retreat were shadowed. He

The prosecution had tried with considerable zeal to prepare the state witnesses during months of incarceration. Elaborate measures must have been taken to safeguard the prosecutor against such disappointing failures as Krestinsky. He confessed in camera, but recanted in public with the assertion that the Soviet leaders might not otherwise hear the truth. Only after a recess he confessed again and stuck bravely to this second confession for eight grilling days of silent reprieve until his execution.

The alibis may look all right to Russians who have no means of checking on anything happening abroad and who have lived for decades in a spy scare which makes every foreigner look like a potential enemy. Framing has been a requisite practice of Russian justice and of many a secret police force. Frequently, the prosecutor did not even take the trouble to provide a proper frame-up.

How did the defendants allow themselves to be dragged through the performance of the public trials after their long records of indomitable revolutionary energy? How could men who had suffered unflinchingly in Tsarist jails and in exile, who had held high office under the Soviet regime, fifteen of whom had been among the twenty-six signatories of the Stalin Constitution, contradict their whole past? It beats the ordinary mind to believe that the confessions could have been genuine. It is indisputable that no physical torture was applied at any stage of their confinement by the GPU. The witnesses bear testimony that the defendants possessed all their accustomed gifts of intelligence, wit and repartee during the trial sessions.

Two explanations have been offered. One is that prolonged persecution had unnerved the old campaigners, that they had given up hope of seeing daylight again. When approached with the suggestion that a confession would not exclude a sentence but would stay the execution and permit them to disappear under assumed names, they might in part have accepted the assigned rôles on the stage. The news that unrepentant and, presumably, just as innocent men had been liquidated without trial in the Llublanka prison, that Karakhan, a Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Mironov of the Foreign Press Department had been shot out of hand on December, 1937, by the GPU, is assumed to have had a back-breaking effect on men like Bessonov, former counselor at the Berlin Embassy, who refused for six months to accuse himself, then confessed and was consequently pardoned to fifteen years in prison.

Another explanation arises from the fact that in the second trial of 1936, Sokolnikov, also a Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Radek, the flamboyant penman, had confessed and been publicly awarded only a prison sentence. Why should other revolutionary leaders hesitate to sacrifice their moral and political reputations, if by such pusillanimity alone death could be averted? Still some of the defendants did not budge. They might have accepted the tempting offer if they had been asked to confess only to plotting against Stalin and his inner circle. But to admit the lowest form of spying to the detriment of Russia! No.

But it is difficult to believe that hardened men, with long lives underground and decades of unblemished collaboration in one revolutionary effort, should have succumbed to the ordeal without a greater motive than to save their lives, apart from the flimsiness of a promise which they could not enforce. They may have recalled Condorcet writing, in the shadow of the guillotine, his book on the boundless expectations of life, on the silver trumpets of indomitable hope. They had given their whole life to the cause of the Revolution which had been their father and mother and family. Could the terrible plight have weighed so desperately on their conscience that they chose the supreme sacrifice of even their own past, to allow the Soviet state to survive? Could the former Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Rykov, could the incorruptible and intimate friend of Lenin, Bukharin, entertain reasonable hope that the Nazi regime or the Japanese would lift them as Quislings to greater prominence and greater historical glory?

To allay any doubt on the side of the Russian public that it was not a fully fledged encirclement as in the dark days of Allied intervention but a mere plot of the anti-Comintern Axis powers, the Polish Secret Service and the British Intelligence were implicated in no less degree during the trials. There is reason to doubt that it was done with greater justification than in the former cases.

4. ICONS DEFY INQUISITION

European Socialists did not pretend that the party doctrine was a philosophy excluding all other creeds. The tamed Social Democrats in Europe accepted members of any religious denomination and even priests to the party. Plekhanov believed that the progress of

enlightenment would cause the natural death of organized religion. Lenin had once declared that Communists should claim freedom of conscience and worship and separation of state and church as long as they had not gained exclusive political power. But he added that once a Communist state had been established, there would be no more need for religion as the private life of a citizen would be regulated in every detail by the state. A real Communist could not be a Christian. He had to be an active atheist and an implacable foe of Christianity.

Lenin did not recommend stressing this attitude in public or disregarding religious feelings. Bukharin and Preobrazhensky underlined in the ABC of communism that the campaign against religious worship should be conducted with patience and consideration. "The credulous are extremely sensitive. Mockery would hinder the campaign." This counsel did not prevail in the civil war, for the local revolutionaries were drunk with power anyhow and the popes were representatives of the old regime which they wanted to eradicate, root and branch. As all established churches suffered when the form of state they were linked with went on the rocks, the Orthodox Greek Church bore the brunt of attack.

The clergy took an active part in the persecution of other Christians, the Georgian, the Bessarabian, the Ruthenian sister churches and in the Russification of the Catholic Church in Poland. Sermons were censored, priests were expected to act as police informers. Still, thousands of priests stood up for the cause of God among their peasants, led by a simple peasant life, and they did not disdain to make use of the superstitious feelings amongst the peasantry. Their cultural level was low. Allowed to marry, they could not obtain higher rank and had no influence on church affairs or the spiritual life in the church. While the Orthodox Church held a strong grip on eighty to eighty-five million Russians through the elaborate rites, resplendent festivals and the conservative simple dogma, twenty-five other millions of believers in the orthodox faith lived apart from the state church a spiritual life of their own in one of many sects, like the priestly and priestless Old Believers—hunted as apostates and religious maniacs—United Believers, Stundists of a Lutheran type, Dukhobors, who believe in successive reincarnations of Christ and fled to Canada in 1898.

Forcing the Orthodox Church to follow the political vagaries of

the Tsars was chiefly responsible for the harsh fate which befell the just and unjust alike among the clergy after the Revolution of 1917. Under the Kerensky regime, the Church Congress was convened to resolve inner reforms which had been in the offing since 1905. The Patriarchate was restored. But when the new Patriarch Tikhon refused to resign the claim of supremacy over the state, the Congress was dissolved. When Lenin took over the power, the fate of the church as an institution was sealed.

Many militant bishops and priests were slain in the hectic days of cosmic rage when the clergy was found to take to the side of the White Guards. The Soviets made it clear that they had no use for any churches or religious institutions. Church property was nationalized. The peasant folk resented the indiscriminate prosecutions of the priestly underdog. The central authorities realized that the time was not ripe for a frontal attack and that it would be dangerous to make martyrs and let the sympathies of the parishioners again cement around the persecuted priests.

Tactics changed and the atheist movement got a free hand to propagate a new creed. At first the "Godless" heaped abuse on traditional worship. Rituals were mocked by grotesque replica. Red devotions, red mass were lampooned on stage and posters. Red flag processions with technical icons paraded the streets. Cynical slogans, quotations of Marx and Lenin on religion, cartoons of the priests as servants of the bourgeois tried to attract the passerby by striking colors. The next move was to carry the godless propaganda of the Central Atheist Society into the remote villages. Even if the peasants willingly listened to the wise boys, underneath their skin they kept on cherishing the glamor of the church ceremonies, the candle-lighted icons, the deep sound of the church bells and the native choir music. When this negation of traditional values did not have the right effect, substitutes were invented for baptism, marriage vows and burial service. A "production confirmation" was introduced to mark the entry of youth into the labor army. Joining hands before a magistrate and a red banner took the legal place of marriage bans and sacrament in church. More success was achieved with the enforcing of the new-style calendar, the Gregorian, which is now universally accepted in Russia as well as in the outer world.

Though the clergy was no longer bodily liquidated, the financial boycott had the result of making life almost unbearable for the



THE OLD REGIME
(Cartoon, Moscow, 1927)



THE VILLAGE PRIEST
(Cartoon, Moscow, 1927)

priests, if they insisted on going on with their clerical duties. The church as such had lost all property and income. Taxes could no longer be raised for parish purposes. Offertories were regarded as illegal hoardings and confiscated. A parish must have at least twenty members to be able to rent a church for worship. No priest was allowed residence in the parish and had to become an itinerant missionary.

The hardest of all blows was the law that religious teaching was not allowed to youth under eighteen years of age in groups of more than four. It practically wiped out any influence of the church on the coming generation. In Article 124 of the Stalin Constitution of 1935 it reads: "Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." This excludes legality of religious teaching.

In the last year or two atheist propaganda has been abandoned. The persecution has abated. Priests can again vote as ordinary citizens under the new constitution, at least on paper.

Twenty-five years after the 1917 Revolution, the Soviets did not need to oppose religion any more, for, generally speaking, religion has lost all influence on the young people in Moscow, for instance, only eighteen or twenty churches of about six hundred were now opened and they were quite large enough to shelter the churchgoers of the capital. The battle against the church was won, and the victor could well afford to sign an armistice.

This considerate judgment of Eve Curie is confirmed by other honest observers. The Soviets now are following the guiding line given in 1942 by Mikhail Kalinin, the Speaker of the Soviet Union:

We are often told that among our soldiers, especially those of older age, there are believers who wear crosses and recite prayers whom the younger people ridicule. We must remember that we do not persecute any one for religion. We believe that religion is a misleading institution and struggle against it by education. But since religion still grips considerable sections of the populace and as people are deeply religious, we cannot combat it by ridicule. Of course, if some young people find it amusing, that is not so terrible. But we must not allow it to develop into mockery.

This statement is also an answer to the question: What has the Kremlin achieved with its anti-religious policy? Russian youth has not been won over to new gods by the negative policy of persecution which has driven the icons into the humble huts. But the prohibition of church instruction blocked the normal way for old traditions to

be translated to the children of believers. The Soviets also tried a positive method and have succeeded in giving the youth other ideals in a tempting and persuasive setting. They are led away from a melancholy confession to the orthodox faith of their forbears to a vigorous acclaim of the triumphs of science, of machine, of organization. They heard a new message, were shown new means of learning, of experimenting, were placed in charge of men and motors, were allowed to learn by trial.

How should the young, to whom all science was a brand-new revelation taken up with the eagerness of a native, see the limitations of science as substitute of religion? How should they realize that science can be used for good and for ill and needs a moral counterpart to insure the best use for man? They were too young to have notions of the peculiar soul life of Russian sectarians. They saw a fulfillment of the Christian exhortation "men to be brethren" in the new patriotic unity. "Arise, ye damned of the earth." Theirs was to be the era of electricity, lighting up the dark huts of their parents where candles had marked the holy days and kerosene the others, where crazy superstitions and pathetic lethargy thrived in dimmed corners. Loud-speakers had blared into their ears that "Bog" the Lord, the ruler, governor, sovereign, was only the God for the "bogy," the rich, that the priests were as greedy as the garden spider. They wanted clean-shaven faces and skulls or shapely trimmed beards. They despised the long flow of hair the popes had favored and their forefathers adopted.

After a decade of bitter remonstrations, the older people bowed to the official drive against the churches and retreated to the icons in their homes when the doors of most of the churches were sealed. On the whole, they did not renounce their faith, crossed themselves as of old and took to a simpler Bible Christianity. But there are no signs that the deep melancholy which was cast over their heads in the years of active persecution will give way to an openly voiced confident crusade for restoration of the power lost by the Orthodox Church. The subservience to God's will has been a traditional trait in the long-suffering peasantry. "My Kingdom is not of this world" was their consolation. Bible readers, who believe the Anti-Christ has to rule 1000 years have the fatalistic tendency not to resist anyhow.

The Orthodox clergy did not show a united front when the torrent broke loose over their heads in 1917-18. A part of the clerics

had left the fold as Reformist Church "to save the Orthodox creed from Imperial papacy" when the Church Congress split over the decision of the Patriarch Tikhon to insist on the supreme authority of the church over the state. In 1922, a section of the clergy adopted the Soviet rule as "Living Church," fought against monasteries as out-dated institutions and attempted a reformation on Lutheran lines. Others formed an "Old Apostolic Church," which abolished all ceremonies, in turn opposed by the "Church Renaissance," which wanted to guard every old rite. In this turmoil, the Patriarch resigned. He was arraigned in the Easter Week in 1925 before a court but not tried. The priests, who have lived through the ordeals and kept their vows to administer the blessings of the church, have made their peace with the regime resigned to the limited sphere which the Soviets tolerate. They stand in line with all other subjects for the defense of their country.

Other religious denominations were not treated with less ruthlessness than the Orthodox Church during the years of active persecution. The First Commandment was completely reversed to the needs of the Soviets and no other god allowed to be worshiped than the new order. It was of no regard to the Inquisition of the Kremlin if believers had been fettered or persecuted by the old regime. All traces of worship alien to the Bolshevik dogma were doomed to be wiped out with staunch determination.

At Easter, 1925, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Cieplak and his coadjutor were put to death for refusing to accept the new law that it was illegal to teach children. The Protestant Baptists had been principal objects of surveillance under Tsarist rule.

When they insisted upon preaching the gospel with the same courage as before, the Soviets clamped down on them. Lenin hated more intensely than clerics the lay priests *sans soutane*, the Christian Socialists, who objected to clericalism and who tried to conform everyday life with Christian traditions. They were more difficult to overthrow, he rightly defined.

Jewish temples along with churches, chapels and mosques were forced to close. A rabbi was persecuted like any pope, priest or mullah as a character suspected of "independent" leanings. The Zionist movement was proscribed as was all other non-Bolshevik political or social activity. Jewish Communists were the vanguard against their Zionist brethren, not unlike the Marauns in the times of the

Spanish Inquisition. But anti-Semitism was not tolerated. The inter-racial doctrine of equality was strictly upheld as one of the foundations of the Soviet Union not for the sake of humanitarian principles. Jewish merchants were punished and liquidated as illegal traders, not as Jews. Yiddish was encouraged to be taught in Jewish schools. But the parents usually preferred the children to attend the public schools in the hope of better advancement in life.

Only the Moslem communities were treated differently as they lived mostly in compact groups on the borders of the Union. The fiery believers in Allah had to be enticed into the Soviet fold by careful procedure. The propaganda was successful. A Moslem Congress of 1923 held at Ufa, Siberia, offered prayers for Lenin's, the unbeliever's, health. Today the twenty million Moslems are second to none in the allegiance to Moscow. The conclusion from all evidence has still to be "that the basic and irreconcilable antagonism between religion and Bolshevism persists," as Maurice Hindus put it.

But there has been a significant change in the outer relations to the churches by permitting the dignitaries to function recently as officially acknowledged heads. There seems to be more than one reason for the reversal of policy.

In the territories under Nazi occupation and in the Baltic states the leading bishops of the Orthodox creed declared in the early summer of 1943 their separation from the Russian Church and their allegiance to the Karlova Council, which had been formed in Yugoslavia by refugee bishops after the Soviet rise to power. This movement was led by the Archbishops of Mitau, Narva and Latvia, the Metropolitan of Lithuania and the Bishop of Kovno. The Bishop of Vladimir and Volhynia, Sikorski, at the same time founded an independent Ukrainian Church.

The Kremlin was not slow in making a counter-move by accepting the formerly opposed proposal of the church leaders in Soviet Russia to elect a permanent Patriarch of All Russia and to re-establish the Holy Synod of bishops as chief executive of the Orthodox Church. The new Patriarch Sergei was reinstated in September, 1943, with full regalia in the presence of the Archbishop of York of the Anglican Church in an imposing ceremony.

There seems to be a further step planned by the Kremlin, the use of the newly vested ecclesiastical authority for official missions

abroad to foster traditional ties with Orthodox sister churches. It would be in line with the acceptance of the heritage of Russian nationalism to revive the claims of the Russian church to the tutelage over the holy places in Palestine and to the spiritual leadership in the realm of Byzantium over all believers of the ancient Greek faith. It might also mark the beginning of a new epoch of uniting the separate Greek churches under one accepted Patriarch backed by the temporal power of the actual successor to the mantle of the Byzantine emperors.

The icons on gold, framed by emeralds and sapphires, return to public acclaim. Time alone will show whether for good—which would amount to a complete break with the Lenin creed—or as a matter of war expediency. As long as freedom of religious education is refused, there can be no talk of freedom of worship.

CHAPTER NINE

TOWARD THE NEXT REVOLUTION

I. LORD OF ALL THE RUSSIAS

THE great French bourgeois revolution gave all power to the revolutionary Robespierre and called him the "Incorruptible," as supreme praise for a fighting politician. The great Russian proletarian revolution was receding when Stalin took over all power as "Father of all peoples."

Joseph Vissarionovich Djughashvili was born in 1879 into a peasant family at Guri in Georgia. His father was a shoemaker in a factory. After having passed through the church school at home in 1893 he became a student at the Orthodox Theological Seminary of Tiflis. As early as 1897, he joined Marxian circles and contacted illegal Socialist cells. In the next year he was expelled from the Seminary as politically undesirable. From now on he led the life of a professional revolutionary. He worked underground as David, Koba, Misheradze, Chuchikov, Ivanovich and latest as Stalin, the name which he kept for good. Arrested at Batum in 1902 he was held for a year in jail and exiled to the Irkutsk province for three years more. He escaped after a month and spent the next year as an itinerant missionary of revolution in the Caucasus and a delegate of the Party Conference abroad. Whereas most of the Georgian Socialists leaned to the Mensheviks after the party split of 1903, Djughashvili joined the Bolsheviks. Another arrest in 1908 brought him eight months in prison and three years' exile. He again escaped from Vologda in northern Russia after a few months and went underground in Baku. Caught and sent back to Vologda in 1910, he disappeared once more during the next year and was stationed at St. Petersburg by the party. These arrests and escapes alternated with undercover periods until he was exiled in Turuhansk, a Siberian village, in 1913.



TEHERAN, 1943

Stalin was spared the fate of Dostoievsky, who was twice flogged while at Omsk in a forwarding prison for saving a convict from drowning and for complaining about filth in the soup. If Stalin retains a burning hatred against the Tsarist regime which forced him to spend twenty years of his lifetime underground or in captivity, it would be only a simple human reaction.

When the Revolution liberated all political exiles, Stalin went to Petrograd. Until Lenin's arrival he was, together with L. Kameney, editor of the *Pravda* which at that time supported the provisional government.

He is said to have met Lenin once in 1912 in Cracow before he joined him in April, 1917, as a member of the Central Committee at Petrograd. In the same year, he became the People's Commissar for National Minorities and, as such, responsible for the execution of the Soviet policy toward the minorities living on Russian soil. The newly declared freedom for all races to choose their own future was used by the Caucasian Menshevik members of the Kerensky government to go home and organize the Union of Caucasian Republics, independent from Moscow as the kingdom of Georgia had been for 2000 years until 1803. But the tribes and races felt safe against renewed Moscow oppression and returned one by one to the Soviet fold. Only the Georgian Republic held out. When Soviet troops invaded their valleys in March, 1921, the Jordania government relied on Turkish assistance. Having occupied the two southern provinces of Ardaghan and Artvin, the Turks made peace with the Soviets and the Menshevik rule was ousted. A great cultural program has been put into action by Moscow. Today the Caucasian troops are the mainstay of the Soviet army.

During the civil war, Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Soviet from 1920 to 1923 and took an active part on many fronts, at the defense of Tsaritzin, later in his honor named Stalingrad, with the Third Army around Perm, at Leningrad and Smolensk and in the southern Ukraine.

Soon after the end of the open fighting, in 1922, Stalin became the secretary general of the party and entered the decisive period of his life. Lenin seems to have grown to suspect the ambitious comrade. "This cook will oversalt all dishes." In his so-called testament of December 22, 1922, he writes:

"Comrade Stalin having become the Secretary General of the

Party, has concentrated tremendous power in his hands, and I am not sure he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution."

On January 4, 1923, he added the postscript: "Stalin is too rude. . . . I propose to the comrades to find a way of removing him. . . ."

Stalin has outlived any threat to his rise in power. In 1931, his implacable adversary Trotsky asserted that Stalin could no longer be ousted by any other power in Soviet Russia. It is no secret how he disposed of competitors in public esteem. He has written his own law and given Russia his own constitution.

The Stalin Constitution of 1936 has upheld the Soviet system as a fiction. It is a strictly one-man affair to elect deputies by popular vote, if no opposition to the official dogma or policy can be voiced, no representatives can be chosen except those on the one-party list. Whatever achievements have been recorded in Soviet Russia during the last twenty years bear the personal stamp of Stalin. It is no mean success even in our times where dictatorial power can be easier sustained than Machiavelli foresaw, by a blend of modern technique, medieval terror and ancient political science.

The mighty step toward an "equalitarian federated world socialism," as H. G. Wells calls it, suffered less from the human limitation of those who had to execute it than from the natural limitations of man as power. As Secretary General of the Communist Party, as Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of all Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Stalin today heads all executive branches of government. He can and does shift marshals and generals, Heroes of the Soviet Union and knights of the Order of Lenin, managers and professors like pawns on a chessboard at his pleasure. He is lord over life and death of any Soviet citizen. No wonder he is held in awe.

Stalin cannot be called a "faultless man" in the sense of Cimourdain though his retainers proclaim him infallible. He does not possess Lenin's "blind certainty of an arrow that seeing nought besides, flies straight to the goal." He is the only diadochos of Lenin who gambled in decisions and often altered the course but managed to ride on the crest of the wave longer than any fellow-in-arms. He is called the great Stalin by those around him. That is not unnatural for adoring disciples and tenants. But does a really

great man need to support fawning to the extent to be seen in Soviet Russia in every path of life? There is the Mussolini vanity to see scribbled in black or white, "*Evviva il Duce*" on any sidewalk and house wall. There is the Hitler insistence on hailing his name, already cursed by hundreds of millions, and hanging his framed features under every ceiling. Byzantinism was always considered despicable by free men.

No book can be published without servile bowing before the Lord of all the Russias. From the Great Soviet Encyclopedia all references to the rôle of Trotsky and other liquidated heroes of 1917 have been erased. This could be explained by political expediency in times when the regime was tottering. But why must all pens engaged in literary work drip sheer adoration and rival in distorting historical facts and estimates? Pushkin, the great poet, but a courtier and gourmet, is suddenly groomed as a popular tribune. His untimely death in a duel, which his wife provoked, appears in modern essays as the sinister work of reaction. Dostoevsky ended his famous eulogy on Pushkin with the cry: "Humble yourself, proud man!" At the end of the newest research book on the poet we find the admonition: "Be proud, ye masters of your own destiny under the leadership of the great Stalin."

Not content with the laurels of a lawgiver and marshal in the field of a victorious army, Stalin seems to insist on also reaching Lenin's fame as prophet and author. "You ask me who best understands the Russian language and I reply: Stalin!" exclaimed Mikhail Kalinin, his friend, the Speaker of the Soviet Union.

If Stalin turns the globe in his study and looks at it from the North Pole, the Heartland of the World Island, dominating the approaches to three continents by land, spreads in an immense arc before him. Its natural riches and strategic importance are supplemented by a combination of the mightiest army and an equally strong winged force. A third powerful instrument will come into the range of his mind. Whatever the deficiencies of the former Soviet system have been, the *aura popularis* of the harbingers of freedom to all races in their orbit goes with the Lord of the Kremlin wherever his name is spelled among those who live under oppression. It is a mighty weapon to put the law down in countries out of reach of the giant's arms.

Will Stalin follow the ways of Napoleon I? Bonaparte the Cor-

sican started as successful general, became First Consul and masterful administrator, triumphator and Emperor. He ended in exile. Stalin started with the exile, became a powerful administrator, First Consul and may be accorded supreme laurels as general in the field. He has founded a new aristocracy of the sword as Napoleon did. Nobody will oppose him if he should choose to place Peter the Great's mitre crown on his head. But we may doubt that he has more use for robes and crowns than Moses, who refused the name of King in Israel, but surpassed all kings of men in fame as the greatest lawgiver in history.

2. BACK TO OLD GLORY

The Soviet army has proved its valor in adversity and in victory. The training of brains in military science has paid full dividend since the pupils of Tukhachevsky, who were boys of 15-18 at the time of the October Revolution, have come to the fore. They did not reach the command of armies until a retreat of 800 miles in depth and a series of unsuccessful battles had taken a heavy toll of Russian resources. Conservative figures amounted to seven million dead on the Russian side by the summer of 1943.

Estimates of losses are a controversial subject since their publication ranks as one of many propaganda weapons. Eve Curie found it difficult to believe the exact figures published day by day. "I was wondering incidentally, if anybody except God himself could make with such precision the melancholy count of the dead soldiers whom I have seen shrouded and hidden by the thick snow." But single loss is enough to bereave a family for a lifetime. Tukhachevsky's plan of defense, which his successors disdained, bears out the opinion that part of the initial losses could have been avoided.

The calculable factors of history and geography pointed to choosing a defensive stand inland behind natural and artificial strongholds. This would have permitted the undisturbed assembly of the Russian man power from the Volga Basin and the Urals, while an attack from the Polish border would break on the inland fortifications.

Russia had prepared the Stalin Line of fortifications in depth from Lake Peipus along the Berezina through the Pripet Marshes

to Korosten and the middle course of the Dniester, ending in the Black Sea. This line made use of the strong defense position at the Drissa River, just East of Dvinsk, to prevent any junction between forces using the northern and central historic routes of aggression. It was strongly fortified in the gap between Korosten and the Dniester. According to the plan of Tukhachevsky, only small delaying forces were to be kept west of the Stalin line. The bulk of the armies was to be concentrated up to 100 miles behind the front to block any forces breaking through between Kiev and Kursk.

Moscow was to be made self-contained to a fortified camp including essential war industries. To safeguard the industrial life lines of the Ukraine, Kiev was chosen as the pivot of the southern defense, to be held at all costs by seasoned troops. Sharing the fate of Count Schlieffen, the dead Tukhachevsky did not live to see to the execution of his grand strategy. The new Supreme Command made a faulty appraisal of his scheme and changed principal directions.

The Polish armies in 1939 were defeated in the open field one after the other by the surprise of superior concentrations. Military science had advised leaving only small forces in the forefields of the natural fortress along the Carpathian Mountains. The wrong steps taken by Warsaw could have warned the Russian General Staff. Instead, huge armies were assembled east of Bialystok and near Minsk and caught in pincer moves by Nazi spearheads, which had an easy attack from the bases retained at the partitioning of Poland. Instead of concentrating the bulk of Russian armies in the Stalin Line west of Kiev, devised for this purpose, strong forces were deployed in front of the fortifications. The Dnieper barrier was stripped of covering troops. This allowed Rundstedt to gain an easy crossing near Clerkasy. Instead of retreating from the area around Smolensk at once when the town was taken, as advised by Clausewitz in 1812 and Tukachevsky in the years of planning, the slower-witted successors handed their troops to the Nazis on a platter for carving up. When the Nazis had broken through the depth of the Stalin Line at various points in the same fashion in which the Maginot Line had been dislodged in 1940 in France, there was no preconceived Russian plan of a co-ordinated retreat and isolated actions were fought with tremendous losses. Millions of gallant Russians had

to pay for the lessons their superiors insisted on learning the hard way. Their sacrifice saved the capitals from surrender.

Stalin had taken over the supreme command after the long series of pitfalls and replaced Voroshilov by Timoshenko as his deputy. The new henchman was energetic but no match for the opposite number in the field, Fedor von Bock. The Soviet commander led a gallant attack with 20 infantry and 7 cavalry divisions and 14 tank brigades, blasted a corridor through the Nazi line but did not follow up with motorized infantry. His tanks were encircled and a German counter-offensive went around the Russian flank, taking 240,000 prisoners. On June 17, 1942, von Bock launched out from Charkov. While Timoshenko moved all reserves south toward Charkov, the Germans shifted the bulk north. On June 20, new tactics were used by von Bock along the line from Kursk to Voronezh: spearheads of shock troops after artillery barrage, tanks to follow. Up to July 7, von Bock's armies had gained 100 miles in depth.

Timoshenko had rushed troops to the north, which were shattered on July 2-3. The Nazis now struck at the Russian center with two Panzer armies and two infantry armies. Von Bock did not send all his forces through the gap at the same place. While piling up his armies, he let them converge from three directions, inviting counter-attack. When his left southern wing was outflanked, Timoshenko, with the Panzer armies from the north in his rear, had to retreat fast. The obvious move for him would have been to retreat four or five days earlier toward Stalingrad. The suicide battle of the brave 62nd Soviet Army at Stalingrad allowed Stalin to convert the Volga city into a second Madrid. The defense of Stalingrad became the turning point of the Nazi tide.

Timoshenko was relieved of the southern front command. The new set of young generals—their average age is 42—has turned the table on the aggressors to all appearances permanently. Their planning is up to the fighting valor of their men. Among the new men at the top, Alexander N. Vasilevsky is at present Stalin's right-hand man in the Defense Ministry and General Staff, promoted from lieutenant general to marshal within one year. A. Voronoff, the artillery specialist, and A. Novikoff, chief of air forces, K. Rokossovsky of Stalingrad fame and M. Popov, the daring firebrand, V. Sokolovsky, the "meat-grinder," R. Malinovsky, a subtle tactician,

and the youngest of army chiefs, F. Tolbukhin of Taganrog are young and brilliant marshals-to-be of quick rise.

The Russian soldier has been famed since time immemorial for his stamina in adversity. Against his attacks, lesser numbers of Finns and Balts could stand up to him. In Europe only the British soldier matches him under retreat and distress in fighting to the end. The Golden Horde was beaten on the Snioe Meadow by the Muscovite defenders in 1380 at the price of near exhaustion, the flower of the Russians being mowed down in one day. In a similar spirit, called forth by religious fervor, the Russian warriors defeated Timor on the banks of the Oka River and saved Moscow from the Mongols in 1395. *War and Peace*, Sholokhov's *The Silent Don*, Boris Voyetekhov's *The Last Days of Sevastopol* give epic testimony to the stubborn heroism of the Russian rank and file of modern times. In 1812 they were still serfs, in 1914, peasants without much say or civic liberties, and today, not what history will call free men. But they all fought and died in the mystic devotion to the soil which reared them as bravely in the second siege of Sevastopol in 1942 as in the first in 1856. The defense of Leningrad was not as spectacular as Sevastopol or Stalingrad but the civilian heroism was even greater with more than one and a half million people starving to death during the one winter of 1941.

Both hero and coward live in one human shell. Heroes are not born. There are no heroic or cowardly nations or races. How to become a hero depends on the temperament, the background, the intelligence, the gift of measuring up a situation in a split second. It is easier for the brave to emerge out of a band of brothers, to rise to courage, in the thin red line of heroes supported by the same emotions, traditions, memories of love or revenge, than to face fate alone in cool reasoning. Dead heroes take the secret of their decision with them. Those who return dislike to talk. The trumpets are blown by others.

Real warriors feel "keen joy in foemen worthy of their steel." The Russians, as a rule, do not behave differently from other fighters. It is a poetical exaggeration to attribute their fighting qualities primarily to the "unfathomable Russian soul." Free men will say with the fire-fighting Cockney woman of Lambeth, who meekly refused praise for valor: "Most of us acted bravely because there was nothing else to do."

Stalin seems to believe that heroism can be taught by encouraging individual acts of bravery. He pours out lavish praise with traditional methods. The Stalin historians have been ordered to present Russian history in new and brilliant garb. If Our Lady of Kazan, to whom generations of Russian soldiers used to pray before the battles, has not been restored to old glory, Mother Russia has been exalted with increasing fervor and glamor. Hero worship in the style of Thomas Carlyle has been granted anew to by-gone figures. Three men a prince, a count, a commoner have been chosen for glorification. Their portraits adorn the barrack rooms, their names are inscribed on three high decorations reserved for high-ranking officers. The reasons for their elevation can only be guessed.

Prince Alexander Nevsky, a Saint of the Orthodox Church, was during the campaigns for control of the Baltic Sea shores victorious in the battle on the Neva against the Swedes in 1240 and on the ice of Lake Peipus against the Teutonic Knights in 1242. He was the first to claim for Russia the foothold which was populated by Swedes and Finns, not by Russians, and which five centuries later Peter the Great secured in the Nystad Peace of 1721.

Field Marshal Suvarov rose from the ranks to the position of Commander in Chief. A victor in many battles against the Swedes, the Turks, the Poles, the Italians, he finally proved his mettle in the retreat across the Alps in 1802, escaping annihilation by Napoleon's superior armies. He combined peasant shrewdness with a pious and erudite mind and loved to play the cynical fool against opposition and court intrigues. He believed in systematic education for heroism and was the idol of his serf-soldiers.

Field Marshal Prince Kutuzov was a count by birth, a great courtier of the rococo period, who in old age was chosen Commander in Chief during the Napoleon invasion in 1812. The Russians defeated Napoleon by retreats and hit-and-run tactics and forced him to leave Russia. Kutuzov died soon afterwards in Bunzlau, Silesia. He was never rewarded with laurels of victory, but was praised for his wisdom in moderation, because he did not sacrifice his troops by the old-time marching to death in solid columns. In the case of Suvarov and Kutuzov, contemporary Russian historians stressed the fact that both were called to the High Command by Tsars who disliked them. This version may make the choice more palatable for the Soviet public.

The scorched-earth policy grew out of the populace in Napoleonic days without command from above. When Napoleon I watched Moscow, the town of sixteen hundred churches and a thousand palaces, afire, he turned to Coulaincourt "This is a war of extermination! A demon inspires this people. What savage determination!"

Heroes of the Soviet Union, proud bearers of the Order of Lenin, the Red Star, are joined in public acclaim by the knights of the Order of the War for the Motherland. Tax exemptions and annual pensions are granted to the holders of the higher grades of decorations. A great wave of enthusiasm sweeps the whole of Russia to outdo the neighbor in daring and valor. Stalin has his ear to the ground. He reacts spontaneously, disregarding any party principle or creed of old with sovereign disdain, if he can get things better done the other way. He revived the system of elite formations by designating the Fourth Tank Brigade "First Guard Tank Brigade" for exceptional valor in the defense of Moscow on November 11, 1942. Later, whole corps and armies were granted the same distinction. Guardsmen receive double pay. Their officers take the prefix to their title. As further honor the names of battlefields are added to the denomination of successful units for special valor. Generals wear the same velvet collars and triple red trouser stripes, the officers the huge gaudy insignia of old. Retreat to glory! And to better pay! Whereas a private draws 100 rbl. per month, a lieutenant receives 1000, a colonel 2400 rbl.

The revolutionary oath of allegiance of April 22, 1918, taken "before the face of Russia and the whole world" with the pledge "to Revolutionary discipline, the cause of socialism and to the Brotherhood of Nations," has given way to the oath of 1939: "To the People, to Russia, the Fatherland!" When the recruits take the oath they kneel down, kissing the regimental standard as of old.

These changes have not been unavailing. The young generals, commanders and officers who can see the marshal's baton not only in the knapsack but within reach, acclaim the leader, if not the system, in genuine admiration. Stalin has given them a chance in life which hardly one of their fathers would have dreamed of. They have been forged into a privileged class. Epaulettes, officers' mess, the batman system—the most detestable signs of prerogatives under Tsarist rule—have come back. Officers are not supposed to join

their men off duty, though they have gone through the same boyhood of untold starvation and privation as the men they are called to command. They have been chosen by chance from the same peasant's or worker's home unless they were sons who had publicly decried their origin from privileged families.

The "insane optimism," as Eve Curie calls it, is the key to the enigmatic fight against so many odds, the dour endurance of yesterday, the ambitious pushing power, the *vydvigat* of today. Let the hinterland writhe in agonies under the strain of economical and physical exhaustion, the men of 1943 will not be likely to lay down their arms like their fathers in 1917, without being told to. They will fear neither demobilization nor loss of work.

Stalin has assured his men a life of promise. They will go, like Napoleon's Guards, where they are ordered to go. There is no other military instrument in the world in the hands of one man which could be compared with Stalin's praetorian guards.

3. THE ETERNAL PEASANT

The comparison of Stalin with the Tsars, facile as it may appear at first sight, contains a very true idea. After the eradication of the members of the old regime, completed in Russia with all the Asiatic ferociousness of this unbridled and yet genial people, the revolutionaries were the next in line for the firing squad and the ugly purges of modern pattern. Old regime and old guard have much in common not only with regard to the guillotine but also in their mentality. If the Revolution has sunk into the marasmus of opportunism, it is they who are united in the desire for change, they who have become the revolutionaries against the new vested interests of the victorious group which holds the easy chairs with iron tenacity.

This process of changing places will not come to an end until the last stratum of the people has satisfied its desire for social and political renovation, illusionary as these wishes may prove before the judgment of history. In Russia, this lowest stratum of merely instinctive longings and dreams is the peasantry. Never in history was a peasantry shifted so quickly and ruthlessly through the most diversified positions on the social ladder: serfs only two to three generations ago, they became nominally free in order to be sacrificed to the Moloch of modern industrialization. Then Stolypin created

the basis for a genuinely free peasantry. After ten years, the Bolshevik Revolution nourished their illusion that revolution means more land. The Soviets had to increase urban proletariat in order to be able to sustain the revolutionary idea by the tenets introduced from the materialist and entirely differently constructed West. When this task had been accomplished in a certain measure, the peasants were cast once more into the utter wilderness of organized slavery, more efficient and all-embracing than the patriarchal despotism of the old serfdom could ever venture to grow.

The Hitlerian onslaught violated what on this earth is closest to the Russian peasant, the endless plains of Holy Mother Russia. This foolish outburst of megalomania has forced the Russian peasant into a compulsory solidarity with his government. Otherwise friction between the amorphous mass of peasants and the centralism of the Kremlin would already have come into the open. Such afterbirth of revolutionism is bound by natural law to grow from the soil following every violent change of the social structure. The present solidarity against the hated intruder will, to be sure, give a new direction to the government rather than to the subconscious longings of the peasants. The Kremlin will have to follow them, because they are the real defenders of Russia, which they saved by the hecatomb of their poor and anonymous lives.

When the present war ends as it is likely to end, namely, with a weakening of the military power of the neighbors of Russia and a decrease in the spiritual force of the Western world at large, the exterior pressure which till now has kept the Russian peasant quiet and reluctant to embark on new social ventures will have been removed. Then the peasant revolution will come upon the scene, presumably with much less *éclat* than the Bolshevik outburst, but with much more far-reaching effects. The kolkhoz is largely the result of the desire on the part of the Soviets to secure grain surpluses for the quickly growing armament industries and for the financing of imports necessary for armaments which were to match the Western equipment. So the main reason for this agrarian socialism will have fallen to the ground as soon as the Western war against Russia has worn itself out. Ideological reasons of social justice and the like have never played any part in this last act of socialization, the destruction of the kulaki. What is left of genuine revolutionary impetus will not even suffer from the reversing of agrarian com-

munism, once the nightmare of Russian politics, external aggression, has disappeared.

Give us land to own! For close to 300 years, the stubborn peasants in Russia have clamored for owners' rights on the land on which they sweated. Since Stenka Razin carried the torch of rebellion in 1668, the peasants' hopes have risen high and dropped low with the political tide. The Bolshevik ideal of grain factories in super size and worked by machines and farm laborers under official control was just the opposite of what the old peasantry had dreamt of for centuries and what the French peasants had achieved in the days of the French Revolution. For centuries, despotism in its varied forms of conquest, vassalage, conscription and taxation had haunted the peasantry. It had been an inexorable battle with changing forms of attack. Now a new form of oppression was threatened by the masters of the Russian Revolution who had promised liberty but now ruled from the Kremlin like the powers of old.

The Russian peasant was not blind to the dawn of the Revolution but he was by nature reticent. At first he was bribed by the huge bait: all the land around him was to be his own. He forgot about the titles of possession and the tax collector in the initial excitement. When the officials came with the decree that grain above the barest need of the peasant had to be delivered to the state—and that at lower than his market price—he rebelled in line with all his neighbors, the poor with the kulak. He forced a reversion of the levy into a food tax.

At the same time, freedom to sell his produce in the open or black market or to barter it for goods he needed was restored to him. The rebellious spirit did not abate. The peasant in all countries is an essentially conservative element and therefore indomitable by force. Taxation means robbing him of the legitimate reward for his work. He cannot be an altruist and is none, because he feels the pressure to save for a rainy day in a changing climate and the isolation from the outside world on his fenced island. He wants to see his kin tilling the same soil for generations after he has passed on.

All Soviet decrees were fundamentally opposed to his innermost feeling. The Kronstadt rebellion of 1921 reflected the bitterness of his mood. "The Communists selected the best pieces of land and weigh more heavily on the poor peasants than the former land owners. A new communist serfdom arose. The peasant in the Soviet

farm became a slave." The peasant reacted with the weapon of passive resistance. To him it did not pay to raise any surplus which the state seized.

The Soviets solved the dilemma by socializing the farms in a natural reaction of the bureaucracy. The cities starved because the estates which had formerly produced chiefly their flour had been destroyed. The peasants grew only their own food but no surplus. In the eyes of Moscow they were also suspected of the same conservative political and religious ideas which adorned the French peasantry in spite of the liberation by the Fathers of Revolution.

The poor and middle-class peasants were again bribed into acquiescence when the drive against the kulak took serious forms. They were further bribed into joining the collectives by preferential grants of seed and tools. The young people were genuinely won over by the Soviets through mechanization—of old a favorite pastime with the peasants in their natural curiosity for gadgets they could play with—and the grandiose effort of educating the village in the new creed. For the elder generation the new bureaucracy remained the same foe as the old, the white-collar workers and desk farmers with their flood of regulations the despised objects of bitter attention. That is the same ineradicable tradition as in other countries. The New Deal or Herbert Hoover could offer the riches of the world to the farmers. They would still see red when forms had to be filled out or applications to be mailed.

After the disappearance of the kulak and private property the peasants made their own laws by separating homesteads and gardens from the common land. The Kremlin had to legalize the procedure. The statistics show that this lenience bore fruit for cities and villages. When the *Pravda* announced in February, 1941, that the test case of paying a bonus for rise in production in the Ukraine would be extended to all kolkhozy in Russia, it meant a further step toward private economy on farms.

The present war has stopped this progress. Can it be expected that after the war the Russian peasant will more eagerly submit to a rigorous dictate of farm control by the far-away Kremlin? Have the quota ratings been free of the natural trial and error of centralized planning? Have the party officials in charge of regional fixing of rates been supermen, who never succumb under pressure

from above, by penalty of death, to the temptation of giving the official needs preference over the local conditions?

The peasants will not have forgotten that in February, 1941, quotas of deliveries in meat and poultry based on the acreage of collectives were still enforced. Those who had no cattle or other livestock had to buy their deliveries from neighbors in cash. The long-promised self-government in the kolkhozy such as true co-operative units enjoy in the world, has never matured. All is still decreed by the Politbureau and supervised by government officials. It seems to be almost certain that the homecoming soldiers, filled with the pride of many distinctions, having attained dignity of rank, will be less inclined to accept orders in home life from "civilians" than before they had to join up. We may discount therefore the theoretical chance that the reins of control will be tightened on farming.

The other trend could be an overflow of pent-up hatred against the party guardians, a new outburst of cold fury which, according to Count Witte's prediction of 1905, would again "sweep all traditions aside without sense of mercy, wreck and ruin everything." Peasants are never grateful subjects for long.

The Russian peasant, when roused, might not stop short of destroying all modern improvements, the very machines he loved to tend and drive, as insignia of bureaucratic overlordship. He would still admire large-scale planning of the Soviets providing irrigation, electricity, motorized transport, but in the desire to break the chains around individualism at home, he might go back to the dreams of "Black Partition"—redistributing all land among peasants as owners, rejecting any interference by the state.

A third trend would be the evolution of the collective to a farm in which all members of the kolhoz would have a vote in forming farming schedules and in planning operations. It may be said that this would be only a transitory stage toward complete private enterprise because it has been proved throughout the world that few farm enterprises flourish under debating societies. It may further be said that this would mean the abolition of the grain factories which saved Russia from complete starvation in the critical past, that it would mean retarding the amazing progress in mechanical cultivation of grain, corn and hay crop. Would a slowing down of the rapid mechanization on the Russian farms be a definite draw-

back for national economy? W. H. Chamberlin estimated in 1934 that eventually all farming would be done under strict control as state farming with 120,000 harvester combines operating on 30 million acres and that 1.2 million peasants could do this job, thereby releasing up to 25 million rural families for other work.

Undoubtedly, this vision would upset any equilibrium not only in Russian economy but in national life. An increase in the size of the homesteads would prevent neither the use of labor-saving modern machinery nor the retaining of larger units for large-scale grain, corn and potato planting. The American and Canadian wheat fields have all along been run by private enterprise and still produce sufficient and more for the needs of the home front and for export. Farmers on this side of the world started in old days clearing quarter-sections by hand and building cabins and barns with logs and nails. Nobody told them how to do it and nobody asked them to fill forms for planning. Thus they kept preferential love for freedom in the choice of working methods. This continent has not fared badly under this free-for-all system and has led the world in modern tilling and marketing methods. One could not persuade one in a thousand American farmers that it would be wiser and more profitable to let Washington or Ottawa do the planting and ordering on a farm. It has been the same till now in all the old countries, where American settlers came from, in Scandinavia and Central Europe, in Italy and Spain, not to forget the strongholds of individual farming, Switzerland and France.

The American grain, corn and dairy belts rely less on hired labor than at any earlier time. Ford-Ferguson, Case and Allis-Chalmers tractors, Massey-Harris and Deere combines are driven by children with attached implements like bicycles and prams. Cows are milked by Surge and Laval and just stripped by hand at a fourfold saving of labor. Thus a family can run a 120- to 200-acre farm with top efficiency, making use of the co-operative facilities in trucking, canning, freezing, harvesting, threshing and the ancient pioneers' labor exchange with the neighbors.

In milk and meat produce, poultry and hog production and in any livestock breeding, the collectives in Russia have been unable to beat the individual homestead. The stubborn refusal of the theorists or politicians in Moscow to ease the ban on the size of the dwarf farms has been largely responsible for the dire shortage of food

except cereals in the whole of Russia. The times when anyone was dubbed kulak who raised cattle to breeding age, and was purged, are still sticking in the minds of the peasant. The inconsistency of government measures has increased the tendency on the part of the average Russian peasant to bide his time but to press in recurrent waves for the right of absolute ownership of larger strips of land. He considers the garden to which he has held so tenaciously as a jumping-off place and the bonus system as a bribe—not to be refused but still a bribe. He is still as thrifty as his long-bearded forebear, sucking tea and brandy through a lump of sugar between the teeth, keeping salt on the table not mixed with the food, pretending ignorance with hidden delight. "I am a dark man I know nothing." There has been a definite change in the youth. It remains to be seen whether the glamor of mechanization will still be the deciding influence in later life.

Of all Russian neighbors, the Finns have set up the best specimen of rural democracy. Of old, they had been accustomed to teamwork of dragnet and church boat crews, seeding and reindeer grazing. In the 1880's the Danish example of co-operative dairies had found followers on a small scale in Finland. But in 1899 Hannes Gebhard founded the Pellevro Seura, a folklore society to prevent the Russification by force of all educational facilities to drown the sagas and cultural traditions of the Finnish race. Within two years, legislation gave the frame for co-operatives to spread into every rural activity so that today Finland is a nation co-operative second to none in the world. Hydro power and flour mills, bacon factories and dairies, sawmills and seed refineries, lumber shipping and village stores are run by the neighbors' teams uniting their forces in wholesale corporations. It is a literate nation without class distinctions, 60 per cent of its people living on the soil, and more, *of* the soil. Out of these 2 million people come 800,000 members of the various co-operatives.

The most practical evolution for Russian agriculture seems a change from collectivism to co-operative development. It will stem the trend of the change in national income from the soil to industry. In 1913, 60 per cent was derived from agriculture, but in 1940 only 29.3 per cent. The Soviet system would not even need foregoing the most cherished principle that no acquisition of wealth may be attained by the use of hired help, based on the erroneous assumption

that all hired labor guarantees a profit. Under co-operative rule all are equal shareholders. Wealth in a farmer's mind might also be savings in cash or bonds. In the genuine peasant's mind it is land, the only eternal value with a power of regeneration of its own. To what does it amount if a kolkhozy chairman or Kirghiz farmer sign one million roubles, or a Central Asia farmer two million in war bonds, as recently announced? Farmers and peasants in Soviet Russia cannot put their savings into consumer goods or livestock, because the former are not available and the latter cannot be increased on the limited homestead.

How will the dictator of Russia react? This is unpredictable. In the past, whenever the dogmatic course of the party has threatened his regime, he has chosen to yield. His actions in the army reform show that he does not hesitate to defy and burn ancient Bolshevik prejudices. When he sees the time has come to choose between the party bureaucracy and dogma or peasantry, he can even invoke again Lenin's authority, who urged that "the Soviet State should be based on a combination of the stimulus of individual gain with the general interest of the proletarian dictatorship."

CHAPTER TEN

RUSSIA IN FUTURE

I HEARTLAND OF THE WORLD ISLAND

FORGOTTEN men have studied the influence of the character of land and the climate of the earth on the course of history long before it became the fashion to prattle about geopolitics and its sinister apostles in the Nazi camp. Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen did not invent thinking in space when they gave science a new approach to the analysis of surroundings in relation to Man. Sir Halford Mackinder, roused by the uncritical adoration of Admiral Mahan's thesis on the predominance of sea power at the dawn of this century, drew in the year of Versailles the attention of the peacemakers to the Russian ascendancy in being. He conceived the four and a half million square miles between the Arctic and the Himalayan range, bordered by the Siberian forest belt and the Isthmus between the Baltic and the Black Sea as the Heartland dominating the World Island, the Asia-Europe-Africa super-continent. The ruler of this great impregnable natural fortress in the world could wield in his view supreme command of the world without commanding the Seven Seas.

The Russian of today hardly needs the scientists of political geography to make him realize the favorable strategical position of his homeland. The Devil takes him up to the mountain top and shows him the tempting vastness without horizon which the Golden Horde crossed in the conquering sweep from the Mongolian cradle to the shores of the Adriatic where Subuday's horses watered in 1241 when Batu, grandson of the Djenghis Khan, had conquered Russia, Poland, Silesia and Hungary.

Any attempt in history to migrate against the rising sun was doomed. The East always swallowed the invader. This gives pride to the Russian, who, in turn, cautiously approaches the West with

innate distrust fearing that his native strength may be poisoned by Western civilization.

Strong as the fortress of Great Russia may seem, the garrison does not want to take unnecessary chances and is looking for additional strength. The Kremlin is not hampered by the ideological haze which prevented the Western world from grasping the meaning of the Revolution of modern man. The men of destiny in Russia are brutally realistic. They put Russia first, second and third. If by so doing they should happen to save the remainder of the world they would not object to using such gossip as a means of fostering their purpose. But they would not waste energy for the unknown world's sake.

Russians ponder over greater security ever since they have withstood the Nazi attempt of conquest by the skin of their teeth. They know that strategical points of traditional design can be overridden by winged aggressors, and that modern defense is mainly depth resistance. They had to revise the concepts of their fathers, who thought of the Bosphorus as a passage into the Mediterranean and of Hangoe as a guardhouse for Leningrad, Peter the Great's beloved window to Europe, in terms sufficient to meet the dangers of modern warfare.

Do the Russians have a blueprint of how to plan their security on a global scale? We may assume that, according to available intelligence, the Kremlin visualizes a defense in depth covering the globe.

Zones of Incorporation, of Infiltration, of Interference, of Interrogation and of Information, though without rigid contours, can be drawn as a rough conception of this global strategy.

The Zone of Incorporation into the Soviet Union comprises Karelia around Viborg, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bielo-Russia, the western Ukraine, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. The Kremlin insists that these regions form integral parts of Russia by historical and natural right, whereas in the case of the Baltic states and Bessarabia actual plebiscites before the Nazi occupation had already legalized the entry into the Union. As in every case of historical claims disputes arise out of different aspects of validity.

During the Napoleonic invasion of central Europe, Finland was ceded by Sweden to Russia. The Finns had resisted Russification

and enjoyed partial autonomy until they achieved independence as a nation in the Revolution of 1917. The young Soviets recognized this state in December, 1918. Finland certainly enjoyed prosperity and healthy progress, leaning more toward the Western orbit in the preference given co-operative action than to the totalitarian form of the Soviets. In November, 1939, Russia invaded Finnish territory after the refusal to cede strategical bases around Viborg against strips of woodland further north. The reinstatement of a Quisling government under a Comintern disciple miscarried and the campaign proved a costly venture. But four months later Finland was forced to cede the Karelian Isthmus, the shore of Lake Ladoga and the ice-free port of Petsamo and 400,000 refugees had to be settled inland by the Finns as only one per cent wished to stay under Soviet rule. When the Nazis invaded Russia in June, 1941, Finland joined in the war to regain the losses of 1940 and to prevent herself from becoming operational battleground.

As the Baltic is strategically blocked by Denmark's geographical position, Russia will have strong reasons for upholding the claims to free access to the ocean and to establish the old frontier between Sweden and herself as outlined under the settlement of Nystad in 1721.

The Baltic states have a colorful history. After the decline of the Livonian Order, Sweden and Poland took over the border countries until Peter the Great conquered them in his drive to the Baltic coast. Lithuania was after 1539 part of Poland until both were taken over by Russia by force in the eighteenth century. All the border states were subjected to Russification. They wanted to gain national independence following the withdrawal of the German occupation armies as democratic republics and were, as such, recognized by the Soviets in separate peace treaties in 1920. Lithuania since 1926, Estonia and Latvia since 1934 were subjected to a non-communist dictatorship.

After the start of World War II, Russia demanded the right to occupy military bases of the small neighbor states with the consent of Germany, and concluded mutual-aid agreements which reserved the right of transit for Soviet forces and guaranteed non-interference in the political affairs of the republics. Within a year, Russia declared the guarantees void because the three republics had concluded a defense alliance, a menace to the security of the Soviet Union.

Four weeks later, when all persons opposing the Soviet invasion had been arrested or deported, plebiscites voted for inclusion into the Soviet fold. The United States did not recognize the procedure, "being opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state however powerful, in the domestic affairs of any other sovereign state, however weak."

Poland, a national state since the tenth century, fought for centuries with Moscow over the control of the Ukraine and Bielo-Russia, regions technically not Polish. In three partitions of 1772, 1791 and 1795, Poland proper was carved up by Russia, Austria and Prussia. At the peace conference of Versailles, Poland was restored and began expanding eastward during the period of civil war in Russia. In the treaty of Riga of 1921 the Soviets were forced to recognize the booty. Marshal Pilsudski, who after 1926 was virtual dictator and in 1934 had issued a totalitarian constitution, was considered a menace to the peace by the Kremlin. When Hitler invaded Poland, the Soviets made use of the occasion to again turn the tables, for the sake of liberating the blood brothers. Bielo-Russia was made an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union. The oil-bearing region of East Galicia was occupied by the Russians, who made a treaty with the Nazis for a final border line which eliminated an independent Poland from the map. This deal has been the legal basis for the Soviet claim that all former and present inhabitants of these districts are now Soviet citizens. The Polish government in exile in London refutes the claim. As a counter-move Moscow has supported the formation of the "Union of Polish Patriots" and of the Kosciusko Division, whereas the government-in-exile troops are fighting on the fronts with the British forces. Later, the Soviets even broke off diplomatic relations with the Poles in London.

The borderland of the Ukraine, populated by neither Poles nor Russians, has for ages been the scene of heavy clashes. The Ukrainians, with an ancient culture and mostly of Orthodox faith, resented Polish attempts to convert them to the Roman Catholic creed. During World War I, an independent Ukraine was sponsored by the Germans, who needed the granary but knew that the regime would collapse but for the bayonets of the occupation armies. The Polish minority persecuted the Ukrainians on cultural grounds, after the grant of the western Ukraine to Poland by the Treaty of St. Germain. Bessarabia was for a hundred years under Russian rule until

it was seized by Roumania in 1918. The Russian and Ukrainian minority in this region of less than 20,000 square miles is estimated at one-quarter of the total, the majority being Roumanians. In northern Bukovina, the Ukrainians are about one-half. So these claims are based by the Soviets on historical grounds.

Requests for access to the Mediterranean and to the North Sea have not been substantiated. Neutralization of the Straits comes nearest to reality as a possible solution if Turkey could be induced to resign its sovereignty against a hundred-year guarantee for the inviolability of its territory by all the world powers. Dreams of Tsarist times for a protectorate over Malta and other strongholds would be contested. Norwegian ports are more coveted by the present rulers as safeguard for the Murmansk approach.

Whereas the need of a permanent border revision in the northwest and in the west is clearly asserted, there are no demands voiced for the south and the east.

In the second line of defense, the Zone of Infiltration, or security sphere, any form of government will be recognized if the country in question accepts Russian tutelage in foreign and military matters.

It was General von Seeckt who reviewed the failure of Pan-European plans in his book *Germany between West and East* to the effect that it had been a tragic error to leave Russia outside the European League. The Russian Center attracts the neighbors with magnetic power. The sword of Enver Pasha, who led a Pan-Turk movement, is in the Moscow Army Museum. The adhesive force of Russia is not confined to the Pan-Slavs. Decisive influence is due to the feeling that it is safer to live on the bridge of land than on the perisphere. "For Mongolian cruelty, for Caucasian courage, for Moslem piety, for French esprit, for German orderliness, the Russian soul became the melting pot. . . ."

In the Zone of Infiltration, Finland, Rump-Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Iran, Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia are more or less slated by the Soviets. Suggestions such as that put forth by G. D. Cole in *Europe, Russia and the Future* of a belt of federated states stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean alongside the Soviet Union, are obnoxious to the Kremlin, which prefers the radical approach to every single unit along the border and does not wish to be confronted by a new *cordon sanitaire* of 1919 memory. Proposals of an East European

Federation including Poland and Czechoslovakia are nipped in the bud by vigorous resentment emanating from Moscow.

Though the O. W. Kuusinen regime was abortive, the Soviets will not give up the wish to see the Mannerheim line of political resistance in Finland against Soviet influence overruled by popular consent. In Poland, the Rump of tomorrow, the revived All-Slav movement is designed to foster a regime of peasants and workers in outspoken opposition to the former ruling body of Pilsudski legionnaires, the gentry and middle class. An All-Slav Committee was formed in Moscow in 1941. It announced at the Third Conference of May 9, 1943, the new arrangements with the Kremlin for arming and equipping the Polish Division on Soviet soil under General Berling while the fiery leader of the Patriots Union, Wanda Vasilevska, related to the Narkomindel, denounced "the traitors in London who serve the Germans!" Her paper *Volna Polska*, the "Will of Poland," and a new publication, *Slavyanie*, which has offered for a year and a half the helping hand of the Soviets to the Slav brethren, also voiced the same sentiments to all Slav people. They play light on the bitter feuds among the blood brethren and they address each nationality in its own language.

The new Pan-Slav Movement does not embrace the Slavs in the former mythical fervor of blood and soil design which drove Hartvig, Hitler and Rosenberg to similar if contrasting depths of devotion. The Kremlin seems to share the view that the European Slavs have shown a "conspicuous inability to unite for any length of time," as Vera Michelis Dean aptly defined it. The new Moscow line refrains from ornamentals and puts down the law. The cleavage between the partisan guerillas and the Serbian Chetniks of General Mihailovich, is openly denounced as the fault of the latter, who refused to follow orders from the former Comintern and to risk the arduously assembled mountain forces to forays before the Allied might could be thrown into battle.

Northern Iran has been the goal of Russian infiltration for decades. Lend-Lease transports now dominate the country and the efficient rule of the American Adviser on finances, Dr. Millspaugh, prevents any friction between the British and Russian competitors of old for the greater influence. The treaty of January 29, 1942, signed by Iran, Great Britain and the Soviet Union placed Iran virtually under domination of the two Allied powers, who have the right to maintain

such numbers of military forces as they deem necessary. It guarantees the security of Iran by this procedure against attack from third parties. That excludes any annexation of the two harbors Bandar Shapur and Khorranshaba, at the same time securing this life line for imports for Soviet Russia. The near-by port of Basra in Iraq has the same importance as feeder line. Russia will naturally try to be safeguarded against a blocking of this artery. The tripartite agreement of Teheran in November, 1943, assures Iran of the complete withdrawal of all occupational forces at the end of the war.

In Sinkiang, the northwestern province of China, Russian infiltration started in 1931 with help in modernizing the one-half million square miles by introducing electricity, telephone service, air traffic and motor roads. The Soviet Union sent specialists in irrigation, husbandry, military training and cinemas, making the region dependent on Soviet economy, after assisting the autocratic rule of Sheng Shih-Tsai to squelch uprisings from the many thousands of Moslem clans. In exchange for services rendered, the Six Great Policies include kinship to Soviet Russia besides pledges of racial equality, peace, anti-imperialism, reconstruction and honesty. Wendell Willkie states in *One World* that he found a hotbed of intrigues between the Soviet friends and the loyal Chinese in Sinkiang producing enough political powder in central Asia to blow the lid off the world again when the present fighting is over.

Outer Mongolia was long a model of liaison conforming to the Soviet blueprint of mutual assistance. Since March, 1936, Russian garrisons have taken over actual protection. The country has become part and parcel of the Soviet Union in all but name.

The time-honored policy of "having friends in the rear of enemies" as balancing power, which Walter Lippmann recently outlined in his renowned discourse on United States foreign affairs, is denounced by the Kremlin as cumbersome and often backfiring. In the third sphere of friendly attention, the Zone of Interference, the good-neighbor policy of the Soviets would be fairly exacting toward Sweden and Norway, Germany and Austria, Belgium and France, Hungary and Italy, Greece and Turkey, Syria, the Lebanon and Egypt, Iraq and Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, Afghanistan, Japan and China. Here all methods of assistance to good-will associations, from Free Committees outside their native countries to cultural exchanges and economic ties, will find a vast field of

Soviet research, asking for reciprocation on the part of these neighbors if not for a strict following.

Interference could at any time be extended to the countries in the Zone of Interrogation if need should arise to have more than the usual diplomatic relations in Denmark, Holland, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal, North and South Africa, India, the Dutch Indies, Thailand, Burma.

The remainder of the world—the Americas, Australia and Polynesia—would be in the Zone of Information where Russia would be content to be informed of plans and operations. This would take on the countries outside the World Island.

Up to the year 2000 A.D. all imaginable brain capacity in the Narkomindel will be needed to keep abreast of events in the March of Time. Whosoever holds the reins in the present setup in Moscow will not be allowed to mark time. The millions of young Slavs raised in a steady stream on Russian and Slavonic soil, who by 2000 A.D. will have reached 550 millions as compared with 375 million non-Slav Europeans, will dictate in their language the rate of progress to the place in the sun which their simple creed promises. "We will surpass all others." If taken at face value these figures seem staggering to those who fear the weight of numbers if they are on the losing side. Napoleon predicted that "in a century, Europe will have become Cossack." He was wrong. Even on a paper count it would take three centuries. Slav peoples in themselves are differentiated. Pan-Slavism has lost the magnetic appeal. Russia will be the last realm to be overcrowded. It will still take some time to fill all habitable places of the earth. Nevertheless, many lips are pursed to the question: "Will the rising man power of the Russians be content to use its strength in peaceful competition within their boundaries, or feel the urge to be successor to the Mongols, who once dominated the Heartland by force?"

The Kremlin seems to take a less emotional view of the present war than the average Anglo-Saxon. Revolutionary spirit was the bread and butter of the Russian rulers. From the viewpoint of historic materialism this war is but another outbreak of economic cancer, an interlude in the fight for raw materials, markets, freedom of the seas and traffic lanes essential for the preservation of capitalism. The heirs of the Soviet traditions are realists to the bone. If they pretend to be suspicious of sinister motives in others, they are




usually free from being scared. They know, on the other hand, that there is a difference between the military side and the political side of a problem. It is the duty of the military to destroy the enemy's forces as quickly and cheaply as possible. These are in modern total wars men, machines and productivity. It is a part-time job. For war is the mere continuation of a political course with other than peaceful means, not a goal in itself.




The political leaders have to look ahead to a time when bugles cease to sound. This the Kremlin is certainly doing. The heroic period of Revolution is closed. There will be no more export of world communism unless Europe, China or India split wide open in civil warring and tempt the curiosity of a younger generation of Russians to take up the challenge of the Fathers of the Revolution. To all intent, Stalin will try to direct the energies of his peoples to the stupendous task of reconstruction and development of untapped resources without missing a chance to increase foot-holds of Russia in an unsettled world. Stalin wants the continuing help of neighbors for the recovery of Russian economy. Who will blame him if he drives a hard bargain and tries to get the aid on his terms—and as cheaply as possible?

Under this aspect, the scenes on the revolving international stage of the present lose the frightening appeal if viewed from the vantage point of an onlooker who watches a tournament of old hands at a game. The Moscow declaration of November, 1943, is a reassuring sign that the rules of the game have been agreed upon. At any rate, fear is the worst enemy of the peace of tomorrow.

The conferences of Moscow and Teheran in the last quarter of 1943 have proven that the Russian dictator is willing and prepared to compromise with the English speaking democracies on a workable, secure peace, to guarantee the home rule of all neighbors outside the Zone of Incorporation free from Soviet pressure for a similar political system. A Russian proverb speaks of a compromise as "sown on black with a white thread in a broad pattern." If one has no black thread it is wiser to use any other color than to omit mending.

Russia has shown that she could survive under terrific blows despite the immense sacrifices she paid during the civil war and the trial and error period of reconstruction. This is not only amazing to the superficial observer. It is looked upon as a veritable phenomenon that the cumbersome, unyielding material which composes the





Soviet Union had also the power to prepare and execute offensive plans against the invader on mutilated home grounds. The Kremlin has succeeded in placing the whole public and private economy on war footing unparalleled in any other country in the world by disregarding civilian needs and human lives. Russia can never be beaten again by warring on one front as in the Crimean, the Russo-Japanese and World War I. She will emerge from the present war as the strongest military land owner of the globe, under a national flag accentuating the recreation of a spirit which radiates a challenge to any other nationalist pride. She does not pledge herself to world wide democracy and reserves the right to claim any former possession, conquest or goal of Tsarist Russia as legitimate.

But she has adapted herself in two important spheres to collaboration with the great democracies of America and the British Commonwealth. The Communist bugbear will not be revived. Stalin does not want on the borders of Russia revolutionary upheavals which might sweep across continents and oceans in the aftermath of this Armageddon if not hemmed in and blocked by strong disciplined forces and authorities. The second reason for Stalin to seek co-operation with the Allies of today lies in the dire need of Russia for a long term program and active economic foreign assistance in reconstruction of the depleted and mauled Russian economy. Where else could he find such help than in the hardly singed resources of the Anglo-American orbit?

This gives more than just hope for an honest and lasting peace, something nearer to a *pax hominibus bonae voluntatis* than past centuries have seen, if it is based not on force but equal chances of progress for victors and vanquished.

2. GOD IN RUSSIA

... It is well said in every sense that a man's religion is the chief fact with regard to him. ... By religion I do not mean here the church creed which he professes, the articles of faith he will sign and in words or otherwise assert. ... This is not what I call religion, this profession or assertion which is often only a profession and assertion from the outworks of man. ... But the thing a man does practically believe, lays to his heart and knows for certain, his vital relations to this mysterious universe ... that is in all cases the primary thing for him and creatively determines the rest. That is his religion, or it may be his mere scepticism and non-religion the manner in which he feels himself spiritually related to the Unseen World or No-World. ...

Thomas Carlyle found this the essence of his study on heroes.

The Russian Communist theorists took great care to exclude any irrational motives in their actions. They warned of accepting dogmatic beliefs as substitutes for proofs. Critical faculty should replace human emotions.

But the reactions among the Soviet subjects show nevertheless irrational traits. Social passion is also religion. Christopher Dawson calls Karl Marx the secularized prophet Isaiah of modern age. What Marx prophesied by his analysis of the social and economic body has often failed to come true. More convincing is his forecast that an unrestricted life in search of material bliss will finally collapse.

Remote in many ways from reality, a dreamer of electrification, as H. G. Wells calls him, Lenin was able to bring his manna of faith to millions who from then on awaited in awe the miracle of the fulfillment of his gospel. Belief is more important to the success of any mass movement than a rational conviction of its righteousness. Communist ventures have been more or less failures in the indifferent atmosphere of western Europe. Just the lack of intensity of belief in the West prevented communism from filling in the vacuum in religious tenets left by evanescent creeds. The West developed substitutes in large variety. But none of these ersatz religions could transcend the narrow sphere of parochial, philistine, national group egotism. They lacked the magnetism of Christianity for all human beings. In the spiritual sense, indifference of the Western type has to be judged worse than atheism. It leaves man in a kind of rotting decay, while atheism arouses a new transfiguration of his religious genius. "So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth," warns Revelation III, 16. Bishop Tihon rightly says to Stavrogin in Dostoevsky's *Possessed* that the atheist stands at the penultimate step to the most perfect faith, while the merely indifferent person lives only on fear.

Perhaps future history will regard Bolshevism primarily as a violent outburst of image-breaking rage breaking traditional observances and pious beliefs, a burning of God, a second Crucifixion as the end of one stage and the turn to a new aeon in Christian history. The whole impersonal, matter-of-fact conception of the Creation in Communist minds would well illustrate this trend of thought.

We must remain aware that this uncompromising attitude of mind, this utter disgust with personalism in religion, renders the change

in the object of veneration extremely easy. Not without reason does Jacques Maritain fear the day when the Dictator of Russia commands his people to adore God rather than the electron. The span of one generation in recent Russian history has proved that the indigenous nature of a great and creative people cannot be changed overnight. Instead of wearing the soft clothes of which Western socialist democracy always dreamt, socialism appeared in Russia in the hard armor of Asiatic tyranny, as a yoke upon "democracy and its weaklings of peace and good will." Truth will always bring division. It cannot be the unctuous plaster over disunity.

Could Bolshevism fulfill the faith of its primitive adherents? The Russian Revolution did not succeed in the impossible task of equating the unequal. What Christianity calls the equality of man is equity before God, equal rights before the judge, not equality within society. Within society men are and will be unequal. There is, as St. Paul emphasized, a diversity of vocations and gifts, and hence also a diversity of rewards within society. Only in the Utopias of the Platonists, from their grand master down to Thomas More and Campanella, and on the spiritual mountains of the moon is there perfect equality of merit and recompense. The Russian Revolution, after some initial hesitation, has again accepted a fundamental Christian tenet: that within society the contributions of different individuals are different and deserve different recognition.

The appeal to the common interest of primitive Russia, "surrounded by capitalist and fascist hyenas," has never failed Bolshevism. Whether an individual toils merely to gratify his immediate needs or to help his unknown brothers is a fundamental distinction. This kind of group egotism is quite different from the solidarity of a cartel or a labor union, or any closed group exercising its solidarity consciously at the expense of the community at large.

Communism in its Russian version comes nearer to Christian ideology than a purely agnostic philosophy which cannot find sufficient justification for the legal equity of individuals. The great problem remaining for Bolshevism is whether some religious genius can reconcile its ethics with the indomitable Christian belief that God alone is supreme judge. With the appearance of new classes and revolutionary opportunists in Russian society, the original craving for social justice will finally peter out. What is to be done against the waves of destruction which will inevitably rise in their

turn, if no new belief in God's might to adjust all tribulations has been established? There will be no real community life without it. And that is what civilization means: a citizen's fair conduct, a good neighbor by civil policy.

Modern Russian patriotism is not nationalism in the Western sense of unity in language or race, color or political creed. To a hundred and sixty-odd races and nationalities the Soviet psychologists, led by Stalin, had restored a folklore and grammar or founded it anew. This cultural freedom, even if bought at the price of political and economic serfdom, was the most integrating force of the revolutionary epoch. The Christian missionary ideal of equality among all who are born to God's image had attained a degree of practical application in Soviet Russia unknown in other countries. There was no more racial discrimination in the administration of the law.

This was sufficient to guarantee the Soviet creed followers in the international forum. Despite the official admission following the dissolution of the Comintern: "The conditions in various countries are fundamentally different and have changed entirely with time even inside of revolutionary compounds. There is no need and not even room for a unified international organization," there will remain the magnetic appeal of the doctrine. "Arise, ye damned of the Earth!"

3. CHARTER OF CHARITY

The Soviets had isolated Russia from the sympathy of the outer world by the ruthless extermination of established churches of every denomination to, an extent that the pendulum swung violently to the plain assumption in other countries that Anti-Christ had arisen in person. To point a finger to this sore alone was sufficient for any agitator to gather a large crowd asserting the need for a crusade against the Soviets. We must go deeper into the matter to gain a safer platform for judgment and to take lessons.

What has been or is wrong with Western civilization, or as Willard L. Sperry puts it: "Why has religion been so ineffectual?" It has been under a severe handicap since the machine age gave way to the motor age, and the motor age to the air age. Teaching humility amidst the sky-scraping successes of science, the adulation of the

winged man, the self-righteous supremacy of a man-made state and society was like swimming against an overpowering tide. The gods must look down on the self-destruction of scientific man with a wary smile.

Cynics have delighted in discovering hypocrisy in the Christian churches, in scathing criticism of the mercenary love of God. Scientists have lauded the ethics of incorruptible science, the truth of facts and figures, the undistorted, dispassionate, unattached investigator as superior to the introvert Christian missionary living in a haze of make-believe.

In the encyclical "On Atheist Communism," Pius XI admitted that it was unfortunately true that the conduct of certain Catholic circles had done much to shake the faith of the working classes in the religion of Christ. In northern and eastern Germany, Lutheran pastors often seemed to the rural workers to be the domestics of their feudal patrons. The Anglican Church was regarded as an ivy-clad refuge for younger sons of the titled gentry, and the clerics were scoffed at as government appointees. All churches have known low tides and high tides. Sectarians and atheists have helped the churches to a revival of spiritual vigor and fervor. The fight between the Kingdom of Man and the Kingdom of Christ has been unending. If Jean Jacques Rousseau believed that man would be redeemed by human reason, by the good in man's own nature, and had no need of the Saviour, modern science raised similar hopes of a limitless scientific amelioration of conditions on earth. The popular tendency has been anticlerical and atheistic but not unreligious. Christian dogma was no longer a dynamic power. It had grown into a habit of lip service to the institutional values of Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Darwin's respect for Creation, the great sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance, and Goethe's confession that "life is bound together from birth to the grave by the sacrament of religion" were forgotten by the modern agnostics.

Christianity's road was rough. The intelligentsia have mocked for decades at all human ideals as old-fashioned, have derided the Ten Commandments. They put a noose around their own necks by paving the way for totalitarian creeds with their deliberate confusion of moral right and wrong. John Buchan, the late Lord Tweedsmuir, once warned that "there is an ugly pathological savour

about it, as though a mature civilization were being attacked by hordes of diseased and vicious children."

There is no spiritual or temporal perfection under the rule of any creed. It is an illusion to believe monarchy or autocracy as such to be bad, and republican government or democracy as such to be good.

There is another popular illusion. The hope that Christians can keep aloof from the political struggles of the modern world and watch the conflicting parties devour each other—Bolshevism, fascism, and communism, capitalism, or vice versa—is shortsighted. All economic systems hold out the promise of a material paradise for their assiduous followers. In America this may conjure up a vision of more plumbing and air conditioning, more cars, faster and smaller, more efficient ice boxes. Russia is still far from such a goal but is confident of surpassing the American economy some day. Why not? The present war will result in drawing both economic systems closer together in practical work. Communism pays dividends and bonuses to toilers in the same way as high capitalism. In both systems the managers have the say-so. They report either to political or to financial shareholders and understand each other in any language. It is easy for Standard Oil or Du Pont or Dow to contact and contract with Chemtorg as with I. G. Farben or Imperial Chemicals. It will be as profitable for Russian Stal to pool resources and markets with Creusot, Skoda or Big Steel in England as with U. S. Steel or Bethlehem, not to speak of the mutual interests of Big Oil. After the bogey of Bolshevism, on which Hitler and Mussolini thrive, from which Sir Henry Deterding suffered, has been exploded, Russia will never have to fight because of the communism of the 1917 brand.

On the other side, the same game is played with the bogey of capitalism. The natural foundation of capitalism in any form is the urge of man to have a reward for his labor, to increase such reward by better work, more endeavor and training, to save for a rainy day and to leave behind an inheritance for his family. The Soviets have tried in vain to eradicate this trend in their followers. They have given way to nature but still insist on blaming the fundamental evil which capitalism had brought into the world. The abuse of capitalism in its bureaucratic or monopolistic form will always have to be checked by society. But freedom of choice of toil will benefit mankind more than regimentation. Russia of today would not show

the face we admire but for the savings, the low capitalism of the common folk, which Russia needed and used for reconstruction and defense. It is no sign of strength but of weakness to uphold a bogey.

The motives of managers may or may not be less honest and pure than those of Christian missionaries or orthodox Jews. By force of position, they have to prefer a closed shop, monopolies, regulated existence to freedom of man. Fundamentally, the Papal encyclicals were right in equating communism and materialistic liberalism as the outcome of the same liberal theory. They are in different stages of evolution from the same point of departure to the same goal: beatitude on earth by man's power.

What are God-fearing people to do in such a uniform world? Christianity expresses a most profound spiritual belief. But the spirit is a multi-colored aura. One day, it descends impressively upon this sinful though hallowed world. The next day, it seems to vanish again into the sky above.

The essence of the lives of great reformers is that in death they live more intensely and deeply than in physical life. No prophet of materialistic welfare has yet achieved like immortality. If there is some difference between the Western and the Russian version of communism, the latter is farther removed from Christian dogma but nearer to Christian ethics.

This does not signify that the great materialistic streams of ideas with their able and enthusiastic followers play a negligible rôle in the evolution of mankind. They seem to be an indispensable medium to shake man's soul down to the roots. Every Anti-Christ serves to awaken man's religious notions from contaminating contacts with the rough life of everyday. Atheism is a recurrent process of purifying religiousness. In this sense, Bolshevism has opened the road to a Christian revival in Russia among the great conservative peasant body.

Russian communism stresses man's duties toward his fellow man, therefore recognizes the spiritual ties of Christian brotherhood even if by violent heresy. Western liberalism is far more pagan in the belief that ills will rectify themselves by the selection of the fittest in a natural process. Russia has never known Renaissance and Humanism, and has tended to collective association, a strong Christian trait.

Russian Bolshevism has been but a transitory stage in history. Christianity, having fallen behind, can have a new lease of messianic

pilgrimage if it stresses social justice by the free will of man. The rule of collectivism by a few as managers exercises exclusive power of government and capital by force and intimidation. The revival of a competitive spirit in satisfying earthly needs, of freedom of choice in enterprise, should restore the equilibrium of nature. More than one creed promises the goal that the Green Pastures and all good things upon the earth shall be accessible to all of God's children, according to work, without regard to origin, race, color or creed. Christians may believe that the shortest way to freedom from want is to accept the Ten Commandments and the gospel of Christ the Redeemer as the foundation of a Charter of Charity. People have been waiting for results for almost two millenniums. The Revolution of minds goes through the world and will not stop at dinner tables or press conferences. As long as every meeting, every speech, every banquet is hailed as the beginning of a new epoch in history the world will remain a pathetic political kindergarten.

Lenin came single-handed, unarmed with any weapon, into his native land that seethed with fratricide, despair and hunger after defeat. Clarity of mind, fearless determination to preach his gospel, to act in accordance with his vision made him ruler of millions. He boldly challenged a decrepit old world with loose joints and tottering faith. To stay in power, he took to arms, terror and bloodshed, installed fear and hatred as satellites. After his death his creed petered out. It promised social justice and racial equality. It will find followers and apostles beyond the boundaries of Russia as long as no other faith proves a superior integrator of mankind.

Christ, single-handed, unarmed with any weapon, defied the Roman overlords of his native land and the fearsome priests of the Old Testament. His gospel of peace became the Magna Charta of the world and stood the test for nearly two thousand years though later followers took to force in missionary zeal. Through dark and lighter ages the Sermon on the Mount has guided millions to a better life. Has it become a reality of life for all the millions of Christians? No. It has never been a dream fulfilled. With all freedoms in the offing, with spring tides of hatred engulfing the continents, the Christian moral code, cleansed and reinforced, should remain the lodestar of the coming epochs.

The Gospel has not yet come true. But millions have died before their time to defend human faith that it will be true—one day.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

AS SUGGESTED FOR FURTHER READING

The printed material referring to the last hundred years of Russian history is naturally immense. I have conscientiously tried to peruse an infinitesimal part of it but I had to confine myself within the narrow compass of this book to references of a selection of the principal sources I have used, leaving periodicals unquoted with few exceptions. Apart from the technical difficulties arising from the limitations of wartime, the Russian material requested special consideration because of different times of publication inside Russia.

Under Tsarist rule, historical science was strictly censored. In spite of this bondage and of the restricted possibility for research in official archives, the old Russian historians created fundamental works of lasting importance. After the downfall of the monarchy the situation changed radically. The October Revolution of 1917 released a flood of publications, mostly discussing the most modern history, political science and revolutionary problems. But with few exceptions only Marxist historians had the chance to take the floor. The renowned historians of old were banished from the market in Soviet Russia and could only produce abroad in a very limited way.

But the twenty-five years of Soviet literature do not show a uniform face on Bolshevik historical science. Since 1918, very valuable documentary evidence and countless textbooks and propaganda literature of far lesser scientific value have been produced, but not a single standard work presented Russian history by turning to account old and newly discovered material. It is manifest that political considerations of the moment and the actual conditions of the Revolution have interfered with impartial research, quite apart from the rigidity of the methods of historical materialism, which were used exclusively. Nevertheless, the production of the first period until 1934 was noteworthy.

Historical periodicals such as *Krasny Archives*, *Krasny Letopis*, *Historik Marxist*, *Proletarska Revolucia*, *Katorga i Saika* disclosed unknown documentary material and produced many good monographs. Abroad, a number of periodicals supplemented the domestic research: *Archives Russkoj Revolucii* (Berlin), *Beloje Delo* (Berlin), *Military Archives of the Association for Enlightenment in Military Science* (Belgrade), *The Voice of the Past in Exile* (Paris).

In 1934, the Soviet government surprised the world with a proclamation criticizing education in history. In the wake of the condemnation of most of the exalted leaders in politics, economics, science and art during the first period of the Revolution, nearly the whole literary production of the past fifteen years was declared prejudicial and dangerous. The leader of Marxist

historians, Professor M. N. Pokrovsky, who died in 1932, had been considered the Soviet authority in history. His book, *The History of Russia in Most Concise Form*, had become THE textbook of the Soviet Union. In 1937 he was officially pronounced an enemy of the state. "Despite his wish to be the Bolshevik historian, the anti-marxian, anti-leninist, methodological attitude of Pokrovsky to a number of cardinal problems led to politically dangerous, unscientific, in principle hostile conclusions. . . . Hardly any other sector of the ideological front has been so clogged by our enemies as the historical science."

Schlesinger gives a valuable report of these discussions in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* No. 1-2 (Paris, 1938).

The result of the action was the confiscation of the works of Pokrovsky, Fridland (dean of the faculty at the Moscow University), Lukin (professor of modern history in Moscow), Pionkovsky, Tomsinsky, Dubrovsky, Zelevich, Sef, Vanag and temporarily Eugène Tarlé and many others. A Government Committee accepted a new textbook on the *History of the Soviet Union* by Shestkov. Since 1934, several other history books have been published under the new regulations, and a number of prewar publications have been re-edited. The history of the Russian Revolution was thoroughly revised, especially with regard to the rôle which living and dead actors had played in decisive positions. Therefore, though partly new documents were added, the revised publications have on the whole little scientific value.

Bibliographies

There is no universal exhaustive bibliography of Russian history from the first literary beginnings up to date. The old school of Russian historians have done some fundamental work, the newer schools have contributed many monographs. In general matters, A. G. Mazour gives a valuable report in *An Outline of Modern Russian Historiography* (Berkeley, 1938) with a preface by R. J. Kerner. Useful hints are naturally to be found in the *Cambridge Modern History*, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, the *Great and Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (Russian) in the part "Russian History."

Good material is to be found in *An Encyclopaedia of World History*, edited by Professor W. L. Langer (Boston, 1940), W. Putulov, *Chronological Register of Russian History and USSR 1800-1925* (Russian Leningrad, 1929), M. N. Tichomirov, *Sources for the History of the USSR* (Russian Moscow, 1940), the latter treats in Vol. I the periods until the end of the eighteenth century, in Vol. II the nineteenth century until the nineties. Also recommendable:

A. A. Boroecky, *Bibliography of the History of the Proletariat in the Tsarist Epoch* (Russian Moscow, 1926)

S. Danishevsky, *Attempt of a Bibliography of the October Revolution* (Russian: Moscow, 1926)

M. Dobranicky, *Systematic Register of the Literature of Russian History* (Russian Moscow, 1926)

Eastern European Institute of Breslau, *Eastern European Bibliography*, not quite complete (German: Breslau, 1920-23)

A bibliographical Register, *The Historical Science in Soviet Russia 1917-27* (German: Berlin, 1928) with a preface by my late friend Otto Hoetzsch; *A Systematical and Commented Bibliography of the 1900 Most Important Books and Essays Published Outside of the Soviet Union in the Years 1917-1932 on Bolshevism and USSR* edited by K. Mehnert (German: Berlin, 1933), and the *Special Register 1920-23* of the *Russische Korrespondenz* (German: Berlin, 1923) have been a great help for my earlier studies. A grand outlay planned by the Russian Foreign Archives of the Ministry of External Affairs at Prague for *The Bibliography of the Russian Revolution 1917-1921* (Russian: Prague, 1938), edited by J. Slavik and S. P. Postnikov, was uncompleted on account of the invasion and, though containing only the collection of books owned by the Archives, was well stocked and accurately arranged.

Lenin's place in history accounts for special registers to the *Collected Works: Systematic Bibliography* by V. Bystransky (Russian: Leningrad, 1925) and *Bibliography* (Russian: Moscow, 1935) of the Thirty Volumes Edition.

General Works

The following works of Russian authors are recommended. *History of the Soviet Union*, Vol. I from dawn to the end of eighteenth century, Vol. II: Russia in the nineteenth century (Russian: Moscow, 1939-40), a compilation by the newer Soviet historians with interesting critical notes on the elder school, good maps and bibliographies of the various chapters. Dmitriev, Lebedev, Nechkina, Ssiroiechkovsky and Tichomirov, *Textbook for History of the Soviet Union* (Russian: Moscow, 1939-40), does not give equal value in all parts. V. Kluhevsky, *History of Russia* (New York, 1926), is a classic of the elder Russian School in four substantial volumes. S. Platonov, *Russian History Up to Date*, concluded by Otto Hoetzsch (New York, 1929), gives reliable orientation. M. N. Pokrovsky, the former leader of Bolshevik historians, gives a well-designed pattern of Marxian methods in writing history in *Russian History from the Beginning to the Present* (New York, 1931). G. Vernadsky, *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia* (Boston, 1936), is a first-rate short guide with bibliography. By the same authority the first volume, *Ancient Russia* (New Haven, 1943), has just been published in the plan of *A History of Russia* by G. Vernadsky (Yale) and M. Karpovich (Harvard), which promises to become a monumental standard work of ten volumes.

Of foreign authors there is an even greater number of works to choose from. *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. X, *Russia*, and Vol. XI, *Russia and the Levant*, by S. Askenazy and G. Drage, are out-dated but valuable. Theodor von Bernhardi, *Geschichte Russlands und der Europaischen Politik in den Jahren 1814 bis 1831* (German: Leipzig, 1863), is antiquated but worth reading. Otto Hoetzsch, *Russland* (German: Berlin, 1913), is also a good guide through prewar times. A very valuable standard work is Sir Bernhard Pares' *A History of Russia* (New York, 1926), with an extensive bibliography. Also valuable

is K. Staehlin's *Geschichte Russlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (German. Berlin, 1923-25), four volumes in a broad outline—excellent reading.

Monographs

P. Milukov's *Outlines of Russian Culture* (Philadelphia, 1942), edited by M. Kappovich, is a cardinal work on religion, churches, literature, architecture, painting and music. Th. G. Masaryk, the famous scholar and statesman, presents an important analysis of the Russian problematics in *The Spirit of Russia* (New York, 1919). A. Luther gives a compact study of literature on the political background in *Geschichte der Russischen Literatur* (German. Leipzig, 1924).

A picture of the growth of the modern Russian society reveal

N. Flerovsky (V. V. Bervi) in 1868, *The Predicament of the Working Classes* (Russian. reprinted Moscow, 1938)

N. Lenin, *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Russian: 1899), discussing the evolution of a domestic market for heavy industry.

A. G. Rashin, *The Forming of the Industrial Proletariat* (Russian: Moscow, 1940), a statistical treatise

M. Tugan-Baranovsky, *Geschichte der Russischen Fabrik* (German. Berlin, 1900)

S. Prokovich, *Über die Bedingungen der industriellen Entwicklung Russlands* (German. Tuebingen, 1913)

C. Lehmann and Parvus, *Das hungernde Russland* (German. Stuttgart, 1900), present well-planned studies of a doctor and an economist on the recurrent famines of Tsarist Russia. P. Maslov, *Die Agrarfrage in Russland* (German. Stuttgart, 1907), is one of the outstanding works on the differentiation in the Russian peasantry, whereas Max Sering compares the Russian agrarian problems with other countries in *Die Internationalen Preisbewegungen und die landwirtschaftlichen Bedingungen in nicht-tropischen Ländern* (German. Berlin, 1927).

General Revolutionary Literature

Lenin's *Collected Works* are a requisite for any scholar. Twenty volumes have been edited with valuable historical comments (Moscow, 1923-26), and thirty volumes of a later edition, well documented but annotated from a biased party angle, have been published (Moscow, 1927-33). All foreign editions in English, French and German are incomplete, such as the *Collected Works* (New York, 1927-42), authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute at Moscow.

Still praiseworthy is A. Thun, *Geschichte der revolutionären Bewegung in Russland* (German. Leipzig, 1863), especially the chapter on terrorism. L. Kulczycki, *Geschichte der Russischen Revolution* (German. Gotha, 1910), covers in three volumes the period of the Dekabrist to 1910.

S. Rabinovich, *Zur Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung bis zur Revolution 1905* (German. Berlin, 1914), is a careful study with an introduction on the social-economic structure of Russia. I. Martov (Jul. O. Zederbaum), *The State and the Social Revolution* (New York, 1938), with a supplement for the years after 1908 by Th. Dan, is the history of the Menshevik theory with a large

amount of material. E. Jaroslavsky, *Aus der Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei der Soviet Union (Bolsheviki)* (German Hamburg, 1929-31), gives the official party view with good documentation but in one-sided manner. Another official party historian is A. Bubnov, who wrote the voluminous *All Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviki)* (Russian Moscow, 1930). Part I, which treats of the principal stages of the party history, is interesting. O. Zinoviev, *Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei Russlands* (German Hamburg, 1923, French Paris, 1926), is a good though abbreviated outline of the history of Bolshevism. The historian of the Berlin and Manchester Universities and later of Brooklyn College, Arthur Rosenberg, former member of the Communist faction of the Reichstag, makes a serious attempt to dissect the relations between Comintern and the Russian party in *History of Bolshevism from Marx to the First Five Years Plan* (London, 1934). In W. Gurian, *Bolshevism* (New York, 1932), we find an interesting and valuable treatise of social and political phenomena of Bolshevism, well-arranged documents and register.

Chapter One

An excellent monograph by A. G. Mazour, *The First Russian Revolution* (Berkeley, 1937), gives the origins, development and significance of the Dekabrist uprising, with an extremely careful bibliography and illustrations by old masters. B. Pares, *Reaction and Revolution in Russia* (*Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XII, 1910), is a good guide through the period after 1861. The bibliography which includes the part "The Reform Movement, 1904-1909" gives a survey of the earlier literature of the theme. Worth reading are the pen portraits of the Tsars Alexander I, II, and III (1777-1894) by M. N. Pokrovsky (*Russian Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. II).

Archibald R. Colquhoun, a high British civil servant and later special correspondent of the *London Times*, deals with Russian imperialism in the Far East in *China in Transformation* (New York and London, 1898). K. Popov, *Japan's Economy* (Russian Moscow, 1936), describes in two chapters the first period of the capitalist evolution in Japan (1868-93) and the entry of Japan into the war of the Far East (1894-1905). A profound study by (Major-General Sir) Frederick Maurice, *The Russo-Japanese War* (*Cambridge Modern History* Vol. XII, 1910), and a monograph by O. Haintz, *Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg* (German Berlin, 1937), analyzed the war of 1905 and its literature. The Russian sailor A. S. Novikov-Prboj, *Zussima* (German Zurich, 1935), portrays the mood in the Russian fleet and his experiences in captivity in 1905.

A number of renowned Russians, among them Peter Struve, Prince Eugene Trubeckoj, V. Nabokov, A. Kornilov, A. Amfiteatrov, write on the political, social and economic problems in *Russen über Russland* (German: Frankfurt, 1906). M. N. Pokrovsky examines in *Witte* (*Russian Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. XI) from a Marxian viewpoint the political life of the much discussed statesman who published his own *Memoirs of Count Sergei Y. Witte* with a good introduction by O. Hoetzsch (German Berlin, 1923, New York and Toronto, 1921), an indispensable source of material, to which V. K. Korostovetz adds interesting items from the archives of Prince V. P. Meshchersky in *Graf Witte* (German Berlin, 1929).

Of the extensive biographical literature of the period I recommend V. Figner, *Nacht über Russland* (German Berlin, 1928), V. K. Korostovetz, *Neue Vaeter-Neue Soekne* (German Berlin, 1926), which gives an egregious account of society life before 1900, A. S. Suvorin, *Das Geheimtagebuch* (German Berlin, 1925), on the political and social life around 1900, and S. M. Popper, editor of the *Birshevya Wjedomosti*, "Was nicht in die Zeitung kam" (German Frankfurt, 1929).

Chapter Two

M. S. Miller, *The Economic Development of Russia 1905-1914*, has a very good bibliography of the Russian, English, French and German literature (London, 1926) M. Gordon, *Workers before and after Lenin* (New York, 1941), has digested an immense material in an extensive thesis S. Koehler, *Die Russische Industriearbeiterschaft von 1905-1917* (German Leipzig, 1921), has neatly arranged statistics on industrial development, wages and working conditions, and describes labor and labor unions legislation *Das Proletariat und die Russische Revolution* (German Stuttgart) by A. Chervanin (Menshevist) is worth reading on account of the polemics.

The agrarian sector of the Revolution of 1905 is well presented by N. Karpov in *The Peasant Movement of 1905* (Russian Leningrad, 1925) and by A. Morochovetz, *The Peasant Movement and the Social Democrats in the Epoch of the First Russian Revolution* (Russian Moscow, 1926).

A general presentation of the Revolution of 1905 is given by Lev Trotsky, *The Russian Revolution of 1905* (New York, 1925), where the veteran of 1905 elucidates not only the history and anatomy of the Revolution but his thesis of the "permanent revolution," and by S. N. Bolousov, *Textbook for the History of the First Revolution 1905* (Russian Moscow, 1924). A. Ular, *Die Russische Revolution* (German Berlin, 1905), contains interesting observations on the attitude of the bureaucracy, Theodor Schiemann, *Die Lettische Revolution* (German Berlin, 1907), is interesting despite the prejudicial viewpoint of a Balt K. Ziliacus, *Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Russland und Finnland* (German Munich, 1912), presents a lot of material on the political police, the informer system and the Finnish nationalist movement from the Finnish angle.

An exquisite outline of the Duma history is to be found in A. Lev, *The Second Duma* (New Haven, 1940), a study of the Social Democratic party and the Russian constitutional experiment with a good bibliography. Further material shows S. G. Tomsinsky, *The State Duma* (Russian. *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. XVIII).

As usual, the memoirs of the period are unequal in historical value. *The Diary of the Last Tsar* (French Paris, 1925) covers the period from 1890 to 1906. It is of less political value than *Letters of Wilhelm II to the Tsar 1894-1914* (Paris, 1924). V. Voytinsky, *Der Erste Sturm* (German Berlin, 1931), recalls the personal experiences of a young student and revolutionary during the rise and decline of the Revolution of 1905 Boris Savinkov, a leading Social Revolutionary, describes in *Memoirs of a Terrorist* (New York, 1931) in detail the assassination of Plehve, Grand Duke Sergei, and the unmasking of the informer Azev. Count G. Lamsdorff, *Die Militärbefehlshaber Kaiser W. II's*

am Zarenhofe von 1904 bis 1914 (German: Berlin, 1937), tells the inside stories of the exchange German aide-de-camps attached to the Tsars since the marriage of Tsar Nicholas I to a Prussian princess in the critical years. A. Shapovalov, *Erinnerungen auf dem Wege zum Marxismus* (German: Berlin, 1932), is an interesting document of the life of a revolutionary worker, and O. Piatnicky, *Aufzeichnungen eines Bolschewik aus den Jahren 1896 bis 1917* (German: Berlin, 1930), tells the life story of a professional revolutionary.

Chapter Three

The period after 1907 and the internal problems of Russian labor have been treated by Lenin in essays and articles which have been combined in the volumes of the *Collected Works*. Lenin's and Zinoviev's *Gegen den Strom* (German: Hamburg, 1921; French: Paris, 1923) contains the essays of the years 1914-16 illustrating the reaction of the Bolsheviks to the war. N. N. Popov, *Outline of the History of the Communist Party* (New York, 1934), gives in two volumes a valuable report of party debates during the years of reaction 1906 to 1914. Trotsky's *My Life, an attempt of an Autobiography* (New York, 1930) is a first-rate and firsthand account of the fight between the International and the Russian patriots, of the author's endeavors to unite the two wings of the Socialists in the crucial years and of his work during World War I.

K. Kautsky, *Sozialisten und Krieg* (German: Prague, 1937), is a verbose volume with valuable documentary evidence of the Socialist International attitude toward war. The voluminous work of O. H. Gankin and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and the World War* (Stanford, 1940), is an excellent standard book on the origin of the Comintern with an important chronological appendix 1848-1918, an extensive register and very impressive bibliographical notes.

Essays on "War as Social Problem" by F. Rothstein, "War as a Problem of Armed Fight" by M. Tukhachevsky and "War and Live Force" by S. Budkevich are to be found in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XIII. The official publications of the various Foreign Offices are essential documentations on the origin of World War I (if edited after 1918, as the White Books issued during the war were not in all cases honest statements).

Austria, *Oesterreich-Ungarn und der letzte Krieg* (Vienna, 1930-38), documents published by the Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten

France, *Official Documents* (New York, 1925), published by the French Ministry for External Affairs

Germany, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* (Berlin, 1925-28)

Great Britain, *Papers Respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact* (London, 1924), presented to Parliament

Russia, *The International Relations of the Imperialistic Epoch* (London, 1924)

United States, *Foreign Relations: Russia* (Washington, D. C., 1919)

A. A. Mogilevich and M. S. Asapetian, *On the Road to the World War* (Russian: Moscow, 1940), present the contents of published and unpublished diplomatic documents of the Tsarist and provisional governments and comment on the contradictions in the Franco-German and Anglo-German versions of the start of the First and Second Balkan Wars and World War I. Parker

Thomas Moon of Columbia gives detailed reports on the various stages of international bickering in Asia Minor and the Levant up to 1915 in *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York, 1927). Naturally the memoirs of the leading diplomats of the period contain much supplementary material *My Mission to Russia from the American Embassy April 1916 to November 1918* (New York, *La Russe des Tsars pendant la grande guerre* (Paris, 1922) and *An Ambassador's Memoirs* (New York and London, 1925) by Maurice Paléologue, *Russia from the American Embassy April 1916 to November 1918* (New York, 1922) by David R. Francis, the American Ambassador, *The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame* (London, 1921) by Lady Algernon Lennox, daily impressions of the British Ambassador in Paris, 1913 to 1918, with interesting sidelights on the rôle of Isvolsky. Lt. Colonel Charles à Court Repington reveals the extent of military co-operation in *The First World War* (New York, 1920), M. N. Pokrovsky gives an interesting account of Russia's moves for position before 1914 in *Die Entente* (German: Berlin, 1928), Professor Sydney B. Fay of Harvard publishes his impartial findings in *New Light on the Origin of the World War* (New York, 1921) and *The Origins of the World War* (New York, 1930), Baron M. Taube gives useful hints in *Der grossen Katastrophe entgegen* (German: Berlin, 1929) for studies on Witte, Sazonov and Isvolsky, and the Major General of the Soviet army, former military attaché in Paris before 1914, Count A. A. Ignatiev, contributes interesting sidelights in *Fifty Years in Service* (Russian: Moscow, 1942).

Chapter Four

The Russian material available for the study of the period from World War I to the present time is immense in weight and range but of unequal value for the needs of the historian. Even the evidence of documents of legislation, minutes of proceedings, exchange of letters is often lacking in the fundamental honesty of proof, being tainted and distorted afterwards. The use of memoirs faces similar and additional difficulties. Statesmen and generals, dignitaries of the monarchy and the republic as well as of the Soviet regime present their views and experiences to the public in an unending queue. The vanquished mostly plead as if they were defendants before the forum of history, the victors as if they had to prove the justice of their victories. Truth and fiction are often entangled. It would be unfair to assume that the authors intended to write fiction. But they found it difficult to judge their own part in history from the proper historical viewpoint. Even historians suffer from prejudice, the nearer they are to the time of happenings.

Some of the selected works cover more than this chapter. The principal sources of information also referring to the prewar times are the shorthand records of the Extraordinary Investigation Committee of the Provisional Government, *The Downfall of the Tsarist Regime* (Russian: Moscow, 1924-27). In seven volumes, of more than 3,000 pages, are published the hearings of the former Ministers Protopopov, Stuermer, Chvostov, of the Generals Chabalov, Ivanov, Polivanov and Shubajev, of the Princes Andronikov, Golizin, Volkonsky, of the politicians Maklakov, Cheidse, Guchkov, Milukov and others. Avdeiev, Maksakov, Nedinov, Rjabinsky and Vladirova have compiled in six

volumes of over 2000 pages *The Chronicle of the Revolution* (Russian Moscow, 1923-26)—documents and comments, not always impartial, but very valuable assistance for research. Also useful: *The History of the Civil War* (Russian. Moscow, 1936) by Bubnov, Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Vol. I, from the start of World War I to early October, 1917, and *The Illustrated History of the Russian Revolution 1917* (London, 1928) by Astrov, Slepkov, Thomas.

Memoirs (Russian Berlin, 1922-23) by N. Suchanov, a Menshevik member of the Petrograd Soviet and an excellent observer of men and motives, is one of the best accounts of the Revolution in seven volumes Stalin in *The October Revolution* (New York, 1934) and *October and Trotsky's Theory* (Sidney, 1934) and numerous articles contradicts the accounts given by Lev D. Trotsky in a continuous flow of penmanship. 1917 (Russian Moscow, 1925), Vol. III of the *Collected Works*, of which part was translated by Max Eastman in *History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1936), is a very personal outline of the dynamics of events from July, 1917, to the Second Soviet Congress, refuting the "legends of the bureaucracy" and discussing "October Revolution," "Socialism in One Country" and the "Permanent Revolution."

A. I. Denikin, the White Russian leader in the South, gives a long-winded account of the downfall of monarchy and army, the Kornilov fight and the Civil War in five volumes, *Sketches of the Russian Chaos* (Russian Berlin and Paris, 1921-25), of which a part is translated in *The Russian Turmoil* (London, 1922) and in *The White Army* (London, 1930), under the same author's name. J. E. Hodgson, *With Denikin's Armies* (London, 1932) and A. Soutar, *With Ironside in North Russia* (London, 1940), are records of eyewitnesses in the various theaters of intervention.

The Central Archives in Moscow have edited two documentary volumes: B. Grave, *The Bourgeoisie on the Eve of Revolution February 1917* (Russian: Moscow, 1927), and M. Fleer, *The Labor Movement during the War* (Russian: Moscow, 1925). P. Milukov, *The History of the Second Russian Revolution* (Russian Sofia, 1921-24; German: Vienna, 1920), discusses the contradictions of the Revolution, the fight between the bourgeois and the Socialist parties and the question. Kornilov or Lenin?

The protocols of the *First and Second Soviet Congress* have been published by the Central Archives in Russian (Moscow, 1928 and 1930-31). M. Gaisinsky discusses the All-Russian Peasant Congress in *The Fight of the Bolsheviks in the Peasantry 1917* (Russian. Moscow, 1933); A. Chernov, the renowned peasant leader and Social Revolutionary member of the Kerensky directorate, tells his story in *The Great Russian Revolution* (New Haven, 1936).

Alexander Kerensky himself gives in his *Memoirs* (New York, 1929) proof of the paramount difficulties in keeping Russia in the war and the human qualities of the ill-fated leader of the Russian republic.

I. Minz, *The Provisional Government*, presents the other view of the case in *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XIII Sir Alfred Knox, *With the Russian Army 1914-1919* (London, 1921), comments drily from the sidewalk on the deterioration of the Tsarist regime. J. Lomonosov's *The Russian February Revolution* (German: Munich, 1921) is a sober report of his participation in the Revolution in the difficulties facing the Bolsheviks in the early weeks. S.

Matislavsky, *Five Days* (German: Berlin, 1922), is the vivid life story of an active revolutionary.

Chapter Five

Kremlin propaganda needs were responsible for the retrospect alteration of historic records, either eradications, going to the extent of eliminating whole pages from printed editions, or falsifications. Impartial scrutiny reveals that there was no uniform attitude of the inner Bolshevik circle in the critical moments of party history. There has been an incessant struggle over theory and practical decisions, conforming to Lenin's belief that free discussion would prevent ossification of the party doctrine and Byzantinism.

There was no unity of opinion in October, 1917, whether the time was ripe for the decisive *coup d'état*, what to do at Brest Litovsk, how to create a new army, a new administration and a new economy. The transition from war communism to the N.E.P., from world revolution to "socialism in one country," from soviet system to autocracy was bitterly debated, leading to resignations of Sovnarkom members and to oppositional factions as is natural in every healthy atmosphere of politics. These dissensions were properly recorded and for two decades not contested as truth.

Since 1937, administrative measures have been taken not only to insure for the future the adherence to a strict if changing party line by all publications—a censorship of proportions never achieved by other competitors—but to force a rewriting of history of the revolutionary period. All opponents of the party oligarchy at the Kremlin, such as Bukharin, Kamenev, Radek, Rakovsky, Rykov, Trotsky, Tukhachevsky, Zinoviev and countless others are posthumously suffering misinterpretation and distortion of facts if not pillorying as criminals.

Faced by such unique procedure, it is extremely difficult to use newer recording as historical proof. Documentation of earlier dates deserve at least preference even if newer material is presented as court evidence or personal confession. Care has to be taken on the other hand to prevent prejudice from entering into the choice of Soviet references of other nature.

The fundamental facts of the revolutionary period can be gathered from the collection of protocols in the official editions published by the Communist party *Resolutions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee* (Russian. Moscow, 1932), Part I 1898 to 1924, supplemented by the *Minutes of the Petrograd and All Russian Conference of April 1917* (Russian. Moscow, 1925), *Minutes of the Sixth Congress July-August 1917* (Russian. Moscow, 1934), *The Second and Third Petrograd City Conference July-September 1917* (Russian. Moscow, 1927), *The Seventh Party Conference March 1918* (Russian. Moscow, 1928).

M. N. Pokrovsky, *Studies on the History of the October Revolution* (Russian. Moscow, 1927), is a compilation of essays of members of the Red Professoriate, in parts of doubtful impartiality as written under surveillance, but valuable as material. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1940), is edited by Bertram D. Wolfe from the literary estate of the brilliant Socialist theorist and leader in Poland and Germany. It is instructive

in the criticism of Bolshevism even where her views have been refuted by history (agrarian problems, soviet system).

Valuable material can be found in monographs such as

- A. Aichenwald, *The War Communism* (Russian Moscow, *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XII)
- N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (New York, 1921), popular outline of the Revolution, today of only historic interest
- J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1919* (Stanford, 1934), outstanding catalogue of documents relating to the October Revolution and the following months,
- S. Dubzovsky, *Die Bauernbewegung in der Russischen Revolution* (German: Berlin, 1929), interesting in spite of the uncritical use of Soviet statistics,
- H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia 1919-1923* (Stanford, 1935), very reliable and valuable general economic data and review of the American Relief Administration—Hoover Lend-Lease,
- N. Kakurin, *The Decline of the Russian Army 1917* (Russian Moscow, 1925), reliable documents, well commented,
- Hans Kohn, *Nationalism in The Soviet Union* (London, 1933), a short and excellent outline, with excerpts of official documents,
- L. Kritsman, *Die heroische Periode der Grossen Russischen Revolution* (German Berlin, 1929). This attempts an analysis of the "war communism" but gives far more than the title suggests, not only describing the economic difficulties of the civil war period but very ably analyzing the mechanism of the Revolution

Meller and Pankratova, *The Labor Movement in 1917* (Russian Moscow, 1926), V. Miliutin, *History of the Industrial Development of the USSR 1917-1927* (Russian Moscow, 1928), Pankratova, *The Factory Committee and the Labor Unions in the Revolution* (Russian Moscow, 1926), give good analyses of the parallelism of the two tracks of labor organization *Planwirtschaftliche Versuche der Soviet Union 1917-1927* (German Leipzig, 1929) by F. Pollock, V. Sarabianov, *Economics and Soviet Economy* (Russian Moscow, 1926) and V. P. Timoshenko, *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem* (Stanford, 1932), produce good monographical research.

The literary beautiful book of John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World* (New York, 1919), recommended by Lenin, gives brilliant reflections of the idealist observer, without a profounder analysis of events, which is attempted by the former correspondent of the Manchester *Guardian*, Philips Morgan Price in *My Reminiscences of The Russian Revolution* (London, 1921). Lev Trotsky gives an as usual teeming account of his own participation in "Creating the Russian Communist Army" in *Current History*, Vol. XI (New York, 1919-20) and in *Problems of Revolution* (New York, 1922), with essays on imperialism and revolution, communism and terrorism—an answer to K. Kautsky and the N. E. P. His *Lenin biography* (New York, 1925) should be read besides William C. White, *Lenin* (New York, 1936), and Valeriu Marcu's *Lenin* (London, 1928), the spirited recording of a poet and his friendship with Lenin dating from the Zurich days, written with brilliant penmanship though without scholarly accuracy. V. Viencov and S. Bielcky, *The Red Guards*

(Russian: Moscow, 1924), is a reliable thesis with maps of the early military actions of the Soviets.

L. Kritsman's criticism of Soviet statistics which were used as weapons in the fight for survival is a timely warning. "Our statistical material is deplorable. Its unreliability and sloppiness can often be traced to sheer lack of honesty and is amazing."

Chapter Six

Despite all opposition Lenin persuaded the Soviets to ratify the Treaty of Brest Litovsk as a necessary breathing-time. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, the authority on the War between the States and on disarmament problems between the wars, analyzes in *The Forgotten Peace*—an extensive study in colorful style—the attached documents and contemporary opinions of the peace treaty which did not deserve the name (New York, 1939). T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (New York, 1940), gives an instructive chapter on "war and peace in Marxism" and then traces through a vast material, neatly cited in the appendix with complete tables of all Soviet treaties, agreements, etc., the foreign policy of the Soviets from 1917 to 1939. To the same category belongs A. Upham Pope, *Maxim Litvinov* (New York, 1943), giving the interesting life story of the former corporal in the Russian army who stood the test of endurance in the Narkomindel longer than any other collaborator, more cosmopolitan than the average Bolshevik top ranker. The author is uncritical toward the policy as such. The two volumes of Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London, 1930), lack the scholarly approach but are a good compendium, whereas *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), the autobiography by the same author, adds sidelights on the human problems involved, covering 1921 to 1940 with growing critical insight. M. Lovenstein, *American Opinion of Soviet Russia* (Washington, D. C., 1941), presents an interesting investigation of changes in public opinion illustrated by excerpts of government documents, periodicals, magazines and newspapers during 1917 to 1933. An excellent book of reference is J. Kluchnikov and A. Sabanin, *The International Policy of Modern Times* in treaties, diplomatic correspondence and declarations (Russian. Moscow, 1926), Vol. II from the imperialist war to the suspension of the blockade. F. L. Schuman's *American Policy toward Russia Since 1917* (New York, 1928), is a reliable account of recent difficulties.

Out of the heap of literature on the treaty of Brest Litovsk two publications are more interesting than the average. One is Capitaine Jacques Sadoul, *Notes sur la Revolution Bolschevique* (Paris, 1919). This is a collection of letters written from October, 1917, to January, 1918, by the member of the French Military Mission in Russia to Ministers Albert Thomas and Jean Longuet of the *Populaire*, interesting especially on conversations of Sadoul with Lenin and Trotsky during the critical weeks of Brest Litovsk. The other is the *War Diaries and Other Papers* (London, 1929) by Major General Max Hoffmann, one of the principal figures, giving an honest, untainted picture of the German view. On Rapallo, Count Harry Kessler, *Walter Rathenau* (London, 1929), produces a clean account of proceedings.

On the history of the Red Army and the civil war changes in the official

approach toward historical facts are manifest since 1930, partly in order to extinguish memories of Trotsky as one of the fathers of the Soviet state. A further trend is toward presenting the character of the civil war, the fight against the capitalist and squire class of Russia, more and more as a patriotic war for the sake of the fatherland and nation. The attempt to link up the civil war with 1812 is merely utilitarian and a twisting of historic facts. Documentary evidence of the unchanged and unrevised sources is given in excellent form in J. Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918* (Baltimore, 1936). I. Mintz and N. Kakurin, *The Civil War* (Russian: *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XVIII), makes a lucid exposition with two valuable colored tables and good bibliography. The same volume contains a thesis on civil war in general from the Communist outlook. Interesting in the same way is *The Class War* by M. Tukhachevsky (Russian Moscow, 1921), a collection of essays in which the author generalizes the experiences of Russia and expands them to international scope. J. Thomas, *Illustrated History of the Civil War in Russia 1917-1921* (German. Berlin, 1929), is nearly all documentary material well arranged and without political bias. On the other hand, *Documents for the History of the Civil War in the USSR* (Vol. I, Moscow, 1940) is typical for the new trend in historiography. Edited by I. Minz and E. Gorodecky, this book includes some unknown material, but mostly documents are revised and former comments reversed. The same happened in the widely read compilation *The Civil War in Russia* (Vol. I, Russian Moscow, 1936). The books of N. Kakurin, *How the Revolution Fought*, published by the Military Academy (Russian Moscow, 1925-26, 2 vols.), and *Outline of the Strategy of the Civil War*, are solid academical studies and indispensable for the scholar in matters concerning the civil war. Additional resource can be gained from A. de Lazari, *Tables of the History of the Civil War in Russia* (Russian Moscow, 1926). A collection of essays by S. Kamenev, N. Podvoiny, D. Petrovsky, K. Radek, L. Trotsky, A. Verchovsky and others, *The Red Army* (German Vienna, 1933), presents valuable material but is only of historical interest like Lev Trotsky, *How the Revolution Took to Arms* (Russian Moscow, 1923-25), three volumes in five parts with many maps. S. Gussov, *The Civil War and the Red Army 1918-1924* (Russian. Moscow, 1925) and *Lehren des Buergerkrieges* (German Hamburg, 1923), gives a good description of the stages of the civil war with the clear intention of providing a First Reader for the foreign Communists.

Valuable on special problems

W. C. Bullitt, *The Bullitt Mission to Russia* (New York, 1919), contains interesting observations of the most critical period.

V. Antonov-Ovsejenko, *Notes on the Civil War* (Russian: Moscow, 1924-28, 2 vols.), much material on the early years

The Black Earth (Russian: Charkov, 1925), a collection of essays on entente intervention, and *Die Deutsche Okkupation der Ukraine*, secret documents edited by A. Schlichter (German. Strassburg, 1937)

A. Gukovsky, *The French Intervention in South Russia* (Russian Moscow, 1928)

N. Subatovsky, *The Allies, the Russian Reaction and the Intervention* (Russian. Leningrad, 1926)

Graf Ruediger v. d. Goltz, *Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum* (German. Leipzig, 1920)

V. Boldirov, *Directorate, Kolchak, Intervention* (Russian. Novo-Nikolaevsk, 1925)

Mrs. E. Varneck and H. H. Fisher, *The Testimony of Kolchak and other Siberian Material* (Stanford, 1935), especially interesting on Siberian partisan fights

W. Graves, the American general in charge, *America's Siberian Venture 1918-1920* (New York, 1941)

R. E. Dupny, *Perish by the Sword: The Czech Anabasis and Our supporting Campaigns in North Russia and Siberia 1918-20* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1939)

K. V. Sakharov, *Das Weisse Siberien* (German: Munich, 1925) and *Die Tschechischen Legionen in Siberien* (German: Berlin, 1930)

There is much sensational and dubious literature on the Cheka (Ve.Che Ka) such as creeps up in hectic times and controversial feuds on like matters in all countries where thrillers find big crowds of readers and unscrupulous writers like to cash in.

A good survey on the special police system of the Soviets is in J. Thomas, *Illustrated History of the Civil War*, in a separate chapter which makes use of M. Pokrovsky's thesis, and in two essays by M. Lăcis (Sudrabs), *The Extraordinary Commission for the Combat against the Counter-Revolution* (Russian: Moscow, 1921) and *Two Years' Fight on the Inner Front* (Russian: Moscow, 1920).

Chapter Seven

The literature on the adolescent years of the Soviet Union and the growing pains in planning economy is again unequal in value. The range goes from countless articles and essays in magazines and dailies to voluminous statistics and tables in books and encyclopaedias, difficult to sift from the propaganda riff-raff.

A comparison of official statistics and oppositional publications by Menshevist and Trotskyite experts allows nevertheless a fair if not exact discrimination. A good survey, N. de Basily, *La Russie sous les Soviets* (Paris, 1938), gives twenty years of Bolshevik experience. L. Lawton, *An Economic History of Soviet Russia* (London, 1933, 2 vols.), presents after a too short historical survey an intricate analysis covering the years of planning up to 1931-32. A compendium edited by G. Dobbert, *Die Rote Wirtschaft, Probleme und Tatsachen* (German: Berlin, 1932), tries a cross-cut, partly successful, at its best in H. Jonas, *Organisation der Wirtschaft*, and O. Auhagen, *Die Landwirtschaft*.

Elisha M. Friedman, *Russia in Transition* (New York, 1932), is based on a mass of contemporary original material and newspaper and magazine research, exceedingly well arranged in register and index and a valuable guide through the early years of planning. L. E. Hubbard, *Soviet Labor and Industry* (London, 1942), is an up-to-date, thorough study of literary resources and personal

investigations. The first chapters, on "Causes and Effects," and "Conditions under the Tsar," suffer from historical reminiscences and abbreviation of essential phases. R. H. Knickerbocker, *The Soviet Trade Menace* (New York, 1930), W. H. Chamberlin, *The Soviet Planned Order* (Boston, 1931), Calvin Hoover, *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia* (New York, 1931), Sherwood Eddy, *The Challenge of Russia* (New York, 1931), are among the critical observers of the initiation of the Great Experiment. The official Soviet view is found in Gosplan, *The Soviet Union Looks Ahead* (New York, 1930), and in G. Grunko, *Der Fünf-Jahresplan* (German. Berlin, 1930), with a good order of the genesis of planning and the perspectives of success, which bourgeois criticism discusses in P. Haensel, *Die Wirtschaftspolitik Soviet Russlands* (German Tuebingen, 1930), and B. Brutzkus, *Der Fünfjahresplan und seine Erfuellung* (German Leipzig, 1932). Two essays by O. Schiller, *Die Kollektivbewegung in der Soviet Union* (German. Berlin, 1931) and *Die Landwirtschaftlichen Probleme der Soviet Union* (German Berlin, 1932), P. Liashenko, *Grain Farming* (Russian. Moscow, 1932), give excellent orientation in agrarian problems. Leo Pasvol'sky and H. G. Moulton, *Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction* (New York, 1924), V. Dyachenko, *The Role of Money in the USSR* (Russian. Moscow, 1933), S. Zagorsky, *Wages and Regulations of Labor Conditions in the USSR* (Geneva, 1930, Boston, 1931), I. M. Budish and S. S. Shipman, *Soviet Foreign Trade* (New York, 1931), present special problems with firm reason and impartiality.

A. Yugov published a good survey of the Soviet "general line" with interesting critical remarks of an honest Socialist in *Fünfjahresplan* (German. Berlin, 1931) with an appraisal by Th. Dan. Other publications of the same author were *Economic Trends in Soviet Russia* (New York, 1930), a critical study, *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace* (New York, 1942), with a wealth of facts and figures, a very fair account of the highs and lows in the three Plans and an intelligent estimation of statistical material and contemporary literature. Latest material was reported at the conference of the Russian Economic Institute *USSR Economy and War* (New York, 1943), whereas John Scott's *Behind the Urals* (New York, 1942) is the best available information on the Siberian steel and coal empire.

Chapter Eight

There is no history of the Comintern available which could introduce impartiality into the intricate pattern of interrelations between the Russian Bolshevik party and the foreign branches in various national disguises. The large amount of literary material spread over the world in nearly every language is mostly biased and does not stand up before scholarly scrutiny. In V. Serge, *Russia Twenty Years After* (New York, 1937), are readable critical remarks on the changes in Russian politics since Lenin's death. George Chicherin's *Two Years of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1920) covers only 1917-1919 on a score of pages. Joseph Davies' *Mission to Moscow* (New York, 1942) is an ambassadorial account of impressions gained in the critical years. D. J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1930-1942*, is a profound compilation of mostly official statements well arranged, though not always critical and scholarly.

On the Red Army there is a large amount of amateur reportage with little material worth sifting. N. Basseches, *The Unknown Army* (New York, 1943), and Sergei Kournakoff, *Russia's Fighting Forces* (New York, 1942), are worth reading but neither the former correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* nor the former White Guard officer, who fought in the South and recanted some years ago, are careful enough in the use of official material handed out for publication. The *Foreign Affairs*, New York, the *Revue Militaire*, Paris, the *Militärwochenblatt*, 1918 to 1939, Berlin, and the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, 1937-1939, have been used for expert control data.

The trials which shook the world and ended with the radical liquidation of the most active fighters of the October Revolution and all followers of the Old Guard have also yielded voluminous papers. Trotsky, the principal defendant in absentia, has written during the last decade of his life full of resentment. But all his literary work is based on an extremely profound knowledge of facts. *Arbeiterstaat, Thermidor und Bonapartismus* (German: Paris, s.d.) is a warning on historical and theoretical grounds. *Soviet Economy in Danger* (New York, 1933) and *Verratene Revolution* (German: Antwerp, 1936) give valuable critical material on the questions of socialism and state, family, culture and youth, the growth of inequality which allows an answer to the sorrowful question of the author 'Whither Soviet Union?' The trials have been reported on in two official publications (shorthand) *Prozessbericht ueber die Strafsache des sovietfeindlichen trotzkistischen Zentrums* (German: Moscow, 1937) contains the accusations and the testimonies of Piatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and others. *Der Prozessbericht ueber die Strafsache des antisovietistischen Blocks der Rechten und Trotzkisten* (German: Moscow, 1938) refers to Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, Krestinsky, Rakovsky, Grinko and others. Only short newspaper reports are available on the secret trial of Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eidemann, Putna. Stalin gave his judgment in many articles and speeches, not yet collected, and in the books *Leninism* (New York, 1928), *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow* (Moscow, 1939), *Marxism and the National Question* (New York, 1942), *Joseph Stalin's Credo* (New York, 1940). Trotsky answered in *Stalins Verbrechen* (German: Zurich, 1937) with an analysis, and his son, L. Sedow, investigates the indictment of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others by pointing to countless contradictions in *Rotbuch ueber den Moskauer Prozess* (German: Antwerp, s.d.). Collected counter-material gives *The Case of Leon Trotsky* (New York, 1937) by a Preliminary Commission of Enquiry under the chairmanship of John Dewey.

Valuable material on the problems of the structure and importance of the Orthodox Church can be found in A. Fortescue, *The Eastern Orthodox Church* (London, 1907), S. N. Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church* (New York, 1935) and Timashev, *Religion in Soviet Russia 1917-1942*, a conscientious survey by the Fordham professor. E. Jaroslavsky, *Die Gottlosenbewegung in der Soviet Union* (German: Moscow, 1934), gives a short outline of the Godless movement which under the Stalin Constitution still enjoys the privilege of a monopoly in agitation. On the changes in the views on morality read V.

Svetlov, *Marriage and Family under Capitalism and Socialism* (Russian: Moscow, 1939, and Famina W. Halle, *Woman in Russia* (New York, 1932).

Chapter Nine

For a forecast of future spiritual development a study of the classics of Dostoevsky, Turgenev and L. Tolstoi is essential. Contemporary authors such as Count Alexei Tolstoi, Mikhail Sholokhov and Voyetekhov give additional characteristics of the people's mind apart from official versions. O. Spengler's *Russian Pseudomorphosis* (Vol. II, *Decline of the Occident*) elucidates the "un stomachached exposition of Russia to Western ideas," the "rudimentary culture" reacting violently against the influx from the West, René Fulop-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism* (London, 1927), and the prolific writings of Nikolai Berdiaev, *The Russian Revolution* (London, 1931), *The Origin of Communism* (London, 1937), *Solitude and Society* (London, 1938), *Spirit and Reality* (London, 1939), bring emphatic counter-arguments against the success of materialism in Soviet Russia.

Chapter Ten

Bruce C. Scopper of Harvard, a shrewd observer gave forecasts in *Pan-Sovietism* (Boston, N. Y., 1931), and in *What Russia Intends* (London, 1931), and supplemented them in *Foreign Affairs* 1940 *How Much Can and Will Russia Aid Germany?*

Boris Souvarine, *Staline, Aperçu historique du Bolshevisme* (Paris, 1935), with a voluminous bibliography is a not unbiased life story of Stalin by an old friend of Trotsky, giving some orientation on present-day Soviet Russia. Stalin defends his policy vigorously in *The War of National Liberation* (New York, 1942). From John Scott, *Duel for Europe, Stalin vs. Hitler* (Boston, 1942), Larry Lesueur, *Twelve Months that Changed the World* (New York, 1943), Henry Cassidy, *Moscow Dateline* (New York, 1943), to the old-timers Maurice Hindus, Louis Bryant, Lincoln Steffens, Frazier Hunt, William A. Rhys and Walter Duranty, a galaxy of flourishing pens has been at work to sketch impressions of the Kremlin and the Supreme Commander. The list of best sellers in this field is topped by Wendell Willkie, *One World*, and Eve Cune, the brilliant daughter of eminent parents with *Journey Among Warriors*.

INDEX

- Abdul Hamid (1876-1918), last Sultan of Turkey, deposed by National Assembly, 1909, 81
- Adler, Victor (1852-1918), Austrian Socialist, 13
- Aehrenthal, Lexa Count von (1854-1912), Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister 1906-1912, 55
- Agricola, German military commentator, 224
- Akulov, Soviet attorney-general, 168
- Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, Russian war lord thirteenth century, 31, 248
- Alexander I (1777-1825), 1, 80, 214
- Alexander II (1818-1881), 2, 37
- Alexander III (1845-1891), 4
- Alexeev, M. V., Russian general, Chief of General Staff under Nicholas II and Kerensky, White Army leader, 72, 76, 81, 84, 103, 110, 111, 113, 147
- Alix Feodorovna, Princess of Hesse, Empress of Russia (Tsarina), 62, 63, 71
- Andronikov, Prince, 63
- Antonov-Ovsejenko, V. A., Russian revolutionary, Soviet envoy Prague 1925, 124
- Artzibashev, M. P., Russian author of *Szarin* (1907), 43
- Avenarius, R. (1843-1896), German philosopher, 48
- Axelrod, P. B., co-founder of Russian Socialist Party 1883, Menshevist, 68
- Azev, police agent and leader of Russian Social Revolutionary Party, 43
- Badjamev, Tibetan witch doctor, 4
- Bagratuni, Russian general, 116
- Baranov, Tsarist, later Soviet general, 219
- Barnes, Russian scientist, 188
- Barthou, J. L. (1862-1934), French politician and author, Prime Minister 1913, Minister of Interior 1934, assassinated beside King Alexander of Yugoslavia, Marseilles 1934, 147, 148
- Batu Khan (1201-1255), grandson of Djenghis Khan, Mongol war lord, conquered Russia and Balkan countries 1235-1246, 258
- Bebel, August (1840-1913) leading German socialist, 68
- Beliaiev, Russian general, Minister of War 1906, 83
- Berling, Polish colonel, Soviet general, leader of Kosciuszko Division, 263
- Bernstein, Eduard (1850-1932), German socialist and founder of Revisionism, author of *Theory and History of Socialism*, 39
- Bertie, Sir Francis, later Lord of Thame, 1912-1918 British ambassador in Paris, 161
- Besobranov, Russian official, 8
- Bessonov, Soviet diplomat, 231
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Baron Theobald (1856-1921), German Chancellor 1909-1917, 65, 92
- Bickersteth, J. Bourgon, Warden of Hart House, U. of Toronto, since 1942 Director of Education, British War Office, 220
- Bismarck, Otto, Prince (1815-1898), German Chancellor, 6, 54, 174
- Bizenko, A. A., Russian social revolutionary, member of Soviet delegation to Brest-Litovsk, 108
- Blackett Sir Basil, British representative of Treasury, 148
- Blagoiev, Bulgarian student, socialist, 38
- Bloch, Joseph, German economist, 47
- Blum, Léon (1876-), leader of French Socialists, Prime Minister (1935-1937) Front Populaire, 211, 212
- Bock Fedor von, Nazi fieldmarshal, 246

- Bogdanov, Russian socialist, 48
 Bolozov, Russian squire, 30
 Borodin, M. (Grusenbergh), Bolshevik adviser in China 1925-1927, editor of *Moscow News*, 211
 Borodin, N., Russian political writer, 64
 Bratianu, Jon (1864-1927), Roumanian Liberal politician and Minister of State, 103
 Bredichin, Russian sailor, 26
 Brennan, Gerard, American political writer, 212
 Briand, Aristide (1862-1932), French statesman, 147, 224
 Broide, Menshevist, member of Russian Production Board 1917, 87
 Bruening, H. Dr. (1885-), economist, German Chancellor and Foreign Minister 1930-1932, professor at Harvard, 210, 224
 Brussilov, A. A. (1853-1926), Russian general 1914-1917, army commander, under Kerensky, supreme commander, chief adviser of Red Army 1920, 73, 81, 101, 111, 113, 114, 158, 218
 Bubnov, member of Central Committee Bolshevik Party, 21
 Buchan, John, Baron Tweedsmuir (1875-1940), author, novelist, Governor General of Canada, 211
 Buchanan, Sir George W., British diplomat, ambassador in Russia 1916, 66, 78
 Budjenny, S. M., sergeant in World War I, champion rider of Tsarist Army, military leader in civil war, Marshal of Soviet Union 1941, 149, 151, 158, 159, 160, 218
 Bukharin, N. J., leading Bolshevik, publicist, member of Soviet executives and Comintern, liquidated 1937, 144, 146, 177, 226, 228, 232, 233
 Bulak-Balakhovich, Tsarist officer, leader of White partisans, 160
 Bulazev, Russian lawyer and writer, 79
 Bulgakov, N., Russian socialist, later orthodox theologian and professor in Paris, 38, 47
 Bullitt, W. C., American diplomat, ambassador in Moscow 1933-1936, ambassador in Paris 1936-1940, 155
 Burdikov, Tsarist court official, 63
 Burzev, Russian publisher, 116
 Buygin, A. G., Russian Minister of Interior 1905, 16
 Caballero, L., Spanish Republican, Loyalist Prime Minister 1937, 211
 Camapanella, Th. (1568-1639), Italian philosopher, author of utopian novel *Civitas Solis*, 269
 Carlyle, Thomas (1795-1881), Scottish historian, author of *Heroes and Hero Worship*, *Frederick the Great*, 248, 268
 Carnot, L. N. (1753-1825), military engineer, organizer of "levée en masse" and revolutionary armies in French Revolution, 150
 Chabalov, Russian general, 88
 Chamberlain, Joseph (1836-1914), industrialist, British statesman, father of Sir Austen and Neville Chamberlain, 53
 Chamberlin, W. H., American author and journalist, 255
 Checheglovitov, Russian Minister of Justice 1914, 53, 62
 Cheidse, leader of Menshevist Duma deputies 1917, 63, 86
 Chelnokov, mayor of Moscow, 81
 Chernichevsky, N. G. (1828-1889), Russian socialist and author, 37, 70
 Chernomasov, editor of Bolshevik *Pravda*, as police agent, 43
 Chernov, V. M., co-founder of Russian Social Revolutionary Party, Minister of Agriculture 1917, 105, 135
 Chiang Kai-shek (1887-), leader of Chinese National Party Ko Min Tang, president and generalissimo of Chinese Republic, 211
 Chichakhov, Russian admiral 1905, 16
 Chicherin, G. V. (1877-1936), Russian diplomat, since 1904 Bolshevik, Commissar of Foreign Affairs 1918-1930, 147, 148, 150, 155
 Christie, Walter A., American tank specialist, inventor, 222

- Chrystalov-Nozar, lawyer, Menshevik chairman of St. Petersburg Soviet, 22
- Chuchnin, Russian admiral, 11
- Cieplak, Polish Catholic Archbishop, executed Easter 1925, 237
- Cimourdain, former priest and revolutionary leader in French Revolution, immortalized by Victor Hugo 1793, 242
- Clausewitz, Karl von (1780-1831), author of standard work *On War*, 221, 223, 224, 245
- Cole, G. D., British writer, 263
- Colquhoun, Archibald, British civil servant, correspondent of London *Times* in China 1898-1901, 7
- Condorcet, M. J. (1743-1794), French revolutionary and author, 232
- Conrad, Baron von Hoetzendorf (1852-1917), Austrian chief of general staff, 54
- Coulaincourt, Count de, Napoleon I's Master of Horse, diarist, 249
- Curie, Eve, 235, 244, 250
- Czernin, Ottokar, Count, Baron von und zu Chudenitz (1872-1932), Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister 1916-1918, 142
- Dan, Th., Menshevik historian, 45, 46
- Danilov, J., Quartermaster General of Russian Army 1914-17, 77, 81
- Danton, G. J. (1759-1794), lawyer, leader in French Revolution, 119
- Darwin, Charles (1809-1882), 271
- Daumier, French cartoonist of nineteenth century, 88
- Dawson, Christopher, 268
- Dean, Vera Michels, 263
- Déat, French fascist, 213
- Delbrueck, Hans, (1848-1929), German historian, author of *History of Military Science*, 60
- De Maestre, Sardinian Minister at St. Petersburg, 49
- Denikin, A., Russian general, Tsarist army commander, leader of White army in southern Russia 1918-1920, 101, 103, 129, 152, 154, 156, 157, 158
- Deterding, Sir Henry, Dutch oil magnate, 272
- Diamandi, Roumanian diplomat, 101
- Dí Castillo, Johannes de, Jesuit philosopher, 169
- Dimitri, Pavlovich, Russian grand duke, 81
- Dimitrov, G., Bulgarian communist, secretary general of Comintern, 217
- Djenghis Khan (1162-1227), Mongol war lord and ruler of Asia and Russia, 258
- Doriot, Jacques, former French communist, later fascist and Nazi collaborator, 213
- Dostoevsky, Fedor (1821-1881), Russian author, condemned to death for revolutionary activities, 1849, paroled after Siberian exile, later Pan Slavist, 2, 6, 59, 241, 243, 268
- Dowbor-Musnicki, Russian general, 1917 leader of Polish Volunteers, 114
- Djugashvili, Josip V *see* Stalin
- Dubassov, F. V., Russian admiral, governor general of Moscow, 1905, 27
- Dubrovín, leader of "True-born Russians," 35
- Dukhonin, N. N., Russian general, 117, 128, 129
- Durnovo, P. N., Russian police chief, 1905-06 Minister of Interior, 61, 62
- Dutov, A. J., Cossack ataman, 114
- Dyachenkov, V., Soviet economist, 200
- Dziershinski, Felix E. (1877-1926), Polish revolutionary, head of Bolshevik state police (Cheka), Commissar for Transportation, 1921, chairman of Soviets for Economy, 1924, 121, 145, 226
- Edward VII, (1841-1910), 54
- Eichhorn, H. von, German field-marshal, 147
- Eisenstein, Serge, Russian film producer, 24
- Engels, Friedrich (1820-1895), co-founder of scientific socialism, 40, 47, 48
- Enver Pasha (1882-1922), leader of Young Turk revolution 1909, Minister of War and generalissimo in Turkey, 1914, 262

- Erzberger, Mathias, German politician and cabinet minister, 92
- Evert, Russian general and army commander 1917, 73
- Fisher, Baron, British First Sea Lord 1904-1910, 1914-15, 54
- Flandin, Pierre Etienne, French politician and cabinet minister, 224
- Foch, Ferdinand (1851-1929), 158
- Francis Ferdinand, Austrian archduke and heir apparent, 64
- Franco, 211
- Fredericks, Baron, Russian minister of the Court, 34, 62
- Frunze, M. V., Bolshevik leader, Commissar of Defense, 156
- Fuller, J. F. C., British general, tank expert, military author, 222
- Gapon, G. A., 12, 13
- Gaulle, Charles de, 222
- Gauss, 148
- Gebhard, Hannes, professor and founder of co-operative Finnish organizations, 256
- Gerasimov, Tsarist police chief, 22, 29
- Goebbels, Joseph, Dr., 166, 217
- Goering, Hermann, 217, 230
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749-1832), 271
- Gogol, Nikolaus (1809-1852), 174
- Goldschmidt, H., 188
- Golikov, captain of cruiser *Potemkin*, 24
- Gortchakov, A. Prince (1798-1883), Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 1866-1882, 6
- Goremykin, J. L. (1839-1883), Russian Minister of Interior and Prime Minister, 34, 78
- Gorky, Maxim (1869-1938), 26, 48, 120
- Graves, W. S., American general, chief of U. S. expeditionary force in Siberia 1918, 152
- Grey, Sir Edward, Viscount, British Foreign Secretary 1905-1916, 55
- Gribovich, 60
- Grimm, Robert, 69
- Grinko, G. F., 200
- Grosdev, 87
- Grumbach, Salomon, 149
- Guchkov, A. J., leader of Octobrists in Duma, president of Third Duma, Minister of War in Kerensky government, 52, 71, 81, 90, 95
- Gurko (1825-1901), Russian fieldmarshal, army commander in Russo-Turkish War, 77
- Haldane, Lord R. B. (1856-1928), 58
- Harrison, A., 158
- Hartvig, Russian minister at Belgrade, Pan Slavist, 263
- Hegel, George Friedrich (1770-1831), 48
- Helferich, Karl (1872-1924), German economist, Vice-Chancellor and ambassador at Moscow 1918, 147
- Helena, Princess of Montenegro, Queen of Italy, 62
- Herzenstein (1877-1942), Russian Duma deputy, 30
- Hilferding, Rudolf, Dr., Austrian physician, leading German socialist and author, Minister of Finance 1929, 148
- Himmler, H., 168
- Hindus, Maurice, Russian-American author, 238
- Hitler, Adolf, 165, 175, 211-213, 215-217, 223, 230, 243, 261, 263, 272
- Hobbes Thomas (1588-1679), 165
- Hoffmann, Max, German general, Chief of Staff eastern front 1917-1918, delegate at Brest-Litovsk, 142, 144
- Homer, 164
- Hoover, Herbert, 253
- Huguet, French major, military attaché London, 64
- Ignatiev, Count, Russian military attaché in Paris 1917, Soviet military commentator, 63, 218
- Ironside, Edmund, Baron, British fieldmarshal, 154, 155
- Isvolsky, A. P. (1856-1919), Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassador in Paris, 54, 55, 56, 161

- Jakovleva, V. N., Bolshevik, 98
 Janukovsky, Tsarist, later Soviet general, 219
 Joffé, A. (1883-1927), Bolshevik, Soviet envoy at Berlin, Vienna, Tokyo, 143, 147, 148, 210, 227
 Joffre, J. J. C. (1852-1931), Marshal of France, French generalissimo 1914-16, 65
 Jollos, Russian Duma deputy, 30
 Judson, W. V., 143
 Junkers, 222
 Kaganovich, Lazar M., Bolshevik, Commissar for Transportation, railroad organizer, brother-in-law of Stalin, 126, 224
 Kaledin, A. M., Russian general, White army leader, 114
 Kalinin, Mikhail, Speaker of the Soviet Union, 235, 243
 Kalnoky, Count (1832-1898), Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister 1881-1896, 54
 Kamenov, A., Bolshevik, member of the Party executive, liquidated 1937, 48, 69, 92, 119-121, 124, 142, 147, 159, 226, 228
 Kamenev, S. S., Tsarist staff colonel, Soviet Army chief, 218
 Kamkov, social revolutionary, 108
 Karakhan, L. M., Bolshevik, Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, ambassador in China, liquidated 1937, 231
 Kautsky, Karl (1854-1937), German socialist, author, 49, 68
 Kerensky, Alexander F. (1881-), Duma leader of Trudoviki, Minister of Justice, of War, and Prime Minister 1917, chairman of directorate of Russian Republic until October 1917, 61, 82, 86, 89, 95-97, 99-105, 108, 110-113, 116, 117, 122-125, 28, 134, 218, 234, 241
 Kirov, S. M., Bolshevik, secretary of Leningrad party, assassinated 1935, 157, 168
 Kishkin, N. M., member of the Kerensky directorate, 1917, 102
 Kjellén, Rudolf (1864-1922), Swedish historian and geographer, 60
 Knox, Sir Alfred, British major general, observer in Russia 1914-18, 151
 Kokovzov, V. N., Count, Russian Prime Minister 1911-14, 52, 53, 60, 62
 Kolchak, A. V., Russian Admiral, White Russian dictator in Siberia, delivered by Czechs to Soviets, executed 1920, 152, 156
 Kollontai, Alexandra M., Bolshevik, Soviet ambassador to Sweden, 98, 124, 146
 Komissarskaja, Russian actress, 51
 Konar (alias Polechuk), Polish agent, assistant commissar of agriculture, 168
 Kononov, A. J., Russian industrialist, Minister of Commerce, 71, 80
 Korvinichenko, Russian general, 110
 Kork, Tsarist Colonel, Soviet general, liquidated 1937, 219
 Kornilov, L. G. (1870-1918), Russian general and leader of counter revolution 1917, 94, 95, 101, 104, 109, 110, 112-114, 129
 Kossuth, Lajos (1802-1894), leader of Hungarian Revolution 1848-49, 214
 Krasnov, P., Russian general, White Army leader, 102, 152
 Krassin, L. B., engineer and economist, Soviet ambassador in Paris and London, 147
 Krestinsky, N. N., Soviet Commissar of Finance, ambassador in Berlin, assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, liquidated 1937, 146, 231
 Krivoshein, Russian Minister of Agriculture 1917, 76
 Kropotkin, Peter A. Prince (1842-1921), 38
 Krupskaja, Natalie K. (1869-1937), wife of Lenin, 69, 226
 Krylenko, N. V., Bolshevik, Commander-in-Chief of Red Army, 1918, later Public Prosecutor of Soviet Union, 96, 124, 129
 Krymov, A. M., Russian general, 81, 102, 103
 Kshezinska, 92
 Kuehlmann, Richard, von, (1873-), German diplomat, Foreign Minister 1917-18, 142, 143, 144

- Kun, Bela, leader of Hungarian Communist Republic 1919, later member of Comintern, 212
- Kudashev, Prince, Russian diplomat, 76
- Kurlov, Russian general, 78
- Kuropatkin, A. N., Russian general 1898-1904, Minister of War, 7, 11, 59
- Kutozov, M. J. (1745-1813) Russian Commander-in-Chief during the war against Napoleon, 248
- Kuusinen, O. W., Finnish communist, 263
- Kuybyshev, V. V., Bolshevik, Soviet economist, 156
- Lazis, M. J. (Sudrabs), Bolshevik, Lithuanian revolutionary 1905, 129
- Legras, Professor of Dijon, 151
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich Ulanov (1870-1924), Founder of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet Union and the Communist International; first President of the Council of People's Commissars, 23, 27, 28, 38-40, 44, 45, 47, 48, 68-70, 83, 90-95, 98, 99, 104, 105, 107, 108, 115, 117-124, 126, 127, 131, 133, 134, 136-149, 154, 162, 164, 168, 170-174, 178, 180, 184, 193-195, 219, 225, 229, 232, 234, 237-239, 241, 243, 249, 257, 268, 279
- Leo XIII, Pope (1878-1903), 165
- Levisky, Russian general, 117
- Liman von Sanders, Oswald, Chief of the German military mission to Turkey in 1913 and Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army in the First World War, 58
- Lippmann, Walter, 264
- Litvinov, Maxim (Meier Wallach) 1930-1939 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, later ambassador in Washington, 1943, recalled as Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 149, 155
- Lloyd George, British statesman, Prime Minister 1916-1922, 79, 148, 155, 158, 159
- Lockhardt, Bruce, 155
- Lomov, Bolshevik, Member of Central Committee, 145
- London, Jack, 174
- Low, David, 88
- Ludendorff, Erich, Russian general, Acting Chief of General Staff 1916-1918, 92
- Ludwig, Emil, 230
- Lukomski, Russian general of the White Army, 129
- Lunacharsky, A. V., Bolshevik author and educator, People's Commissar for Education 1917-1929, 47, 48, 98, 124, 129
- Luxemburg, Rosa (1871-1919), Marxist theorist, author, leader of Polish and German Socialists, co-founder of Spartakus League in Germany 1918-19, 40, 68
- Lvov, Prince, Liberal Duma leader, Prime Minister, 81, 89, 99, 102, 134
- Lyssenko, Professor, Soviet scientist, 175
- Mach, Ernst (1938-1916), Austrian scientist and philosopher, 48
- Machiavelli, Niccolo (1469-1527), Florentine historian, 242
- Machaisky, J., Russian anarchist, 39
- Mackensen, August von, Prussian fieldmarshal in World War I, 77
- Mackinder, Sir Harold, British historian and geographer, 60, 258
- Machno, N. J., Russian anarchist, 158
- Mahan, A. T. (1840-1914), American admiral and naval historian, author of *The Influence of Sea-power on History*, 258
- Malenkov, Soviet economist, 206
- Malinovsky, Bolshevik Duma deputy and Tsarist police agent, 43
- Malnovsky, R. Soviet general and army commander, 246
- Maltzan, Ago, Baron (1871-1927), German diplomat, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs 1922-1925, 148
- Manikovsky, Russian general 1917, 86
- Manus, Russian financier, 63
- Marcu, Valeriu (1898-1942), author of monographies on Lenin, Machiavelli, Scharnhorst, friend of Lenin, 83
- Maritain, Jacques (1882-), 269
- Mark Twain (1835-1910), 174
- Martov, L. (Cederblum), Menshevik leader and author, 39, 66, 124

- Marty, Andre, French Communist, 69, 161
- Martynov, A. S., Menshevist, later Bolshevik author, 39
- Marx, Karl (1818-1883), 28, 37, 38, 44-47, 118, 119, 165, 174, 239, 268
- Maslov, P., socialist theorist and author, 107
- Maruchenko, Russian sailor, leader of *Potemkin* mutiny 1905, 25, 26
- Mendelev, D. J. (1834-1907), Russian scientist, 119
- Metaxas, Greek general and dictator, 212
- Metternich, Clemens W. L., Prince (1773-1859), Austrian statesman, Foreign Minister 1809-1821, Chancellor 1821-1848, 214
- Michael, Grand Duke, brother of last Tsar Nicholas II, 85
- Mikhailovich, Drazh Y., 263
- Miliukov, Paul, Professor, Russian Cadet, Duma deputy, Foreign Minister 1917, 52, 67, 80, 86, 89, 93, 95, 103, 113
- Miliza Princess of Montenegro, Russian Grand duchess, 62
- Millerand, Alexandre (1859-), French Socialist, President of French Republic 1920-1924, 159
- Millsbaugh, Dr., American economist and financial adviser to the Iranian Government, 264
- Min, G. A., Russian general, 145
- Mirbach, Count, German ambassador to Soviets, assassinated 1918 by Social Revolutionaries, 146, 147, 228
- Mirofanov, Russian historian, 59
- Mironov, Soviet official in Narkomindel, 231
- Missel, French general, 145
- Molotov, Vyacheslav M. (Skjabin), (1890-), Bolshevik, Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 121, 164, 184
- Moltke, Helmut Count von (1848-1916), Prussian colonel general, Chief of General Staff 1914, 67
- More, Sir Thomas, (Morus, 1478-1535), English statesman, Catholic humanist, Lord Chancellor of Henry VIII, executed, sanctified, 1886. author of *Utopia*, 269
- Morrison, Herbert St., British Labor M. P., Home Secretary, 213
- Moses, 244
- Muralov, N. J., Bolshevik, Red Army leader, 218
- Mussolini, Benito (1883-), 175, 211, 212, 217, 243, 272
- Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus (1756-1796), 149
- Nadolny, R., German diplomat, 147
- Nakrazov, Russian Duma Deputy, cadet, 85
- Napoleon I, Bonaparte (1769-1821), Emperor of France, 1, 75, 221, 223, 243, 244, 248, 249, 250, 265
- Nathanson, M. A. (Bobrov), Russian social revolutionary, 108
- Nechaev, S. G., Russian revolutionary, 40
- Nepanin, Russian vice-admiral, 85
- Nicholas I (1796-1855), Emperor of Russia, 25
- Nicholas II (1868-1918), Emperor of Russia, last Tsar, 5, 53, 54, 55, 62, 80, 81, 112
- Niedermayer, Dr. Prof von, German general, 223
- Nikita, Prince (1841-1921), later King of Montenegro, 62
- Nikitin, Russian Minister of the Interior, 1917, 116, 130
- Nikolai, Nikolajewich (1856-1926) Grand Duke, Commander-in-chief of the Russian Army 1914-1915, 62, 70, 72, 76, 81
- Novikov, A., 19
- Novikoff, A., Soviet general, Chief of Air Force, 246
- Orkhanidze, G. K., 45
- Pahlen, A. F., Count, Russian Privy Councillor 1905, 16
- Pahlen, R. V., Count, Russian cavalry general 1812, 221

- Paléologue, Maurice, French ambassador Petrograd 1913-1917, 66
- Palycin, Prince, Russian Prime Minister 1917, 85
- Parvus-Helphand, German socialist, 92
- Patek, S. Polish diplomat, 158
- Pavlov, Soviet scientist, 175
- Peter I, the Great (1672-1725), Emperor of Russia, 114, 244, 248, 259, 260
- Peter Nikolaievich, Russian Grand duke, 62
- Petlura, S. V., Ukrainian socialist, member of directorate, 151
- Petrasky, Russian revolutionary, 2
- Petrachistky, leader of Duma Cadets, 33
- Piatakov, G. L., Bolshevik, Red Army leader, 146
- Pietri, French politician and cabinet minister, 224
- Pilsudski, Joseph (1875-1932), organizer of Polish Legion in World War I, Chief of State and First Marshal of Poland, 158, 261, 263
- Pisarev, Russian novelist, 174
- Pius XI (1922-1939), 271
- Platten, F., Swiss socialist, later communist, 92
- Plekhanov, G. V. (1856-1918), Russian socialist and theorist, 32, 38, 39, 47, 68, 104, 232
- Plehve, V. K., Russian Minister of Interior, 15
- Pobiedonoszev, K. P. (1827-1907), Procurator General of Russian Holy Synod, 4
- Podvoysky, P., 129
- Poincaré, Raymond (1860-1934), French statesman, President of the French Republic 1914, 55, 63, 147
- Pokrovsky, M. N., Bolshevik historian, 56
- Polivanov, Russian general, Minister of War, 78, 86
- Polkovnikov, Russian general, 116
- Polovzov, Russian Privy Councillor 1905, 16
- Pompadour, Marquise de (1721-1765), 169
- Popov, M., Soviet General, 246
- Proskian, Russian Left social revolutionary, 108
- Protopopov, A. D., Russian industrialist, Duma deputy, Minister of Interior, 79
- Pugachev, E. J. (1744-1775), peasant leader, 14
- Purishkevich, V. M., Russian Duma deputy, 81
- Pushkin, Alexander S. (1799-1837), Russian poet, 174, 177, 243
- Rachja, I. A., Bolshevik organizer of Finnish Red Guards, 124
- Radek, Karl (Sobelsohn), pen name Parabellum, Struthahn, Austrian, active German social-democrat 1904-1912, Soviet press agent Berlin 1918, member of Bolshevik Party executive 1920-24, exiled 1927-29, jailed 1937, 137, 146, 210, 226, 232
- Rakovsky, Chr. G., Bulgarian communist, Roumanian citizen, member of Sovkarnom 1917-1925, Soviet envoy London and Paris 1924-27; liquidated 1937, 148
- Ramchivili, I. I., Georgian Menshevik, 32
- Rasputin, Grigori, Russian orthodox monk, Court adviser, 63, 72, 78, 79
- Rathenau, Walter, German minister of Foreign Affairs 1922, 148
- Ratzel, F. (1844-1904), German geographer, founder of anthropogeography, 258
- Razin, Stenka, 1668, peasant leader in Russia, 252
- Rehevsky, Liberal Duma deputy, 86
- Repington, Charles C., Lieutenant Colonel, military correspondent, London *Times*, 64
- Rjabushinsky, P. P., Russian industrialist, 100
- Rjasanov, D. B., Bolshevik, author and publisher, 124
- Robespierre, M. de (1758-1794), leader of Gironde in French Revolution, terrorist, 240
- Robins, Raymond, 143, 154
- Rodsianko, Mikhail V., president of Russian Duma, 76, 80, 84, 111

- Rokossovsky, K., Soviet general and army commander, 246
- Romanovsky, Russian general and White army leader, 129
- Roosevelt, Theodore (1858-1919), 14
- Rosen, Baroness, 63
- Rosenberg, Alfred, Nazi author, 263
- Rothschild, Edmond, Baron de, 70
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712-1778), 271
- Rozdhestvensky, S., Russian admiral, 14
- Rundstedt, Gerd von, Nazi field-marshal, 245
- Russell, Bertrand, Earl, 118
- Russky, Russian general and army commander 1917, 73, 81
- Rutenberg, P. M., Russian engineer, industrialist in Palestine, 13
- Rydz-Smidly, Polish Commander-in-chief 1939, 158
- Rykov, Bolshevik, Soviet Prime Minister 1924-1930, liquidated 1937, 124, 226, 228, 232
- Saadi, Muscheriff Ed Din (1184-1291), Persian poet and philosopher, author of *Boustán* and *Goulistan*, 166
- Sabler, V. K., Procurator General of Russian Holy Synod, 53
- Sadoul, 145
- Salesky, member of Petrograd Soviet, 87
- Salisbury, Marquess of, R. A. Cecil (1830-1903), British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, 53
- Saslavsky, founder of Russian Workers League, 37
- Sazonov, S. (1860-1927), Russian Foreign Minister, 55, 58
- Schacht, Hjalmar, Dr., German banker and president of Reichsbank, Member of Hitler Government since 1935, 201, 204
- Scheidemann, Philipp (1863-1936), German socialist, chancellor 1919, 92
- Schelling, Ernst von (1775-1854), German philosopher, 49
- Schlieffen, A. Count (1833-1913), Prussian fieldmarshal, Chief of General Staff, 245
- Schmidt, P. P., Russian naval lieutenant, 26
- Schneider, Russian Left social revolutionary, 108
- Seeckt, Hans von (1836-1937), German colonel general, organizer of Reichswehr, 262
- Sergei, A., 16
- Sergei, Patriarch of Greek Orthodox Church under Soviet rule, 238
- Shakespeare, William (1564-1616), 174
- Shaposhnikov, B., Tsarist colonel, Soviet marshal, 225
- Sheng Shi-Tsai, Chinese Governor General of Sinkiang, 264
- Shidlovsky, leader of Duma Octobrists, 80
- Shulinsky, Russian general, Chief of General Staff 1914, 60
- Shingarev, A. I., Duma deputy, Minister of Finance and Agriculture 1917, 82
- Shlapnikov, A. G., Bolshevik, 83
- Sholokhov, Mikhail, Russian author, 161, 247
- Sikorski, orthodox Bishop of Vladimir, founder of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 238
- Simon, Sir John, Viscount, British Cabinet minister, 148
- Sinclair, Upton, 174
- Sipjagin, D. S., Russian Minister of Interior, 15
- Skobelev, M. D., Russian general in Russo-Turkish war, 63
- Skoblin, Soviet general, 224
- Skoropadsky, P. P., Russian guards general, Hetman of Ukraine 1917, 71
- Slepkov, A., Bolshevik author, 29
- Silkansky, E. M., Russian physician, Bolshevik, 150
- Sokolnikov, G. A., Bolshevik, member of Central Committee, liquidated 1937, 121, 143, 145, 200, 228, 232
- Sokolovsky, Soviet general, 246

- Speransky M. M. (1772-1839), First Minister of the Tsar, 1, 4
- Spindonova, M. A. Russian social revolutionary, 108
- Sperry, Willard Learoyd, Rev., 270
- Stalin (Djugashvili), Prime Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union, Supreme Commander of Forces, 45, 121, 127, 144, 154, 156, 157, 164-168, 172, 173, 193-207, 211, 214-216, 224, 226, 227-232, 235, 240-246, 248-250, 266, 267
- Standley, W. H., 217
- Steffens, Lincoln, American observer in Russia 1917-18, 152
- Stichinsky, Russian Privy Councillor, 29
- Stolypin, Peter A. (1862-1911), Russian Prime Minister, promoter of land reform, 34-36, 42, 51, 250
- Stresemann, Wolfgang, German statesman, Chancellor and Foreign Minister, 147
- Struve, Peter B., Russian socialist, later right radical, 38, 52
- Stuermer, Boris V. (1848-1917), Russian Prime Minister, 78-80
- Suchomlinov, V. A. (1848-1926), Russian general, Minister of War, 60
- Suvarov, A. V. (1729-1800), Russian fieldmarshal, 248
- Sverdlov, Bolshevik, member of Central Committee, 121, 145
- Tarlé, Eugene, 220
- Terechenko, M. I., Russian industrialist, Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs 1917, 81, 115
- Tikhon, Patriarch of Russian Orthodox Church during Kerensky regime, 234, 237
- Timoshenko, Soviet marshal, 160
- Timor, 247
- Tumenev, 35
- Tiutiunik, White Russian guerrilla leader, 160
- Tkachev, Russian socialist, 40
- Togo, 14
- Tolbukhin, F., Soviet general, 247
- Tolstoi, Alexei N., Count, Russian novelist, 160
- Tolstoi, Leo N., Count (1828-1910), 51, 172, 177
- Tomsky, M. P., Bolshevik, labor union leader, liquidated 1936, 43, 228
- Trepov, D. M., Governor General of St. Petersburg, 15, 80
- Treviranus, G. G., tutor of Friedrich Engels, pastor at Bremen, 48
- Triandofilov, Soviet general, liquidated 1937, 225
- Trotsky, Lev D. (1879-1940), Menshevik, later Bolshevik and revolutionary leader 1905 and 1917, organizer of Red Army, author, exiled from Russia 1928, 22, 23, 27, 39, 50, 68, 69, 91, 98, 108, 109, 121-125, 127, 129, 133, 142-145, 150-152, 156, 157, 159, 167, 168, 217, 219, 225-230, 242, 243
- Trubeckoi, I. N., Prince, Russian publicist, 10
- Tugan-Baranovsky, Russian economist, 38, 64, 109
- Tukhachevsky, M. N. (1893-1937), Tsarist lieutenant, Soviet Army commander 1918, Marshal, Chief of General Staff, author, 156, 158, 159, 219, 220, 223-225, 239, 244, 245
- Turgenev, Ivan S. (1818-1883), 37, 174
- Uberevich Tsarist colonel, Soviet general, 219
- Uritsky, M. S., Menshevik, 140, 145-147
- Uvarov, Russian historian, 2
- Vasilevsky, A. N., Soviet general, Chief of General Staff, 246
- Vasilevska, Wanda, leader of Polish Patriots in Soviet Russia, wife of Soviet diplomat, 263
- Vatutin, Soviet general and army commander, 225
- Verkhovsky, A. I., Russian Minister of War in Kerensky government, 117
- Viviani, R. (1862-1925), French socialist, Prime Minister of the French Republic, 63
- Volodarsky, W., Bolshevik, Commissar for Propaganda, 140

- Voronoff, A., Soviet general, 246
 Voronzov-Dashkov, I. I., Count, Russian governor general in Caucasus, 76
 Voroshilov, marshal of Soviet Union, former Commissar of Defense, 154, 246
 Voyetekhov, Boris, Russian novelist, 247
 Warburg, Max, German banker and economist, 79
 Weizer, Commissar of Foreign Trade 1931-32, 192
 Wells, H. G., 242
 Wesley, John (1703-1791), English religious reformer, founder of Methodist Church, 242, 268
 Weygand, Maxime, French general, Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch 1918, 159
 Wheeler-Bennett, John, British author, 147
 Wilhelm II (1859-1942), Emperor of Germany 1888-1918, 53
 Williams, Albert R., 199
 Willkie, Wendell, 164, 173, 178, 264
 Wilson, Woodrow (1856-1924), President of U. S. 1916-1924, 143, 155, 158, 161
 Wise, E. F., British diplomat, 148
 Witte, Serge, Count (1849-1915), Russian Finance and Prime Minister, 8, 14, 16, 18, 29-31, 33, 57, 254
 Wrangel, P. N. Baron (1877-1928), Russian general, leader of White Southern Army, 157, 159, 180
 Yakoda, Genrich, Bolshevik, Chief of G. P. U., 168, 228
 Yegorov, A. J., Soviet general, Chief of General Staff, liquidated 1937, 159, 160, 225
 Yezhov, Chief of G. P. U., 169
 Yudenich, Nikolai, Russian general, leader of White Northwestern Army, 152, 156
 Yugov, A., Menshevik author and economist, 196, 208
 Yussupoff, Felix, Prince, slayer of Rasputin, 81
 Zasulich, Vera, Russian terrorist, 15
 Zavich, Russian Duma deputy, Octobrist, 86
 Zavin, Russian industrialist, oil expert, 106
 Zinoviev, Grigori E., Bolshevik, close friend of Lenin, chairman of Comintern, liquidated 1936, 45, 49, 69, 90, 98, 119-121, 124, 135, 145, 210, 226, 228
 Zubatov, S. V., Tsarist police chief, 12